ALBERT

Notes: In markets, in which exchange requires costly search for trading partners, intermediaries can help to reduce the trading frictions. This intuition is modeled in a framework with heterogeneous agents, who have the choice between intermediated exchange and search accompanied by some bargaining procedure. The equilibria of such a game are characterized. In the case of a monopolistic intermediary, the tradeoff between the bid-ask spread and the costs of delay during private search determine the intermediary's clientele. In equilibrium the monopolist charges a positive spread. Traders with large gains from trade prefer to deal with him, whereas traders with relatively low gains from trade engage in search. In case of competition among intermediaries, the classical Bertrand result obtains, and bid and ask prices converge to the (unique) Walrasian equilibrium price. Thus, in the confines of the model, the Walrasian auctioneer of the market under consideration can be replaced by competing intermediaries. In addition a multiplicity of subgame perfect Nash equilibria emphasizes the coordination problems inherent in models of intermediation.

Notes: In this paper we analyze the properties of price equilibria in a duopoly market where firms sell vertically differentiated products, consumers being uncertain about which firm sells which quality. Both existence and properties of price equilibria are characterized by the beliefs of the consumers' population about the distribution of quality between firms.

Notes: The survey classifies economic theories of the firm into four categories based on the level of aggregation in economic models: (1) neoclassical, (2) industrial organization, (3) contractual, and (4) organizational incentive. Economic theories of the firm are evaluated on the basis of their potential application to problems of management decision making. The survey suggests that a management perspective can be useful in developing an integrated theoretical analysis of the firm that addresses both competitive strategy and organizational design.

Notes: Commitment: The Dynamic of Strategy, by Pankaj Ghemawat.Ghemawat's Commitment makes recent results in game-theoretic industrial organization accessible and useful to practitioners in the field of strategic management. This book contributes to the management strategy literature on two levels. On a conceptual level, Ghemawat strives to isolate “commitment” as the sole explanation of persistent differences in firm performance. On a more pragmatic level, he provides a framework intended to aid managers in making commitment-intensive decisions. It is with respect to how well he achieves these two distinct goals that I evaluate Ghemawat's contribution. In addition, I review briefly the book's content, and I compare Ghemawat's approach to some alternative approaches familiar to scholars and practitioners of strategic management.

Notes: In the present paper, we relate the extent of job security offered to incumbent managers to the extent of competition among firms in the product market, where the extent of job security is measured by the probability that an incumbent manager continues to be employed by his current firm and the extent of competition is measured by the degree of differentiation between competing brands. We demonstrate that when competition between firms intensifies and “on-the-job training” is relatively more conducive to reducing the variable costs of production, firms tend to offer reduced (increased) job security to incumbent managers, provided that the degree of differentiation between competing products is sufficiently large (small), respectively. If “on-the-job training” is relatively more conducive to reducing the fixed costs of production, however, the previous result is reversed.

Notes: This paper presents a model of strategic product choice when consumer preferences combine features of both horizontal and vertical product differentiation. Consumers disagree on what amount of a “special” characteristic makes for a better product, but those who prefer more of this attribute are willing to pay more for it. Within this demand structure, I examine the advantages of first-mover firms. I find that such firms typically do best in markets where the maximum degree of product differentiation is limited by preferences rather than technology. These are “niche markets”. Follower firms do better in markets in which the range of preferences is broad relative to the span of feasible goods.

Notes: This paper reexamines Grossman and Hart's (1980) insight into how the free-rider problem excludes an external raider from capturing the increase in value it brings to R firm The inability of the raider to capture any of the surplus depends critically on the assumption of equal and indivisible shareholdings–the one-share-per-shareholder model In contrast, we show that once shareholdings are large and potentially unequal, a raider may capture a significant part of the increase in value Specifically, the free-rider problem does not prevent the takeover process when shareholdings are divisible.

Notes: We analyze the implementation problem faced by firms when trying to collude in the face of asymmetric information about costs. Assuming that transfer payments are possible, we examine the incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints that must be satisfied by any cartel agreement. Two scenarios are considered. Firms may or may not withdraw from the agreement after each firm's costs become known. If no withdrawal is possible, we find that the monopoly rule is implementable when weak types of individual rationality constraints are required. This contrasts with some results in the literature. If withdrawal is possible, we find a potential conflict between different forms of individual rationality constraints, in particular, between interim and ex post constraints. This conflict disappears in industries with a large number of firms.

Notes: This paper offers a general characterization of the optimal product line prices for a monopolist whose quality of products is initially unknown to consumers. In the focal equilibrium, a monopolist signals a high-quality product line by pricing as if quality were known to be high, but costs of production were higher than they truly are. In a rich set of environments, this characterization implies that the prices of all products are initially distorted upward, with the price distortion being largest for products with the most inelastic demands and/or quality-sensitive production costs. These implications yield predictions for the time path of prices flint are broadly consistent with evidence from the marketing literature. The multidimensional signaling problem is made tractable by the satisfaction of a very simple and powerful single crossing property.

Notes: Managerial behavior that is rational and profit-maximizing sometimes will seem to be overly conservative. If the valuation of innovations contains white noise and the status quo would be preferred to random innovation, then any innovation that does not appear substantially better than the status quo should be rejected, for reasons arising from regression toward the mean. The more successful the firm, the higher is the optimal acceptance threshold and conservative bias. Other things equal, more successful firms will spend less on research, adopt fewer innovations, and be less likely to advance the industry's best practice.

Notes: I present an integrated survey of management strategy, which examines organizational design, competitive strategy, and public policy considerations. In addition, 1 offer suggestions on how economic analysis can be applied in unifying and developing management strategy as a field of study.

Notes: Under prospective pricing, payers for health care essentially use price regulation of hospitals as a way of indirectly regulating the provision of treatment intensity. This paper presents a theory of how a nonprofit hospital selects treatment intensities for its products given the payer's choice of prices and then determines how the payer should select prices in light of this theory. The main result is that, in equilibrium, the ratio of price to marginal cost will vary across products inversely with the elasticity of demand with respect to treatment intensity. This means that, generally, the hospital will earn positive (negative) accounting profit on products with low-(high-) intensity elasticities of demand.

Notes: Legislation to create optional no-fault insurance (ONFL) programs has recently been enacted in Florida and Virginia. ONFI programs provide compensation to patients when certain medical complications arise, provided the patient agrees not to sue the doctor for additional damages. The optimal design of ONFI programs is explored in this paper, focusing on the incentive effects of ONFI programs. The question of whether ONFI programs should be funded entirely by participating doctors, or whether social subsidies are optimal, is examined.

Notes: A number of recent Canadian and U.S. antitrust cases have involved allegations that manufacturers of durable products have refused to supply parts to independent service organizations, apparently to monopolize the market for repairs of their products. This paper provides a theory of these strategies and considers the welfare implications of judicial orders to supply. The refusals here are seen as necessary to protect manufacturers' program of price discrimination: Expensive repairs represent a way to select high-intensity, high-value users and charge them more. In addition to the usual ambiguity associated with the welfare effects of prohibitions of price discrimination, forcing competition in repairs can have the further damaging effect of reducing social welfare by inducing manufacturers to lower product quality.

Notes: The litigation crisis in this country is a subject of great importance to the chief executive officers of public uccounting firms. 1 will first address the problem's magnitude and its source and then speculate on the developments we might expect in the future. Like all forecasts, mine will certainly be wrung. I hope that my degree of error on the pessimistic side will be considerable.

Notes: Research and development (R&D) competition among firms has recently been extended to R&D competition involving research joint ventures. It was previously shown that in an industry conducting cost-reducing R&D followed by competition in the product market, if all firms both fully share R&D information and coordinate investments to maximize pint profits, final products prices are lower, and firms' profits are higher than with information shriving alone, joint profit maximization alone, or no cooperation. In this paper we question whether a single research joint venture (RJV) cartel is the best form of industry R&D coordination. We show that there are circumstances in which splitting a single RJV cartel into several competing ones yields lower product prices. Moreover, we show that in these circumstances, splitting the industry into exactly two competing RJV cartels would be best.

Notes: This paper studies the order of adoption of a process innovation, thin-slab casting, by U.S. steel makers. A game-theoretic model of technology adoption with capacity constraints indicates that incumbents are likely to trail entrants in adopting process technologies that reduce the minimal scale required to compete. Evidence from the case study also indicates, however, that the sorts of interactive effects emphasized by game-theoretic models may be dominated by the effects of competitors' heterogeneous precommitments.

Notes: Identical cases of wine are often auctioned one immediately after another. Ashenfelter (1989) reports that on average, the later lots fetch less. Such a systematic price difference seems anomalous, the more so because it is shown here that rational expectations imply not equal, but rising, prices. Risk aversion is an obvious way of reconciling the evidence with rational behavior. There is an alternative explanation. The auctions observed by Ashenfelter involved a buyer's option, whereby the first-round winner could purchase further cases at the same price. It is shown that this feature may both account for the observed price trajectory and raise seller revenue.

Notes: This paper examines the incentives for integration when the market for consumer durables (hardware) is oligopolistic and the market for complementary services (software) is monopolistically competitive. We find that the equilibrium industry structure will depend on the magnitude of the fixed costs of software development. If the software development costs are relatively large, the equilibrium industry structure is unintegrated, that is, neither hardware firm integrates; if the software development costs are relatively small, the equilibrium industry structure is integrated, that is, both hardware firms integrate. Under the integrated industry structure, hardware profits are lower, less varieties are provided, and hardware prices are lower than under the unintegrated industry structure. The game has a prisoners' dilemma structure when the software development costs are relatively small because of a foreclosure effect. Strategically increasing the number of software varieties provides an avenue for an integrated hardware firm to increase its market share and profits by reducing the number of software varieties available for an unintegrated rival technology. Although consumer surplus is higher under an integrated industry structure, the total surplus associated with the unintegrated industry structure exceeds that of the integrated industry structure.

Notes: Price setting by firms and search by customers is analyzed, relaxing two basic attributes of most search models: price precommitment and agent heterogeneity. Customers are characterized by individual demand functions for a homogeneous good and can choose to employ a threat to search. Firms noncooperatively make pricing decisions by using the individual demand curves under conditions of constant marginal cost. Firms adopt pricing rules that optimally respond to customer search histories. Bargaining power is endogenously assigned. Firms know their common marginal cost; customers, the cost distribution. The unique separating equilibrium is characterized by a lumpy distribution of prices and by heterogeneous shopping behavior by customers giving rise to “shoppers” and “nonshoppers”

Notes: Most research on product positioning supports the idea of differentiation. Product standardization (i.e., minimum differentiation) occurs only under very limiting assumptions. Yet, similar products are often observed in the marketplace. We attempt to restore the case for standardization by using more realistic assumptions than in previous work. We assume that consumers consider not only observable attributes in brand choice, but also attributes that are unobservable by the firms. We find that standardization is an equilibrium when consumers exhibit sufficient heterogeneity along the unobservable attributes under both positioning with exogenously given prices and price competition, We also show that, under insufficient heterogeneity along the unobservable attribute, our results coincide with past research that argues in favor of differentiation.

Notes: This paper proposes an empirical methodology for studying various (implicit or explicit) collusive behaviors on two strategic variables, which are price and advertising, in a differentiated market dominated by a duopoly. In addition to Nash or Stackelberg behaviors, we consider collusion on both variables, collusion on one variable and competition on the other, etc. Using data on the Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola markets from 1968 to 1986, full information maximum likelihood estimation of cost and demand functions are obtained allowing for various collusive behaviors. The collusive hypothesis is not rejected, and the best form of collusive behavior is selected via nonnested testing procedures. Using the best model, Lerner indices are computed for both duopolists to provide summary measures of market power. Finally, our approach is contrasted with the conjectural variation approach and is shown to give superior results.

Notes: Bidders in hostile takeovers have colluded in five separate instances. It is found that these collusive agreements did not affect the target's price significantly. A model is developed to explain this observation. A welfare analysis indicates that a positive probability of cartel formation can be socially beneficial and may or may not be beneficial to the target's shareholders, depending on the process generating takeover attempts. This sheds light on the existing policy debate concerning regulations of collusive agreements. An analysis of the existing case law is provided, which indicates that such collusive arrangements are legal at present.

Notes: 〈blockFixed type="quotation"〉The Directors of … Companies … being the managers rather of other people's money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in private copartnery frequently watch over their own.—Adam Smith, 1776, Wealth of Nations

Notes: Because many durable goods industries are also industries with significant innovative activity, we analyze the relationship between an oligopolistic firm's choice of product durability and cost-reducing innovation in rental and sales markets. We demonstrate the firm's durability may be greater than, equal to, or less than a social planner's, depending upon innovation's impact on the marginal cost of durability. We also show that the firm's innovation level can be maximized for moderate levels of concentration if the output is durable. This provides theoretical support for the empirical observation that innovation is often maximized in markets of moderate concentration.

Notes: In this paper we attempt to disentangle the effects of deregulation on rail costs from those directly attributable to mergers. We estimate that cost reductions obtained from mergers ranged from a high of 33% for the Burlington Northern to a low of a 3% cost increase for the CSX. However, firms not engaged in significant merger activities experienced similar cost differentials indicating that consolidation was not a prerequisite for cost savings. We conclude that although mergers did confer some benefits on the participating firms, they were not a prerequisite for railroads being able to achieve substantial cost savings.

Notes: For a homogeneous product oligopoly market, possibilities for pure strategy Nash equilibria in prices are studied. Consumers, who each nonstrategically purchase one unit up to a common reservation price, are hypothesized to be more concerned with large price differences (and therefore buy from the cheapest firm) than slightly different prices. For the duopoly case, existence, uniqueness, and characterization results are provided. Linear examples are given with 2 and n firms.

Notes: This paper analyzes the ongoing transformation of the soft drink distribution of Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola from systems of independent bottlers to captive bottling subsidiaries, A transaction cost-based theory is developed to explain this restructuring. It is postulated that changes in the external environment and the resulting changes in the strategies of Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola raised the costs of transacting between them and their independent bottlers. Two types of empirical tests are presented. One exploits the difference in the distribution of Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola in the fountain channel. The other consists of statistical analyses of the competitive effects of the move toward captive distribution. Both types of tests support the basic hypothesis.

Notes: Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life, by Avinash Dixit and Barry Nalebuff

Notes: In this comment on James Emshoff's (1993) paper,/〉 I will begin by briefly summarizing the paper. Then I will give my reaction to the issues raised in the paper from the perspective of an economist and professor of business strategy. As I discuss later, it is the work of Alfred Chandler, Jr., rather than work of economists, that is most relevant to the issues raised by Emshoff. In my view economists must understand the limitations of standard economic approaches to organizational issues in order to begin to make progress on issues raised by Chandler and Emshoff.

Notes: The paper analyzes a regulatory game between a public and a private payer to finance hospital joint costs (mainly capital and technology expenses). The public payer (inspired by the federal Medicare program) may both directly reimburse for joint costs (“pass-through” payments) and add a margin over variable costs paid per discharge, while the private payer can only use a margin policy. The hospital chooses joint costs in response to payers' overall payment incentives. Without pass-through payments, under provision of joint costs results front free-riding behavior of payers and the first-mover advantage of the public payer. Using pass-through policy in its self-interest, the public payer actually may moderate the under provision of joint costs; under some conditions, the equilibrium allocation may be socially efficient. Our results bear directly on directly Medicare policy, which is phasing out pass-through payments.

Notes: We augment efficiency-based theories of ownership by including influence costs. Our principal conclusion is that the prospect of organizational decline and layoffs creates additional influence costs in multiunit organizations that would be absent if there was no prospect of layoffs and would be lessened or eliminated in focused organizations. This helps explain the tendency of firms to divest poorly performing units, as well as the pattern of sales of such units to firms already in businesses related to that of the divested unit.

Notes: When it was legal, resale price maintenance (RPM) was commonly observed on items such as aspirin, pens, pencils, toothpaste, soap, shaving cream, and milk. In providing a theory that is based on compensating retailers for their opportunity cost of shelf space, and that does not hinge on the existence of externalities in nonprice competition, this article explains why a manufacturer might impose RPM on these and many other products. By contrast, the use of RPM on food, grocery, and drug store items is not easily explained by standard theories such as free riding on presale services and quality certification by high-priced retailers.〈blockFixed type="quotation"〉The typical supermarket has room for fewer than 25,000 products. Yet there are some 100,000 available, and between 10,000 and 25,000 items aye introduced each year./〉

Notes: Why does the cost of organizing particular activities differ across competitors? This article explores in detail the organization of Nucor, a steel minimill that has sustained a significant cost advantage over its competitors. Nucor's past success highlights the complementarities among organizational policies and competitive advantage as well as barriers to the imitation of apparently superior organizational arrangements. The case study also suggests avenues for additional empirical and theoretical research.

Notes: What accounts for the diversity and limited concentration that has long characterized the organization of the advertising agency industry? This question is addressed by treating an advertising agency as a multiproduct firm. The firm's product line or service mix is defined in terms of the set of different media categories where an agency places the advertising messages that it creates on behalf of its clients. Evidence is presented indicating that the structure of demand and costs in the advertising agency industry conforms to the conditions that MacDonald and Slivinski showed were required for an industry to sustain an equilibrium with diversified firms.Building on this framework, we formulate a set of three hypotheses relating to the realization of product-specific scale and scope economies. The first two hypotheses posit that given low fixed costs and minimal entry barriers, both media-specific scale and scope economies are available and can be exploited by relatively small-size agencies. The third hypothesis suggests that large agencies may experience diseconomies of scope as a consequence of excessive diversification induced by two pervasive industry institutional phenomena: (1) “bundling” of agency services to match client demand for a mix of media advertising, and (2) “conflict policy,” which prohibits an agency from serving competing accounts and operates as a mobility constraint.Utilizing a multiproduct cost function, we estimate media-specific scale and scope economies for a cross section of 401 U.S. agencies in 1987. The results obtained support the set of three hypotheses outlined above. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings for the restructuring currently underway in this industry.

Notes: Recent advances in the theoretical literature have greatly expanded our understanding of the forces that shape the competitive dynamics of research and development, but a paucity of sufficiently detailed empirical data has left these insights relatively untested. We draw on unusually detailed qualitative and quantitative infernal data provided at the research program level by 10 major pharmaceutical firms to explore the usefulness of the modern literature as a source of insight into the dynamics of competition in ethical drug discovery.Our analysis focuses on one particularly compelling aspect of the literature: the suggestion that in “winner take all situations,” competition in R&D becomes a Prisoner's Dilemma, leading to overinvestment in research. Without adequate measures of the social return to innovation, we can say nothing about whether there is “too much” or “too little” research undertaken by the industry, but our results do not support the suggestion that R&D investment in drug discovery is driven by the “tit-for-tat” or simple reaction function models hinted at by the institutional literature. First, R&D investment is only weakly correlated across firms once common responses to exogenous shocks are accounted far, and second, rivals' R&D results are positively correlated with own research productivity, which we interpret as evidence for extensive R&D spillovers rather than the depletion externality implied by “winner take all” models.These results are not, of themselves, sufficient to reject the hypothesis that investment behavior in the industry is driven by strategic considerations since there is theoretical support for a wide variety of observable behavior as equilibrium outcomes of strategic interaction. Nonetheless, they suggest that the more extreme forms of rent dissipation identified in the literature are probably poor characterizations of the reality of competition in pharmaceuticals. Our results point both to the need to develop theories that incorporate richer models of possible payoff structures, adjustment costs, and firm heterogeneity and to the need to collect empirical data that is comprehensive enough to enable one to test them.

Notes: Empirical work has failed to keep pace with recent advances in transaction cost theory and the theory of contract. The first econometric analysis of its kind is reported by using a new data set of small subcuntractors making specific inputs for customers in the engineering industry. The use of formal contracts is found to be strongly associated with specific investment and other variables measuring technological complexity and vulnerability to potential opportunism by customers. Furthermore, despite typically long-term relationships, over half of subcontractors avoid making efficient, specific investments. Overall, we find strong support for the transaction cost theory of contracts.

Notes: We examine the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and acquisition activity subsequent to corporate restructurings in a sample of 152 firms created by a voluntary corporate spin-off. We also investigate the linkage between these relationships and the stock market reaction to the initial restructuring announcements. Surprisingly, CEO wealth in the form of stock and options is strongly related to friendly and hostile acquisition activity, respectively. Moreover, the stock market appears to anticipate this subsequent acquisition activity. These results ask us to rethink our understanding of the motivational properties of equity ownership and the stock market's reaction to voluntary corporate spin-off announcements.

Notes: This paper studies the firm's choice between implicit and explicit contracts as alternative methods of assuring product quality. The relationship between these two contractual forms is studied using a dynamic model with imperfect monitoring and team moral hazard where both the firm and the consumer take unobservable actions that affect product performance. The firm chooses the contractual arrangement that maximizes expected profit. Identified are conditions on the primitive attributes of the transactions and on the firm's environment that can help explain why firms might decide to use explicit contracting, implicit contracting, or a combination of the two. I also show that there are conditions under which the introduction of reputation causes explicit contracts to be more uniform and less sensitive to the details of the transaction than implied by static models.

Notes: We study the firm's incentives to engage in research for pollution-control technologies and to adopt new technologies that if discovers or that are discovered by other firms. Licensing of discoveries is assumed possible. We also study the regulator's problem in designing optimal environmental regulations that both control pollution and provide incentives for research. Technology adoption standards are part of the optimal regulation. Another finding is that making the adoption standard stricter reduces research.

Notes: We investigate the role of price advertising in a market where consumers are imperfectly informed about prices. We consider a monopolist whose demand depends on price and advertising expenditure. This demand function is derived from optimizing behavior of consumers. Uninformed consumers may pay a cost to visit the seller and obtain price information. Advertising enables the monopolist to increase the number of informed consumers. In equilibrium the uninformed consumers form rational price expectations, and the seller necessarily adopts a random pricing and advertising strategy.

Notes: A model of advertising is presented in which consumption experience is an imperfect indicator of product quality. In equilibrium, neither price nor advertising signal the quality of newly introduced goods. Advertising of established products can be a signal of quality, but if it is, it must be an imperfect signal leaving residual uncertainty that influences consumers’ repurchase decision. A set of observable implications follow.

Notes: A model of procedural decision making in firms is combined with an oligopoly model to study the effect of limited managerial cognition on firm flexibility. It is argued that a firm may vary its flexibility, and, hence, that there exists a trade-off between decision-making costs and costs due to imperfect adjustment to the environment. The main conclusions are the following: (1) The level of flexibility chosen by firms tends to be too low, from a social welfare point of view. (2) Entry reduces firm flexibility. Aggregated flexibility in the market may, however, increase in which case consumers are unambiguously better off. (3) Integration of isolated markets increases firm flexibility and consumer welfare.

Notes: This paper studies a model in which two payers contract with one hospital. True costs per patient are not a possible basis for payment, and contracts can only be written on the basis of allocated cost. Payers choose a contract that is fully prospective or fully based on cost allocation, or a payment scheme that would give some weight to each of these two. We characterize the payers'equilibrium contracts arid show how in equilibrium hospital input decisions are distorted by the payers’ incentives to engage in cost shifting. Two cost-shifting incentives work in opposite directions, and equilibrium can be characterized by too little or too much care relative to the socially efficient level.

Notes: This paper compares the cost and quality incentive effects of cost reimbursement and prospective payment systems in the health industry. When a provider cannot refuse patients who require high treatment costs or discriminate patients by qualities, optimally designed prospective payments can implement the efficient quality and cost reduction efforts, but cost reimbursement cannot induce any cost incentive. When the provider can refuse expensive patients, implementation of the first best requires a piecewise linear reimbursement rule that can be interpreted as a mixture of pure prospective payment and pure cost reimbursement, Under appropriate conditions, prospective payment can implement the first best even when the provider can use qualities to discriminate patients.

Notes: We consider communication of quality via cheap talk and dissipative advertising expenditures, when consumers have heterogeneous tastes for quality, and price information must be acquired through costly search. For search pods, cheap talk communicates quality when fixed costs are roughly constant across quality levels, while if fixed costs vary greatly with quality, then firms having the higher fixed-cost quality level use dissipative advertising. For experience goods, quality can be communicated by cheap talk in a range where low-quality firms have greater fixed costs, and low-quality firms use dissipative advertising if their fixed costs are greater still.

Notes: This paper analyzes the interaction between a regulator and monopolist in the determination of the price for the monopolist's product, where only the monoplast knows ex ante its true marginal cost of production. The regulator observes the market price proposed by the monopolist and decides whether to hold a rate hearing, where suck a hearing is a costly means of verifying the monopolist's marginal cost. Subsequent to a rate hearing, the regulator can impose a market price for the monopolist's product; in the absence of a rate hearing, the market price is set equal to the monopolist's proposed price. Equilibrium behavior by the monopolist and regulator is characterized, and the degree of regulatory “activism,” as defined by the probability a rate hearing is held, is seen to vary ex post with the monopolist's true marginal cost.

Notes: While the economic approach to the politics of regulation emphasizes the importance of organized economic interests in shaping policies, political institutions in which regulatory agencies are embedded may also have significant effects. By including both economic influences and characteristics of political institutions in a model of price setting by state regulators, this paper demonstrates that both shape regulatory behavior in the telecommunications industry. Whether commissioners are elected or appointed, whether they face confirmation by a legislature, and whether a single party controls both executive and legislative branches of state governments influence the level of prices charged for basic services.

Notes: We investigate the choice of compensation scheme by firms. Our basic model shows that the unique equilibrium choice for profit maximizing duopsonists in a labor market is for one firm to offer a wage rate and for the other to offer a piece rate. This result arises because the firms recognize that, by offering different compensation schemes, they induce self-selection among workers, which thereby decreases the intensity of competition in the labor market. We find this asymmetry to be robust to allowing for firing, free entry, and a class of more general compensation schemes. When we broaden our model to permit firms to be differentiated in the eyes of workers (either geographically or by “other working conditions,” e.g.), we find that our results are preserved when differentiation is low, but that both firms choose to offer a piece rate when differentiation is high.

Notes: In the present study I identify an inherent characteristic of health care markets that may lead to excessive investment by hospitals even when compensated according to a prospective reimbursement rule. It is demonstrated that the stochastic nature of the demand for medical services combined with the lumpiness of investment decisions may give rise to excessive investment when multiple hospitals select independently their levels of capacities. The source for the excessive incentives to invest is the difficulty of one hospital to internalize properly the externality generated by its investment decisions. Such an externality arises because when one hospital expands its capacity, it is more likely to be able to serve not only patients residing in its region but patients residing in neighboring regions as well.

Notes: What is the nature of the industrial organization of the market for physician services? Is the market “competitive?” Are there pareto-relevant market failures, such that there is room for welfare-improving policies? Economists have devoted a great deal of attention to this market, but it remains relatively poorly understood. The key features of this market are that the product being sold is a professional service, and the pervasive presence of insurance for consumers. A professional service is inherently heterogeneous, nonretradable, and subject to an asymmetry of information between buyers and sellers. These characteristics are what bestow market power on sellers, further strengthened by the fact that consumers face only a small fraction of the price of any service due to insurance. This paper considers the implications of these characteristics for agency relationships between patients and physicians, and insurers (both private and public) and physicians. Agency relationships within physician firms are also considered. Both theoretical and empirical modeling of contracting between insurers and physicians and of the joint agency problems between patient and physician and insurer and physician are recommended as areas for future research. Because failures in this market are seen to derive largely from the structure of information, the potential gains from government intervention may be sharply circumscribed. Nonetheless, careful consideration of the competitive implications of contracting between physicians, insurers, and other health care providers is an important area for antitrust policy.

Notes: We show that asymmetric information may prevent firms with pure discount bonds from renegotiating their capital structure prior to the maturity of the debt, although this would increase the value of the firm when its prospects are poor. This inefficiency can be reduced if the firm issues debt with a risky intermediate debt payment, such as a coupon or a sinking fund payment. We also demonstrate that bankruptcy institutions leading to deviations from absolute priority can improve the timing of recapitalizations by financially distressed firms. Finally, we show that, under certain conditions, the optimal capital structure adjustment during financial distress consists of a convertible debt-for-straight debt swap.

Notes: In the audit literature, it was postulated that audit firms are differentiated due to their quality and, thus, the fees charged are a function of quality. We hypothesize that this may lead to audit firm specialization in different amounts of auditing, leading to a differential audit fee structure. This hypothesis is empirically tested by using a very large sample of audit fees paid to then Big Eight auditors. The results are consistent with the hypothesis in that three Big Eight auditors are observed to charge significantly different fees when compared with the other firms.

Notes: This paper develops a simple model of sequential innovations with a diversity of research lines. Competitive strategies of firms for R&D are analyzed at each stage in a sequence of innovations. We compare two alternative regimes of enforcing patent law, as a mechanism to provide adequate incentives for R&D at each stage. The regime that protects the research line gives monopoly rights to an entire line of research, hence limiting the utilization of the previous knowledge and retarding subsequent innovations. The other regime protects the product, which facilitates the use of previous knowledge at the expense of providing inadequate protection to the ideas embodied in the product, and results in underinvestment in the first stage.

Notes: This article examines the role that multimarket operations play in a firm's ability to preempt entry into new markets when presence in a market does not commit the firm to remain there. Success in one market affects a firm's incentives and, in turn, strategic power, to fight a rival fur survival in a related market. This is modeled as a way of attrition, and the risk-dominant equilibrium is derived. The model supports brand proliferation as a credible preemptive strategy for an established firm and also has implications regarding the strategic role of economies of scope and “deep pockets.”

Notes: This paper offers a new theory of limit pricing. Incumbents from different markets or regions “compete” against one another, with each attempting to price in a manner that deflects entry into the others' markets. An entrant is imperfectly informed as to the incumbents' respective investments in cost reduction and seeks to enter markets in which incumbents have high costs. In a focal equilibrium, the entrant uses a simple “comparison strategy,” in which it enters only the highest-priced markets, and incumbents engage in limit-pricing behavior. The influence on pricing of the number of markets and the scope of entry is also reported. Throughout, the central feature of the analysis is that an incumbent's price affects its investment incentives, with lower prices being complementary to greater investment.

Notes: This paper considers price and advertising decisions by a monopolist manufacturer who is privately informed about the strength of consumer demand. Consumers respond to advertising and to the retail price chosen by an uninformed retailer on the basis of his beliefs about demand. This signaling game has a unique intuitive equilibrium outcome in which a high-demand manufacturer chooses his full-information pair of wholesale price and advertising. When demand is low, the wholesale price is distorted downward from its full information level, whereas demand-enhancing advertising may be distorted in either direction. Dissipative advertising is not distorted because it is never used.

Notes: This paper analyzes, within the framework of the new regulatory economics that emphasizes asymmetries of information, the optimal structure of an industry. The duplication of fixed costs incurred in a duopoly structure may be socially justified in a static model by three effects: the sampling effect, the yardstick competition effect, and the increasing marginal cost effect.We show that in general, asymmetric information favors duopoly when the market structure is decided before firms discovers their cost characteristics (a common situation in dual sourcing for procurement), and favors monopoly when the market structure is decided after firms discover their cost characteristics (the case of split-award auctions).

Notes: This paper investigates how a designer of an organization (referred to as the regulator) should organize a production activity in which two different units produce components and where each unit has private information about its costs. Three organizational structures are analyzed. In the first (informational consolidation), the regulator contracts with a consolidated unit that produces both components. In the second (informational decentralization), the regulator independently contracts with the producer of each component. In the third (informational delegation), the regulator contracts with one of the units, which in turn subcontracts with the other. In each case, the regulator's optimal mechanism consisting of payment and output schedules is fully characterized. Informational consolidation and informational decentralization yield different output schedules. Under informational decentralization, the optimal output schedule may not depend on the sum of the marginal costs of each component, but when it does, the regulator strictly prefers informational consolidation to informational decentralization. Informational delegation is shown to be equivalent to informational decentralization when the regulator can observe the contracting between the units.

Notes: Books reviewed in this article: Economics, Organization and Management, by Paul Milgrom and John Roberts

Notes: Economic transition in Eastern Europe should generate market growth. In addition, current discussions on economic integration and the development of a free-trade area in Eastern Europe will improve market accessibility. These two forces will significantly affect the strategies by which external firms will choose to supply markets in Eastern Europe. This paper examines the ways in which supply strategy is likely to change. We show that both market growth and improved market accessibility will lead the external firms to switch from exporting to foreign direct investment. However, market growth is likely to lead to dispersed investment in the growing economies, whereas increased market accessibility, by establishing an integrated regional bloc in Eastern Europe, is more likely to lead to concentrated investment plus infra-regional exports to the remainder of the regional bloc. The switch from exporting to local production through foreign direct investment will favor consumers through lowered prices but will harm national producers by depressing profit margins.

Notes: This paper demonstrates that, when the manager of a poorly performing firm generates firm-specific rents, strategic considerations associated with anticipated future restructuring may lead to the adoption of risky operating policies. Furthermore, this bias toward risky policies may be exacerbated by increases in managerial entrenchment. This is the case even when the manager does not have an ownership stake in the firm. On the other hand, a manager of a firm that is performing well will prefer safer policies. These results are driven by endogenously determined management-borne costs of financial distress, and obtain under both restructuring regimes that enforce the priority of creditor claims as well as restructuring regimes that induce deviations from absolute priority.

Notes: This paper considers an agency model in which a principal delegates an agent authority to choose investment projects. The performance of the project depends stochastically on the agent's evaluation and operating efforts. The paper examines the conditions under which the principal prefers to assign production to a second agent. It is shown that the tasks will be assigned to two agents of the agent chooses an unobservable operating effort. The tasks will be assigned to one agent if the agent's evaluation and operating efforts are both unobservable and if disutilities of efforts are large relative to the profit from the risky project.

Notes: The publication of the passive learning model of Jovanovic and subsequently the active exploration model of Ericson and Pakes led to a resurgence in research on firm growth and survival. Empirical work measuring the relationship of growth and survival relative to size and age uncovered a number of strong regularities, consistent with the new theoretical models and also with a rather broad class of models of which the above represent special cases. But recent theoretical work has shown that when the learning models are applied to the special case of the labor managed firm, most of the sharp empirical predictions derived for profit maximization are rendered indeterminate. Given the impact of ownership structure on the theoretical results of the learning models, we use a dataset of French producer cooperatives to determine whether firms of different ownership structures actually have substantially different growth and survival patterns. We find that French cooperatives survive and grow in very much the same way as has been found for U.S. firms, suggesting that the empirical regularities previously uncovered hold for a much broader class of firms. We are left to conclude that the underlying empirical growth and survival relationships continue to hold for firms with sharply differing ownership structures, and the theoretical models are attempting to explain these broad-based relationships by means of overly specific modeling.

Notes: This paper uses origin-destination data to define geographic local hospital markets in large metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). Results support past findings of service rather than price competition, with negative-cost Herfandahl-Hirschman indexes relationships at the market level (and sub-MSA level) and with profit margins negatively related to hospital market competition. The effects of total (direct plus indirect) market competition are unchanged between 1983 and 1988, precisely estimated, robust to estimation techniques, and unaffected by whether the number of direct competitors is included as an explanatory variable.

Notes: It is well documented that a firm may choose to offer underpriced securities in an initial public offer. An open question is why investment banks do not retain underpriced offers in their portfolio. We argue that the distribution of underpriced securities allows banks of high qualify to signal their value to their customers, promoting in this way their other product lines. We show that the total dollar value of underpriced securities distributed (rather than the percentage value) acts as the signal. We also find that, all else equal, larger customers and those with more elastic demand functions receive n larger total dollar value of underpricing.

Notes: This paper develops a theory to explain the frequently observed resistance offered by the management of target firms to high-premium takeover bids. Contrary to the popular perception of managerial entrenchment at the expense of the shareholders' interests, such resistance may be strategically designed to increase shareholder wealth by threatening to initiate an informal auction process fur the target involving other potential bidders. Remarkably, this strategy can be effective even when it is common knowledge that the other bidders do not have a higher reservation price for the target. The analysis also offers insights into division of takeover gains and several other takeover-related issues.

Notes: I study how profit-maximizing organizations make decisions. Members of organizations tend to have incompatible preferences over decisions, but willingness to pay for decisions plays a very limited role in actual decision making. A sizable empirical literature documents that people who provide critical services, are hard to replace, or deal effectively with external shocks are powerful; they have disproportionate influence over decisions. This can be profit maximizing because the right to shape the firm through its decisions renders the firm more attractive as an employer. Thus, the relative costliness of employees' departures should affect their relative power.

Notes: Review of Smeeding, T., O'Higgins, M., and Rainwater, L. (Ed.), Poverty, Inequality and Income Distribution in Comparative PerspectiveBorooah, V. K., McGregor, P. P. L., and McKee, P. M., Regional Income Inequality und Poverty in the United Kingdom

Notes: This paper is concerned with the growing earnings dispersion among British men. The study is based on unit record data drawn from the New Earnings Survey. It is found that increases in inequality within age groups account for most of the rise in earnings inequality overall. Occupation too is a significant explanation of growing inequality among workers, but the major part of increased inequality within age groups remains unexplained.

Notes: We construct quarterly aggregate gross and net capital stock series for the post-war U.S. economy using annual capital stock, capital depreciation, and capital discard figures along with quarterly investment series. We construct nominal and real measures of all three categories in the aggregate capital stock: consumer durable goods, producer durable goods, and business structures. In constructing the nominal series we take into account the changes in capital goods' prices. The series are constructed using four different methods. Using time- and frequency-domain techniques, we compare the constructed series and characterize their short-run, business cycle, and long-run cyclical properties. We find that the constructed series exhibit very different cyclical and shock persistence dynamics. Practial implications are discussed.

Notes: This article presents an historical Social Accounting Matrix (1938) for the Netherlands, including related, non-monetary tables on demographic characteristics, employment, etc.

Notes: Zakat is an important form of religiously-mandated charity under Islam. This paper examines its impact on income inequality in Pakistan. Data from 1987–88 are used to construct two income distributions-one that would have obtained if zakat had not been given, and one that did obtain when such giving took place. Atkinson-Kolm-Sen relative indices of income inequality are computed which show that zakat does reduce measured income inequality in Pakistan. Both intra-province and inter-province components of over-all inequality decline, though the amount of change is small.〈blockFixed type="quotation"〉So give to the kinsman his due, and to the needy, and to the wayfarer. That b best for those who seek Allah's countenance.The Koran

Notes: In order to improve on the income growth rate as an indicator of changes in well-being, four composite indices of growth and income distribution are introduced and compared. When applied to the United

Notes: This article proposes a new method to compute the real value-added of industries which would substitute for the traditional double deflation method. The new method consists of deflating industries' direct and indirect contributions to final demand deliveries (their value-added by commodity) by the respective final demand commodity prices. The article shows that the new industry real value-added measures have better statistical and analytical properties than those obtained by the double deflation method.

Notes: Using the 1983 and 1989 Surveys of Consumer Finances, I find evidence of sharply increasing house-hold wealth inequality over this period. Whereas mean wealth increased by 23 percent in real terms, median wealth grew by only 8 percent. The share of the top one-half percentile rose by five percentage points, while the wealth of the bottom two quintiles showed an absolute decline. The Gini coefficient increased from 0.80 to 0.84. Almost all the growth in real wealth accrued to the top 20 percent of wealthholders. In contrast, the degree of wealth inequality was almost identical in 1983 as in 1962, and real wealth growth was more evenly distributed across the wealth distribution. There is also evidence that the sharp increase in wealth inequality from 1983 to 1989 was due to a correspondingly sharp rise in income inequality, the increase of stock prices relative to housing prices, and relatively slow inflation.

Notes: After defining households' productive time in non-SNA activities, the paper discusses the most lie quently used wage-based methods for imputing a value to this time. It argues that because the relation between market wages and household output is, at best, unknown, such valuations are not fruitful for economic analysis purposes. The paper then proceeds to show that it is possible to establish an output-related valuation of productive time which per se is relevant for economic analysis. Combined with time-use data, it can be used as a transitional measure for valuing household production at factors cost in a satellite account.

Notes: We use OECD data to examine inter-industry wage differentials (relative wages among industries) for 14 OECD countries over the period 1970–85. We find, first, that the industrial wage structures have shown remarkable stability over time in terms of rank order for all the countries in the sample. Second, despite their rank order stability, wage structures show a tendency to expand or contract. While the U.S. has shown increasing industry wage dispersion between 1970 and 1985, the pattern is very mixed for other countries. Unionization is a significant factor in explaining cross-country differences. Third, industry wage rankings show some evidence of becoming increasingly similar across nations over time, and this movement is associated with a convergence of per capita incomes. Fourth, industry wage differentials are positively related to an industry's productivity growth, output growth, capital intensity, and export orientation.