ALBERT

All Library Books, journals and Electronic Records Telegrafenberg

Your email was sent successfully. Check your inbox.

An error occurred while sending the email. Please try again.

Proceed reservation?

Export
  • 1
    Monograph available for loan
    Monograph available for loan
    Cambridge : Cambridge University Press
    Call number: PIK M 490-19-92440
    Type of Medium: Monograph available for loan
    Pages: xiii, 341 Seiten , Diagramme , 24 cm
    ISBN: 9781107172661 , 9781316624791
    Language: English
    Note: Contents: 1. Introduction and examples ; 2. Mechanism design basics ; 3. Myerson's Lemma ; 4. Algorithmic mechanism design 34 ; 5. Revenue-maximizing auctions ; 6. Simple near-optimal auctions ; 7. Multi-parameter mechanism design ; 8. Spectrum auctions ; 9. Mechanism design with payment constraints ; 10. Kidney exchange and stable matching ; 11. Selfish routing and the price of anarchy ; 12. Network over-provisioning and atomic selfish routing ; 13. Equilibria: definitions, examples, and existence ; 14. Robust price-of-anarchy bounds in smooth games ; 15. Best-case and strong Nash equilibria ; 16. Best-response dynamics ; 17. No-regret dynamics ; 18. Swap regret and the Minimax theorem ; 19. Pure Nash equilibria and PLS-completeness ; 20. Mixed Nash equilibria and PPAD-completeness.
    Branch Library: PIK Library
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
Close ⊗
This website uses cookies and the analysis tool Matomo. More information can be found here...