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  • 1
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract The paper argues that in the context of public choice for non-market goods, two assumptions of the simple model of the rational economic actor may not hold. The assumptions are that there is a direct connection between choice and outcome, and that preferences are not affected by the act of making a choice. Consequently, to understand people's preferences for public goods, it is important to measure their beliefs and values separately rather than simply to observe their choice behavior or to ask them what they would be willing to pay for the public good. In an example study, people's preferences for U.S. policies toward Nicaragua were measured and further analyzed into their beliefs about the effects of those policies on Nicaraguan outcomes, and their evaluations of the Nicaraguan outcomes. It was shown that the process of making a two-person choice changed the preferences, and that the separate measures or beliefs and values gave insight into the process of the change that would not have been available had only the preferences been measured. Implications for the contingent valuation method are explored and an alternative approach is proposed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Public choice 64 (1990), S. 279-290 
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary and conclusions Exploring the variation in the structure of rent-seeking games widens the field of positive institutional theory. By altering the structure of Tullock's (1980) efficient rent-seeking game, some additional insight into the various possible forms of rent-seeking behavior is derived. Furthermore, the games presented demonstrate that Tullock's theory of rent-seeking has a wide variety of potential applications outside the standard profit seeking paradigm of neoclassical theory. The rent-seeking games introduced in this paper are not an exhaustive listing of game types, but rather a demonstration of the diversity of Tullock's game and the rich variety of solutions which result. The specific structure a game takes is a function of the economic, political, and social context from which it arises. Furthermore, the resulting level of residual rent will be determined by the game's structure. As Tullock (1980) points out, this result may be the more interesting. People play games to increase their wealth by the capture of residual rents, and the magnitude of this rent is determined by the rules under which the games are played. Thus, there are incentives for players to structure their rent-seeking game to obtain a desired result. An obvious extension of this study is the inclusion of bias, a larger number of players, and nonlinear probabilities. When a specific topic is under exploration, the bias and level of entry of additional players many generate some of the most interesting results. For example, suppose the rent-seeking model was being adopted for a study of revolution. The existence of several political parties and their allies, increasing the number of players, and the technological level of the various interest groups would be of central importance. The approach taken to resolving these issues should be applicable to a wide variety of circumstances, and this realization should substantially enrich the discourse on rent-seeking behavior and its implications.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Public choice 74 (1992), S. 425-445 
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract A random pivot model is used to expand the theory of policy-minded candidates. Previous results (Wittman, 1977, 1983; Cox, 1984; Hansson and Stuart, 1984) are derived under weaker assumptions. New results about candidate strategies in multiple elections are also obtained. The thrust of these results supports Calvert's (1985) finding that office-seeking and policy-mindedness are countervailing forces in election contests.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Public choice 74 (1992), S. 495-500 
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Public choice 74 (1992), S. 501-502 
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Public choice 75 (1993), S. 1-20 
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper incorporates objectives of both legislators and bureaucrats in a model of public sector decisionmaking. Existing models assume that either bureaucrats control production information and decisions, (Niskanen-type models) or legislators control production decisions (legislative models). My model explicitly incorporates imperfect agent behavior and corresponding preferences of both legislators and bureaucrats to reflect the bilateral nature of appropriations. The analysis shows that output levels generally differ from politically and socially efficient levels and depend on the relative weights of legislative and bureaucratic interests. Accordingly, Niskanen-type and legislative models are viewed as special cases of this more general approach.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Public choice 75 (1993), S. 21-42 
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper presents an econometric analysis of the votes on five pivotal amendments to the omnibus foreign trade bills of the U.S. House and Senate in 1987. Probit estimation is used to identify the relationships between geographic variations in employment in trade-sensitive industries and congressional voting on changes in foreign trade policy procedures. The implied pattern of expected net benefits for the industries from the five amendments is highly consistent with qualitative evidence on the costs and benefits at stake. Two general conclusions stand out: (1) Procedural foreign trade policy proposals can have very specific beneficiaries. (2) Diffuse export interests can be influential in opposition to procedural protectionism.
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Public choice 75 (1993), S. 79-91 
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper develops a simple, incentive compatible, allocation mechanism by means of which both polluters and pollutees will reveal their preferences so that the government can determine the Pareto optimal pollution level. The mechanism involves a combination of the Pigou tax and the Clarke tax. The two taxes are complementary and together provide a practical solution to the environment problem. The mechanism is applied to the problem of finding the optimal quality of river water which serves both as a waste disposal and as a source of drinking water.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 9
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 10
    ISSN: 1573-7101
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Political influence by a professional association, like the influence of any special interest group, is a collective good for the members of the profession. This paper investigates the variables affecting the ability of state optometric associations to overcome the free rider problem and induce optometrists to join the association. Although the empirical results show little evidence that organization costs are reduced by concentration in urban areas, the results do strongly support the hypothesis that there will be less free riding in smaller groups. The results also support the hypothesis that selective incentives enable latent groups to overcome the free rider problem. By providing continuing education at reduced fees to members of the association, optometric associations have increased the percentage of optometrists who are association members in those states with statutory continuing education requirements.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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