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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Pricing To Signal Product Line Quality (1992)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 1 (1992), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper offers a general characterization of the optimal product line prices for a monopolist whose quality of products is initially unknown to consumers. In the focal equilibrium, a monopolist signals a high-quality product line by pricing as if quality were known to be high, but costs of production were higher than they truly are. In a rich set of environments, this characterization implies that the prices of all products are initially distorted upward, with the price distortion being largest for products with the most inelastic demands and/or quality-sensitive production costs. These implications yield predictions for the time path of prices flint are broadly consistent with evidence from the marketing literature. The multidimensional signaling problem is made tractable by the satisfaction of a very simple and powerful single crossing property.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00151.x
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Advertising as Information: Matching Products to Buyers (1993)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 2 (1993), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We consider communication of quality via cheap talk and dissipative advertising expenditures, when consumers have heterogeneous tastes for quality, and price information must be acquired through costly search. For search pods, cheap talk communicates quality when fixed costs are roughly constant across quality levels, while if fixed costs vary greatly with quality, then firms having the higher fixed-cost quality level use dissipative advertising. For experience goods, quality can be communicated by cheap talk in a range where low-quality firms have greater fixed costs, and low-quality firms use dissipative advertising if their fixed costs are greater still.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1993.00199.x
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A Modelof Competitive Limit Pricing (1992)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 1 (1992), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper offers a new theory of limit pricing. Incumbents from different markets or regions “compete” against one another, with each attempting to price in a manner that deflects entry into the others' markets. An entrant is imperfectly informed as to the incumbents' respective investments in cost reduction and seeks to enter markets in which incumbents have high costs. In a focal equilibrium, the entrant uses a simple “comparison strategy,” in which it enters only the highest-priced markets, and incumbents engage in limit-pricing behavior. The influence on pricing of the number of markets and the scope of entry is also reported. Throughout, the central feature of the analysis is that an incumbent's price affects its investment incentives, with lower prices being complementary to greater investment.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00585.x
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Protection and the Business Cycle (2003)
    Berkeley, Calif. : Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
    Advances in economic analysis & policy 3.2003, 1, art3 
    Details
    ISSN: 1538-0637
    Source: Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Empirical studies have repeatedly documented the countercyclical nature of trade barriers. In this paper, we propose a simple theoretical framework that is consistent with this and other empirical regularities in the relationship between protection and the business cycle. Focusing on self-enforcing trade agreements, we find theoretical support for countercyclical movements in protection levels. The fast growth in trade volume that is associated with a boom phase facilitates the maintenance of more liberal trade policies than can be sustained during a recession phase in which growth is slow. We also find that acyclic increases in the level of trade volume give rise to protection, implying that whether rising imports are met with greater liberalization or increased protection depends on whether they are part of a cyclic upward trend in trade volume or an acyclic increase in import levels.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/advances/vol3/iss1/art3
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  • 5
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    Multilateral Trade Bargaining: A First Look at the GATT Bargaining Records (2020)
    American Economic Association
    Details
    Publication Date: 2020-07-01
    Description: This paper empirically examines recently declassified tariff bargaining data from the GATT/WTO. Focusing on the Torquay Round (1950–1951), we document stylized facts about these interconnected high-stakes international negotiations that suggest a lack of strategic behavior among the participating governments and an important multilateral element to the bilateral bargains. We suggest that these features can be understood as emerging from a tariff bargaining forum that emphasizes the GATT pillars of MFN and multilateral reciprocity, and we offer evidence that the relaxation of strict bilateral reciprocity facilitated by the GATT multilateral bargaining forum was important to the success of the GATT approach. (JEL C78, F13)
    Print ISSN: 1945-7782
    Electronic ISSN: 1945-7790
    Topics: Economics
    Published by American Economic Association
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  • 6
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    Advertising Collusion in Retail Markets (2010)
    De Gruyter
    Details
    Publication Date: 2010-08-03
    Description: We analyze non-price advertising by retail firms, when the firms are privately informed about their respective costs of production. In a static advertising game, an advertising equilibrium exists in which lower-cost firms select higher advertising levels. In this equilibrium, informed consumers rationally employ an advertising search rule in which they buy from the highest-advertising firm since lower-cost firms also select lower prices. In a repeated advertising game, colluding firms face a trade-off: the use of advertising can promote productive efficiency, but only if sufficient current or future advertising expenses are incurred. At one extreme, if firms pool at zero advertising, they sacrifice productive efficiency but also eliminate current and future advertising expenses. Focusing on symmetric perfect public equilibria for the repeated advertising game, we establish conditions under which optimal collusion entails pooling at zero advertising. More generally, full or partial pooling is observed in optimal collusion. Such collusive agreements reduce consumer welfare, since they restrict informed consumers' ability to locate the lowest available price in the market.
    Electronic ISSN: 1935-1682
    Topics: Economics
    Published by De Gruyter
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  • 7
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    Advertising Competition in Retail Markets (2010)
    De Gruyter
    Details
    Publication Date: 2010-08-03
    Description: We consider non-price advertising by retail firms that are privately informed as to their respective production costs. We construct an advertising equilibrium in which informed consumers use an advertising search rule whereby they buy from the highest-advertising firm. Consumers are rational in using the advertising search rule since the lowest-cost firm advertises the most and also selects the lowest price. Even though the advertising equilibrium facilitates productive efficiency, we establish conditions under which firms enjoy higher expected profit when advertising is banned. Consumer welfare falls in this case, however. Under free entry, social surplus is higher when advertising is allowed. In addition, we consider a benchmark model of price competition; we provide comparative-statics results with respect to the number of informed consumers, the number of firms and the distribution of costs; and we consider the possibility of sequential search.
    Electronic ISSN: 1935-1682
    Topics: Economics
    Published by De Gruyter
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  • 8
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    Is Everything Neutral? (1988)
    University of Chicago Press
    Details
    Publication Date: 1988-04-01
    Print ISSN: 0022-3808
    Electronic ISSN: 1537-534X
    Topics: Economics
    Published by University of Chicago Press
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  • 9
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    What Do Trade Negotiators Negotiate About? Empirical Evidence from the World Trade Organization (2011)
    American Economic Association
    Details
    Publication Date: 2011-06-01
    Description: According to the terms-of-trade theory, governments use trade agreements to escape from a terms-of-trade-driven prisoner's dilemma. We use the terms-of-trade theory to develop a relationship that predicts negotiated tariff levels on the basis of pre-negotiation data: tariffs, import volumes and prices, and trade elasticities. We then confront this predicted relationship with data on the outcomes of tariff negotiations associated with the accession of new members to the World Trade Organization. We find strong and robust support for the central predictions of the terms-of-trade theory in the observed pattern of negotiated tariff cuts. (JEL F11, F13)
    Print ISSN: 0002-8282
    Electronic ISSN: 1944-7981
    Topics: Economics
    Published by American Economic Association
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  • 10
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    An Economic Theory of GATT (1999)
    American Economic Association
    Details
    Publication Date: 1999-03-01
    Description: We propose a unified theoretical framework within which to interpret and evaluate the foundational principles of GATT. Working within a general equilibrium trade model, we represent government preferences in a way that is consistent with national income maximization but also allows for the possibility of distributional concerns as emphasized in leading political-economy models. Using this general framework, we establish that GATT's principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination can be viewed as simple rules that assist governments in their effort to implement efficient trade agreements. From this perspective, we argue that preferential agreements undermine GATT's ability to deliver efficient multilateral outcomes. (JEL F02, F13, F15)
    Print ISSN: 0002-8282
    Electronic ISSN: 1944-7981
    Topics: Economics
    Published by American Economic Association
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