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  • 1995-1999  (130)
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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Many long-term contracts incorporate a termination clause. This paper argues that when agents have hidden information, such a clause has a beneficial incentive effect—it enables a principal to screen agents' private information at a lower cost. In a two-period model, this paper characterizes the optimal long-term contract with a termination clause, which specifies that the principal will switch agents in the second period when the first-period cost is high. The analysis delineates how the optimality of this clause depends on the intertemporal cost correlation structure, on the limits to agents' liability, and on the principal's degree of commitment.
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The role of product warranty in segmentation of consumer durable product markets is highlighted. I demonstrate that consumer moral hazard and heterogeneity in product usage create variation in the valuation of product warranties by the different segments in the market. In this context, the firm, by offering a self-selecting menu of base warranty and extended warranties, satisfies the warranty demands of the various segments of the population. The consumer choice behavior prediction of the theory with regard to extended warranty is empirically validated with data from a survey of new car buyers.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Why are moving sales a successful and widespread phenomenon? How can it be optimal for a seller to disclose her low valuation for the item to be sold? We propose an explanation based on the “lemons problem” in bargaining with asymmetric information about quality. Disclosing a low valuation signals that there are significant gains from trade, so that trade takes place when it wouldn't otherwise, and all agents are made better off.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Royalty payments from a franchisee to a franchisor serve as incentive for the franchisor to provide appropriate levels of quality and brand, name investment. However, since they also distort the service provided by the franchisee, we should expect relatively lower royalty rates in franchises that are primarily service-oriented. Casual examination of royalty rates across product-oriented and service-oriented franchises shows that the opposite is true, with service-type franchises enjoying higher royalty rates. We resolve this apparent puzzle. The basic argument we put forth is that in product-type franchises, a franchisor can charge a wholesale price on goods transferred to the franchisee, thus using an alternative instrument that also serves as an incentive for the franchisor. Moreover, in general, a franchisor will use both wholesale price and royalty to minimize distortions in retail price and service at the retail level. We then test the predictions of our model on different industries and find confirmation for the same.
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Research on durable goods has shown that because of a time inconsistency problem, a monopolist manufacturer prefers to rent rather than sell its product. We reexamine the relative profitability of renting versus selling from a marketing perspective. In particular, using a simple linear demand formulation, we assume a durable goods monopolist has to use downstream intermediaries to market its product. In contrast to the case of an integrated monopolist, we find that when the monopolist has to rely on intermediaries, then it prefers to go through an intermediary that sells rather than one that rents its product. Similarly, the intermediary that sells the product is more profitable than the intermediary that rents the product. However, if the monopolist can commit to a set of prices, then the intermediary that rents is more profitable than the intermediary that sells.
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  • 7
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: I present tests of a competitive rationale for price promotions. In a model with a population of informed and uninformed customers, price competition yields a static equilibrium in which each seller draws a price from a specified density function. Price data on coffee and saltine crackers products are used to test whether the sample of prices on each product could have possibly come from the theoretically specified density function. The results suggest that some markets are indeed consistent with the marginal distributions of prices predicted by the model. Furthermore, in the process of testing this rationale for price promotions, estimates are obtained for the marginal cost of each product, the number of competing goods, and the percentage of informed consumers. The resulting excess variability of these estimates across competing brands can also raise questions with respect to the empirical validity of the model.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Empirically validating and testing the specification of game theoretic models has received limited attention in the marketing literature. The authors provide an econometric framework for estimating the parameters of response functions when the observed data in the market place are the Nash equilibrium outcomes of an underlying dynamic duopoly game specification. Specifically, the estimation procedure accounts for the joint endogeneity of market shares and marketing efforts of market rivals using a system of simultaneous equations that included the market response function and the Nash equilibrium conditions. A formal statistical test is used to detect model misspecification. The empirical analysis is carried out using data from four product markets: pharmaceutical, soft drink, beer, and detergent. Comparisons are provided with conventional estimation of the response function parameters in which the equilibrium conditions are ignored in the estimation. Managerial implications of the empirical results are discussed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We show that price-matching guarantees can facilitate monopoly pricing only if firms automatically match prices. If consumers must instead request refunds (thereby incurring hassle costs), we find that any increase in equilibrium prices due to firms' price-matching policies will be small; often, no price increase can be supported. In symmetric markets price-matching guarantees cannot support any rise in prices, even if hassle costs are arbitrarily small In asymmetric markets, higher prices can be supported, but the prices fall well short of maximizing joint profits. Our model can explain why some firms adopt price-matching guarantees while others do not.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: I consider a firm's choice between having people who carry out complementary tasks report to the same manager and having them report to separate, function-based managers. Even supposing that the former enhances coordination, the latter may be preferred because it improves the firm's control over employees. I show that, because switching from a function-based hierarchy to a process-based hierarchy reduces the firm's direct control, it raises the attractiveness of making the employee pay more sensitive to performance. Also, this switch tends to raise the profitability of fostering altruism between employees. I extend the analysis so that it deals with the relative benefits of IT- and M-form organizations. I show that the M form becomes more profitable as the firm gets large.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
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