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  • Articles  (4)
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  • 1985-1989  (4)
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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Theory and decision 26 (1989), S. 235-251 
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: proxy contests ; corporate control ; cooperative games ; voting games ; Shapley values ; quarrellers ; core ; φ-stable pairs
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract Proxy fights have received comparatively little attention relative to the more popular methods for corporate control transfer: merger and tender offers. This paper presents an analytic model of the proxy contest as a cooperative game with four players: management, passive shareholders, insurgent shareholders and a trust fund. The power of the players and the effectiveness of certain managerial actions is discussed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Mathematical methods of operations research 33 (1989), S. 405-422 
    ISSN: 1432-5217
    Keywords: games ; restricted cooperation ; core ; convex functions
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Description / Table of Contents: Zusammenfassung Spiele mit beschränkter Kooperation sind kooperativeN-Personenspiele mit Nebenzahlungen, wobei nicht jede Teilmenge von Spielern zulässig zu sein braucht. In diesem Sinn sind die Kooperationsmöglichkeiten beschränkt. Balancierte und vollständig balancierte Spiele werden in diesem Zusammenhang untersucht. Die entsprechenden Sätze über die Existenz von Kernen werden von einem Sandwichsatz über Mengenfunktionen im Rahmen der linearen Programmierung abgeleitet. Insbesondere werden allgemeine konvexe Spiele diskutiert, deren Bedeutung auch für die kombinatorische Optimierung Edmonds and Giles (1977) aufgezeigt haben.
    Notes: Abstract Games with restricted cooperation are cooperativeN-person games with sidepayments, where the collection of feasible coalitions need not comprise all subsets of players and thus is restricted. We study balanced and completely balanced games in this context and derive the corresponding core theorems from a sandwich theorem for set functions within the setting of linear programming. In particular, we discuss general convex games, which Edmonds and Giles (1977) have shown to be of particular importance also in combinatorial optimization.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 16 (1987), S. 43-68 
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Keywords: Fuzzy game ; fuzzy measure ; value ; core ; extension ; cooperative market
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract The problem of the existence ofvalues (FA-valued, linear, positive, symmetric and efficient operators) on symmetric spaces of “fuzzy games” (that is, ideal set functions of bounded variation) arises naturally from [8], [18], [23] and [2], [3], [4] where it is implicitely approached for technical purposes. In our present work, this problem is approached in itself for the main reason that it is essentially related with the problem of the existence of significant countable additive measures lying in the cores of the “market games”. In fact, it is shown here that there exists a continuous value on the closed subspacebv′ICA ofIBV spanned by thebv′ functions of “fuzzy probability measures” ([9]), this values is “diagonal” onpICA, the closed subspace ofbv′ICA spanned by the natural powers of the fuzzy measures and this is used to prove the main result stating that the cooperative markets contained inpICA have unique fuzzy measures in their cores which are exactly the corresponding diagonal values. This result is of interest because it is providing a tool of determiningCA measures lying in the cores of large classes of games which are not necessarily “non-atomic” and, specially, because it is opening a way toward a new approach of the “Value Equivalence Principle” for differentiable markets with a continuum of traders which are not “perfectly competitive”.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Mathematical methods of operations research 30 (1986), S. A239 
    ISSN: 1432-5217
    Keywords: cooperative game ; core
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Description / Table of Contents: Zusammenfassung In Driessen (1986) wurde für Spiele, die eine gewisse Bedingung erfüllen, gezeigt, da\ der Kern des Spieles in der konvexen Hülle von gewissen Vektoren der Marginalwerte liegt. Es wurde vermutet, da\ diese Inklusion ohne weitere Bedingung an das Spiel gilt. In dieser Note wird nun gezeigt, da\ die Inklusion für alle Spiele gilt.
    Notes: Abstract In Driessen (1986) it is shown that for games satisfying a certain condition the core of the game is included in the convex hull of the set of certain marginal worth vectors of the game, while it is conjectured that the inclusion holds without any condition on the game. In this note it is proved that the inclusion holds for all games.
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