ALBERT

All Library Books, journals and Electronic Records Telegrafenberg

Your email was sent successfully. Check your inbox.

An error occurred while sending the email. Please try again.

Proceed reservation?

Export
Filter
  • Articles  (23)
  • representation  (22)
  • Drosophila
  • stability
  • Springer  (23)
  • Philosophy  (23)
  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Studia logica 66 (2000), S. 297-323 
    ISSN: 1572-8730
    Keywords: algebraic logic ; relation algebras ; relativization ; representation
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract In this paper we introduced various classes of weakly associative relation algebras with polyadic composition operations. Among them is the class RWA∞ of representable weakly associative relation algebras with polyadic composition operations. Algebras of this class are relativized representable relation algebras augmented with an infinite set of operations of increasing arity which are generalizations of the binary relative composition. We show that RWA∞ is a canonical variety whose equational theory is decidable.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 4 (1994), S. 215-231 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Meaning ; representation ; disjunction problem ; Twin-Earth ; Fodor ; asymmetric causal dependency ; actual ; naturalized semantics ; information
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract In an earlier paper, we argued that Fodorian Semantics has serious difficulties. However, we suggested possible ways that one might attempt to fix this. Ted Warfield suggests that our arguments can be deflected and he does this by making the very moves that we suggested. In our current paper, we respond to Warfield's attempts to revise and defend Fodorian Semantics against our arguments that such a semantic theory is both too strong and too weak. To get around our objections, Warfield proposes a modified reading of one of Fodor's conditions and proposes adding a new condition to the theory. We show that neither the modified reading nor the additional condition saves the asymmetric causal dependency approach to naturalized semantics.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 5 (1995), S. 357-371 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Action ; anti-individualism ; artificial agents ; child development ; computation ; embedded systems ; environmentalism ; formality condition ; individualism ; learning algorithms ; mobile robots ; representation
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract The dispute between individualism and anti-individualism is about the individuation of psychological states, and individualism, on some accounts, is committed to the claim that psychological subjects together with their environments do not constitute integrated computational systems. Hence on this view the computational states that explain psychological states in computational accounts of mind will not involve the subject's natural and social environment. Moreover, the explanation of a system's interaction with the environment is, on this view, not the primary goal of computational theorizing. Recent work in computational developmental psychology (by A. Karmiloff-Smith and J. Rutkowska) as well as artificial agents or embedded artificial systems (by L.P. Kaelbling, among others) casts doubt on these claims. In these computational models, the environment does not just trigger and sustain input for computational operations, but some computational operations actually involve environmental structures.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 129-165 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Computation ; cognition ; representation ; information processing ; physical symbol systems ; language of thought
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Cognitive science uses the notion of computational information processing to explain cognitive information processing. Some philosophers have argued that anything can be described as doing computational information processing; if so, it is a vacuous notion for explanatory purposes. An attempt is made to explicate the notions of cognitive information processing and computational information processing and to specify the relationship between them. It is demonstrated that the resulting notion of computational information processing can only be realized in a restrictive class of dynamical systems called physical notational systems (after Goodman's theory of notationality), and that the systems generally appealed to by cognitive science-physical symbol systems-are indeed such systems. Furthermore, it turns out that other alternative conceptions of computational information processing, Fodor's (1975) Language of Thought and Cummins' (1989) Interpretational Semantics appeal to substantially the same restrictive class of systems. The necessary connection of computational information processing with notationality saves the enterprise from charges of vacuousness and has some interesting implications for connectionism. But, unfortunately, it distorts the subject matter and entails some troubling consequences for a cognitive science which tries to make notationality do the work of genuine mental representations.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 167-184 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Connectionism ; eliminativism ; propositional attitudes ; representation ; symbols
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Ramsey, Stich and Garon's recent paper ‘Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology’ claims a certain style of connectionism to be the final nail in the coffin of folk psychology. I argue that their paper fails to show this, and that the style of connectionism they illustrate can in fact supplement, rather than compete with, the claims of a theory of cognition based in folk psychology's ontology. Ramsey, Stich and Garon's argument relies on the lack of easily identifiable symbols inside the connectionist network they discuss, and they suggest that the existence of a system which behaves in a cognitively interesting way, but which cannot be explained by appeal to internal symbol processing, falsifies central assumptions of folk psychology. My claim is that this argument is flawed, and that the theorist need not discard folk psychology in order to accept that the network illustrated exhibits cognitively interesting behaviour, even if it is conceded that symbols cannot be readily identified within the network.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 21 (1990), S. 347-358 
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: artificial intelligence ; understanding ; representation ; meaning ; intentionality ; teleology ; subjectivity ; semiotics ; philosophical anthropology
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Summary Artificial Intelligence can be considered as the so far last attempt to decode the anthropological comparison between human beings and machines. Thereby it also represents in a prominent way what can be called “systemic thought”. Searle's conclusive argument against strong AI (that is the idea of computers having intention in a literal way) refers to his precise distinction between syntax and semantics. This difference obviously opposing some of Searle's other essential ideas will only convince if it also explains the genetic-pragmatic aspect. A theory explaining the “life of mind” and the possibility of understanding needs to combine representation and intention with the subjective causation of signs. At the same time they have to be contextualized within a model of teleologically interpreted life recognized with the help of self-experience and self-reflection. This suggests that AI is a simulation which wrongly believes to be a real duplication. Actually it is a semiotic reduction (syntax and semantic surface of signs only) and a psychological compensation (Turing test) connected with a genetic or abductive fallacy. The biological decontextualization, in fact the elimination of teleology and intention, the deconstruction of subjectivity, the loss of the genetic-pragmatic dimension and the abductive fallacy induce the strong AI to confuse its surface-illusion of simulated understanding with the real process itself.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 23 (1992), S. 85-103 
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: life ; teleology ; evolution ; reality ; representation ; experience
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Summary A comprehensive definition of the phenomenon called “life” led to the addition of many dimensions to the natural sciences, and especially the conscious mental dimension. Historical attention is paid not only to those employing the natural philosophical paradigms, but also to evolutionary theories and to the Kantian teleological philosophy. The belief that science can solve the riddle of life is a category of purposal thinking. A revised version of critical teleology is essential for comprehension of life.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 3 (1993), S. 183-200 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Connectionism ; representation ; explicit rules
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract At present, the prevailing Connectionist methodology forrepresenting rules is toimplicitly embody rules in “neurally-wired” networks. That is, the methodology adopts the stance that rules must either be hard-wired or “trained into” neural structures, rather than represented via explicit symbolic structures. Even recent attempts to implementproduction systems within connectionist networks have assumed that condition-action rules (or rule schema) are to be embodied in thestructure of individual networks. Such networks must be grown or trained over a significant span of time. However, arguments are presented herein that humanssometimes follow rules which arevery rapidly assignedexplicit internal representations, and that humans possessgeneral mechanisms capable of interpreting and following such rules. In particular, arguments are presented that thespeed with which humans are able to follow rules ofnovel structure demonstrates the existence of general-purpose rule following mechanisms. It is further argued that the existence of general-purpose rule following mechanisms strongly indicates that explicit rule following is not anisolated phenomenon, but may well be a common and important aspect of cognition. The relationship of the foregoing conclusions to Smolensky's view of explicit rule following is also explored. The arguments presented here are pragmatic in nature, and are contrasted with thekind of arguments developed by Fodor and Pylyshyn in their recent, influential paper.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 4 (1994), S. 333-344 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Emergence ; content ; information ; representation ; computers
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract I examine whether it is possible for content relevant to a computer's behavior to be carried without an explicit internal representation. I consider three approaches. First, an example of a chess playing computer carrying ‘emergent’ content is offered from Dennett. Next I examine Cummins’ response to this example. Cummins says Dennett's computer executes a rule which is inexplicitly represented. Cummins describes a process wherein a computer interprets explicit rules in its program, implements them to form a chess-playing device, then this device executes the rules in a way that exhibits them inexplicitly. Though this approach is intriguing, I argue that the chess-playing device cannot exist as imagined. The processes of interpretation and implementation produce explicit representations of the content claimed to be inexplicit. Finally, the Chinese Room argument is examined and shown not to save the notion of inexplicit information. This means the strategy of attributing inexplicit content to a computer which is executing a rule, fails.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 5 (1995), S. 45-68 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Vision ; categorization ; representation ; similarity ; receptive fields ; multidimensional scaling ; feature spaces
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract It is proposed to conceive of representation as an emergent phenomenon that is supervenient on patterns of activity of coarsely tuned and highly redundant feature detectors. The computational underpinnings of the outlined concept of representation are (1) the properties of collections of overlapping graded receptive fields, as in the biological perceptual systems that exhibit hyperacuity-level performance, and (2) the sufficiency of a set of proximal distances between stimulus representations for the recovery of the corresponding distal contrasts between stimuli, as in multidimensional scaling. The present preliminary study appears to indicate that this concept of representation is computationally viable, and is compatible with psychological and neurobiological data.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 11
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 6 (1996), S. 47-60 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Behavioral criterion (of intended object of representation) ; Braitenberg vehicle ; Dennett ; Dretske ; extensional content ; information theory account of representation ; intended object ; intentionality ; intrinsic natural representation ; Lloyd ; machine error ; misrepresentation ; qualia ; representation ; Wittgenstein
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract In Simple Minds, Dan Lloyd presents a reductive account of naturally representing machines. The theory entails that a system represents an event by virtue of potentially misrepresenting it whenever the machine satisfies a multiple information channel, convergence, and uptake condition. I argue that Lloyd's conditions are insufficient for systems intrinsically naturally to misrepresent, and hence insufficient for them intrinsically naturally to represent. The appearance of potential misrepresentation in such machines is achieved only by reference to the extrinsic design or extrinsic interpretation or attribution of an intrinsically nonexistent or underdetermined purpose, end, or goal to such devices in identifying an intended object of representation in the system's salient behavior under the uptake condition. The implication is that Lloyd-representation is not intrinsic natural representation in a cognitively relevant sense, and Lloyd's simple ‘minds’ are not minds but mere machines.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 12
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 9 (1999), S. 3-28 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: physical symbols ; formal programs ; neural networks ; designation ; interpretation ; representation ; semantics ; intensional meaning ; extensional meaning ; causal capacities ; emergence ; levels
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract The purpose of this article is to show why consciousness and thought are not manifested in digital computers. Analyzing the rationale for claiming that the formal manipulation of physical symbols in Turing machines would emulate human thought, the article attempts to show why this proved false. This is because the reinterpretation of ‘designation’ and ‘meaning’ to accommodate physical symbol manipulation eliminated their crucial functions in human discourse. Words have denotations and intensional meanings because the brain transforms the physical stimuli received from the microworld into a qualitative, macroscopic representation for consciousness. Lacking this capacity as programmed machines, computers have no representations for their symbols to designate and mean. Unlike human beings in which consciousness and thought, with their inherent content, have emerged because of their organic natures, serial processing computers or parallel distributed processing systems, as programmed electrical machines, lack these causal capacities.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 13
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 8 (1998), S. 353-374 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: connectionism ; explicit ; implicit ; process ; representation
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Explicitness has usually been approached from two points of view, labelled by Kirsh the structural and the process view, that hold opposite assumptions to determine when information is explicit. In this paper, we offer an intermediate view that retains intuitions from both of them. We establish three conditions for explicit information that preserve a structural requirement, and a notion of explicitness as a continuous dimension. A problem with the former accounts was their disconnection with psychological work on the issue. We review studies by Karmiloff-Smith, and Shanks and St. John to show that the proposed conditions have psychological grounds. Finally, we examine the problem of explicit rules in connectionist systems in the light of our framework.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 14
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 1-30 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Artificial intelligence ; content ; cognitive science ; mind-body problem ; representation ; semantic ; syntax
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract I argue that there are no mental representations, in the sense of “representation” used in standard computational theories of the mind. I take Cummins' Meaning and Mental Representation as my stalking-horse, and argue that his view, once properly developed, is self-defeating. The argument implicitly undermines Fodor's view of the mind; I draw that conclusion out explicitly. The idea of mental representations can then only be saved by appeal to a Dennett-like instrumentalism; so I argue against that too. Finally, I argue that there is no good metaphysical reason in favour of believing in mental representations and that cognitive science can manage perfectly well without them.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 15
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 2 (1992), S. 185-201 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Constraint ; individuation scheme ; infon ; information ; representation ; type
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract I argue that the role played by infons in the kind of mathematical theory of information being developed by several workers affiliated to CSLI is analogous to that of the various number systems in mathematics. In particular, I present a mathematical construction of infons in terms of representations and informational equivalences between them. The main theme of the paper arose from an electronic mail exchange with Pat Hayes of Xeroxparc. The exposition derives from a talk I gave at theTheories of Partial Information conference held at the University of Texas at Austin, January 1990.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 16
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 2 (1992), S. 175-183 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Meaning ; representation ; disjunction problem ; information semantics ; Fodor ; asymmetric causal dependency
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract InPsychosemantics Jerry Fodor offered a list of sufficient conditions for a symbol “X” to mean something X. The conditions are designed to reduce meaning to purely non-intentional natural relations. They are also designed to solve what Fodor has dubbed the “disjunction problem”. More recently, inA Theory of Content and Other Essays, Fodor has modified his list of sufficient conditions for naturalized meaning in light of objections to his earlier list. We look at his new set of conditions and give his motivation for them-tracing them to problems in the literature. Then we argue that Fodor's conditions still do not work. They are open to objections of two different varieties: they are too strong and too weak. We develop these objections and indicate why Fodor's new, improved list of conditions still do not work to naturalize meaning.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 17
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 5 (1995), S. 219-242 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Explicit ; implicit ; connectionism ; representation
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Much of traditional AI exemplifies the “explicit representation” paradigm, and during the late 1980's a heated debate arose between the classical and connectionist camps as to whether beliefs and rules receive an explicit or implicit representation in human cognition. In a recent paper, Kirsh (1990) questions the coherence of the fundamental distinction underlying this debate. He argues that our basic intuitions concerning ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ representations are not only confused but inconsistent. Ultimately, Kirsh proposes a new formulation of the distinction, based upon the criterion ofconstant time processing. The present paper examines Kirsh's claims. It is argued that Kirsh fails to demonstrate that our usage of ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ is seriously confused or inconsistent. Furthermore, it is argued that Kirsh's new formulation of the explicit-implicit distinction is excessively stringent, in that it banishes virtually all sentences of natural language from the realm of explicit representation. By contrast, the present paper proposes definitions for ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ which preserve most of our strong intuitions concerning straightforward uses of these terms. It is also argued that the distinction delineated here sustains the meaningfulness of the abovementioned debate between classicists and connectionists.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 18
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 7 (1997), S. 531-541 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Dynamical systems theory ; computation ; motivational oscillatory theory ; representation ; Turing machine ; van Gelder ; Watt governor
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Van Gelder (1995) has recently spearheaded a movement to challenge the dominance of connectionist and classicist models in cognitive science. The dynamical conception of cognition is van Gelder's replacement for the computation bound paradigms provided by connectionism and classicism. He relies on the Watt governor to fulfill the role of a dynamicist Turing machine and claims that the Motivational Oscillatory Theory (MOT) provides a sound empirical basis for dynamicism. In other words, the Watt governor is to be the theoretical exemplar of the class of systems necessary for cognition and MOT is an empirical instantiation of that class. However, I shall argue that neither the Watt governor nor MOT successfully fulfill these prescribed roles. This failure, along with van Gelder's peculiar use of the concept of computation and his struggle with representationalism, prevent him from providing a convincing alternative to current cognitive theories.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 19
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 7 (1997), S. 475-494 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Emergence ; learning ; representation
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract The paper uses ideas from Machine Learning, Artificial Intelligence and Genetic Algorithms to provide a model of the development of a ‘fight-or-flight’ response in a simulated agent. The modelled development process involves (simulated) processes of evolution, learning and representation development. The main value of the model is that it provides an illustration of how simple learning processes may lead to the formation of structures which can be given a representational interpretation. It also shows how these may form the infrastructure for closely-coupled agent/environment interaction.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 20
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Minds and machines 9 (1999), S. 223-240 
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: representation ; redescription ; recoding
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract This paper analyses the impact of representation and search operators on Computational Complexity. A model of computation is introduced based on a directed graph, and representation and search are defined to be the vertices and edges of this graph respectively. Changing either the representation or the search algorithm leads to different possible complexity classes. The final section explores the role of representation in reducing time complexity in Artificial Intelligence.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 21
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 13 (1998), S. 541-554 
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: complex natural system ; stability ; evolvability ; decomposable hierarchy ; genetic network ; Random NK Boolean Network
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract I criticize Herbert Simon's argument for the claim that complex natural systems must constitute decomposable, mereological or functional hierarchies. The argument depends on certain assumptions about the requirements for the successful evolution of complex systems, most importantly, the existence of stable, intermediate stages in evolution. Simon offers an abstract model of any process that succeeds in meeting these requirements. This model necessarily involves construction through a decomposable hierarchy, and thus suggests that any complex, natural, i.e., evolved, system is constituted by a decomposable hierarchy. I argue that Stuart Kauffman's recent models of genetic regulatory networks succeed in specifying processes that could meet Simon's requirements for evolvability without requiring construction through a decomposable hierarchy. Since Kauffman's models are at least as plausible as Simon's model, Simon's argument that complex natural systems must constitute decomposable, mereological or functional hierarchies does not succeed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 22
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 6 (1991), S. 205-226 
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Diagrams ; ethnomethodology ; knowledge ; photography ; representation ; science ; sociology
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Sociologists, philosophers and historians of science are gradually recognizing the importance of visual representation. This is part of a more general movement away from a theory-centric view of science and towards an interest in practical aspects of observation and experimentation. Rather than treating science as a matter of demonstrating the logical connection between theoretical and empirical statements, an increasing number of investigations are examining how scientists compose and use diagrams, graphs, photographs, micrographs, maps, charts, and related visual displays. This paper focuses on diagrams in biology, and tries to demonstrate how diagrams are an integral part of the production of scientific knowledge. In order to disclose some of the distinctive practical and analytical uses of diagrams, the paper contrasts the way diagrams and photographs are used in biological texts. Both diagrams and photographs are shown to be “constructions” that separately and together mediate the investigation of scientific phenoman.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
  • 23
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 6 (1991), S. 255-274 
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Classification ; diagrams ; evolution ; history ; natural history ; natural system ; ornithology ; phylogeny ; representation ; systematics ; taxonomy
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract ‘The Natural System’ is the abstract notion of the order in living diversity. The richness and complexity of this notion is revealed by the diversity of representations of the Natural System drawn by ornithologists in the Nineteenth Century. These representations varied in overall form from stars, to circles, to maps, to evolutionary trees and cross-sections through trees. They differed in their depiction of affinity, analogy, continuity, directionality, symmetry, reticulation and branching, evolution, and morphological convergence and divergence. Some representations were two-dimensional, and some were three-dimensional; n-dimensional representations were discussed but never illustrated. The study of diagrammatic representations of the Natural System is made difficult by the frequent failure of authors to discuss them in their texts, and by the consequent problem of distinguishing features which carried meaning from arbitrary features and printing conventions which did not. Many of the systematics controversies of the last thirty years have their roots in the conceptual problems which surrounded the Natural System in the late 1800s, problems which were left unresolved when interest in higher-level systematics declined at the turn of this century.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
Close ⊗
This website uses cookies and the analysis tool Matomo. More information can be found here...