ISSN:
1572-8641
Keywords:
Artificial intelligence
;
content
;
cognitive science
;
mind-body problem
;
representation
;
semantic
;
syntax
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Computer Science
,
Philosophy
Notes:
Abstract I argue that there are no mental representations, in the sense of “representation” used in standard computational theories of the mind. I take Cummins' Meaning and Mental Representation as my stalking-horse, and argue that his view, once properly developed, is self-defeating. The argument implicitly undermines Fodor's view of the mind; I draw that conclusion out explicitly. The idea of mental representations can then only be saved by appeal to a Dennett-like instrumentalism; so I argue against that too. Finally, I argue that there is no good metaphysical reason in favour of believing in mental representations and that cognitive science can manage perfectly well without them.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00360576
