ALBERT

Anmerkung: Contents: Intro -- Foreword -- Preface -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Part I -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- 1.1 Themes, Approach and Structure of the Book -- 1.1.1 Methodology and Approach -- 1.1.2 Structure and Themes -- References -- Chapter 2: Political Coalitions in Agricultural and Food Policies -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Value Chains and Political Coalitions -- 2.2.1 Consumers -- 2.2.2 Landowners -- 2.2.3 Environmental Concerns -- 2.2.4 International Interests -- 2.2.5 Globalization of Value Chains and New International Coalitions -- 2.2.6 GM Regulations and Agribusiness -- 2.2.7 An Iron Triangle of Food Aid -- 2.2.8 Food, Feed, and Fuel -- 2.2.9 Insuring Crops or the Insurance Industry? -- 2.2.10 Consumer-Farmer Coalitions -- 2.3 Conclusions -- References -- Chapter 3: Factors Influencing Policy Choices -- 3.1 Income Distribution -- 3.1.1 Relative Income and Loss Aversion -- 3.1.2 Inequality and Ideology -- 3.2 Economic Structure -- 3.3 Deadweight Costs and Transaction Costs -- 3.4 Political Institutions -- 3.4.1 Political Regimes -- 3.4.2 Democratization and Agricultural Policies -- 3.4.3 Bureaucracies and Institutions -- 3.5 Ideology -- 3.6 Political Organization -- 3.7 Information -- 3.7.1 The Rationally Ignorant Voter -- 3.7.2 Mass Media -- 3.7.3 The Bad News Hypothesis -- 3.7.4 Information and Policy Instrument Choice -- 3.8 Crises -- 3.9 International Institutions -- 3.10 Conclusion -- References -- Part II -- Chapter 4: The Development Paradox -- 4.1 Economic Growth, Restructuring, and Political Incentives -- 4.1.1 Information Costs -- 4.1.2 Political Organization -- 4.1.3 Political Reforms -- 4.2 Development and Policy Combinations -- References -- Chapter 5: Anti-Trade Bias and the Political Economy of Instrument Choice -- 5.1 Anti-Trade Bias -- 5.2 Political Economy of Instrument Choice 5.3 Instrument Choice, Trade, and International Institutions -- References -- Chapter 6: Development Paradox and Anti-Trade Bias Revisited? -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 Reform and Decline of Agricultural Taxation in Poor Countries 1980-2010 -- 6.2.1 Economic Growth: The Development Paradox at Work -- 6.2.2 Political Reforms and Mass Media -- 6.2.3 Structural-Adjustment Programs and Policy Conditionality -- 6.2.4 Summary -- 6.3 Reform of Agricultural Subsidies in Rich Countries -- 6.3.1 The WTO and Policy Reforms -- References -- Chapter 7: Policy Reform in History: Europe, the USA, and China -- 7.1 Introduction -- 7.2 Europe -- 7.2.1 Free Trade in Europe -- 7.2.2 The Agricultural Crisis of the Late Nineteenth Century -- 7.2.3 The Growth of Agricultural Protection in the Mid-­Twentieth Century -- 7.2.4 The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) -- 7.2.5 A Perfect Storm -- 7.3 USA -- 7.3.1 The Emergence of the Farm Bills -- 7.3.2 Political Coalitions in the Farm Bill -- 7.3.3 Persistence and Policy Reforms -- 7.3.4 Recoupling Through Crop Insurance and Biofuels -- 7.4 China -- 7.4.1 Political Changes, Grassroots Pressure, and Agricultural Reform -- 7.4.2 The World's Largest Agricultural Subsidy Program -- References -- Part III -- Chapter 8: Food Price Volatility -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Benefits and Costs of Price Stabilization -- 8.2.1 Balancing Volatility and Distortions -- 8.3 Trading-off Volatility and Distortions? Empirical Observations -- 8.4 Food Politics with Price Volatility -- References -- Chapter 9: Crises, Media, and Agricultural Development Policy -- 9.1 Introduction -- 9.2 The Right Price of Food -- 9.2.1 Some Basic Principles -- 9.3 Communications on Price Effects on Poverty and Food Security -- 9.4 The Market for Communication, Mass Media, and Donor Funding -- 9.4.1 Communication Incentives -- 9.4.2 Mass Media and Social Media 9.5 Food Prices and Development Policy Priorities and Funding -- 9.6 Bad News and Good Policies? -- References -- Chapter 10: Food Standards -- 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 Efficiency and Equity Effects -- 10.3 Government Decision-Making on Standards -- 10.4 Development and Pro-Standard and Anti-­Standard Coalitions -- 10.5 Standards and Trade -- 10.6 The Persistence of Standards: Dynamic Political Economics -- 10.7 Trade and Political Dynamics -- References -- Chapter 11: Public Investments in Agricultural and Food Research -- 11.1 Introduction -- 11.2 Spillover Effects of Public Research -- 11.3 Distributional Effects of Public Research Investment -- 11.4 Economic Development and Research Investment -- 11.5 Trade and the Impacts of Public Research -- 11.6 Interactions with Other Policies -- References -- Chapter 12: Land and Institutional Reforms -- 12.1 Introduction -- 12.2 Political Reforms and Land Reforms: Lessons from Early Twentieth-Century Western Europe -- 12.2.1 Efficiency of Land Rental and Sales Markets -- 12.2.2 A Political Economy Answer to the Puzzle -- 12.2.3 Political Reforms in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries and Land Tenure Reforms -- 12.2.4 Tenure Reform Patterns -- 12.3 Political Changes and Institutional Reforms: Lessons from East Asia and Eastern Europe in the Late Twentieth Century -- 12.3.1 Leadership Change, Reforms, and Legitimacy of the Political System in China -- 12.3.2 Economic Reforms and Political Collapse in Eastern Europe -- 12.3.3 Grassroots Pressure and Leadership Support for Reforms -- 12.4 Historical Legacies and Land Reforms -- 12.4.1 Transfer Landownership or Use Rights? -- 12.4.2 Transfer Land to the Current Users or Previous Owners? -- 12.4.3 In-Kind Versus Share Distribution of Land? -- 12.5 Conclusions: Political Regime Change and Grassroots Pressure -- References -- Chapter 13: Policy Interactions 13.1 Introduction -- 13.2 Economic Interaction Effects -- 13.3 Political Interaction Effects: Compensation -- 13.4 An Illustration of EIEs and PIES -- 13.4.1 Interactions of Public Agricultural Research Investment and Commodity Policies -- 13.4.2 EIEs with Fixed Commodity Policy -- 13.4.3 EIEs with Endogenous Commodity Policy -- 13.4.4 Politically Optimal PARI with Commodity Policy -- 13.4.5 Economic Development and Endogenous Research and Commodity Policies -- 13.5 Institutions and Credible Compensation -- 13.5.1 Compensation, Enforcement, and Institutions -- References -- Index