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Voting cycles, plurality rule and strategic manipulation (1990)

Berg, Sven ; Lepelley, Dominique

Springer

Annals of operations research 23 (1990), S. 247-256

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ISSN: 1572-9338

Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000

Topics: Mathematics , Economics

Notes: Abstract In this note, we investigate the connection between the existence of cycles and the opportunities of strategic manipulation under a specific social decision function, the plurality rule. Contrary to previous research in this field, voting cycles are considered as a possible cause rather than a consequence of strategic voting. The results we obtain allow us to evaluate the vulnerability of the plurality rule to strategic voting, and to study how the distribution of voters over preference orderings affects the risk of manipulation.

Type of Medium: Electronic Resource

URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02204849

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