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  • Articles  (27)
  • epistemology  (16)
  • Darwin  (13)
  • Springer  (27)
  • American Physical Society (APS)
  • Blackwell Publishing Ltd
  • Philosophy  (27)
  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Prima facie and seeming duties (1996)
    Springer
    Studia logica 57 (1996), S. 47-71 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8730
    Keywords: prima facie duties ; defeasible reasoning ; practical reasoning ; epistemology
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Sir David Ross introduced prima facie duties, or acts with a tendency to be duties proper. He also spoke of general prima facie principles, wwhich attribute to acts having some feature the tendency to be a duty proper. Like Utilitarians from Mill to Hare, he saw a role for such principles in the epistemology of duty: in the process by means of which, in any given situation, a moral code can help us to find out what we ought to do. After formalizing general prima facie principles as universally quantified conditionals I will show how seeming duties can be detached from them. There will be examples involving lies, burnt offerings and the question of whether to have a napkin on your lap while eating asparagus. They will illustrate the defeasibility of this detachment, how it can lead into dilemmas, and how general prima facie principles are overridden by more specific ones.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00370669
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Pseudoscience as structurally flawed practice: A reply to A.A. Derksen (1995)
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 26 (1995), S. 323-326 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: pseudoscience ; A. A. Derksen ; epistemology
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Summary I respond to two criticisms levelled by A. A. Derksen in a recent issue of this journal against characterizing pseudoscience as structurally flawed practice: I argue that he surreptitiously invokes this conception, his official view that we should concentrate on pseudoscientists' pretensions rather than their practices notwithstanding; and I critically examine his contention that judgements of scientificity (and pseudoscientificity) cannot properly be made independently of a consideration of whether the relevant theories and practices are empirically well-confirmed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00766732
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Towards a Philosophy of Chemistry. A short extract of this paper was first read at the 10th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Florence, August 19–25, 1995. (1997)
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 28 (1997), S. 307-336 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: philosophy of chemistry ; epistemology ; experiment ; classification ; reference ; prediction ; technology ; matter ; material properties
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Abstract The paper shows epistemological, methodological and ontological peculiarities of chemistry taken as a classificatory science of materials using experimental methods. Without succumbing to standard interpretations of physical science, chemical methods of experimental investigation, classification, reference, theorizing, prediction and production of new entities are developed one by one as first steps towards a philosophy of chemistry. Chemistry challenges traditional concepts of empirical object, empirical predicate, reference frame and theory, but also the distinction commonly drawn between natural science and technology. Due to its many peculiarities, I propose to treat chemistry philosophically as a special type of science, apart from other sciences.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008206719087
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The hierarchies of knowledge and the mathematics of discovery (1991)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 75-95 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Learning ; induction ; logic ; relativism ; epistemology
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Rather than attempting to characterize a relation of confirmation between evidence and theory, epistemology might better consider which methods of forming conjectures from evidence, or of altering beliefs in the light of evidence, are most reliable for getting to the truth. A logical framework for such a study was constructed in the early 1960s by E. Mark Gold and Hilary Putnam. This essay describes some of the results that have been obtained in that framework and their significance for philosophy of science, artificial intelligence, and for normative epistemology when truth is relative.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00360580
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Deleting the Subject: A Feminist Reading of Epistemology in Artificial Intelligence (2000)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 10 (2000), S. 231-253 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: epistemology ; feminist epistemology ; symbolic AI
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract This paper argues that AI follows classical versions of epistemology in assuming that the identity of the knowing subject is not important. In other words this serves to `delete the subject'. This disguises an implicit hierarchy of knowers involved in the representation of knowledge in AI which privileges the perspective of those who design and build the systems over alternative perspectives. The privileged position reflects Western, professional masculinity. Alternative perspectives, denied a voice, belong to less powerful groups including women. Feminist epistemology can be used to approach this from new directions, in particular, to show how women's knowledge may be left out of consideration by AI's focus on masculine subjects. The paper uncovers the tacitly assumed Western professional male subjects in two flagship AI systems, Cyc and Soar.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008306015799
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Why we Believe (1999)
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 30 (1999), S. 317-339 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: knowledge ; full belief ; epistemology ; radicalprobabilism ; instrumentalism ; pragmatism ; bayesianism
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Abstract The radical probabilist counsels the prudent never to put away uncertainty, and hence always to balance judgment with probabilities of various sizes. Against this counsel I shall advise in favor of the practice of full belief — at least for some occasions. This advice rests on the fact that it is sometimes in a person's interests to accept certain propositions as a means of bringing it about that others recognize oneself as having accepted those propositions. With the pragmatists, therefore, I shall reject the view that belief formation must in every instance be a truth-directed affair. Unlike the pragmatists, however, I shall conclude that the enterprise of belief formation is not directed exclusively, or even primarily, at attaining knowledge. In other words, pursuit of that which it profits to believe, on the one hand, and pursuit of knowledge on the other, are distinct enterprises, which overlap (when they do) only accidentally.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008394130995
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Radikaler Konstruktivismus und Konstruktionismus (1992)
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 23 (1992), S. 323-352 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: constructivism ; naturalism ; epistemology ; realism ; idealism
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Summary Both radical constructivism and constructionism are naturalized approaches to epistemology. They try to fertilize results from biology and psychology for epistemological aims. They both refuse epistemological realism as unsustainable metaphysics. This raises the problem of the range of the naturalistic approach to epistemology. Constructivism, in both forms, turns out to be untenable because it runs in an aporia: it must borrow from realism either, or it must qualify its own position as a metaphysical one. But therewith, constructivism would be blamed to be metaphysical itself.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01801456
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The epistemic basis of defeasible reasoning (1991)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 437-458 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Defeasible reasoning ; default reasoning ; nonmonotonic reasoning ; epistemology ; closed world assumption
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract This article argues that: (i) Defeasible reasoning is the use of distinctive procedures for belief revision when new evidence or new authoritative judgment is interpolated into a system of beliefs about an application domain. (ii) These procedures can be explicated and implemented using standard higher-order logic combined with epistemic assumptions about the system of beliefs. The procedures mentioned in (i) depend on the explication in (ii), which is largely described in terms of a Prolog program, EVID, which implements a system for interactive, defeasible reasoning when combined with an application knowledge base. It is shown that defeasible reasoning depends on a meta-level Closed World Assumption applied to the relationship between supporting evidence and a defeasible conclusion based on this evidence. Thesis (i) is then further defended by showing that the EVID explication of defeasible reasoning has sufficient representational power to cover a wide variety of practical applications of defeasible reasoning, especially in the context of decision making.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00352919
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Why are there no objective values? (1995)
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 26 (1995), S. 35-62 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: ethics ; intuitionism ; epistemology ; objectivism ; moral knowledge ; moral values
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Summary Using the mathematical frameworks of economic preference ranking, subjective probability, and rational learning through empirical evidence, the epistemological implications of teleological ethical intuitionism are pointed out to the extent to which the latter is based on cognitivist and objectivist concepts of value. The notions of objective value and objective norm are critically analysed with reference to epistemological criteria of intersubjectively shared valuative experience. It is concluded that one cannot meaningfully postulate general material theories of morality that could be tested, confirmed or refuted by intersubjective empirical evidence of preferences and values, however loosely the empirical evidence of values may be interpreted. This situation is explained with reference to the ways in which preceived values become systematically influenced by the concomitants of individual valuative experience, but which have nothing to do with contingent subjective interests.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01130925
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Epistemology Culturalized (2000)
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 31 (2000), S. 75-107 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: agency ; culturalism ; epistemology ; mind-body problem ; naturalism ; normativity
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Abstract The anti-metaphysical intentions of naturalism can be respected without abandoning the project of a normative epistemology. The central assumptions of naturalism imply that (1.) the distinction between action and behaviour is spurious, and (2.) epistemology cannot continue to be a normative project. Difficulties with the second implication have been adressed by Normative Naturalism, but without violating the naturalistic consensus, it can only appreciate means-end-rationality. However, this does not suffice to justify its own implicit normative pretensions. According to our diagnosis, naturalism succumbs to the lure of an absolute observer's stance and thereby neglects the need for participation in communal practice. By contrast, methodical culturalism ties down the concepts of epistemology to the success of such practice. Only from this perspective, the normative force of epistemology can be appreciated. Also, the mind-body problem loosens its hold and the distinction between action and behaviour is reestablished. In the last section, the mutual relation between philosophy andscience is reconsidered.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008361223224
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