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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The design of rent-seeking competitions (1988)
    Springer
    Public choice 56 (1988), S. 17-29 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract In the standard Tullock model of rent-seeking as a noncooperative game, aggregate expenditures by seekers can equal, exceed, or fall short of total rents depending on what is assumed about the number of seekers and the marginal return to a seeker's investment. If the supply of an input into the rent-seeking process is controlled by a politician who receives payment from seekers for it, the indeterminacy of the process becomes a less serious problem. He supplies it and designs the rent-seeking game to maximize his wealth. The author derives expressions for the number of seekers and the marginal return parameter which maximize the politician's wealth in one-input and two-input rent-seeking processes.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00052067
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