Electronic Resource
Springer
Public choice
104 (2000), S. 81-120
ISSN:
1573-7101
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Economics
Notes:
Abstract This paper investigates the choice of an interestgroup between lobbying (``words'') and pressure(``actions'') in order to influence a policymaker. Both lobbying and pressure are modeled asstrategic means of transmitting information that isrelevant to the policymaker. However, only pressure isdirectly costly to the policymaker. The interactionbetween the interest group and the policymaker isframed as a repeated signaling game. In equilibriumpressure – in contrast to lobbying – only occurswhen the interest group's reputation is sufficientlylow, and always improves its reputation. It is shownthat (repeated) lobbying cannot completely substitutefor pressure, and that the interest group may beforced to sustain its reputation through lobbying. Weconclude that pressure is typically used to build upa reputation, lobbying to maintain a reputation.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1005139726166
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