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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Utilization of mathematical programming for public systems: An application to effective formation of integrated regional information networks (1991)
    Springer
    Mathematical programming 52 (1991), S. 71-98 
    Details
    ISSN: 1436-4646
    Keywords: Multiobjective approach ; group decision making ; regional utility function ; game theory ; nucleolus
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Mathematics
    Notes: Abstract This paper concerns a methodological reflection on the multiobjective approach to public systems which involve group decision processes. Particular attention is given to an integrated program of regional systems which include value trade-offs between multiple objectives. Our intention is to combine the judgmental processes with the optimization processes in the “soft” public systems. A two-layer approach is applied. At the first layer, each regional program is formulated in mathematical programming based on a utility assessment with different regional characteristics. Each subsystem independently reflects its particular concern as a single agent. The dual optimal solutions obtained for each subsystem are treated as an index, or the theoretical prices, representing the value trade-offs among the multiple objectives. At the second layer, an effective formation of interregional cooperation for compromising the conflicting regional interests is examined. Ann-person cooperative game in the characteristic function form is used to evaluate the effectiveness of the cooperation. The characteristic function for the game is derived on the incremental value of the regional benefit after the formation of a cooperation. The nucleolus and the augmented nucleolus as the solution concepts of the cooperative game are used for indicating the effectiveness of the cooperation. Finally using alternative criteria, the results in assessing the best decisions are examined comparatively.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01582881
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Can a costly reporting system make environmental enforcement more efficient? (1995)
    Springer
    Stochastic environmental research and risk assessment 9 (1995), S. 151-170 
    Details
    ISSN: 1436-3259
    Keywords: Environmental regulation ; compliance ; game theory ; whistle-blowing ; reporting system ; water quality management
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Architecture, Civil Engineering, Surveying , Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering , Geography , Geosciences
    Notes: Abstract A formal mathematical model is developed to ascertain the effectiveness of a reporting system for improving the enforcement of environmental laws and regulations when reports are costly. To model realistic enforcement problems arising over environmental issues such as compliance to water and air quality standards, a formal enforcement model is constructed using concepts from probability and statistics, non-cooperative game theory, and economics. In order to demonstrate clearly the benefits gained when an environmental agency takes advantage of a reporting system, a formal enforcement model with a costly reporting system is rigorously compared to one with no reporting system. The calculation and comparison of Nash equilibria for a range of values of model parameters indicates under what conditions a reporting system can be truly effective. Overall, it is found that a reporting system, such as whistle-blowing, can be helpful for reducing violations of environmental standards, thereby maintaining better environmental quality.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01585604
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Control and game-theoretic assessment of climate change: Options for Joint Implementation (2000)
    Springer
    Annals of operations research 97 (2000), S. 203-212 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-9338
    Keywords: conflict ; cooperation ; energy economics ; environmental control ; game theory ; resource allocation ; system dynamics ; 90-99 ; 90A16 ; 90A30 ; 90D50 ; 93C55 ; 93C95
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract The Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) demands reductions in greenhouse gas emissions by the industrialized countries, while developing countries are still permitted to expand their energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. To identify, assess and compare options for avoiding and minimizing anthropogenic climate change, the framework of dynamic-game models (the SCX conflict model and the problem-specific TEM model) is applied to analyze the interaction between energy technologies, emission reductions and economic output with regard to energy use and the relationship between conflict and cooperation in climate policy. Basic variables are energy production, emissions into the enviroment, the energy price and the economic output. Major control parameters are the allocation of funding with regard to various energy options and the degree of international cooperation through technology transfer and capital flow. In particular, the impact of cooperation between industrialized and developing countries is evaluated to understand the role of governments in the transition to sustainable market economies. Simulations and numerical results are presented which can be used in a constructive way to implement a Joint-Implementation Program as an advanced market institution.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1018940627463
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Interconnected games and international environmental problems, II (1994)
    Springer
    Annals of operations research 54 (1994), S. 97-117 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-9338
    Keywords: Modelling ; interconnection ; side payments ; game theory ; environment ; transboundary pollution ; multiple objective games ; repeated games ; tensor games ; tradeoff ; Pareto equilibrium ; Nash equilibrium ; Folk theorem ; prisoners' dilemma ; JEL C70 ; Q28
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract Some features of international environmental problems are considered. A basic problem is to induce countries to adopt a cooperative approach. One of the instruments to induce countries to cooperate is an exchange of concessions in fields of relative strengths, such as swapping trade concessions for cooperation on international environmental problems. This instrument will be modelled in this paper with tensor games. Both tradeoff and non-tradeoff tensor games will be addressed, with emphasis on tradeoff tensor games with linear strict weights. The relationship between the Pareto equilibria of a non-tradeoff tensor game and the Nash equilibria of the associated tradeoff tensor games will be studied. Due to structural similarities between tensor games and repeated multiple objective games, some attention will also be paid to the latter. Relationships between objects related to Folk theorems for the tradeoff tensor game with completely additive weights and the corresponding objects for its constituting isolated games will be studied. Since many international environmental problems have prisoners' dilemma characteristics, it is analyzed how interconnection may enhance cooperation in prisoners' dilemma games.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02031729
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    On the core of the minimum cost steiner tree game in networks (1995)
    Springer
    Annals of operations research 57 (1995), S. 233-249 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-9338
    Keywords: Steiner tree ; game theory ; cost allocation ; integer programming ; linear programming
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract A cost allocation problem arising from the Steiner Tree (ST) problem in networks is analyzed. This cost allocation problem is formulated as a cost cooperative game in characteristic function form, referred to as theST-game. The class ofST games generalizes the class of minimum cost spanning tree games which were used in the literature to analyze a variety of cost allocation problems. In general, the core of anST-game may be empty. We construct an efficient Core Heuristic to compute a “good” lower bound on the maximum fraction of the total cost that can be distributed among users while satisfying the core constraints. Based on the Core Heuristic, we also provide a sufficient condition for a givenST not to be optimal for the linear programming relaxation of an integer programming formulation of theST problem. The Core Heuristic was implemented and tested on 76 data sets from the literature (Wong's, Aneja's and Beasley's Steiner tree problems). Core points were found for 69 of these cases, and points “close” to the core were computed in the others.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02099700
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The principal-agent problem with adaptive players (1996)
    Springer
    Computational & mathematical organization theory 1 (1996), S. 157-182 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-9346
    Keywords: Agency theory ; bounded rationality ; computer simulation ; game theory ; incentives ; learning-mathematical models
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics
    Notes: Abstract In this study we show predictions made by the standard principal-agent theory may not hold when knowlege assumptions are relaxed. Conventional principal-agent models assume players are completely rational: they know their own and other player's utilities and probabilities of all states of nature. In reality, players must make decisions without such knowledge. We define a simple version of the principal-agent game and examine it using object-oriented computer simulation. Player learning is modeled with a statistical learning model. Our results show that even this simple game combined with standard learning assumptions results in complex behavior. Expectations of both the principal and the agents are crucial in determining the system outcomes. Expectations and lack of prior knowledge make it possible for the principal to converge on suboptimal behavior or not converge on a consistent behavior at all. The same attributes in the agents make it possible for the principal to drive expectations down and thus get higher effort for lower reward. This study contributes a more robust understanding of the principal-agent model and its application to incentive design.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01299067
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The principal-agent problem with evolutionary learning (1996)
    Springer
    Computational & mathematical organization theory 2 (1996), S. 139-162 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-9346
    Keywords: Agency theory ; bounded rationality ; computer simulation ; incentives ; game theory ; genetic algorithms
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics
    Notes: Abstract We extend agency theory to incorporate bounded rationality of both principals and agents. In this study we define a simple version of the principal-agent game and examine it using object-oriented computer simulation. Player learning is simulated with a genetic algorithm model. Our results show that players of incentive games in highly uncertain environments may take on defensive strategies. These defensive strategies lead to equilibria which are inferior to Nash equilibria. If agents are risk averse, the principal may not be able to provide enough monetary compensation to encourage them to take risks. But principals may be able to improve system performance by identifying good performers and facilitating information exchange among agents.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00240424
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Asymptotic pseudotrajectories and chain recurrent flows, with applications (1996)
    Springer
    Journal of dynamics and differential equations 8 (1996), S. 141-176 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-9222
    Keywords: Asymptotically autonomous systems ; dynamical systems ; chain recurrence ; game theory ; reaction diffusion ; stochastic approximation
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics
    Notes: Abstract We present a general framework to study compact limit sets of trajectories for a class of nonautonomous systems, including asymptotically autonomous differential equations, certain stochastic differential equations, stochastic approximation processes with decreasing gain, and fictitious plays in game theory. Such limit sets are shown to be internally chain recurrent, and conversely.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02218617
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The management of high seas fisheries (2000)
    Springer
    Annals of operations research 94 (2000), S. 183-196 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-9338
    Keywords: fisheries management ; game theory ; Norwegian spring‐spawning herring ; straddling and highly migratory stocks ; United Nations
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract The intergovernmental United Nations Conference on Highly Migratory and Straddling Stocks, initiated in 1993 and finished in 1995, addressed the conservation and management of fishery resources located both within the coastal state 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the adjacent high seas. These types of marine resources continue to be a source for international conflicts and debates. The original United Nations Law of the Sea of 1982 failed to address transboundary fisheries in a proper way. In particular, the agreement did not recognize the emergence of the complicated “straddling stock” issue. In the new United Nations Law of the Sea agreement of 1995, a consensus was reached that the management of the straddling and highly migratory fish stocks should be carried out through regional fisheries management organizations. We present a review of the straddling stock issues in the international agreement emerging from the negotiations within the United Nations. The review is contrasted with and clarified by game theoretic analyses. We also discuss one international fishery exemplifying the case, the Norwegian spring‐spawning herring. The main conclusion is that the local problems, faced during the stage of setting up regional fisheries organizations for the management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, are expected to be much more complicated and difficult to solve as compared to the cases of “shared fish stocks”. In the current paper, we present two reasons for this increased complexity. The first is the larger number of players as compared to the case of “shared fish stocks” and the second is the possibility of new members entering the regional fisheries organizations.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1018925302021
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Dominant Competitive Factors for evaluating program efficiency in grouped data (1997)
    Springer
    Annals of operations research 73 (1997), S. 253-276 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-9338
    Keywords: Data Envelopment Analysis ; game theory ; efficiency ; linear programming
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract Dominant Competitive Factors, unique solutions to a new class of two-person ratio efficiency games, are introduced as a means for distinguishing exceptional aspects of individual performance. The vectors of input-output multipliers thus obtained may be analyzed collectively so that commonalities within groups and differences across groups may be discovered. The method is applied to "Program Follow-Through", the original impetus for developing Data Envelopment Analysis. Our results are compared with those of the earlier study, whereupon substantial new insights are obtained.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1018933329202
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