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  • Artikel  (2.102)
  • Blackwell Publishing Ltd.  (1.270)
  • Annual Reviews  (832)
  • American Institute of Physics (AIP)
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  • Wirtschaftswissenschaften  (2.102)
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  • 1
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    The Effect of Organizational form on Information Flow and Decision Quality: Informational Cascades in Group Decision Making (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper identifies a disadvantage to decision making in a team. We show that in some cases available information is lost due to sequential communication that results in informational cascades. Although incentive contracts exist that prevent cascades, in some cases these contracts do not maximize shareholders' expected residual value and cascades are tolerated in equilibrium. Cascades never occur in hierarchies that exogenously prevent communication. However, when the firm is organized as a hierarchy (and the agents are given the optimal hierarchical contract), in some cases agents will collude and sequentially communicate, admitting the possibility of cascades. In these cases, the principals must monitor and enforce the hierarchical process. When monitoring costs exceed the cost of cascades, the team is the optimal organizational form.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00115.x
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  • 2
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    A Practitioner's Guide to Estimation of Random-Coefficients Logit Models of Demand (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Estimation of demand is at the heart of many recent studies that examine questions of market power, mergers, innovation, and valuation of new brands in differentiated-products markets. This paper focuses on one of the main methods for estimating demand for differentiated products: random-coefficients logit models. The paper carefully discusses the latest innovations in these methods with the hope of increasing the understanding, and therefore the trust among researchers who have never used them, and reducing the difficulty of their use, thereby aiding in realizing their full potential.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00513.x
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  • 3
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Incumbency and R&D Incentives: Licensing the Gale of Creative Destruction (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper analyzes the relationship between incumbency and R&D incentives in the context of a model of technological competition in which technologically successful entrants are able to license their innovation to (or be acquired by) an incumbent. That such a sale should take place is natural, since postinnovation monopoly profits are greater than the sum of duopoly profits. We identify three key findings about how innovative activity is shaped by licensing. First, since an incumbent's threat to engage in imitative R&D during negotiations increases its bargaining power, there is a purely strategic incentive for incumbents to develop an R&D capability. Second, incumbents research more intensively than entrants as long as (and only if) their willingness to pay for the innovation exceeds that of the entrant, a condition that depends critically on the expected licensing fee. Third, when the expected licensing fee is sufficiently low, the incumbent considers entrant R&D a strategic substitute for in-house research. This prediction about the market for ideas stands in contrast to predictions of strategic complementarity in patent races where licensing is not allowed.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00485.x
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  • 4
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Weak Property Rights and Holdup in R&D (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: We study how the sequence of financing of R&D varies according to the ease with which property rights over knowledge can be defined. There are two financiers: a venture capitalist (VC) and a corporation. The knowledge acquired in costly research becomes embodied in the researcher's human capital, and she may hold up the financier and walk away with the project to develop it elsewhere. The main results are: (1) When property rights are strong, research is always funded by the VC, development is performed efficiently, and breakaways from the VC to the corporation are observed in equilibrium. (2) When property rights are weak, projects may be financed by the VC or the corporation, or may remain unfunded. (3) When property rights are weak, no breakaways occur in equilibrium; local spillovers and strong product market competition increase the likelihood that research projects will get funding. (4) The equilibrium sequence of R&D finance need not be first-best efficient. (5) In equilibrium, and controlling for the strength of property rights, VCs finance projects that are more profitable on average.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00615.x
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  • 5
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    External Liberalization and Foreign Presence: Cross-Industry Evidence From Poland and Hungary (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: External liberalization—the relaxation of restrictions on cross-border trade and inbound direct investment—has played an important role in the programs of economic transition in central Europe. While liberalization is widely heralded, there has been little empirical analysis of the links between liberalization and industry structure. This analysis examines changes in foreign presence following external liberalization in Poland and Hungary. I show that the presence of proprietary and intangible assets explains much of the cross-industry variation in patterns of foreign presence and, for a given level of foreign presence, whether this will occur via trade or inbound direct investment.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00211.x-i1
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  • 6
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Exercising Market Power in Proprietary Aftermarkets (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Over 20 recent antitrust cases have turned on whether competition in complex durable-equipment markets prevents manufacturers from exercising market power over proprietary aftermarket products and services. We show that the price in the aftermarket will exceed marginal cost despite competition in the equipment market. Absent perfectly contingent long-term contracts, firms will balance the advantages of marginal-cost pricing to future generations of consumers against the payoff from monopoly pricing for current, locked-in equipment owners. The result holds for undifferentiated Bertrand competition, differentiated duopoly, and monopoly equipment markets. We also examine the effects of market growth and equipment durability.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00157.x
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  • 7
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Vertical Foreclosure, Technological Choice, and Entry on the Intermediate Market (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper analyzes the profitability of vertical integration for an upstream monopoly facing a potential competitor. We show that it depends on the technology used by the firm when it integrates. We distinguish two types of technologies: standard technologies, used by nonintegrated firms, and nonstandard technologies, reserved for integrated firms and implying the complete foreclosure of nonintegrated firms. Vertical integration with the adoption of a nonstandard technology dominates vertical integration with the adoption of a standard technology and is profitable, as long as the degree of competition in the downstream industry is sufficiently low.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00211.x
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  • 8
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Product Differentiation, Strategic Divisionalization, and Persistence of Monopoly (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper analyzes the strategic incentive of oligopolists to create autonomous rival divisions when products are differentiated. We consider a two-stage game where firms choose the number of autonomous divisions in the first stage and all the divisions engage in Cournot competition in the second. It is shown that product differentiation ensures the existence of an interior subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), and the equilibrium number of divisions increases with the degree of substitution among products and the number of firms. Further, if divisions are allowed to divide further, they always will, which leads to total rent dissipation. Thus, parent firms have incentives to unilaterally restrict their divisions from further dividing. In the free-entry equilibrium, it is found that the possibility of setting up autonomous divisions is a natural barrier to entry. Incumbents may persistently earn abnormally high profits. In the cases where product differentiation is difficult, the only pure-strategy free-entry SPNE is the monopoly outcome even if the entry cost is relatively low.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00581.x
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  • 9
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Termination and Coordination in Partnerships (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: It is common practice for firms to pool their expertise by forming partnerships such as joint ventures and strategic alliances. A central organization problem in such partnerships is that managers may behave noncooperatively in order to advance the interests of their parent firms. We ask whether contracts can be designed so that managers will maximize total profits. We characterize first best contracts for a variety of environments and show that efficiency imposes some restrictions on the ownership shares. In addition, we evaluate the performance of two termination contracts that are widely used in practice: the shotgun rule and price competition. We find that although these contracts do not achieve full efficiency, they both perform well. We provide insight into when each rule is more efficient.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00191.x
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  • 10
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Foreign Direct Investment Strategies and Firms' Capabilities (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper presents a simple model to analyze the effect of geographically localized spillovers on the internationalization decision of firms. It is shown that, once spatially bounded externalities are taken into account, the standard predictions on the nature and direction of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows may be reversed. We highlight three effects. First, an FDI-en-hancing effect: the presence of spillovers increases the profitability of the FDI strategy when the competitive gap between firms is narrow. Second, a dissipation effect: firms may refrain from investing abroad for fear of diffusion of their firm-specific assets. Third, a sourcing effect: the presence of spillovers may induce a firm to invest abroad, even in the absence of exporting costs.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00251.x
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  • 11
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Hospital Reimbursement Incentives: An Empirical Analysis (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Reimbursement systems for health-care providers are very complex, like the production systems that they regulate. This complexity has led to some important misperceptions about the incentive consequences of major reimbursement reforms. One example is the prospective payment system (PPS), developed to provide “high-powered” incentives through fixed prices for hospital admissions for the US elderly. In fact, various features of the DRG system allow reimbursement to vary with actual treatment decisions during an admission, and so are not prospective. This paper develops a general method for measuring actual reimbursement incentives in complex regulated price systems. The method uses regression techniques with variance decompositions to quantify the effects of particular features of the payment system on prospective and retrospective cost sharing, as well as overall generosity of payments. I apply this method to microdata on 20 percent of Medicare hospital admissions in 1987 and 1990 to summarize the incentives created by PPS in practice, and how the incentives are evolving over time. I show that PPS involves limited and decreasing cost sharing with hospitals, most of which is not prospective. The reimbursement incentives vary substantially across diagnoses, demographic groups, and types of intensive treatments, possibly with important implications for hospital behavior and medical expenditure growth. The techniques developed here can be used to analyze a broad range of provider reimbursement mechanisms.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00091.x
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  • 12
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Buyer Alliances and Managed Competition (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: In a health insurance market, a large employer or an organized “buyer alliance” is in a position to influence the design of plans offered to its members. We study how the sponsors of buyer alliances manage competition among insurance firms by focusing on their choices of the format of competition, the number of firms allowed to compete, and the quality of care offered by the firms. We find deviations from optimality in all three dimensions. Specifically, we find a tendency toward too many firms and too much quality, and a bias toward a format involving the prescreening of insurance plans by the sponsor.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00175.x
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  • 13
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Profitability under an Open versus a Closed System (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper explores the conditions under which a monopolist selling a system consisting of a main component and differentiated secondary components can increase profits by allowing competition in the aftermarket for the secondary components. Opening the system in this fashion can increase profits by giving consumers an added incentive to incur the setup cost of purchasing the main component. This paper extends the second-sourcing literature by showing the explicit effects of various parameters of demand on the decision to open the system. The results show that an open system is likely to be more profitable than a closed one when demand for the system is more elastic, when secondary-component variety is more valued, and when the share of the main component in the total system budget of the consumer is high.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00307.x
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  • 14
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Task Shifts vs. Termination as Devices for Eliciting Optimal Effort Supply (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper contrasts assignments to punitive tasks and terminations as alternative incentive devices. The basic question we ask here is: does the threat of assigning employees to a punitive task allow one to attain higher effort levels than termination threats? The answer critically depends on whether employers are able or not to commit themselves not to fire. We show that in the no-commitment case the only relevant incentive device is termination threats. In contrast, when employers commit themselves not to fire, by threatening punitive task reassignments there obtain effort levels that are not implementable by termination. The implementation results are then applied to the study of incentive problems arising when investment infirm-specific human capital is unverifiable.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00033.x
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  • 15
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Firm Characteristics and the Speed of FDA Approval (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper empirically examines the effect of firm-specific characteristics on the length of time required by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to review and approve new-drug applications between 1990 and 1992. The approach treats regulatory decisions as endogenous and explains the variation in regulatory behavior as a function of differences that exist between firms and drugs. Results show that, controlling for drug-specific characteristics, regulators respond to firm-specific characteristics when evaluating new drug applications. For instance, firms that are less diversified and more R&D-inten-sive receive shorter review times for their new-drug applications than more diversified and less R&D-intensive firms. The reason is that most firm characteristics signal information to reviewers about either firm reputation or application quality. This information reduces reviewers' uncertainty about approving a dangerous or ineffective drug and leads to faster review times. The results suggest that regulators respond to the heterogeneities among firms in the pharmaceutical market in systematic ways.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00377.x
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  • 16
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    A Test of the Resource-Based Model Using Baseball Free Agents (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper examines a nearly untested premise of the resource-based view of the firm: managers can exploit uncertainty about a factor's true value to generate returns. Our results show that empirically validating this basic proposition is difficult and potentially impossible, despite our use of a rather simple empirical setting. While market imperfections appear to underlie the payment of baseball free agents, we cannot easily determine whether this imperfection constitutes a return or not. In addition, while we find convincing evidence of uncertainty underlying owner's expectations of a free agent's performance potential, it is not clear whether team owners can exploit this uncertainty by amassing superior informational strategies or investing in complementary assets. Our difficulty in testing resource-based propositions suggests limitations to the theory's practicality.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00585.x
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  • 17
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Exercising Market Power in Proprietary Aftermarkets (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Over 20 recent antitrust cases have turned on whether competition in complex durable-equipment markets prevents manufacturers from exercising market power over proprietary aftermarket products and services. We show that the price in the aftermarket will exceed marginal cost despite competition in the equipment market. Absent perfectly contingent long-term contracts, firms will balance the advantages of marginal-cost pricing to future generations of consumers against the payoff from monopoly pricing for current, locked-in equipment owners. The result holds for undifferentiated Bertrand competition, differentiated duopoly, and monopoly equipment markets. We also examine the effects of market growth and equipment durability.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1046/j.1365-2745.1998.00285.x
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  • 18
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Vertical Foreclosure, Technological Choice, and Entry on the Intermediate Market (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper analyzes the profitability of vertical integration for an upstream monopoly facing a potential competitor. We show that it depends on the technology used by the firm when it integrates. We distinguish two types of technologies: standard technologies, used by nonintegrated firms, and nonstandard technologies, reserved for integrated firms and implying the complete foreclosure of nonintegrated firms. Vertical integration with the adoption of a nonstandard technology dominates vertical integration with the adoption of a standard technology and is profitable, as long as the degree of competition in the downstream industry is sufficiently low.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00189.x-i1
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  • 19
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Graft, Bribes, and the Practice of Corruption (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: We construct a dynamic model of corruption in organizations where officials privately know their propensity for corruption and clients optimally choose the bribe offered. We show that there is a continuum set of stationary bribe equilibria due exclusively to the dynamic nature of the model and the endogenous determination of bribes. This can explain why similar countries have stable but different “implicit prices” for the same illegal services. We also show that, by not considering the reaction of clients, traditional analysis have systematically overestimated the beneficial effect of increasing wages as an anticorruption measure.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00231.x-i1
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  • 20
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Divisionalization and Delegation in Oligopoly (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: We consider a model where oligopolistic firms create independent divisions or franchises, which subsequently delegate output decisions to managers. We show that the number of firms required to make divisionalization privately profitable is greater in our model than in previous pure divisionalization models. However, in contrast with pure delegation models, we show that the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium approaches perfect competition as divisionalization costs tends to zero, even with a small fixed number of firms.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00321.x
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  • 21
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Pay to Switch or Pay to Stay: Preference-Based Price Discrimination in Markets with Switching Costs (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: In many markets, firms can price discriminate between their own customers and their rivals' customers, charging one price to consumers who prefer their own product and another price to consumers who prefer a rival's product. We find that when demand is symmetric, charging a lower price to a rival's customers is always optimal. When demand is asymmetric, however, it may be more profitable to charge a lower price to one's own customers. Surprisingly, price discrimination can lead to lower prices to all consumers, not only to the group that is more elastic, but also to the less elastic group.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00397.x
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  • 22
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Reputation, Honesty, and Efficiency with Insider Information: an Experiment (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: We conduct an experimental study of sales of insider information about an asset's future value, where the insiders cannot purchase the underlying asset. We examine whether such information is purchased, the quality of the information provided, and the subsequent accuracy of purchase decisions in the underlying asset market. Our design explores whether reputation, in a repeated game of finite (but uncertain) duration, is an effective constraint on deliberate strategic misinformation. The insiders have an immediate incentive to state that the asset value is high when its true value is low. We suggest an application to insider trading in financial information markets. With fixed matching, cooperative outcomes featuring truthful revelation are frequently achieved and sustained, even though this suggests subjects have sophisticated beliefs about the beliefs and behavior of others. As a comparison, we also conduct a control treatment with random rematching. Here, information purchase is less frequent, the rate of truthful revelation decreases, and efficiency is diminished. Our results suggest that most people anticipate that others realize the potential value of a good reputation.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00425.x
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  • 23
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Takeover Waves (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Horizontal takeovers often occur in waves. A sequence of takeovers is obtained in a Cournot setting with cost asymmetries. They are motivated by two different reasons: (1) a low realization of demand increases the profitability of takeovers; (2) takeovers raise the profitability of future takeovers. A possible explanation of merger races is also obtained by showing that firms buying in the first place pay a lower price for their targets.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00189.x
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  • 24
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Mergers and Exclusionary Practices in Health Care Markets (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: We evaluate the relationship between insurers (payers) and providers of health care (hospitals) when they each have a nonnegligible share of the market. We focus in particular on their incentives to merge and the existence of equilibria where payers offer preferential treatment to a subset of hospitals. We demonstrate that hospitals are more likely to merge without consolidating their capacities the less competitive they are vis-à-vis the payer's market. Payers are more likely to merge without consolidating their capacities the less competitive either the hospitals' or the payers' market is. A given payer follows an exclusionary strategy when its starting bargaining position vis-à-vis hospitals is weak. At such exclusionary equilibria, payers tend to distinguish themselves from neighboring payers by contracting with a different subset of hospitals.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00315.x
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  • 25
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Measuring Hospital Cost-Sharing Incentives Under Refined Prospective Payment (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper evaluates the usefulness of a model (McClellan, 1997) that was recently proposed for measuring reimbursement incentives under ongoing refinements to the hospital prospective payment system. The model is applied to a single major disease category (HIV infection) for which the hospital reimbursement system has undergone dramatic refinements in recent years. The paper highlights a problem in the original specification, namely, the use of endogenous costs as an explanatory variable. The paper illustrates how hospital response to both marginal price incentives (e.g., a change in the supply of payment-related services) and average price incentives (e.g., a change in the supply of non-payment-related services) can cause either over-or underestimation of payer cost sharing. In the present case study, overestimation of the marginal reimbursement incentives was evidenced. Obtaining cost-sharing estimates that can be used to evaluate alternative payment classification systems requires controlling for endogenous changes in hospital behavior.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00433.x
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  • 26
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    A Strategic Approach to Software Protection (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper demonstrates that there is a strategic reason why software firms have followed consumers' desire to drop software protection. We analyze software protection policies in a price-setting duopoly software industry selling differentiated software packages, where consumers' preference for particular software is affected by the number of other consumers who (legally or illegally) use the same software. Increasing network effects make software more attractive to consumers, thereby enabling firms to raise prices. However, it also generates a competitive effect resulting from feircer competition for market shares. We show that when network effects are strong, unprotecting is an equilibrium for a noncooperative industry.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00163.x
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  • 27
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Effects of One-Way Spillovers on Market Shares, Industry Price, Welfare, and R & D Cooperation (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: With one-way spillovers, the standard symmetric two-period R&D model leads to an asymmetric equilibrium only, with endogeneous innovator and imitator roles. We show how R&D decisions and measures of firm heterogeneity—market shares, R&D shares, and profits—depend on spillovers and on R&D costs. While a joint lab always improves on consumer welfare, it yields higher profits, cost reductions, and social welfare only under extra assumptions, beyond those required with multidirectional spillovers. Finally, the novel issue of optimal R&D cartels is addressed. We show an optimal R&D cartel may seek to minimize R&D spillovers between its members.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00223.x
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  • 28
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Corporate Control Through Board Dismissals and Takeovers (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper examines some policy issues related to the interaction between internal and external corporate control mechanisms—board dismissals and takeovers—by focusing on the information aggregation and other effects related to this interaction. We model the functioning of corporate control mechanisms as an example of a multilayered principal-agent relationship in which shareholders delegate the task of monitoring management quality to the board and rely on the external takeover market to provide additional disciplining of the manager as well as of the board. This gives rise to two effects: (1) a substitution effect, whereby the takeover market partially substitutes for board dismissal of the manager, leading to greater lenience toward the manager by a board acting in the shareholders' best interest, and (2) a kick-in-the-pants effect, whereby the board is stricter with the manager because it may be dismissed by a successful acquirer who views it as lax. The interaction of these two effects leads to various implications about the behavior of boards and potential acquirers. In particular, a well-functioning internal control mechanism (the board) does not obviate the need for external control (takeovers). Moreover, somewhat counterintuitively, there may be a greater incidence of takeovers when the internal control mechanism is working well than when it is not.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00489.x
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  • 29
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Entry Deterrence, Product Quality: Price and Advertising as Signals (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: I analyze the marketing strategy of an incumbent monopolist facing a threat of entry. Product quality is unknown to consumers, and the monopolist's cost is unknown to the potential entrant. The incumbent uses both price and advertising to signal cost and quality. The monopolist faces a dilemma because signaling a high quality attracts customers but requires a high price, whereas signaling low cost prevents entry but requires a low price. I characterize the unique (stable) separating equilibrium and show that dissipative advertising may be used, while it is never used if either quality or cost is known. Some equilibria may involve pooling on cost. A welfare analysis indicates that potential entry may improve welfare and that the effect of unknown quality is not always negative when it interferes with entry deterrence.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00615.x
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  • 30
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Minimum Advertised Price (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper examines minimum advertised price (MAP), a vertical restraint that is observed in manufacturer-retailer interactions. Under MAP, the manufacturer announces that it will reimburse retailers for a fraction of their advertising expenditures if retailers do not advertise the product at below a specified price. MAP can be considered a combination of resale price maintenance (RPM) and a cooperative advertising subsidy. Current antitrust law treats RPM as illegal per se, whereas MAP is judged according to a rule of reason. A framework is presented within with neither a minimum retail price nor a cooperative advertising subsidy is individually sufficient to enable maximization of profits in the complete manufacturer-retailer structure, but the two instruments together are. MAP is therefore a sufficient instrument for the maximization of joint profits. We argue that MAP can also be designed as a second-best instrument that replicates RPM.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00647.x
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  • 31
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    Digitale Medien
    Increases in Executive Pay Following Privatization (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: The average chief executive at one of Britain's twelve regional electricity distribution companies experienced nearly a threefold salary increase in the two years following the industry privatization in 1990. It is hard to account for the tremendous pay raises with conventional explanations for executive compensation rates. They are not attributable to increases in managerial talent, because privatization brought virtually no changes in personnel at the top rank. In addition, the salary increases did not coincide with dramatic changes in firm scale, and cross-firm differences in the raises are uncorrelated with stock-market returns and other measures of firm performance. By contrast, salary increases are highly correlated with firms' potential profits (as measured by the administratively assigned price cap). The findings presented here thus provide new perspectives on the determinants of executive compensation.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00327.x
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  • 32
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Seller Financing of Consumer Durables (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Sellers of consumer durables often provide financing to customers. This paper shows that when customers desire consumption smoothing and when financial markets are imperfect, a seller can find it optimal to offer a menu of deferred-payment plans. A monopolist seller price discriminates among customers with different intertemporal income profiles by making such menu offers, and the interest rate on the seller credit can be significantly lower than the market borrowing rate. Seller financing can be an equilibrium outcome in a game where sellers and banks with market power choose payment plans and interest rates strategically.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00435.x
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  • 33
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    The Effectiveness and Targeting of Television Advertising (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Television networks spend about 16% of their revenues on tune-ins, which are previews or advertisements for their own shows. In this paper, we examine two questions. First, what is the informational content in advertising? Second, is this level of expenditures consistent with profit maximization? To answer these questions, we use a new and unique micro-level panel dataset on the television viewing decisions of a large sample of individuals, matched with data on show tune-in advertisements. The difference in effectiveness of advertisements between “regular” shows (about which viewers are assumed to have substantial information a priori) and “specials” (about which they have very little) reveals the value of information in advertisements and the different roles that information can play. The number of exposures for each individual is likely to be correlated with their preferences, since networks target their audiences. We address this endogeneity problem by controlling for observed, and integrating the unobserved, characteristics of individuals, and find that the estimated effects of tune-ins are still large. Finally, we find that actual expenditures on tune-ins closely match the predicted optimal levels of spending.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00363.x
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  • 34
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    The Vertical Organization of Industry: Systems Competition versus Component Competition (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: We discuss two contrasting styles of vertical organization of complementary activities or components in an industry: systems competition versus component competition. When firms' competencies differ, systems competition is not a perfect substitute for component competition, even with Bertmnd behavior. Costs, prices, industry profits, and the distribution of those profits among firms all differ between the two styles of organization. Moreover, firms' profit incentives do not generally guide them towards the socially efficient form of vertical organization. In duopoly, there is a bias towards open organization (component competition), but with enough firms (three or more, in an exponential example) this bias is reversed.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00143.x
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  • 35
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Statistical Causality and Strategic Behavior in Industrial Markets (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper proposes a simple test of the leader-follower model of strategic behavior. This test relates the temporal notions of leadership central to such models to the empirical methods of statistical causality. This test is performed using data from the US softwood plywood industry of the last three decades. Others have productively explored the spatial pricing practices of this industry by applying a leader-follower model. Similarly, we find that a leader-follower model explains well the temporal relations between key strategic variables (prices) in the industry. We conclude that the leader-follower model imposes meaningful restrictions on observable time-series data and that statistical causality is a useful method for testing these restrictions.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00183.x
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  • 36
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Influence Costs, Structural Inertia, and Organizational Change (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper builds an economic model of the relationship between influence activity and resistance to change in organizations. I show that influence activity can create harmful barriers to change and that the influence costs of change are positively related to the firm's prospects. The model rationalizes the widely held view that firms often must endure a survival-threatening crisis before meaningful change can be achieved. I show that employees' choices of whether to engage in influence activity can depend on their beliefs as to whether the firm will choose to change its organizational form. If employees expect change, their best response is to try to affect the form of the change in their favor.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00237.x
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  • 37
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Patent Breadth, Patent Life, and the Pace of Technological Progress (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: In active investment climates where firms sequentially improve each other's products, a patent can terminate either because it expires or because a non-infringing innovation displaces its product in the market. We define the length of time until one of these happens as the effective patent life, and show how it depends on patent breadth. We distinguish lagging breadth, which protects against imitation, from leading breadth, which protects against new improved products. We compare two types of patent policy with leading breadth: (1) patents are finite but very broad, so that the effective life of a patent coincides with its statutory life, and (2) patents are long but narrow, so that the effective life of a patent ends when a better product replaces it. The former policy improves the diffusion of new products, but the latter has lower R&D costs.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00001.x
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  • 38
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Oligopoly, Financial Structure, and Resolution of Uncertainty (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: We characterize equilibria of a multistage game in which competing duopolists may acquire and share information in advance of choosing their financial structure which, in turn, precedes production. Given sufficient uncertainty, equilibria exist in which the efficiency and, possibly, coordination gains to acquiring and sharing perfect information are sufficient to break Brander and Lewis's (1986) result wherein both firms issue debt to their mutual disadvantage. However, more interesting may be the robustness of that result when uncertainty is low or when information is imperfect. The key insight is that the consequences of issuing debt are invariant to the level of uncertainty, given that firms can recalibrate the terms of debt to achieve the Stackelberg solution.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00067.x
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  • 39
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Entry and Predation: British Shipping Cartels 1879–1929 (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: I examine the outcomes of cases of entry by merchant shipping lines into established markets around the turn of the century. These established markets are completely dominated by an incumbent cartel composed of several member shipping lines. The cartel makes the decision whether or not to begin a price war against the entrant; some entrants are formally admitted to the cartel without any conflict. I use characteristics of the entrant to predict whether or not the entrant will encounter a price war conditional on entering. I find that weaker entrants are fought, where “weaker” means having fewer financial resources, less experience, smaller size, or poor trade conditions. The empirical results provide most support for the long-purse theory of predation. Due to the small number of observations available, 47, I discuss qualitative evidence (such as predatory intent expressed in correspondence between cartel members) that supports the empirical results. The results are also found to be robust to misclassification of the dependent variable, which is a particular concern when dealing with historical data.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00679.x
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  • 40
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Selling to Socially Responsible Consumers: Competition and The Private Provision of Public Goods (2003)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: We model firms as competing for socially responsible consumers by linking the provision of a public good (environmentally friendly or socially responsible activities) to sales of their private goods. In many cases, too little of the public good is provided, but under certain conditions, competition leads to excessive provision. Further, there is generally a trade-off between more efficient provision of the private and the public good. Our results indicate that the level of private provision of the public good varies inversely with the competitiveness of the private-good market and that the types of public goods provided are biased toward those for which consumers have high participation value.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00419.x
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  • 41
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    Digitale Medien
    Price and Nonprice Competition with Endogenous Market Structure (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper examines the effect of the intensity of short-run price competition and other exogenous variables that affect gross profit margins—such as the degree of product differentiation and the consumers' responsiveness to quality—on market structure and on advertising and R&D expenditure. A key result is that more intense short-run competition can lead to lower concentration in industries with high advertising or R&D intensity, unlike exogenous-sunk-cost industries. Also, price competition has a negative effect on advertising or R&D expenditure. A case study is also presented, which is consistent with the theoretical results of the paper.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00053.x
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  • 42
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    Digitale Medien
    Policy Shocks, Market Intermediaries, and Corporate Strategy: The Evolution of Business Groups in Chile and India (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Numerous countries have undergone rapid transitions in their economic environments. Yet, little is known about firms' responses to such transitions. We use field-collected data to study the evolution of eighteen large and diversified business groups in Chile (1987–1997) and India (1990–1997). The chosen periods correspond to significant deregulation in the primary markets in both countries. Conventional wisdom suggests that the intermediation roles played by business groups ought to decrease during these periods. However, we find an increase in group scope, an increase in the strength of the social and economic ties that bind together group firms, an increase in self-reported intermediation attempts by the groups, and some evidence that these actions are associated with improvements in accounting and stock-market performance of the group affiliates. We suggest that the slow development of market intermediaries, in a manner suggested by institutional economics, and the attendant lack of reduction in transaction costs in primary markets, can explain these findings.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00271.x
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  • 43
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    Digitale Medien
    A Reexamination of Yardstick Competition (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper shows that yardstick competition does not assist a regulator when lump-sum transfers are not costly and the regulator does not care about the distribution of income. Yardstick competition may discourage investment that would make efficient operation possible. The paper characterizes optimal regulatory schemes in a simple model and demonstrates that it may be optimal to limit the amount of information available to the regulator.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00033.x
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  • 44
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Price Dynamics and Consumer Learning (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper studies the price dynamics induced by strategic firm behavior in the presence of consumer learning about the uncertain quality differential of the products offered by a duopoly. It is found that consumers learn slowly and that prices converge also slowly to full-information levels. A consequence is that the incentives affirms to manipulate consumers' beliefs are persistent. Although pricing tends to be aggressive at the early stages, and average prices eventually increase over time, price wars may occur at intermediate stages of the product life cycle.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00095.x
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  • 45
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    Digitale Medien
    Tender Offers, Proxy Contests, and Large-Shareholder Activism (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: The paper analyzes tender offers and proxy contests as alternative means of resolving corporate governance conflicts between dissidents and incumbent management. We show that when a dissident shareholder is sufficiently confident about the potential benefits from changing corporate policy, he will seek majority control by making a tender offer rather than initiating a proxy contest. When the dissident is relatively uninformed, however, he may opt for a proxy contest, thereby utilizing the information of other shareholders to implement the better policy. Consistent with empirical evidence, the model predicts that announcements of tender offers will tend to be associated with larger positive stockprice reactions than announcements of proxy contests. The model is easily extended to allow for promanagement bias in proxy voting by institutional investors. Empirical observations that have been viewed as evidence of such promanagement bias are shown to be quite consistent with the absence of such bias. Policy issues are discussed as well. An interesting result is that even policies targeted at reducing the costs of conducting proxy contests may have ambiguous social consequences, given the possibility of substitution between tender offers and proxy contests.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00787.x
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    The Regulation of Predatory Firms (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This article investigates the issue ofpredation by a regulated firm. Since it has private information, a regulated firm obtains higher rents in case of successful predation: the fewer the competitors, the higher the marginal social value of the regulated firm's effort and the higher the informational rents. Both principals (the investor of a “target” firm and the regulator) have to provide some incentives to prevent predation: the investor has to reduce the sensitivity of refinancing to predation; the regulator has to lower the gain of successful predation. It is shown that there is a trade-off between the power of the regulatory incentive scheme and the regulated firm's incentives to prey. In addition, as deterring predation is costly, the investor and the regulator compete when offering contracts: each wants to free-ride on the other. Hence, predation may occur in equilibrium although it makes both principals worse off.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00849.x
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  • 47
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    Limited Liability and Bonus Contracts (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper studies the nature of incentive contracts between a risk-neutral principal and a risk-neutral agent under the constraint that the agent's liability is limited. A necessary and sufficient condition is derived for the existence of a first-best contract under this constraint, and a bonus-based contract is shown to be the most efficient contractual form. Implications of bonus contracts are also discussed.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00899.x
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  • 48
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    Contract Mixing in Franchising as a Mechanism for Public-Good Provision (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper is concerned with the coexistence of company-owned units and franchised units in business format franchising and their different contractual arrangements. Drawing insights from case studies that indicate both the development and the maintenance of company-wide brand names and unit-specific sales activities are crucial to a franchise company, we construct a multitask model to account for such contract mixing in franchising. Intuitively, low-powered contracts are offered to some managers to induce effort for brand-name development and maintenance, while high-powered contracts are offered to the remaining managers to elicit sales activity and capture the beneficial effect of the company brand name. Franchising can thus be viewed as an organizational agreement for production involving brand-name products and services.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00085.x
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  • 49
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    Process- Versus Function-Based Hierarchies (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: I consider a firm's choice between having people who carry out complementary tasks report to the same manager and having them report to separate, function-based managers. Even supposing that the former enhances coordination, the latter may be preferred because it improves the firm's control over employees. I show that, because switching from a function-based hierarchy to a process-based hierarchy reduces the firm's direct control, it raises the attractiveness of making the employee pay more sensitive to performance. Also, this switch tends to raise the profitability of fostering altruism between employees. I extend the analysis so that it deals with the relative benefits of IT- and M-form organizations. I show that the M form becomes more profitable as the firm gets large.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00453.x
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  • 50
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    Time Schedule and Program Profile: TV News in Norway and Denmark (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Two TV channels compete on programming with respect to both time schedule (continuous choice) and program profile (discrete choice), with a directional constraint concerning time schedule (viewers cannot watch TV before they get home). We show how the relative importance of program profile and time schedule, as perceived by the viewers, determines the equilibrium outcome. Furthermore, we find that there is a first-mover disadvantage in a sequential game where one channel sets its two choice variables before its rival does, and a first-mover advantage in a semise-quential game where the channels set time schedules sequentially and thereafter set program profiles simultaneously. The results are applied to the Norwegian and Danish markets for TV news, where number-two channels have challenged the incumbents.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00209.x
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    Disciplinary Takeovers and Industry Effects (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper presents a disciplinary explanation for some seemingly paradoxical stylized facts from the takeover literature. Most notable among these are: (1) hostile takeovers are predicted better by industry-wide than by firm-specific performance failures; and (2) gains from a successful bid for a specific firm extend to other firms in the same industry. Our explanation is based on the idea that managerial incentives based on relative performance evaluation may induce an inefficient industry-wide equilibrium in which all firms underperform with respect to a value-maximizing firm, but no firm underperforms with respect to the industry average. A takeover can serve as a means to destroy such an inefficient industry-wide incentive equilibrium.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00265.x
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  • 52
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    The Interaction between a Most-Favored-Customer Clause and Price Dispersion: An Empirical Examination of the Medicaid Rebate Rules of 1990 (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper examines the effect of the MFC rules adopted by Medicaid on both price dispersion and price levels in the wholesale pharmaceutical market. Theory suggests that the regulations should reduce price dispersion and increase the average price for those products with a high initial level of price dispersion. Using data which can only measure some dimensions of price discrimination, I find that discrimination falls for products sold to hospitals, but not drugstores. Branded drugs facing generic competition have the most dispersion ex ante. Prices of these brands rise with dispersion at the implementation of the new rules. The last two results are consistent with Scott Morton (1997), where I look only at price changes due to the law. The results of this paper confirm that part of the mechanism of action for the price increase is the high level of price dispersion for some products combined with the MFC.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00151.x
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  • 53
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    Digitale Medien
    Division of Labor in Teams (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper examines the incentive effects of division of labor on worker effort, in the absence of the scale effects studied by Adam Smith. The game-theoretic model gives two results. (1) Suppose workers are identical and risk-neutral, and there is stochastic observation of group output by the firm offering compensations subject to some worker-participation constraint. Then the firm can arrive at the same first-best outcome with or without division of labor. However, if workers are risk-averse, division of labor can give the firm strictly greater profit. (2) A deepening division of labor magnifies this positive incentive effect; but if workers are heterogeneous, or if there are certain informational imperfections in the production process, this incentive advantage of division of labor could be impaired or even reversed. The first result may help explain the emergence of division of labor in the early stages of industrialization without relying on the Smithian advantages, which are also present in some labor deployment schemes without division of labor. The second result throws light on some recent anecdotal evidence of a shallowing division of labor in some areas of modern manufacturing. These factors affecting the efficiency of division of labor are then further discussed in the light of recent empirical findings on division of labor and team work, such as those in Katzenbach and Smith (1993).
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00403.x
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  • 54
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    Digitale Medien
    Board Efficiency and Internal Corporate Control Mechanisms (2003)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: We analyze the interactions between internal and external control mechanisms in a framework in which the board selects the CEO and then decides whether to retain or dismiss him after observing a signal regarding his ability. The novel aspect of our paper is that we consider both the hiring and the firing of the CEO by the board. The type of board is defined by its ability to select a good CEO, so that the quality of the CEO depends on the type of board. Then, the dismissal-retention decision provides information not only on the quality of the CEO but also on the board's type. We show that the board's behavior depends on the pressure from the takeover market and on whether its type is publicly known. When the pressure from the takeover market is high and the type of board is private information, the board prefers not to dismiss the manager even if it has received a very low signal regarding his quality. Hence, our model endogenously derives a collusion between board and CEO in which the board does not fire a bad CEO. This behavior emerges as an attempt to hide the board's inability to accomplish the first task, CEO selection, by distorting the second task, the CEO retention-dismissal decision.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00495.x
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  • 55
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    The Role of Network Effects in the US VCR Market, 1978–1986 (2003)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper estimates the importance of indirect network effects in the US video cassette recorder (VCR) market between 1978 and 1986. Estimation reveals the significant role of networks in the format competition between VHS and Beta. The paper also finds that if Sony, the system sponsor of Beta, had aggressively introduced its VCRs at the early stage of competition, Beta would likely have dominated the market in 1985; instead, the format disappeared in 1989. Finally, the paper measures consumer welfare for the value of network effects in VCRs, and assesses the consumer welfare effect of standardization.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00447.x
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  • 56
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    A Comparison of Exit and Voice Relationships Under Common Uncertainty (2003)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: We consider a repeated interaction between a manufacturing firm and a subcontractor. The relationship between the two parties is characterized (1) by moral hazard, and (2) by the fact that they do not have perfect knowledge about the base cost level of the project, which is carried out by a subcontractor (the parties only have identical a priori beliefs). We consider a two-period model where the players can update their estimate of the base cost level according to incoming information. Exit relationships, where the firm signs one-period contracts with different subcontractors, are compared with voice relationships, where both partners commit to a two-period interaction and (due to information sharing and face-to-face communication between the partners) additional information about the base cost level is generated. It is shown that in such a dynamic framework with common uncertainty the quality of the additional information plays a crucial role in determining the characteristics of the optimal relationship: voice-based strategies governed by long-term contracts are preferable if the precision of the additional information about the base cost level is high. If the precision of the additional signal is low, exit strategies with frequent changes of the subcontractors are optimal for the manufacturer.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00531.x
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  • 57
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    Digitale Medien
    Minimum Differentiation in Commercial Media Markets (2003)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: We examine a model of locational choice in commercial media markets. Commercial media (stations) compete for audiences with their choice of programming variety in order to attract advertising revenues from advertisers. These advertisers (producers) compete in a differentiated product market and rely on advertising to inform consumers about their product. We use the model to show that media have incentives to minimize the extent of differentiation between them. This incentive is an implication of the assumed role of advertising as information and as an ultimate nuisance to the audience. When stations minimally differentiate their programming offerings, producers choose lower levels of advertising. Consequently, lower levels of product information are available to consumers, permitting producers to gain higher margins on product sales. As a result, stations can negotiate higher payments for advertising space.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00291.x
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  • 58
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    Hamburger Prices and Spatial Econometrics (2003)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper applies spatial econometrics to hamburger price data to assess the degree of substitutability of products and locations of spatially dispersed franchised chains. First, while intrachain price variation exists, I find that hamburger prices at neighboring outlets of different chains are spatially uncorrelated. I conclude that their products are not close substitutes, which provides an explanation for why price promotions have not raised market share. I do find spatial price correlation, however, among proximate outlets of separate franchisees within the same chain. This finding implies that customers view proximate locations of a chain as substitutes.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00591.x
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  • 59
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    Randal Heeb Innovation and Vertical Integration in Complementary Markets (2003)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper studies vertical integration by an essential-good monopolist into complementary markets. Unlike previous studies of complementary products, consumers are allowed to purchase some components of a complementary basket, but not others. Two different pricing strategies by the integrated firm may emerge. In mass-market equilibria, the price of the complement under integration is zero and it is given away with the essential good. Niche-market equilibria have more conventional pricing. This dichotomy is consistent with consumer software pricing. Integration enhances consumer and total surplus, unless it leads to exit by the higher-quality rival, in which case welfare is reduced. Exit is most likely when it is least damaging to consumer welfare. Integration reduces innovation by the rival firm. The effect on innovation by the integrated firm is ambiguous, but numerical computation of an extended model indicates that integration increases the innovation of the integrated firm and enhances welfare.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00387.x
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  • 60
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    Renegotiation and Collusion in Organizations (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: It has been argued that collusion among the members of an organization may lead to inefficiencies and hence should be prevented in equilibrium. This paper shows that whenever the parties to an organization can renegotiate their incentive scheme after collusion, these inefficiencies can be greatly reduced. Moreover, it might not be possible to prevent collusion and renegotiation in equilibrium. Indeed, if collusion is observable but not verifiable, then the organization's optimal incentive scheme will always be renegotiated. If, instead, collusion is not observable to the principal, both collusion and renegotiation will occur in equilibrium with positive probability. The occurrence of collusion and renegotiation should therefore not be taken as evidence of the inefficiency of an organization.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00453.x
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  • 61
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    Digitale Medien
    Managerial Compensation and Capital Structure (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: We investigate the interaction between financial structure and managerial compensation and show that risky debt affects both the probability of managerial replacement and the manager's wage if he is retained by the firm. Our model yields a rich set of predictions, including the following: (i) The market values of equity and debt decrease if the manager is replaced; moreover, the expected cash flow affirms that retain their managers exceeds that affirms that replace their managers, (ii) Managers affirms with risky debt outstanding are promised lower severance payments (golden parachutes) than managers affirms that do not have risky debt. (Hi) Controlling for firm's size, the leverage, managerial compensation, and cash flow of firms that retain their managers are positively correlated, (iv) Controlling for the firm's size, the probability of managerial turnover and firm value are negatively correlated, (v) Managerial pay-performance sensitivity is positively correlated with leverage, expected compensation, and expected cash flows.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00549.x
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  • 62
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    External Liberalization and Foreign Presence: Cross-Industry Evidence from Poland and Hungary (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: External liberalization—the relaxation of restrictions on cross-border trade and inbound direct investment—has played an important role in the programs of economic transition in central Europe. While liberalization is widely heralded, there has been little empirical analysis of the links between liberalization and industry structure. This analysis examines changes in foreign presence following external liberalization in Poland and Hungary. I show that the presence of proprietary and intangible assets explains much of the cross-industry variation in patterns of foreign presence and, for a given level of foreign presence, whether this will occur via trade or inbound direct investment.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00231.x
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  • 63
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    Digitale Medien
    Intermediation Can Replace Certification (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: We consider a market in which consumers do not have perfect information about product quality. Producers can perfectly reveal that a good is of high quality through certification, which entails socially wasteful costs. Firms can choose whether to sell through an intermediary or to sell independently (vertical integration). We show that multibrand retailing, which leads to a redistribution of profits but not to social costs, can fully or partially replace certification by signaling product quality. Renting the image of a competing high-quality brand is shown to be an outcome that can be sustained through intermediation.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00001.x
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  • 64
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    Coupon Advertising Under Imperfect Price Information (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper studies sales promotions through coupons in an oligopoly under imperfect price information. Sellers can distribute either ordinary coupons, or coupon (price) advertising, or both types of coupons, at distant locations to attract consumers from their rivals' markets. A unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium exists where rebates and couponing intensity are always positive. In the ordinary-coupon equilibrium, prices, promotional efforts, and sellers' profits are higher than in the coupon-advertising equilibrium. However, if sellers are allowed to distribute both types of coupons, only coupon advertising is sent out in equilibrium.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00523.x
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  • 65
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    Quality Competition, Insurance, and Consumer Choice in Health Care Markets (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: In this model, insurance offering a choice of hospitals is valued because consumers are uncertain which hospital they will prefer ex post. A competitive insurance market facilitates tacit price collusion between hospitals; high margins induce hospitals to compete for customers through overinvestment in quality. Incentives may exist to lock in market share via managed-care plans with less choice and lower prices. As technology becomes more expensive, the market increasingly offers too little choice. A pure managed care market may emerge, with underinvestment in quality. Relative to a pure insurance regime, however, all consumers are better off under managed care.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00546.x
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  • 66
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    Strategic Invasion in Markets with Switching Costs (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: We investigate the role of consumer switching costs in a three-stage model in which the entrant and the incumbent firm set prices sequentially and then the consumers decide from which firm to buy. We characterize the unique subgame perfect equilibrium and find that even an entrant with a higher marginal cost may profitably invade part of the market due to the existence of switching costs. Switching costs benefit both firms but harm consumers. This model is used to understand pricing behavior in the US telecommunications industry.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00521.x
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    Yardstick Competition and Investment Incentives (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper analyzes how firms' investment incentives are affected by yardstick competition in a situation in which the regulator is unable to commit himself to the regulatory contract before firms invest. Despite its rent-extracting property, yardstick competition does not necessarily reduce efficiency-improving investment. Considering firm-specific investment, yardstick competition is shown to increase investment incentives over individual regulation affirms. In this case, therefore, yardstick competition both reduces the regulator's informational problem ex post and strengthens the firms' investment incentives ex ante. If instead investment is industry-specific, incentives to invest are lowered by yardstick competition.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00105.x
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    Digitale Medien
    Takeover Waves (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Horizontal takeovers often occur in waves. A sequence of takeovers is obtained in a Cournot setting with cost asymmetries. They are motivated by two different reasons: (1) a low realization of demand increases the profitability of takeovers; (2) takeovers raise the profitability of future takeovers. A possible explanation of merger races is also obtained by showing that firms buying in the first place pay a lower price for their targets.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00157.x-i1
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  • 69
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    Digitale Medien
    Multimarket Contact and Price Coordination in the Cellular Telephone Industry (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Empirical studies have confirmed the prediction of theoretical models that contact in multiple markets may enhance firms' abilities to tacitly collude and consequently achieve higher prices and profits. It has remained largely unexplored, however, how firms coordinate their actions. This paper identifies a method of pricing in the cellular telephone industry that seems to enable firms to coordinate their actions across markets. This pricing pattern is found to raise prices by approximately 7–10%, and cannot be attributed to a variety of noncooperative explanations.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00287.x
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  • 70
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    Digitale Medien
    Focused Firms and the Incentive to Innovate (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper explores the possibility that a firm may make a credible strategic commitment to high levels of innovation by limiting its horizontal or vertical scope. Specifically, I develop a model in which a firm decides whether to undertake an innovation that affects a system of products, which can also be interpreted as multiple stages of the production process. The products are technologically related, and innovation in the core product is assumed to impose costs on the producers of ancillary products, due to cannibalization of the old technology and redesign or retooling costs, for example. I demonstrate that a firm may optimally and credibly commit to innovate by choosing to be a focused firm and licensing the production of the ancillary product, even when licensees are inefficient. In stark contrast to the irrelevance results of the strategic delegation literature, this commitment may be credible even when licensing contracts are renegotiable, but only if licensees are sufficiently inefficient.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00339.x
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    Regulatory Reform and Bureaucratic Responsiveness to Firms: the Impact of User Fees in the FDA (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper examines the impact of user fees on the speed of new-drug review and on the responsiveness of FDA reviewers to pharmaceutical firms. User fees are expected to alter FDA behavior and responsiveness to pharmaceutical firms because they give regulators a financial incentive to process more new-drug applications and because they convey information to regulators that may reduce type I error. The analysis examines the variation in FDA review times for new drugs approved between 1990 and 1995 as a function of differences that exist among firms and drugs. Specifically, it compares estimates of regulator responsiveness to several firm and drug characteristics before and after the introduction of user fees. The results show that user fees produced a significant change in FDA behavior. Regulators have become less responsive to the differences among firms since the introduction of user fees, which suggests that the reform has led to more equity in the new-drug review process. In addition, the FDA has expedited the review of new drugs, especially the most therapeutically novel drugs, which suggests that politicians have been fairly successful in designing a reform to realign regulatory incentives in the FDA.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00363.x
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  • 72
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    Digitale Medien
    Graft, Bribes, and the Practice of Corruption (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: We construct a dynamic model of corruption in organizations where officials privately know their propensity for corruption and clients optimally choose the bribe offered. We show that there is a continuum set of stationary bribe equilibria due exclusively to the dynamic nature of the model and the endogenous determination of bribes. This can explain why similar countries have stable but different “implicit prices” for the same illegal services. We also show that, by not considering the reaction of clients, traditional analysis have systematically overestimated the beneficial effect of increasing wages as an anticorruption measure.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00257.x
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  • 73
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    Digitale Medien
    Systems Competition, Vertical Merger, and Foreclosure (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: We address the possibility of foreclosure in markets where the final good consists of a system composed of a hardware good and complementary software and the value of the system depends on the availability of software. Foreclosure occurs when a hardware firm merges with a software firm and the integrated firm makes its software incompatible with a rival technology or system. We find that foreclosure can be an equilibrium outcome where both the merger and compatibility decisions are part of a multistage game which permits the foreclosed hardware firm to play a number of counter-strategies. Further, foreclosure can be an effective strategy to monopolize the hardware market.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00025.x
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  • 74
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    Digitale Medien
    Hassle Costs: The Achilles' Heel of Price-Matching Guarantees* (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: We show that price-matching guarantees can facilitate monopoly pricing only if firms automatically match prices. If consumers must instead request refunds (thereby incurring hassle costs), we find that any increase in equilibrium prices due to firms' price-matching policies will be small; often, no price increase can be supported. In symmetric markets price-matching guarantees cannot support any rise in prices, even if hassle costs are arbitrarily small In asymmetric markets, higher prices can be supported, but the prices fall well short of maximizing joint profits. Our model can explain why some firms adopt price-matching guarantees while others do not.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00489.x
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  • 75
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    Digitale Medien
    Introduction (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00311.x
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  • 76
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    Digitale Medien
    Using Subjective Risk Adjusting to Prevent Patient Dumping in the Health Care Industry (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: We examine how to procure health care services at minimum cost while preventing suppliers from refusing to care for high-cost patients. A single risk-adjusted prospective payment is optimal only when it is particularly costly for the supplier to discover likely treatment costs. Cost sharing is optimal when these screening costs are somewhat smaller. When screening costs are sufficiently small, screening is optimally accommodated and subjective risk adjusting is implemented. Under subjective risk adjusting, the supplier classifies patients according to his personal assessment of likely treatment costs, and payments are structured accordingly. Optimal procurement policies are contrasted with prevailing industry policies.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00351.x
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  • 77
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    Separating the True Effect from Gaming in Incentive-Based Contracts in Health Care (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper studies the effect of incentive regulation on health care. In the context of incentive-based health contracts, which might also introduce an incentive for the providers simply to report better treatment outcomes, evaluation of treatment using the information supplied by the providers (reported output) could be problematic. The systematic error on the output report is called providers' gaming behavior. This paper develops a general method for decomposing the effect of incentive-based contracts on performance into the true effect, which is the result of clinicians' improved effort induced by the contract, and the gaming effect, which is due to the change in the providers' reporting practice. The method follows the essence of linear structural relation (LISREL) models, and the true treatment output is modeled using a latent variable. Various output measures can be included in the structural evaluation model, but objective measure(s) (output measures not affected by providers' potential gaming) must be constructed based on available information to identify gaming through its correlation with the reported measures. The strengths of this method are that information from more than one output measure can be used, no monitoring system is required, and the construction of a gold-standard measure is not necessary. This method is applied to evaluate the impact of Maine's performance-based contracting on its public providers' substance-abuse services. Evidence of gaming is found in Maine's system, which remains robust in most of the sensitivity analyses. The methodology developed here can be used to evaluate the impact of a broad range of incentive-based contracts.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00383.x
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  • 78
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    Digitale Medien
    Adverse Selection with Competitive Inspection (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: We develop a model with heterogeneous buyers and sellers in which the sellers have private information about their goods' qualities. We show that efficient trading cannot occur without middlemen. Middlemen can provide two services: one is inspection, and the other is the sorting of buyers and sellers through the rationing of sellers and the provision of two different price schedules. The latter service permits the possibility of achieving the first best. When the first best is not attainable, there is a second best characterized by two intervals, one consisting of low-quality noninspected goods, and the other of high-quality inspected goods. We determine whether first and second best outcomes can be implemented in a market equilibrium with both zero and infinite buyer-seller search costs. First and second best outcomes are attainable under a larger set of parameter values when search costs are infinite; also, typically too much inspection occurs in a market equilibrium. Welfare may be either raised or lowered by the introduction of middlemen.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00001.x
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  • 79
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    Digitale Medien
    Empirical Evaluation of Regulatory Regimes in Local Telecommunications Markets (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper relies on an engineering optimization model of the local telecommunication exchange network to calibrate the functions entering various regulatory mechanisms, from both traditional and modern (incentive) regulation, and evaluate their relative performance. The engineering process model is used to generate data, which are econometrically synthesized in a translog economic cost function. Using this estimated cost function and some empirical and institutional information on market and regulatory conditions, we then calibrate demand, social-surplus, and disutility-of-(cost-reducing)-effort functions. These functions, together with probability distributions reflecting the regulator's beliefs about technology characteristics, allow us to quantitatively assess the social value of regulatory transfers and of good cost auditing procedures, the redistributive consequences of the various forms of regulation, and the sensitivity of their relative performance to the cost of public funds.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00061.x
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    Digitale Medien
    Erratum: “Time Schedule and Program Profile: TV News in Norway and Denmark” (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00161.x
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  • 81
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    Digitale Medien
    Licensing vs. Litigation: The Effect of the Legal System on Incentives to Innovate (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: With uncertain scope of patent protection and imperfect enforcement, the effective strength of patent protection is determined by the legal system. We analyze how the legal system affects the incentives of firms to innovate, taking into account possibilities of strategic licensing and litigation to deter imitation. The legal system that guarantees the patentee's monopoly power maximizes the R&D intensities. However, the legal system that induces licensing provides incentives to exert R&D effort while preserving ex post efficiency. We also compare R&D, patent licensing, and litigation behavior under American and English rules of legal cost allocation.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00133.x
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  • 82
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    Digitale Medien
    Rational Nonprofit Entrepreneurship (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper derives the decision to found a nonprofit firm as the equilibrium outcome of a multistage game among individuals who would like a public good to be provided. The model predicts that if individuals will voluntarily contribute towards provision of the public good, then it is in the self-interest of the entrepreneur to impose a nondistribution constraint on herself by founding a nonprofit firm.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00551.x
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  • 83
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    Digitale Medien
    Agency-Theory and Internal-Labor-Market Explanations of Bonus Payments: Empirical Evidence from Spanish Firms (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper combines agency theory and internal-labor-market theories to explain the determinants of bonus payments among a large sample of top and middle managers from Spanish firms. A distinction is made between the decision whether to pay bonus or not and the size of the bonus. The empirical evidence confirms that the two decisions are determined by different factors. The results of the analysis show a trade-off between short-term and long-term incentives (bonuses and promotion opportunities) as well as differences in the pattern of compensation policies across economic sectors and functional areas inside the firm.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00573.x
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  • 84
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    Digitale Medien
    Hiring Risky Workers: Some Evidence (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: Lazear recently suggested that firms that do not expect to live for a long time will hire only safe workers. Hence their worker turnover will be lower. In this paper we test this hypothesis using both the industry growth rate and industry-average age of establishments as measures of the horizon for a particular firm. We find mixed results, both at the industry level and at the establishment level. Establishments in growing industries do indeed exhibit higher churning flows, but a high average age of establishments reduces rather than increases churning.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00669.x
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  • 85
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    Digitale Medien
    Contract Renegotiation with Time-Varying Valuations (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: The paper characterizes optimal renegotiation-proof rental contracts in a model with adverse selection and hidden information. It generalizes the work of Hart and Tirole (1988) to the case of time-varying valuations. The paper considers a durable-goods monopolist who serves a nonanonymous buyer with time-varying valuation for the seller's good. The buyer's valuation has a persistent and a transient component; both are private information. The paper shows that for some range of prior beliefs the seller strictly prefers leasing to selling.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00397.x
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  • 86
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    Digitale Medien
    Product Switching Cost and Strategic Flexibility (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper examines the equilibrium degree of flexibility adopted by firms competing in oligopolistic product markets in which the value of flexibility arises from the initial presence of uncertainty over consumer preferences and its eventual resolution. The equilibrium choice of flexible mode depends on the following factors: (1) the cost of switching product design in response to revealed consumer preferences, (2) the difference in the acquisition costs of the flexible and dedicated modes, and (3) the precision of the ex ante information held by the firms regarding consumer preferences. The relationship between these factors and the equilibrium choice of modes is fully characterized.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00461.x
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  • 87
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    Digitale Medien
    Capacity Commitment versus Flexibility (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: We show how technological flexibility choices and equilibrium configurations (both simultaneous and sequential duopoly) depend on six industry characteristics. Low market volatility combined with intermediate market size favors inflexible technologies; large values of either volatility or size favor flexible technologies; low or intermediate values of both favor the coexistence of flexible and inflexible technologies. The possibility of a flexibility trap exists in industries of low volatility and intermediate size. Entry prevention can sometimes be achieved by inflexible technologies or flexible technologies, depending on the industry characteristics.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00347.x
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  • 88
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    Digitale Medien
    Competition for Managers and Product Market Efficiency (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: We investigate whether competition between two firms to hire managers with different abilities might affect efficiency in the product market, when a manager's effort is his/her private information. We conclude that competition for managers might lead to an improvement in efficiency in the market of the firm that attracts the most efficient manager. Competition for managers might even eliminate the productive efficiency loss due to the asymmetry of information in the firm-manager relationship.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00089.x
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  • 89
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    Health-Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives—Reply (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: I reconsider the implementation of efficient cost and quality efforts when health-care providers may refuse services to consumers, and introduce a mechanism that is a combination of prospective payment and cost reimbursement. Conditions are derived for the prospective payment level and the margin above cost reimbursement for the implementation of efficient efforts.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00139.x
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  • 90
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    Digitale Medien
    Nonlinear Supply Contracts, Exclusive Dealing, and Equilibrium Market Foreclosure (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: We examine how the feasibility of both nonlinear pricing and exclusive dealing arrangements affect incentives for market foreclosure when two manufacturers contract with a retail monopolist. Surprisingly, we find that although market foreclosure equilibria exist, they are Pareto-dominated (from each manufacturer's perspective) by all nonforeclosure equilibria. If one believes that Pareto-dominated equilibria are unlikely to arise, then the difference between our results and those of Mathewson and Winter (1987), who do not allow for nonlinear pricing, suggests an ironic twist on the notion that quantity discounts and other kinds of nonlinear pricing can provide an additional way for a manufacturer to foreclose a rival. By providing a manufacturer with increased flexibility (beyond linear pricing) to extract a retailer's surplus, nonlinear pricing may instead have the effect of reducing the incidence of observed market foreclosure.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00755.x
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  • 91
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    Digitale Medien
    Bargaining When Exchange Affects the Value of Future Trade (2003)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: We examine bargaining in a dynamic context where exchange between two parties affects the potential surplus from future trade. In this setting traders negotiate current contracts anticipating the impact of their agreement on future exchanges. We show that in growing environments these dynamic considerations will often ameliorate bargaining inefficiencies associated with private information and facilitate exchange as both parties cooperate to nurture the relationship. In contrast, we find that in declining environments dynamic considerations will often exacerbate bargaining inefficiencies and hinder trade, as both parties are hesitant to let the relationship mature. These findings have implications for preferences to form long-lived relationships.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00557.x
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    Digitale Medien
    Knowledge Spillovers and Growth in the Disagglomeration of the Us Advertising-Agency Industry (2003)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: We investigate knowledge spillovers and externalities in the disagglomeration and growth of the advertising-agency industry. A simple model of high demand, low wages, and externalities associated with clusters of related industries can explain the dispersion of advertising agency employment across states. Other factors affected the industry growth rate within states. Consistent with Jacobs and Porter but contrary to Marshall, Arrow, and Romer, competition, but not specialization, enhanced growth. In accord with Porter (1990), growth increased with buyer cluster size. Diversity had no effect on growth. Despite improvements in telecommunications and transportation reducing effective distances, location still matters.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00327.x
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  • 93
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    The Dvd-vs.-Divx Standard War: Empirical Evidence of Network Effects and Preannouncement Effects (2003)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: We test empirically for network effects and preannouncement effects in the DVD market. We do this by measuring the effect of potential (incompatible) competition on a network undergoing growth. We find that there are network effects. The data are generally consistent with the hypothesis that the preannouncement of DIVX temporarily slowed down the adoption of DVD technology.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00363.x
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  • 94
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Health-Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives—Comment (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This note analyzes the incentives for cost reduction that different payment policies provide to profit-maximizing health-care providers. Ching-to Albert Ma (1994) proposes a reimbursement mechanism that seeks to induce first-best cost reduction by using a combination of cost reimbursement and prospective payment in a model where higher effort on the part of the health-care provider reduces treatment costs. This note shows that a mechanism of this type, generally, will not result in first-best cost reduction. However, such a mechanism is optimal when the payer has efficiency and distributional concerns.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00127.x
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
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  • 95
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Option Contracts and Vertical Foreclosure (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: A model of vertical integration is studied. Upstream firms sell differentiated inputs; downstream firms bundle them to make final products. Downstream products are sold as option contracts, which allow consumers to choose from a set of commodities at predetermined prices. The model is illustrated by examples in telecommunication and health markets. Equilibria of the integration game must result in upstream input foreclosure and downstream monopolization. Consumers may or may not benefit from integration.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00725.x
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  • 96
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Regulation of Duopoly: Managed Competition vs Regulated Monopolies (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper discusses the regulation of oligopolistic differentiated-product industries. The regulator can control prices and impose quantity restrictions, but cannot control the quality choices of the firms. We inquire about the optimal choice of regulatory regime—whether and under what conditions managed competition or segmentation of the market between regulated monopolies achieves better results. In the spatial duopoly model analyzed here, unhindered competition generally results in an inefficient allocation. When the regulator knows the technologies, optimal managed competition results in distortions of the quality choice, but an optimal regulated-monopolies regime achieves the first best outcome. When the regulator is uncertain about the technologies, neither of these methods yields the first-best outcome. The regulated-monopolies regime still tends to produce better quality choices, but managed competition tends to be more effective at extracting rents from the firms. The overall comparison depends on some finer details of the environment.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00821.x
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  • 97
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Paying Customers to Switch (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper studies the business practice of offering discounts to new customers in markets with switching costs. In a two-period homogeneous-good duopoly model, it is shown that the equilibrium amount of discounts increases continuously in the expected switching costs of a typical consumer. In equilibrium, firms offer the same prices and discounts in a mature market even if they have different market shares, and the demands faced by these firms in a new market become more elastic. Firms are worse off engaging in the discriminatory pricing, while consumers need not necessarily benefit from it. There is costly equilibrium switching of consumers, which creates a dead-weight loss to the society.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00877.x
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
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  • 98
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Introduction (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00425.x
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
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  • 99
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: This paper analyzes six spectrum auctions conducted by the Federal Communications Commission from July 1994 to May 1996. These auctions were simultaneous multiple-round auctions in which collections of licenses were auctioned simultaneously. This auction form proved remarkably successful. Similar items sold for similar prices, and bidders successfully formed efficient aggregations of licenses. Bidding behavior differed substantially in the auctions. The extent of bidder competition and price uncertainty played an important role in determining behavior. Bidding credits and installment payments also played a major role in several of the auctions.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00431.x
    Standort Signatur Erwartet Verfügbarkeit
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  • 100
    Digitale Medien
    Digitale Medien
    Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Quelle: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Thema: Wirtschaftswissenschaften
    Notizen: We examine bid data from the first two broadband PCS spectrum auctions for evidence of value synergies. First, we estimate a benchmark regression for the determinants of final auction prices. Then, we include variables reflecting the extent to which bidders ultimately won or already owned the adjacent wireless properties. Consistent with geographic synergies in an ascending-bid auction, prices were higher when the highest losing bidder had adjacent licenses. The footprints of winning bidders suggest that they were often successful in realizing these synergies.
    Materialart: Digitale Medien
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00497.x
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