ISSN:
1573-7187
Keywords:
Conditional attitudes
;
Beliefs
;
Desires
;
Rationality
;
Conditional probability
;
Conditional desirability
;
Decision theory
;
Representation theorem
;
Conditional preference
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Sociology
,
Economics
Notes:
Abstract Conditional attitudes are not the attitudes an agent is disposed to acquire in event of learning that a condition holds. Rather they are the components of agent's current attitudes that derive from the consideration they give to the possibility that the condition is true. Jeffrey's decision theory can be extended to include quantitative representation of the strength of these components. A conditional desirability measure for degrees of conditional desire is proposed and shown to imply that an agent's degrees of conditional belief are conditional probabilities. Rational conditional preference is axiomatised and by application of Bolker's representation theorem for rational preferences it is shown that conditional preference rankings determine the existence of probability and desirability measures that agree with them. It is then proven that every conditional desirability function agrees with an agent's conditional preferences and, under certain assumptions, every desirability function agreeing with an agent's conditional preferences is a conditional desirability function agreeing with her unconditional preferences.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1004977019944
