ISSN:
1572-9338
Keywords:
Principal-agent
;
multi-agents
;
linear incentive schemes
;
firm organization
;
environmental policy
;
JEL D82
;
L22
;
Q28
Source:
Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
Topics:
Mathematics
,
Economics
Notes:
Abstract Two types of linear-quadratic principal-agent models will be considered: one in which a single agent has to perform several tasks and one in which several agents have to perform a certain task. For both models, we derive optimal contractual principal-agent relations. It turns out that under certain conditions (concerning risk-aversion and the correlation of the agents' outcome) the multiple-agent problem reduces to a multiple-task one-agent problem. Our results will be discussed within the framework of (multiple-) point pollution to which, in addition, also the results of the standard principal-agent model will be applied.
Type of Medium:
Electronic Resource
URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02031727
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