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  • 1
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    The social costs of media feeding frenzies (2001)
    Bingley : Emerald
    International journal of social economics 28 (2001), S. 742-751 
    Details
    ISSN: 0306-8293
    Quelle: Emerald Fulltext Archive Database 1994-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Concern over the cost of excessive media coverage has increased in recent years. This paper offers an explanation of excessive coverage as an application of the tragedy of the commons, resulting from a lack of property rights over a story. News organizations consider only their private costs in covering a story, not the external costs of lower quality of overall coverage and invasion of privacy. However, restricting access to a story can also facilitate censorship. This paper consider means of limiting access which do not compromise journalistic freedom, specifically examining the parallel to tradeable discharge permits in environmental economics.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/EUM0000000005691
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
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  • 2
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Constitutional politics within the interest-group model (1995)
    Springer
    Constitutional political economy 6 (1995), S. 127-137 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-9966
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Abstract I examine constitutional politics using the interest-group model of politics. Constitutional economics argues that rent seeking is inevitable in majoritarian democracy and genuine reform is possible only at the constitutional level. By implication the constitutional equilibrium must differ from the political equilibrium. I examine reasons that such a difference might exist but find weak prospects for a general-interest victory over the special interest in constitutional politics. Although implicit constitutional change (for example, through Supreme Court reinterpretation) and explicit violation are substitute means of altering the constitution, the former dominates the latter. This suggests that a third factor participates in constitutional politics in addition to the general and special interests, which is support for the Constitution itself. Effective rules to restrain rent seeking need to ensure the congruence of the constitutional and general interests.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01303253
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
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  • 3
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Enforcing Constitutional Constraints (1997)
    Springer
    Constitutional political economy 8 (1997), S. 139-150 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-9966
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Abstract I examine the enforcement of constitutional constraintson government. Citizens must be able to identify and prevent(or correct) observed violations of the constitution to successfullyenforce constraints. Identification requires specialized knowledgenecessitating employment of experts in constitutional law. Collectiveaction and coordination problems can also plague constitutionalenforcement efforts. I argue that judicial review is a relativelyefficient enforcement mechanism which substantially mitigatesthese problems.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1009064425503
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
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  • 4
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Calculation of Self-Interest and Constitutional Consensus: The Role of Ideology (1998)
    Springer
    Constitutional political economy 9 (1998), S. 323-333 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-9966
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Abstract Constitutional political economy's veil of uncertainty prevents citizens from identifying their specific interests under political rules and facilitates agreement on rules by moving all individuals to an “average” position. But the calculation of self-interest in such settings is not straight-forward; citizens require a model of how the economy works to predict the effect of rules on welfare. Political ideologies typically supply such models. Citizens subscribing to different ideological models anticipate differential treatment under a given constitutional rule, breaking down the ability of the veil of uncertainty to achieve consensus. Constitutional consensus is unlikely in the absence of ideological consensus.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1009043420573
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
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  • 5
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    The Efficiency Gains from Deregulation (1997)
    Springer
    Journal of regulatory economics 12 (1997), S. 81-89 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-0468
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Abstract We analyze the efficiency gains from deregulating monopolies using an equilibrium rent seeking model. McCormick, Shughart and Tollison (1984) argue that the initial effort to establish regulation dissipates the monopoly profit, limiting the gain from deregulation to the efficiency cost of monopoly. We establish conditions under which this proposition holds; in particular, the initial rent seekers must fail to anticipate the possibility of deregulation. Additionally, through application of the standard rent seeking model, we establish that the potential welfare gains exceed the cost of achieving deregulation. Our results provide support for policies aimed at eliminating monopoly and other types of economic distortion.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1007961904088
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
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  • 6
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Mark S. Rosentraub, Major League Losers: The Real Cost of Sports and Who's Paying for It (1998)
    Springer
    Journal of cultural economics 22 (1998), S. 65-67 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-6997
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Kunstgeschichte , Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1007433615566
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
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  • 7
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    When are stable rights to rents bad? (1999)
    Springer
    Public choice 98 (1999), S. 29-41 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Abstract Stable, enforceable property rights over resources normally furthers economic efficiency. I argue that stable rights to government created rents and wealth transfers, by contrast, generate inefficiency. Secure rights to receive transfers increases rent-seekers' incentive to make political investments creating new transfers. I demonstrate the point using a two period rent-seeking game. Contestable transfers reduce the probability of establishing a transfer program and aggregate rent-seeking expenditures. Strengthening transfer recipients' rights increases the difficulty of eliminating a transfer program.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1026452214108
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
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  • 8
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    The Costs of Cooperation (1999)
    Springer
    The review of Austrian economics 12 (1999), S. 161-173 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7128
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Abstract Public goods production is not necessarily desirable and involves higher costs than is often recognized. Specifically, public goods production may require that a small minority of individuals can collude at the expense of others or impose strategic sanctions on non-contributors. These facilities may have negative as well as positive effects. The same conditions that support public goods production also support business cartels and racial discrimination, for instance. We examine the implications of this perspective for modern debates on economic policy, civic virtue, communitarianism, and libertarianism.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1007864125523
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
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  • 9
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Enhancing Efficiency or Crying over Spilled Milk: The Benefits of Reform (2000)
    Springer
    Public choice 105 (2000), S. 23-40 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Abstract We analyze the welfare gains from the reform of existinggovernment-induced distortions. Our results provide support forpolicies aimed at eliminating monopoly and other types of economicdistortion. Welfare gains over the status quo exist wheneverderegulation occurs. The threat of deregulation can induce amonopoly or cartel to modify its behavior, so a reform policy canprove beneficial even if reform does not actually occur. Optimalpolicy with commitment in fact allows a monopoly to deterderegulation. The possibility of reregulation does not reverse ourresults; the per period welfare gain from reform remainsundiminished.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1005104732244
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
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  • 10
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Randolph Sloof, Game-Theoretic Models of the Political Influence of Interest Groups (2000)
    Springer
    Public choice 105 (2000), S. 195-197 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Quelle: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1005299030176
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