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  • Articles  (133,323)
  • Periodicals Archive Online (PAO)  (132,053)
  • Blackwell Publishing Ltd.  (1,270)
  • Economics  (133,323)
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  • Articles  (133,323)
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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Effect of Organizational form on Information Flow and Decision Quality: Informational Cascades in Group Decision Making (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper identifies a disadvantage to decision making in a team. We show that in some cases available information is lost due to sequential communication that results in informational cascades. Although incentive contracts exist that prevent cascades, in some cases these contracts do not maximize shareholders' expected residual value and cascades are tolerated in equilibrium. Cascades never occur in hierarchies that exogenously prevent communication. However, when the firm is organized as a hierarchy (and the agents are given the optimal hierarchical contract), in some cases agents will collude and sequentially communicate, admitting the possibility of cascades. In these cases, the principals must monitor and enforce the hierarchical process. When monitoring costs exceed the cost of cascades, the team is the optimal organizational form.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00115.x
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A Practitioner's Guide to Estimation of Random-Coefficients Logit Models of Demand (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Estimation of demand is at the heart of many recent studies that examine questions of market power, mergers, innovation, and valuation of new brands in differentiated-products markets. This paper focuses on one of the main methods for estimating demand for differentiated products: random-coefficients logit models. The paper carefully discusses the latest innovations in these methods with the hope of increasing the understanding, and therefore the trust among researchers who have never used them, and reducing the difficulty of their use, thereby aiding in realizing their full potential.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00513.x
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Incumbency and R&D Incentives: Licensing the Gale of Creative Destruction (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper analyzes the relationship between incumbency and R&D incentives in the context of a model of technological competition in which technologically successful entrants are able to license their innovation to (or be acquired by) an incumbent. That such a sale should take place is natural, since postinnovation monopoly profits are greater than the sum of duopoly profits. We identify three key findings about how innovative activity is shaped by licensing. First, since an incumbent's threat to engage in imitative R&D during negotiations increases its bargaining power, there is a purely strategic incentive for incumbents to develop an R&D capability. Second, incumbents research more intensively than entrants as long as (and only if) their willingness to pay for the innovation exceeds that of the entrant, a condition that depends critically on the expected licensing fee. Third, when the expected licensing fee is sufficiently low, the incumbent considers entrant R&D a strategic substitute for in-house research. This prediction about the market for ideas stands in contrast to predictions of strategic complementarity in patent races where licensing is not allowed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00485.x
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Weak Property Rights and Holdup in R&D (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We study how the sequence of financing of R&D varies according to the ease with which property rights over knowledge can be defined. There are two financiers: a venture capitalist (VC) and a corporation. The knowledge acquired in costly research becomes embodied in the researcher's human capital, and she may hold up the financier and walk away with the project to develop it elsewhere. The main results are: (1) When property rights are strong, research is always funded by the VC, development is performed efficiently, and breakaways from the VC to the corporation are observed in equilibrium. (2) When property rights are weak, projects may be financed by the VC or the corporation, or may remain unfunded. (3) When property rights are weak, no breakaways occur in equilibrium; local spillovers and strong product market competition increase the likelihood that research projects will get funding. (4) The equilibrium sequence of R&D finance need not be first-best efficient. (5) In equilibrium, and controlling for the strength of property rights, VCs finance projects that are more profitable on average.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00615.x
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    External Liberalization and Foreign Presence: Cross-Industry Evidence From Poland and Hungary (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: External liberalization—the relaxation of restrictions on cross-border trade and inbound direct investment—has played an important role in the programs of economic transition in central Europe. While liberalization is widely heralded, there has been little empirical analysis of the links between liberalization and industry structure. This analysis examines changes in foreign presence following external liberalization in Poland and Hungary. I show that the presence of proprietary and intangible assets explains much of the cross-industry variation in patterns of foreign presence and, for a given level of foreign presence, whether this will occur via trade or inbound direct investment.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00211.x-i1
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Exercising Market Power in Proprietary Aftermarkets (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Over 20 recent antitrust cases have turned on whether competition in complex durable-equipment markets prevents manufacturers from exercising market power over proprietary aftermarket products and services. We show that the price in the aftermarket will exceed marginal cost despite competition in the equipment market. Absent perfectly contingent long-term contracts, firms will balance the advantages of marginal-cost pricing to future generations of consumers against the payoff from monopoly pricing for current, locked-in equipment owners. The result holds for undifferentiated Bertrand competition, differentiated duopoly, and monopoly equipment markets. We also examine the effects of market growth and equipment durability.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00157.x
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Vertical Foreclosure, Technological Choice, and Entry on the Intermediate Market (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper analyzes the profitability of vertical integration for an upstream monopoly facing a potential competitor. We show that it depends on the technology used by the firm when it integrates. We distinguish two types of technologies: standard technologies, used by nonintegrated firms, and nonstandard technologies, reserved for integrated firms and implying the complete foreclosure of nonintegrated firms. Vertical integration with the adoption of a nonstandard technology dominates vertical integration with the adoption of a standard technology and is profitable, as long as the degree of competition in the downstream industry is sufficiently low.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00211.x
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Product Differentiation, Strategic Divisionalization, and Persistence of Monopoly (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper analyzes the strategic incentive of oligopolists to create autonomous rival divisions when products are differentiated. We consider a two-stage game where firms choose the number of autonomous divisions in the first stage and all the divisions engage in Cournot competition in the second. It is shown that product differentiation ensures the existence of an interior subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), and the equilibrium number of divisions increases with the degree of substitution among products and the number of firms. Further, if divisions are allowed to divide further, they always will, which leads to total rent dissipation. Thus, parent firms have incentives to unilaterally restrict their divisions from further dividing. In the free-entry equilibrium, it is found that the possibility of setting up autonomous divisions is a natural barrier to entry. Incumbents may persistently earn abnormally high profits. In the cases where product differentiation is difficult, the only pure-strategy free-entry SPNE is the monopoly outcome even if the entry cost is relatively low.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00581.x
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Termination and Coordination in Partnerships (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: It is common practice for firms to pool their expertise by forming partnerships such as joint ventures and strategic alliances. A central organization problem in such partnerships is that managers may behave noncooperatively in order to advance the interests of their parent firms. We ask whether contracts can be designed so that managers will maximize total profits. We characterize first best contracts for a variety of environments and show that efficiency imposes some restrictions on the ownership shares. In addition, we evaluate the performance of two termination contracts that are widely used in practice: the shotgun rule and price competition. We find that although these contracts do not achieve full efficiency, they both perform well. We provide insight into when each rule is more efficient.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00191.x
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Foreign Direct Investment Strategies and Firms' Capabilities (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper presents a simple model to analyze the effect of geographically localized spillovers on the internationalization decision of firms. It is shown that, once spatially bounded externalities are taken into account, the standard predictions on the nature and direction of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows may be reversed. We highlight three effects. First, an FDI-en-hancing effect: the presence of spillovers increases the profitability of the FDI strategy when the competitive gap between firms is narrow. Second, a dissipation effect: firms may refrain from investing abroad for fear of diffusion of their firm-specific assets. Third, a sourcing effect: the presence of spillovers may induce a firm to invest abroad, even in the absence of exporting costs.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00251.x
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