Publication Date:
2013-09-12
Description:
At least in some cases, the values confronted in legal decision-making appear to be incommensurable. Some legal theorists resist incommensurability because they fear that this presents an overwhelming obstacle to rational decision-making. By offering a close analysis of proportionality and, more particularly, measures of proportional value satisfaction, I show that this fear is unfounded. Comparative measures of proportional value satisfaction do not require the values to be commensurable. However, assuming incommensurability presents us with the problem of public significance in the proportional satisfaction of values. When two values are commensurable, this public significance is provided by the mediating effects of the overarching third value that provides the common measure of the values. However, when this common measure is removed, then the public significance of value satisfaction must be otherwise achieved. This is why I propose an equal proportional value satisfaction as the most appropriate proportionality maximand. Under equal proportional value satisfaction, the proportional satisfaction of any one value has significance for each and every other value. This kind of public significance is interpersonal rather than impersonal (or second-personal rather than third-personal). The article then shows that the legal process that is most appropriate to equal proportionality is a process that implements defeasible legal rules.
Print ISSN:
1470-8396
Electronic ISSN:
1470-840X
Topics:
Mathematics
,
Law
