ISSN:
1436-3259
Keywords:
Environmental regulation
;
compliance
;
game theory
;
whistle-blowing
;
reporting system
;
water quality management
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Architecture, Civil Engineering, Surveying
,
Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering
,
Geography
,
Geosciences
Notes:
Abstract A formal mathematical model is developed to ascertain the effectiveness of a reporting system for improving the enforcement of environmental laws and regulations when reports are costly. To model realistic enforcement problems arising over environmental issues such as compliance to water and air quality standards, a formal enforcement model is constructed using concepts from probability and statistics, non-cooperative game theory, and economics. In order to demonstrate clearly the benefits gained when an environmental agency takes advantage of a reporting system, a formal enforcement model with a costly reporting system is rigorously compared to one with no reporting system. The calculation and comparison of Nash equilibria for a range of values of model parameters indicates under what conditions a reporting system can be truly effective. Overall, it is found that a reporting system, such as whistle-blowing, can be helpful for reducing violations of environmental standards, thereby maintaining better environmental quality.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01585604
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