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  • Articles  (8)
  • prisoner's dilemma  (8)
  • Sociology  (8)
  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Nash Equilibrium with Lower Probabilities (1998)
    Springer
    Theory and decision 44 (1998), S. 37-66 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: Knightian uncertainty ; ambiguity ; mixed strategy Nash equilibrium ; lower probabilities ; belief functions ; prisoner's dilemma
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract We generalize the concept of Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for strategic form games to allow for ambiguity in the players' expectations. In contrast to other contributions, we model ambiguity by means of so-called lower probability measures or belief functions, which makes it possible to distinguish between a player's assessment of ambiguity and his attitude towards ambiguity. We also generalize the concept of trembling hand perfect equilibrium. Finally, we demonstrate that for certain attitudes towards ambiguity it is possible to explain cooperation in the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma in a way that is in accordance with some recent experimental findings.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1004962423985
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Prisoner's dilemma from a moral point of view (1996)
    Springer
    Theory and decision 41 (1996), S. 187-193 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: Altruism ; game theory ; moral point of view ; prisoner's dilemma ; sympathy
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract In a recent issue of this journal, C. L. Sheng claims to havesolved andexplained the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) by studying it ‘from a moral point of view’ - i.e., by assuming that each player feels sympathy for the other. Sheng does not fully clarify this claim, but there is textual evidence that his point is this: PD's arise only for agents who feel little or no sympathy for each other; they cannot arise in the presence of a high degree of reciprocal sympathy. A high degree of such sympathysolves the PD in that it prevents PD's from arising, and a low degree of itexplains the PD in that it provides an essential condition for the occurrence of that game. This thesis is false, as some examples show. These examples are important; they prevent us from underestimating the problem posed by the PD.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00134644
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Bayesian boundedly rational agents play the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (1994)
    Springer
    Theory and decision 36 (1994), S. 187-206 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: Bounded rationality ; Bayesian ; prisoner's dilemma
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract In this paper a model of boundedly rational decision making in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma is proposed in which: (1) each player is Bayesianrational; (2) this is common knowledge; (3) players are constrained by limited state spaces (their Bayesian minds) in ‘processing’ (1) and (2). Under these circumstances, we show that cooperative behavior may arise as an individually optimal response, except for the latter part of the game. Indeed, such behaviorwill necessarily obtain in long enough games if belief systems satisfy a natural condition: essentially, that all events consistent with the players' analysis of the game be attributed by them positive (although arbitrarily small) subjective probability.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01079212
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The repeated public goods game: A solution using Tit-for-Tat and the Lindahl point (1992)
    Springer
    Theory and decision 32 (1992), S. 133-146 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: Lindahl ; public goods ; collective action ; tit-for-tat ; prisoner's dilemma ; repeated games
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper demonstrates how a repeated public goods problem may be solved by using Tit-for-Tat (TFT) on the Lindahl point. The general solution is developed; geometric and numerical examples are offered.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00134048
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Folk theorems for the observable implications of repeated games (1992)
    Springer
    Theory and decision 32 (1992), S. 147-164 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: Folk Theorem ; prisoner's dilemma ; repeated games ; supergames ; tit-for-tat
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract The fact that infinitely repeated games have many different equilibrium outcomes is known as the Folk Theorem. Previous versions of the Folk Theorem have characterized only the payoffs of the game. This paper shows that over a finite portion of an infinitely repeated game, the concept of perfect equilibrium imposes virtually no restrictions on observable behavior. The Prisoner's Dilemma is presented as an example and discussed in detail.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00134049
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Indefinitely repeated games: A response to Carroll (1990)
    Springer
    Theory and decision 28 (1990), S. 189-195 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: Repeated games ; prisoner's dilemma
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract In a recent volume of this journal John Carroll argued that there exist only uncooperative equilibria in indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games. We show that this claim depends on modeling such games as finitely but indefinitely repeated games, which reduce simply to finitely repeated games. We propose an alternative general model of probabilistically indefinitely repeated games, and discuss the appropriateness of each of these models of indefinitely repeated games.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00160935
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Pavlov and the prisoner's dilemma (1989)
    Springer
    Theory and decision 26 (1989), S. 47-79 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: game theory ; prisoner's dilemma ; Markov chain ; evolution of cooperation
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract Our Pavlov learns by conditioned response, through rewards and punishments, to cooperate or defect. We analyze the behavior of an extended play Prisoner's Dilemma with Pavlov against various opponents and compute the time and cost to train Pavlov to cooperate. Among our results is that Pavlov and his clone would learn to cooperate more rapidly than if Pavlov played against the Tit for Tat strategy. This fact has implications for the evolution of cooperation.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00134056
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The impossibility of a paretian loyalist (1989)
    Springer
    Theory and decision 27 (1989), S. 207-216 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: Liberal paradox ; liberalism ; Pareto-criterion ; prisoner's dilemma ; rights
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract Amartya Sen has argued the impossibility of the Paretian liberal. While his abstract argument is compelling, the concrete significance of the conclusion is in some doubt. This is because it is not clear how important liberalism in his sense is; in particular it is not clear that the sort of liberalism required for the impossibility result is a compelling variety. We show that even if the argument cannot be used to establish the inconsistency of Paretianism and common-or-garden liberalism, it can be adapted to prove a parallel impossibility. This is the impossibility of combining the Pareto criterion with a loyalty constraint involving certain claim-rights rather than liberty-rights. The impossibility of the Paretian loyalist is of interest in itself but it is also interesting for the light it throws on the source of Sen-style impossibilities.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00135096
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