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  • expected utility  (7)
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  • Articles  (7)
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  • Springer  (7)
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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Theory and decision 27 (1989), S. 93-106 
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: cognition ; decision ; graphs ; artificial intelligence ; risk ; uncertainty ; expert systems ; expected utility
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract In the first part, we try to give a representation of the process by which man endeavours to grasp uncertainty. We propose a backward exploration which we will modelize through an influence diagram and then we can draw a few conclusions from that representation for the axiomatics of Decision. In the second part, we deal with the processing of the information formatted in such a way, regarding both its temporal complexity and its elective complexity. The first part as the second one dealing with representation and the consequences for information processing of uncertainty cognition lead to a severe criticism of the expected utility hypothesis. To conclude, we suggest a few remarks on expert systems of decision aid under uncertainty.
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Theory and decision 24 (1988), S. 169-200 
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: decision theory ; risk ; expected utility ; security level ; risk aversion
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract The particular attention paid by decision makers to the security level ensured by each decision under risk, which is responsible for the certainty effect, can be taken into account by weakening the independence and continuity axioms of expected utility theory. In the resulting model, preferences depend on: (i) the security level, (ii) the expected utility, offered by each decision. Choices are partially determined by security level comparison and completed by the maximization of a function, which express the existing tradeoffs between expected utility and security level, and is, at a given security level, an affine function of the expected utility. In the model, risk neutrality at a given security level implies risk aversion.
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Theory and decision 25 (1988), S. 219-223 
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: St. Petersburg Paradox ; expected utility ; bounded utility ; cardinal utility ; Becker's theory of time
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract The assumption of bounded utility function resolves the St. Petersburg paradox. The justification for such a bound is provided by Brito, who argues that limited time will bound the utility function. However, a reformulated St. Petersburg game, which is played for both money and time, effectively circumvents Brito's justification for a bound. Hence, no convincing justification for bounding the utility function yet exists.
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Theory and decision 31 (1991), S. 175-197 
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: preferences ; expected utility ; subjective probability ; Bayesian risk
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract A rational statistical decision maker whose preferences satisfy Savage's axioms will minimize a Bayesian risk function: the expectation with respect to a revealed (or subjective) probability distribution of a loss (or negative utility) function over the consequences of the statistical decision problem. However, the nice expected utility form of the Bayesian risk criterion is nothing but a representation of special preferences. The subjective probability is defined together with the utility (or loss) function and it is not possible, in general, to use a given loss function - say a quadratic loss - and to elicit independently a subjective distribution. I construct the Bayesian risk criterion with a set of five axioms, each with a simple mathematical implication. This construction clearly shows that the subjective probability that is revealed by a decider's preferences is nothing but a (Radon) measure equivalent to a linear functional (the criterion). The functions on which the criterion operates are expected utilities in the von Neumann-Morgenstern sense. It then becomes clear that the subjective distribution cannot be eliciteda priori, independently of the utility function on consequences. However, if one considers a statistical decision problem by itself, losses, defined by a given loss function, become the consequences of the decisions. It can be imagined that experienced statisticians are used to dealing with different losses and are able to compare them (i.e. have ‘preferences’, or ‘fears’ over a set of possible losses). Using suitable axioms over these preferences, one can represent them by a (linear) criterion: this criterion is the expectation of losses with respect to a (revealed) distribution. It must be noted that such a distribution is a measure and need not be a probability distribution.
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Theory and decision 36 (1994), S. 257-275 
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: de Finetti's theory ; expected utility ; rational behaviour ; Allais paradox
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract We present some interesting features of de Finetti's decision theory; then we extended the theory. The extended theory has a normative character and is of the expected utility kind, but it is also very adaptable. By comparing it with some leading theories, we find that our theory is compatible with consideration of the whole probability distribution — it can even accommodate Allais' paradox -, while it is not generally compatible with probability weighting. We are mainly interested in the normative point of view.
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Theory and decision 33 (1992), S. 101-134 
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: Behavior under risk ; expected utility ; security factor ; potential factor
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract Among the violations of expected utility (E.U.) theory which have been observed by experimenters, the violations of its independence axiom is, by far, the most common. It seems that, in many cases, these inconsistencies can be ascribed to the desire for security - called the security factor by L. Lopes (1986) - which “makes people attach special importance to the worst outcomes of risky decisions” as well as to the sole outcomes of riskless decisions (certainty effect). J.-Y. Jaffray (1988) has proposed a model which generalizes E.U. theory by taking into account this factor and is then able to account for certain violations. However, especially in experiments on choice involving prospective losses, violations of the von Neumann-Morgenstern independence axiom cannot be explained by the security factor alone and have to be partially ascribed to the potential factor (L. Lopes, 1986) which “reflects heightened attention to the best outcomes of decisions”, especially when the best outcome is the status quo. In this paper, we construct an axiomatic model for subjects taking into account simultaneously or alternatively the security factor and the potential factor. For this, as in Jaffray's model, it has been necessary to weaken not only the standard independence axiom but also the continuity axiom and, in the same time, to reinforce the dominance axiom. In the resulting model, choices are partially determined by the mere comparison of the (security level, potential level) (i.e. the (worst outcome, best outcome)) pairs offered, and completed by the maximization of an affine function of the expected utility, the coefficients of which depend on both the security level and potential level. In this model, a decision maker who (i) has constant marginal utility for money, (ii) is sensitive to the security factor alone in the domain of gains, (iii) is sensitive to the potential factor alone in the domain of losses, behaves as a risk averter for gains and a risk seeker for losses.
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Theory and decision 35 (1993), S. 55-73 
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: Paradox ; pseudo-paradox ; decision theory ; game theory ; observation ; probability ; utility ; expected utility
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract In quantum domains, the measurement (or observation) of one of a pair of complementary variables introduces an unavoidable uncertainty in the value of that variable's complement. Such uncertainties are negligible in Newtonian worlds, where observations can be made without appreciably disturbing the observed system. Hence, one would not expect that an observation of a non-quantum probabilistic outcome could affect a probability distribution over subsequently possible states, in a way that would conflict with classical probability calculations. This paper examines three problems in which observations appear to affect the probabilities and expected utilities of subsequent outcomes, in ways which may appear paradoxical. Deeper analysis of these problems reveals that the anomalies arise, not from paradox, but rather from faulty inferences drawn from the observations themselves. Thus the notion of ‘quantum’ decision theory is disparaged.
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