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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Theory and decision 41 (1996), S. 257-280 
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: Preference ; decision theory ; utility ; rationality
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract Standard decision theoretic models disregard the phenomenon of interpersonal dependency of preferences. In this paper it is argued that interpersonal dependency of preferences is a serious challenge for standard utility theory. First we sketch the more philosophical aspects of the problem and then, using a simple, formal model for the two-person case, we show that interpersonal dependency of preferences generally results in indeterminacy of preferences (resp. of subjective utility).
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Theory and decision 41 (1996), S. 229-256 
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: Justice ; sense of justice ; rationality ; rational choice ; contractarianism ; contractualism ; game theory ; game ; self-transformation ; reconciliation project
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract Let us say that an individual possesses aprincipled preference if she prefers satisfying her preferences without violating the principles of justice governing her community to satisfying her preferences by violating these principles. Although living among possessors of principled preferences benefits individuals, maintaining such a preference is individually costly. Further, individuals can benefit from others possessing principled preferences without themselves possessing one. In this paper, I argue that occupying a choice situation which mirrors key aspects of our own situation, maximizing rationality requires individuals to develop and maintain principled preferences. To establish that maintaining a principled preference is individually rational for the occupants of such a choice situation, I define a range of individual strategies for them, model their choice of individual strategies as a game, and argue that this game involves an equilibrium in which all of its participants would choose to develop and maintain a principled preference.
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Theory and decision 38 (1995), S. 1-28 
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: preferences ; change ; revision ; rationality ; dynamics
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract A basic framework for studies of changes in preference is introduced, and four types of changes in preference are identified.Revision by a sentence such as ‘A is better thanB’ means that a preference forA overB is acquired. The result ofcontraction by ‘A is better thanB’ is that the subject no longer holdsA to be better thanB. Inaddition andsubtraction, an alternative is added to, or subtracted from, respectively, the set of alternatives that are under consideration. Formal models of these four types of change are introduced, and they are shown to satisfy plausible postulates for rational changes in preferences.
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  • 4
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: Ambiguity ; rationality ; decision ; compound lottery ; two-stage lottery
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper examines preferences among uncertain prospects when the decision maker is uneasy about his assignment of subjective probabilities. It proposes a two-stage lottery framework for the analysis of such prospects, where the first stage represents an assessment of the vagueness (ambiguity) in defining the problem's randomness and the second stage represents an assessment of the problem for each hypothesized randomness condition. Standard axioms of rationality are prescribed for each stage, including weak ordering, continuity, and strong independence. The ‘Reduction of Compound Lotteries' axiom is weakened, however, so that the two lottery stages have consistent, but not collapsible, preference structures. The paper derives a representation theorem from the primitive preference axioms, and the theorem asserts that preference-consistent decisions are made as if the decision maker is maximizing a modified expected utility functional. This representation and its implications are compared to alternative decision models. Criteria for assigning the relative empirical power of the alternative models are suggested.
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Theory and decision 33 (1992), S. 177-189 
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: Axioms ; cooperation ; game theory ; Nash equilibrium ; rationality
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract The purpose of this paper is to analyze axiomatically the Nash equilibrium concept. The class of games under study is a (relatively large) subclass of n-person normal form games. Solutions are correspondences which associate to each game a non empty set of strategy vectors of this game. It is shown that if a solution satisfies the axioms Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and Individual rationality (IR), then all the strategy vectors in this solution are Nash equilibria. This result holds good also if IR is replaced by Strong individual monotonicity (SIM) or Weak principle of fair compromise (WPFC).
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Theory and decision 31 (1991), S. 257-287 
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: financial market ; decision theory ; behavioral decision ; financial flows ; rationality ; herd behavior
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract The insights of descriptive decision theorists and psychologists, we believe, have much to contribute to our understanding of financial market macrophenomena. We propose an analytic agenda that distinguishes those individual idiosyncrasies that prove consequential at the macro-level from those that are neutralized by market processes such as poaching. We discuss five behavioral traits — barn-door closing, expert/reliance effects, status quo bias, framing, and herding — that we employ in explaining financial flows. Patterns in flows to mutual funds, to new equities, across national boundaries, as well as movements in debt-equity ratios are shown to be consistent with deviations from rationality.
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Theory and decision 27 (1989), S. 7-36 
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: rationality ; information ; expectations ; beliefs ; dynamic games ; game equilibria
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract Beside instrumental rationality, concerned with consistency between available means and pursued objectives, cognitive rationality, concerned with consistency between current beliefs and detained information, is nowadays bursting in economic theory. For an individual decision, the two notions are expressed structurally in similar forms, but they heavily interact in the deliberation process, especially when the agent is searching relevant information on his environment and his own determiners. In a game framework, the players' representations are formalized in a more and more sophisticated way, and are closely interwoven with their preferences in contemporary equilibrium notions as well as in selection between corresponding equilibrium points.
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Theory and decision 25 (1988), S. 117-122 
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: Bayesian decision theory ; sure thing principle ; independence axiom ; rationality ; irrationality
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract A troubling challenge to the basic principles of Bayesian decision theory is analyzed as a case where irrationality is no intellectual flaw but a characterological one, i.e., not stupidity but funk.
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