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  • 1
    ISSN: 1572-9966
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract I set out an individualistic and pragmatic choice framework for a normative theory of political economy, and argue that, given pluralism with respect to individual ends, a consensus on any political or economic institution presupposes that it is perceived to serve as a public means to private ends. Concerning the crucial question of the distribution of the benefits that political and economic cooperation can make possible, I argue that the various models typically employed—those pertaining to competitive market interaction, decision making under uncertainty, bargaining theory, and social choice theory—fail to provide for a stable consensus, i.e., one that is resistant to non-compliance and renegotiation. Since, however, such instabilities are mutually disadvantageous, these approaches fail to establish how rational individuals can capture all the gains that cooperation makes possible. Appealing to a modified version of the social-psychological construction that Rawls introduces in chapter 8 ofA Theory of Justice I argue that stability is a function of a perceived sense of mutual concern. I conclude by arguing that Rawls own egalitarian/efficiency principle gives natural expression to such a concern, and thus can serve as the object of a stable consensus.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Constitutional political economy 1 (1990), S. 101-124 
    ISSN: 1572-9966
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract As a guide to efficient social organization, neo-classical economics is deficient in two major ways. First, it uses simplifying assumptions about the decision-environment which destroy its possible relevance to an understanding of decision situations in the real world: notably in its inability to embrace the unknowability of the future and the subjectivity of human decisions. Second, it specifies the nature of policy-relevant choice in too restrictive a fashion to explain the major (constitutional and political) choice-situations inherent in any system of social organization. A more satisfactory intellectual construct can be derived from a political economy-public choice model. This follows broadly the contractarian-liberal model developed notably by Buchanan and Brennan, but envisages a much more thoroughgoing rejection of neo-classical (Paretian) concepts. Thenew political economy would identifyefficiency with the ability of the citizen to constrain government-as-leviathan in a context of multi-level choice. The opportunity-cost situation of citizens-as-choosers is specified by reference to their ongoing possibilities of usingvoice to change unsatisfactory institutional constraints orexit to escape their consequences. The model is used to appraise the constitutional characteristics of fiscal federalism.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Constitutional political economy 1 (1990), S. 129-134 
    ISSN: 1572-9966
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Constitutional political economy 1 (1990), S. 1-26 
    ISSN: 1572-9966
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract The paper takes the simplest possible bargaining game as a paradigm for the coordination problem—i.e. the problem of selecting an equilibrium when many are available. The aim is to explore the circumstances under which evolution will lead to a utilitarian conclusion.
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Constitutional political economy 1 (1990), S. 27-34 
    ISSN: 1572-9966
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract There is an analogy of how the paradox of aggregation (Arrow impossibility theorem) and the paradoxa of individual behavior (people decide inconsistently) have been approached in mainstream research. In both cases it is disregarded that paradoxa are part of social reality. A constitutional approach focussing on rules and institutions promises to yield more fruitful insights.
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Constitutional political economy 1 (1990), S. 53-62 
    ISSN: 1572-9966
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Massive changes in the effective constitution—primarily bearing on the economic powers of the federal government, primarily in the past 60 years—have revived interest in the problem of constitutional maintenance. This paper finds the conventional American theory of constitutional maintenance to have at least three major problems. The paper then suggests three propositions about constitutional maintenance, building on the developing theory ofproprietary government. The most important conclusion is how little we know about this subject.
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Constitutional political economy 1 (1990), S. 35-52 
    ISSN: 1572-9966
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract The contract metaphor in political and moral theory is misguided. It is a poor metaphor both descriptively and normatively, but here I address its normative problems. Normatively, contractarianism is supposed to give justifications for political institutions and for moral rules, just as contracting in the law is supposed to give justification for claims of obligation based on consent or agreement. This metaphorical association fails for several reasons. First, actual contracts generally govern prisoner's dilemma, or exchange, relations; the so-called social contract governs these and more diverse interactions as well. Second, agreement, which is the moral basis of contractarianism, is not right-making per se. Third, a contract in law gives information on what are the interests of the parties; a hypothetical social contract requires such knowledge, it does not reveal it. Hence, much of contemporary contractarian theory is perversely rationalist at its base because it requires prior, rational derivation of interests or other values. Finally, contractarian moral theory has the further disadvantage that, unlike contract in the law, its agreements cannot be connected to relevant motivations to abide by them.
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Constitutional political economy 1 (1990), S. 63-82 
    ISSN: 1572-9966
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper asks what rules for supplying and financing public goods would be chosen by individuals at the constitutional level. A new principle of decision-making is proposed. This separates decisions about how much to spend on public goods from decisions about how to allocate this spending among different public goods; the latter decision is made by allowing each individual to determine how his own tax payment will be spent. Analogies are drawn between this principle and proportional representation, tax relief for charities, and certain procedures for providing state support for political parties and churches.
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  • 9
    ISSN: 1572-9966
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Constitutional political economy 1 (1990), S. 111-111 
    ISSN: 1572-9966
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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