ISSN:
1572-9338
Keywords:
Tradeoffs
;
decisions
;
objectives
;
games
;
policies
;
environment
;
acid rain
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Mathematics
,
Economics
Notes:
Abstract Many contemporary political and economic problems have attributes of social dilemmas. These dilemmas are simply characterized as settings in which individuals have a dominant strategy to not cooperate in collective action. However, this choice results in a Pareto-inferior outcome. Likewise, a dominated strategy exists that results in a Pareto-superior outcome. Where cooperation is absent, this problem has been described as ann-person prisoner's dilemma. This paper discusses the environmental problem of acid rain as such a social dilemma. Relying on a series of laboratory experimental settings, the argument is that many social dilemmas can be resolved through the construction of institutional mechanisms allowing for the coordination of the participant's joint strategies. Policy analysts in particular can profit from focusing on institutional solutions to social dilemmas.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01874738
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