Publication Date:
2019
Description:
〈p〉Publication date: Available online 5 August 2019〈/p〉
〈p〉〈b〉Source:〈/b〉 European Journal of Operational Research〈/p〉
〈p〉Author(s): Kai A. Konrad〈/p〉
〈h5〉Abstract〈/h5〉
〈div〉〈p〉This paper studies the attack-and-defence game between a web user and a whole set of players over this user’s ‘valuable secrets.’ The number and type of these valuable secrets are the user’s private information. Attempts to tap information as well as privacy protection are costly. The multiplicity of secrets is of strategic value for the holders of these secrets. Users with few secrets keep their secrets private with some probability, even though they do not protect them. Users with many secrets protect their secrets at a cost that is smaller than the value of the secrets protected. The analysis also accounts for multiple redundant information channels with cost asymmetries, relating the analysis to attack-and-defence games with a weakest link.〈/p〉〈/div〉
Print ISSN:
0377-2217
Electronic ISSN:
1872-6860
Topics:
Mathematics
,
Economics
