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  • Articles  (33)
  • natural selection  (21)
  • information  (15)
  • Springer  (33)
  • Elsevier
  • Philosophy  (33)
  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    “X” meansX: Fodor/Warfield semantics (1994)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 4 (1994), S. 215-231 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Meaning ; representation ; disjunction problem ; Twin-Earth ; Fodor ; asymmetric causal dependency ; actual ; naturalized semantics ; information
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract In an earlier paper, we argued that Fodorian Semantics has serious difficulties. However, we suggested possible ways that one might attempt to fix this. Ted Warfield suggests that our arguments can be deflected and he does this by making the very moves that we suggested. In our current paper, we respond to Warfield's attempts to revise and defend Fodorian Semantics against our arguments that such a semantic theory is both too strong and too weak. To get around our objections, Warfield proposes a modified reading of one of Fodor's conditions and proposes adding a new condition to the theory. We show that neither the modified reading nor the additional condition saves the asymmetric causal dependency approach to naturalized semantics.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974146
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Can computers carry content ‘inexplicitly’? (1994)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 4 (1994), S. 333-344 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Emergence ; content ; information ; representation ; computers
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract I examine whether it is possible for content relevant to a computer's behavior to be carried without an explicit internal representation. I consider three approaches. First, an example of a chess playing computer carrying ‘emergent’ content is offered from Dennett. Next I examine Cummins’ response to this example. Cummins says Dennett's computer executes a rule which is inexplicitly represented. Cummins describes a process wherein a computer interprets explicit rules in its program, implements them to form a chess-playing device, then this device executes the rules in a way that exhibits them inexplicitly. Though this approach is intriguing, I argue that the chess-playing device cannot exist as imagined. The processes of interpretation and implementation produce explicit representations of the content claimed to be inexplicit. Finally, the Chinese Room argument is examined and shown not to save the notion of inexplicit information. This means the strategy of attributing inexplicit content to a computer which is executing a rule, fails.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974198
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The many uses of ‘belief’ in AI (1991)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 55-73 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Belief ; syntax ; propositions ; meaning ; information ; tractability ; degrees of confidence ; dispositions
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Within AI and the cognitively related disciplines, there exist a multiplicity of uses of ‘belief’. On the face of it, these differing uses reflect differing views about the nature of an objective phenomenon called ‘belief’. In this paper I distinguish six distinct ways in which ‘belief’ is used in AI. I shall argue that not all these uses reflect a difference of opinion about an objective feature of reality. Rather, in some cases, the differing uses reflect differing concerns with special AI applications. In other cases, however, genuine differences exist about the nature of what we pre-theoretically call belief. To an extent the multiplicity of opinions about, and uses of ‘belief’, echoes the discrepant motivations of AI researchers. The relevance of this discussion for cognitive scientists and philosophers arises from the fact that (a) many regard theoretical research within AI as a branch of cognitive science, and (b) even if theoretical AI is not cognitive science, trends within AI influence theories developed within cognitive science. It should be beneficial, therefore, to unravel the distinct uses and motivations surrounding ‘belief’, in order to discover which usages merely reflect differing pragmatic concerns, and which usages genuinely reflect divergent views about reality.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00360579
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Infons as mathematical objects (1992)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 2 (1992), S. 185-201 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Constraint ; individuation scheme ; infon ; information ; representation ; type
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract I argue that the role played by infons in the kind of mathematical theory of information being developed by several workers affiliated to CSLI is analogous to that of the various number systems in mathematics. In particular, I present a mathematical construction of infons in terms of representations and informational equivalences between them. The main theme of the paper arose from an electronic mail exchange with Pat Hayes of Xeroxparc. The exposition derives from a talk I gave at theTheories of Partial Information conference held at the University of Texas at Austin, January 1990.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00704457
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Counting information: A note on physicalized numbers (1996)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 6 (1996), S. 229-238 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Continuum ; counting ; energy ; infinite ; information ; Landauer ; limits ; physical
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Existing work on the ultimate limits of computation has urged that the apparatus of real numbers should be eschewed as an investigative tool and replaced by discrete mathematics. The present paper argues for a radical extension of this viewpoint: not only the continuum but all infinitary constructs including the rationals and the potential infinite sequence of whole numbers need to be eliminated if a self-consistent investigative framework is to be achieved.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00391287
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Function without purpose (1994)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 9 (1994), S. 443-469 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Function ; natural selection ; anatomy ; homology
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Philosophers of evolutionary biology favor the so-called “etiological concept” of function according to which the function of a trait is its evolutionary purpose, defined as the effect for which that trait was favored by natural selection. We term this the selected effect (SE) analysis of function. An alternative account of function was introduced by Robert Cummins in a non-evolutionary and non-purposive context. Cummins's account has received attention but little support from philosophers of biology. This paper will show that a similar non-purposive concept of function, which we term causal role (CR) function, is crucial to certain research programs in evolutionary biology, and that philosophical criticisms of Cummins's concept are ineffective in this scientific context. Specifically, we demonstrate that CR functions are a vital and ineliminable part of research in comparative and functional anatomy, and that biological categories used by anatomists are not defined by the application of SE functional analysis. Causal role functions are non-historically defined, but may themselves be used in an historical analysis. Furthermore, we show that a philosophical insistence on the primary of SE functions places practicing biologists in an untenable position, as such functions can rarely be demonstrated (in contrast to CR functions). Biologists who study the form and function of organismal design recognize that it is virtually impossible to identify the past action of selection on any particular structure retrospectively, a requirement for recognizing SE functions.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00850375
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Population Level Causation and a Unified Theory of Natural Selection (1999)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 14 (1999), S. 521-536 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: fitness ; natural selection ; population level causation ; unification
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Sober (1984) presents an account of selection motivated by the view that one property can causally explain the occurrence of another only if the first plays a unique role in the causal production of the second. Sober holds that a causal property will play such a unique role if it is a population level cause of its effect, and on this basis argues that there is selection for a trait T only if T is a population level cause of survival and reproductive success. Sterelny and Kitcher (1988) claim against Sober that some traits directly subject to selection will not satisfy the probabilistic condition on population level causation. In this paper I show that Sober has the resources to resist the Sterelny-Kitcher complaint, but I argue that not all traits that satisfy the probabilistic condition play the required unique role in the production of their effects.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006516232674
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Evolution of Strategies to Stay in the Game (2000)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 15 (2000), S. 177-196 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: evolutionary failure ; evolutionary success ; fitness ; game of life ; life-history evolution ; natural selection
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Life-history evolution is a complexprocess. Life-history theory covers the fundamentallevel of the process, the evolution of life-historytraits. Life-history traits interact; thosecoevolving as a response to the same selectionpressure form life-history tactics. Top level of thehierarchy, life-history strategy, is formed bygenetically interconnected tactics. Our aim is toexpand the traditional view to life-history evolutionby considering what boundary conditions a successfullife-history strategy has to fulfil. We claim thatthe most fundamental condition successful strategieshave to meet is to minimize the risk of evolutionaryfailure. Here the risk of failure refers to failurein transferring practitioners of the strategy to thenext time point, either through survival, or byreproduction. We make an attempt to classify types ofrisks as they lead to evolutionary failure, anddiscuss how risk minimization ideas may be approachedempirically. We conclude that understanding howtraits evolve may not cover all aspects of howstrategies evolve. We emphasize that bookkeeping ofthe actual causes of failure might help in developinglife-history theory that uses causes of selection topredict responses to selection.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006688902786
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Two Explanations of Evolutionary Progress (2000)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 15 (2000), S. 475-491 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: explanation ; evolutionary progress ; natural selection ; styles of reasoning
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Natural selection explains how living forms are fitted to theirconditions of life. Darwin argued that selection also explains what hecalled “the gradual advancement of the organisation,” i.e.evolutionary progress. Present-day selectionists disagree. In theirview, it is happenstance that sustains conditions favorable to progress,and therefore happenstance, not selection, that explains progress. Iargue that the disagreement here turns not on whether there exists aselection-based condition bias – a belief now attributed to Darwin – but on whether there needs to be such a bias for selection to count as explaining progress. In Darwin's own view, selection explained progressso far as more complex organisms have the selective advantage whenselection operates unimpeded. I show that these two explanations ofevolutionary progress, selection and happenstance, answer for theirobjectivity to different standards, and for their truth or falsehood todifferent features of the world.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006609532691
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Engagement of Religion and Biology: A Case Study in the Mediating Role of Metaphor in the Sociobiology of Lumsden & Wilson (2000)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 15 (2000), S. 669-698 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: analogy ; biological systems ; causation ; complexity ; emergent materialism ; hierarchy ; human sociobiology ; information ; metaphor ; methodological reduction ; ontological reduction ; part-whole relations ; physical systems ; religion and science ; self-organization ; social systems ; theory constitution ; theory reduction
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract I claim that explanations of human behaviour by Edward O. Wilsonand Charles Lumsden are constituted by a religiously functioningmetaphysics: emergent materialism. The constitutive effects areidentified using six criteria, beginning with a metaphorical re-description of dissimilarities between levels of organization interms of the lower level, and consist of conceptual andexplanatory reductions (CER). Wilson and Lumsden practice CER,even though CER is not required by emergent materialism. Theypreconceive this practice by a re-description which conflates thelevels of organization and explain failure of CER in terms oftechnical, not ontological or epistemological reasons. Iinterpret these three practices as a reaction of Wilson againsthis early Christian religious beliefs. Statements by Wilsonindicate this reaction ultimately constitutes his explanations ofsocial, moral and religious behaviour. Tested knowledge about matter at the lower level functions as ametaphysical belief when applied to the higher level becausethere it is untested. I offer twelve criteria for the diagnosisof religious functions of this metaphysical materialism, five ofwhich are satisfied. I show that the constitutive effects of thismaterialism in sociobiology are due to its religious functions,are beneficial for science and do not destroy its public nature.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006688908463
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