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  • Articles  (15)
  • rationality  (15)
  • Sociology  (8)
  • Philosophy  (7)
  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 26 (1995), S. 75-92 
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: Kuhn ; Wittgenstein ; paradigm ; incommensurability ; language games ; relativism ; rationality
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Summary The present paper argues that there is an affinity between Kuhn'sThe Structure of Scientific Revolutions and Wittgenstein's philosophy. It is maintained, in particular, that Kuhn's notion of paradigm draws on such Wittgensteinian concepts as language games, family resemblance, rules, forms of life. It is also claimed that Kuhn's incommensurability thesis is a sequel of the theory of meaning supplied by Wittgenstein's later philosophy. As such its assessment is not fallacious, since it is not an empirical hypothesis and it does not have the relativistic implications Kuhn's critics repeatedly indicated. Although concepts are indeed relative to a language game or paradigm, interparadigmatic intelligibility is preserved through the standard techniques of translation or praxis. The impossibility of radical translation which is captured by the claim of incommensurability lies with that which cannot be said but only shown.
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 21 (1990), S. 293-308 
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: psychology ; Külpe ; methodology ; Popper ; rationality
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Summary The importance of the problem of how to integrate psychology and methodology was rediscovered by Oswald Külpe. He noted that Wundt's psychology was inadequate and that a new methodology was needed to construct an alternative. Külpe made real progress but his program turned out to be quite difficult: he had no appropriate method for integrating the two fields. August Messer tried to fill the gap but failed. The problem was largely dropped due to poor methods at hand for studying it but remained important due to Popper's methodology and de Groot's psychology at least. We may now more effectively return to it by using a bootstrap method.
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 24 (1993), S. 43-62 
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: mathematics ; progress ; rationality ; methodology ; historiography ; cognitive and social factors
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Summary Is mathematical knowledge the product of a method fulfilling temporally and locally invariant criteria and thus manifesting a rationality which sets it entirely apart from all other cultural products? Or is it a socially constructed product, sharing in the accidental and conventional nature of all historically contingent cultural products? In order to be able to take the latter point of view at all seriously into consideration, the most sophisticated and historically informed methodological model is carefully and critically examined. This (Lakatosian) model, however liberal and history-directed it may seem, turns out to incorporate the former, (methodo)logical view of the development of mathematics. It will be demonstrated that the basic assumption underlying Lakatosian methodology is both unwarranted and superfluous for the rational explanation of the growth of mathematical knowledge. This leads to the provisional conclusion that the relevant question is not whether mathematical progress derives ultimately from irreducibly cognitive or from irreducibly social factors, but how cognitive and social factors are interrelated and together, in their indivisible unity, are constitutive of the development of mathematical knowledge. In the forthcoming second part of the article, a model of this socio-cognitive interplay, relying heavily on empirical analyses, will be presented.
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 6 (1996), S. 541-557 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Adaptation ; cognition ; evolutionary psychology ; human evolution ; language ; rationality
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Evolutionary psychology purports to explain human capacities as adaptations to an ancestral environment. A complete explanation of human language or human reasoning as adaptations depends on assessing an historical claim, that these capacities evolved under the pressure of natural selection and are prevalent because they provided systematic advantages to our ancestors. An outline of the character of the information needed in order to offer complete adaptation explanations is drawn from Robert Brandon (1990), and explanations offered for the evolution of language and reasoning within evolutionary psychology are evaluated. Pinker and Bloom's (1992) defense of human language as an adaptation for verbal communication, Robert Nozick's (1993) account of the evolutionary origin of rationality, and Cosmides and Tooby's (1992) explanation of human reasoning as an adaptation for social exchange, are discussed in light of what is known, and what is not known, about the history of human evolution. In each case, though a plausible case is made that these capacities are adaptations, there is not enough known to offer even a semblance of an explanation of the origin of these capacities. These explanations of the origin of human thought and language are simply speculations lacking the kind of detailed historical information required for an evolutionary explanation of an adaptation.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 4 (1989), S. 457-481 
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Evolution ; evolutionary biology ; fitness ; decision theory ; theory of choice ; rationality ; rational behavior ; reductionism
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract A fundamental philosophical question that arises in connection with evolutionary theory is whether the fittest patterns of behavior are always the most rational. Are fitness and rationality fully compatible? When behavioral rationality is characterized formally as in classical decision theory, the question becomes mathematically meaningful and can be explored systematically by investigating whether the optimally fit behavior predicted by evolutionary process models is decision-theoretically coherent. Upon investigation, it appears that in nontrivial evolutionary models the expected behavior is not always in accord with the norms of the standard theory of decision as ordinarily applied. Many classically irrational acts, e.g. betting on the occurrence of one event in the knowledge that the probabilities favor another, can under certain circumstances constitute adaptive behavior. One interesting interpretation of this clash is that the criterion of rationality offered by classical decision theory is simply incorrect (or at least incomplete) as it stands, and that evolutionary theory should be called upon to provide a more generally applicable theory of rationality. Such a program, should it prove feasible, would amount to the logical reduction of the theory of rational choice to evolutionary theory.
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 10 (1995), S. 129-180 
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Evolution ; explanation ; morality ; rationality ; normative communication ; fact/value distinction ; utilitarianism
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Gibbard's theory of rationality is “evolutionary” in terms of its result as well as its underpinning argument. The result is that judgments about what is “rational” are analyzed as being similar to judgments of morality — in view of what Darwin suggests concerning the latter. According to the Darwinian theory, moral judgments are based on sentiments which evolve to promote the survival and welfare of human societies. On Gibbard's theory, rationality judgments should be similarly regarded as expressing emotional attachments to behavioral norms which originate and function to coordinate social interaction. Consequently, Gibbard's theory of rationality might be used to illuminate Darwin's theory of morality, and vice versa. Additionally, as argued in the present essay, both can be further elaborated, and defended, by developing related themes in philosophical ethics: viz., connected with Hume and 20th-century emotivists. The main problem is that this general Darwinian approach faces widespread opposition nowadays, not only in ethics but in philosophy of science. The purpose of this essay is to analyze Gibbard's theory, critically and constructively, with emphasis on the pertinent commonalities in Darwin, Hume and the emotivists, while also critically addressing their common enemies. The pervasive methodological orientation is to relate this analysis to (philosophy of) science in general, and biological science in particular.
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 11 (1996), S. 141-159 
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Popper ; metaphysics ; problems ; falsifiability ; demarcation ; evolution theory ; rationality ; morality ; downward causation ; dogmatism
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract To honour the memory of Sir Karl Popper, I put forward six elements of his philosophy which might be of particular interest to biologists and to philosophers of biology and which I think Popper would like them not to ignore, even if they disagree with him. They are: the primacy of problems; the criticizability of metaphysics (and thus the dubiousness of materialism); how downward causation might be real; how norms should matter to scientists; why dogmatism should be avoided; how genuine science is recognizable. I preface these six things with a brief discussion of Popper's early (but later recanted) mistakes concerning biology.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Theory and decision 33 (1992), S. 177-189 
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: Axioms ; cooperation ; game theory ; Nash equilibrium ; rationality
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract The purpose of this paper is to analyze axiomatically the Nash equilibrium concept. The class of games under study is a (relatively large) subclass of n-person normal form games. Solutions are correspondences which associate to each game a non empty set of strategy vectors of this game. It is shown that if a solution satisfies the axioms Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and Individual rationality (IR), then all the strategy vectors in this solution are Nash equilibria. This result holds good also if IR is replaced by Strong individual monotonicity (SIM) or Weak principle of fair compromise (WPFC).
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Theory and decision 27 (1989), S. 7-36 
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: rationality ; information ; expectations ; beliefs ; dynamic games ; game equilibria
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract Beside instrumental rationality, concerned with consistency between available means and pursued objectives, cognitive rationality, concerned with consistency between current beliefs and detained information, is nowadays bursting in economic theory. For an individual decision, the two notions are expressed structurally in similar forms, but they heavily interact in the deliberation process, especially when the agent is searching relevant information on his environment and his own determiners. In a game framework, the players' representations are formalized in a more and more sophisticated way, and are closely interwoven with their preferences in contemporary equilibrium notions as well as in selection between corresponding equilibrium points.
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Theory and decision 41 (1996), S. 257-280 
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: Preference ; decision theory ; utility ; rationality
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract Standard decision theoretic models disregard the phenomenon of interpersonal dependency of preferences. In this paper it is argued that interpersonal dependency of preferences is a serious challenge for standard utility theory. First we sketch the more philosophical aspects of the problem and then, using a simple, formal model for the two-person case, we show that interpersonal dependency of preferences generally results in indeterminacy of preferences (resp. of subjective utility).
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