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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    “X” meansX: Fodor/Warfield semantics (1994)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 4 (1994), S. 215-231 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Meaning ; representation ; disjunction problem ; Twin-Earth ; Fodor ; asymmetric causal dependency ; actual ; naturalized semantics ; information
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract In an earlier paper, we argued that Fodorian Semantics has serious difficulties. However, we suggested possible ways that one might attempt to fix this. Ted Warfield suggests that our arguments can be deflected and he does this by making the very moves that we suggested. In our current paper, we respond to Warfield's attempts to revise and defend Fodorian Semantics against our arguments that such a semantic theory is both too strong and too weak. To get around our objections, Warfield proposes a modified reading of one of Fodor's conditions and proposes adding a new condition to the theory. We show that neither the modified reading nor the additional condition saves the asymmetric causal dependency approach to naturalized semantics.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974146
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Künstliche Intelligenz und Philosophie (1990)
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 21 (1990), S. 347-358 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: artificial intelligence ; understanding ; representation ; meaning ; intentionality ; teleology ; subjectivity ; semiotics ; philosophical anthropology
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Summary Artificial Intelligence can be considered as the so far last attempt to decode the anthropological comparison between human beings and machines. Thereby it also represents in a prominent way what can be called “systemic thought”. Searle's conclusive argument against strong AI (that is the idea of computers having intention in a literal way) refers to his precise distinction between syntax and semantics. This difference obviously opposing some of Searle's other essential ideas will only convince if it also explains the genetic-pragmatic aspect. A theory explaining the “life of mind” and the possibility of understanding needs to combine representation and intention with the subjective causation of signs. At the same time they have to be contextualized within a model of teleologically interpreted life recognized with the help of self-experience and self-reflection. This suggests that AI is a simulation which wrongly believes to be a real duplication. Actually it is a semiotic reduction (syntax and semantic surface of signs only) and a psychological compensation (Turing test) connected with a genetic or abductive fallacy. The biological decontextualization, in fact the elimination of teleology and intention, the deconstruction of subjectivity, the loss of the genetic-pragmatic dimension and the abductive fallacy induce the strong AI to confuse its surface-illusion of simulated understanding with the real process itself.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01801043
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Evolution: Teleology or chance? (1991)
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 22 (1991), S. 133-141 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: evolution ; teleology ; chance ; purpose ; anthropomorphism
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Summary Revaluation of the problem of natural teleology seems an important precondition for elucidating our environmental crisis and for formulating an ‘ecological ethics’, because it calls for a recognition of an intrinsic value in nature and organisms. Therefore, it is necessary to show that the concept of natural teleology is not in contradiction with scientific theories, in particular not with the theory of evolution. In this paper I shall argue that there is a fundamental misunderstanding about the concepts of teleology and chance in modern thinking. This as a result of a radical transformation of the Aristotelian concept of teleology by Christian theologians during the Middle Ages. This confusion resulted in the rejection of teleology from evolution and in an exaggeration of the role of chance. However, not a solution for the problem of teleology is given here, but only an attempt to prove that neither the fossil-record, nor the role of chance in evolution can give adequate arguments for the negation of teleology in evolution. That is not to say that, therefore there exists teleology in evolution, but the problem of teleology in nature cannot, be solved by the scientific theory of evolution, but only be elucidated by philosophical analysis. At the end of the paper it is argued that teleology must be rather presupposed in evolution.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01801253
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Life and teleology (1992)
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 23 (1992), S. 85-103 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: life ; teleology ; evolution ; reality ; representation ; experience
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Summary A comprehensive definition of the phenomenon called “life” led to the addition of many dimensions to the natural sciences, and especially the conscious mental dimension. Historical attention is paid not only to those employing the natural philosophical paradigms, but also to evolutionary theories and to the Kantian teleological philosophy. The belief that science can solve the riddle of life is a category of purposal thinking. A revised version of critical teleology is essential for comprehension of life.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01801797
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Ahistorical intentional content (1994)
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 25 (1994), S. 241-259 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: Intentionality ; history ; biosemantics ; teleology ; function ; cosmic accident ; computationalism
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Summary One of the main problems of current theory of intentionality concerns the possibility of ahistorical intentional content, that is, content in the absence of any developmental history of the respective item. Biosemanticists like Millikan (1984) argue that content is essentially historical, while computationalists like Cummins (1989) hold that a system's current ahistorical state alone determines content. In the present paper, this problem is discussed in terms of some popular ‘cosmic accident’ thought experiments, and the conceptual framework of these experiments is enriched by some new versions like accidental ‘duplicates’ without any preexisting original. As a result of these evaluations, it is argued that for an item to bear intentional content it is necessary to have a ‘function’ in the forward-looking sense introduced by Bigelow & Pargetter (1987). Since historicity is not necessary for functionality, ahistorical states can be intentional as long as they have functions. This result does not support computationalism, since functionality cannot be determined in terms of current ashistorical state alone, but only with reference to the present and future environmental context of the cognitive system that harbours these states.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00763823
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Can computers carry content ‘inexplicitly’? (1994)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 4 (1994), S. 333-344 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Emergence ; content ; information ; representation ; computers
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract I examine whether it is possible for content relevant to a computer's behavior to be carried without an explicit internal representation. I consider three approaches. First, an example of a chess playing computer carrying ‘emergent’ content is offered from Dennett. Next I examine Cummins’ response to this example. Cummins says Dennett's computer executes a rule which is inexplicitly represented. Cummins describes a process wherein a computer interprets explicit rules in its program, implements them to form a chess-playing device, then this device executes the rules in a way that exhibits them inexplicitly. Though this approach is intriguing, I argue that the chess-playing device cannot exist as imagined. The processes of interpretation and implementation produce explicit representations of the content claimed to be inexplicit. Finally, the Chinese Room argument is examined and shown not to save the notion of inexplicit information. This means the strategy of attributing inexplicit content to a computer which is executing a rule, fails.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974198
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Teleology as Higher-Order Causation: A Situation-Theoretic Account (1998)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 8 (1998), S. 559-585 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: teleology ; causation ; biological function ; proper function ; mental causation ; situation theory
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Situation theory, as developed by Barwise and his collaborators, is used to demonstrate the possibility of defining teleology (and related notions, like that of proper or biological function) in terms of higher order causation, along the lines suggested by Taylor and Wright. This definition avoids the excessive narrowness that results from trying to define teleology in terms of evolutionary history or the effects of natural selection. By legitimating the concept of teleology, this definition also provides promising new avenues for solving long standing problems in the philosophy of mind, such as the problems of intentionality and mental causation.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008366512300
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The many uses of ‘belief’ in AI (1991)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 55-73 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Belief ; syntax ; propositions ; meaning ; information ; tractability ; degrees of confidence ; dispositions
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Within AI and the cognitively related disciplines, there exist a multiplicity of uses of ‘belief’. On the face of it, these differing uses reflect differing views about the nature of an objective phenomenon called ‘belief’. In this paper I distinguish six distinct ways in which ‘belief’ is used in AI. I shall argue that not all these uses reflect a difference of opinion about an objective feature of reality. Rather, in some cases, the differing uses reflect differing concerns with special AI applications. In other cases, however, genuine differences exist about the nature of what we pre-theoretically call belief. To an extent the multiplicity of opinions about, and uses of ‘belief’, echoes the discrepant motivations of AI researchers. The relevance of this discussion for cognitive scientists and philosophers arises from the fact that (a) many regard theoretical research within AI as a branch of cognitive science, and (b) even if theoretical AI is not cognitive science, trends within AI influence theories developed within cognitive science. It should be beneficial, therefore, to unravel the distinct uses and motivations surrounding ‘belief’, in order to discover which usages merely reflect differing pragmatic concerns, and which usages genuinely reflect divergent views about reality.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00360579
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Infons as mathematical objects (1992)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 2 (1992), S. 185-201 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Constraint ; individuation scheme ; infon ; information ; representation ; type
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract I argue that the role played by infons in the kind of mathematical theory of information being developed by several workers affiliated to CSLI is analogous to that of the various number systems in mathematics. In particular, I present a mathematical construction of infons in terms of representations and informational equivalences between them. The main theme of the paper arose from an electronic mail exchange with Pat Hayes of Xeroxparc. The exposition derives from a talk I gave at theTheories of Partial Information conference held at the University of Texas at Austin, January 1990.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00704457
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Counting information: A note on physicalized numbers (1996)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 6 (1996), S. 229-238 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Continuum ; counting ; energy ; infinite ; information ; Landauer ; limits ; physical
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Existing work on the ultimate limits of computation has urged that the apparatus of real numbers should be eschewed as an investigative tool and replaced by discrete mathematics. The present paper argues for a radical extension of this viewpoint: not only the continuum but all infinitary constructs including the rationals and the potential infinite sequence of whole numbers need to be eliminated if a self-consistent investigative framework is to be achieved.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00391287
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