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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Weakly Associative Relation Algebras with Polyadic Composition Operations (2000)
    Springer
    Studia logica 66 (2000), S. 297-323 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8730
    Keywords: algebraic logic ; relation algebras ; relativization ; representation
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract In this paper we introduced various classes of weakly associative relation algebras with polyadic composition operations. Among them is the class RWA∞ of representable weakly associative relation algebras with polyadic composition operations. Algebras of this class are relativized representable relation algebras augmented with an infinite set of operations of increasing arity which are generalizations of the binary relative composition. We show that RWA∞ is a canonical variety whose equational theory is decidable.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1005204532371
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    “X” meansX: Fodor/Warfield semantics (1994)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 4 (1994), S. 215-231 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Meaning ; representation ; disjunction problem ; Twin-Earth ; Fodor ; asymmetric causal dependency ; actual ; naturalized semantics ; information
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract In an earlier paper, we argued that Fodorian Semantics has serious difficulties. However, we suggested possible ways that one might attempt to fix this. Ted Warfield suggests that our arguments can be deflected and he does this by making the very moves that we suggested. In our current paper, we respond to Warfield's attempts to revise and defend Fodorian Semantics against our arguments that such a semantic theory is both too strong and too weak. To get around our objections, Warfield proposes a modified reading of one of Fodor's conditions and proposes adding a new condition to the theory. We show that neither the modified reading nor the additional condition saves the asymmetric causal dependency approach to naturalized semantics.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974146
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Embedded systemsvs individualism (1995)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 5 (1995), S. 357-371 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Action ; anti-individualism ; artificial agents ; child development ; computation ; embedded systems ; environmentalism ; formality condition ; individualism ; learning algorithms ; mobile robots ; representation
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract The dispute between individualism and anti-individualism is about the individuation of psychological states, and individualism, on some accounts, is committed to the claim that psychological subjects together with their environments do not constitute integrated computational systems. Hence on this view the computational states that explain psychological states in computational accounts of mind will not involve the subject's natural and social environment. Moreover, the explanation of a system's interaction with the environment is, on this view, not the primary goal of computational theorizing. Recent work in computational developmental psychology (by A. Karmiloff-Smith and J. Rutkowska) as well as artificial agents or embedded artificial systems (by L.P. Kaelbling, among others) casts doubt on these claims. In these computational models, the environment does not just trigger and sustain input for computational operations, but some computational operations actually involve environmental structures.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974750
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Notationality and the information processing mind (1991)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 129-165 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Computation ; cognition ; representation ; information processing ; physical symbol systems ; language of thought
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Cognitive science uses the notion of computational information processing to explain cognitive information processing. Some philosophers have argued that anything can be described as doing computational information processing; if so, it is a vacuous notion for explanatory purposes. An attempt is made to explicate the notions of cognitive information processing and computational information processing and to specify the relationship between them. It is demonstrated that the resulting notion of computational information processing can only be realized in a restrictive class of dynamical systems called physical notational systems (after Goodman's theory of notationality), and that the systems generally appealed to by cognitive science-physical symbol systems-are indeed such systems. Furthermore, it turns out that other alternative conceptions of computational information processing, Fodor's (1975) Language of Thought and Cummins' (1989) Interpretational Semantics appeal to substantially the same restrictive class of systems. The necessary connection of computational information processing with notationality saves the enterprise from charges of vacuousness and has some interesting implications for connectionism. But, unfortunately, it distorts the subject matter and entails some troubling consequences for a cognitive science which tries to make notationality do the work of genuine mental representations.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00361034
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Connectionism isn't magic (1991)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 167-184 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Connectionism ; eliminativism ; propositional attitudes ; representation ; symbols
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Ramsey, Stich and Garon's recent paper ‘Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology’ claims a certain style of connectionism to be the final nail in the coffin of folk psychology. I argue that their paper fails to show this, and that the style of connectionism they illustrate can in fact supplement, rather than compete with, the claims of a theory of cognition based in folk psychology's ontology. Ramsey, Stich and Garon's argument relies on the lack of easily identifiable symbols inside the connectionist network they discuss, and they suggest that the existence of a system which behaves in a cognitively interesting way, but which cannot be explained by appeal to internal symbol processing, falsifies central assumptions of folk psychology. My claim is that this argument is flawed, and that the theorist need not discard folk psychology in order to accept that the network illustrated exhibits cognitively interesting behaviour, even if it is conceded that symbols cannot be readily identified within the network.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00361035
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Künstliche Intelligenz und Philosophie (1990)
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 21 (1990), S. 347-358 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: artificial intelligence ; understanding ; representation ; meaning ; intentionality ; teleology ; subjectivity ; semiotics ; philosophical anthropology
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Summary Artificial Intelligence can be considered as the so far last attempt to decode the anthropological comparison between human beings and machines. Thereby it also represents in a prominent way what can be called “systemic thought”. Searle's conclusive argument against strong AI (that is the idea of computers having intention in a literal way) refers to his precise distinction between syntax and semantics. This difference obviously opposing some of Searle's other essential ideas will only convince if it also explains the genetic-pragmatic aspect. A theory explaining the “life of mind” and the possibility of understanding needs to combine representation and intention with the subjective causation of signs. At the same time they have to be contextualized within a model of teleologically interpreted life recognized with the help of self-experience and self-reflection. This suggests that AI is a simulation which wrongly believes to be a real duplication. Actually it is a semiotic reduction (syntax and semantic surface of signs only) and a psychological compensation (Turing test) connected with a genetic or abductive fallacy. The biological decontextualization, in fact the elimination of teleology and intention, the deconstruction of subjectivity, the loss of the genetic-pragmatic dimension and the abductive fallacy induce the strong AI to confuse its surface-illusion of simulated understanding with the real process itself.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01801043
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Life and teleology (1992)
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 23 (1992), S. 85-103 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: life ; teleology ; evolution ; reality ; representation ; experience
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Summary A comprehensive definition of the phenomenon called “life” led to the addition of many dimensions to the natural sciences, and especially the conscious mental dimension. Historical attention is paid not only to those employing the natural philosophical paradigms, but also to evolutionary theories and to the Kantian teleological philosophy. The belief that science can solve the riddle of life is a category of purposal thinking. A revised version of critical teleology is essential for comprehension of life.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01801797
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Connectionism, explicit rules, and symbolic manipulation (1993)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 3 (1993), S. 183-200 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Connectionism ; representation ; explicit rules
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract At present, the prevailing Connectionist methodology forrepresenting rules is toimplicitly embody rules in “neurally-wired” networks. That is, the methodology adopts the stance that rules must either be hard-wired or “trained into” neural structures, rather than represented via explicit symbolic structures. Even recent attempts to implementproduction systems within connectionist networks have assumed that condition-action rules (or rule schema) are to be embodied in thestructure of individual networks. Such networks must be grown or trained over a significant span of time. However, arguments are presented herein that humanssometimes follow rules which arevery rapidly assignedexplicit internal representations, and that humans possessgeneral mechanisms capable of interpreting and following such rules. In particular, arguments are presented that thespeed with which humans are able to follow rules ofnovel structure demonstrates the existence of general-purpose rule following mechanisms. It is further argued that the existence of general-purpose rule following mechanisms strongly indicates that explicit rule following is not anisolated phenomenon, but may well be a common and important aspect of cognition. The relationship of the foregoing conclusions to Smolensky's view of explicit rule following is also explored. The arguments presented here are pragmatic in nature, and are contrasted with thekind of arguments developed by Fodor and Pylyshyn in their recent, influential paper.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00975531
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Can computers carry content ‘inexplicitly’? (1994)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 4 (1994), S. 333-344 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Emergence ; content ; information ; representation ; computers
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract I examine whether it is possible for content relevant to a computer's behavior to be carried without an explicit internal representation. I consider three approaches. First, an example of a chess playing computer carrying ‘emergent’ content is offered from Dennett. Next I examine Cummins’ response to this example. Cummins says Dennett's computer executes a rule which is inexplicitly represented. Cummins describes a process wherein a computer interprets explicit rules in its program, implements them to form a chess-playing device, then this device executes the rules in a way that exhibits them inexplicitly. Though this approach is intriguing, I argue that the chess-playing device cannot exist as imagined. The processes of interpretation and implementation produce explicit representations of the content claimed to be inexplicit. Finally, the Chinese Room argument is examined and shown not to save the notion of inexplicit information. This means the strategy of attributing inexplicit content to a computer which is executing a rule, fails.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974198
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Representation, similarity, and the chorus of prototypes (1995)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 5 (1995), S. 45-68 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Vision ; categorization ; representation ; similarity ; receptive fields ; multidimensional scaling ; feature spaces
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract It is proposed to conceive of representation as an emergent phenomenon that is supervenient on patterns of activity of coarsely tuned and highly redundant feature detectors. The computational underpinnings of the outlined concept of representation are (1) the properties of collections of overlapping graded receptive fields, as in the biological perceptual systems that exhibit hyperacuity-level performance, and (2) the sufficiency of a set of proximal distances between stimulus representations for the recovery of the corresponding distal contrasts between stimuli, as in multidimensional scaling. The present preliminary study appears to indicate that this concept of representation is computationally viable, and is compatible with psychological and neurobiological data.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974189
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