ALBERT

All Library Books, journals and Electronic Records Telegrafenberg

X
feed icon rss

Your email was sent successfully. Check your inbox.

An error occurred while sending the email. Please try again.

Proceed reservation?

Export
Filter
  • Articles  (26)
  • L13  (26)
  • Springer  (26)
  • American Physical Society (APS)
  • Blackwell Publishing Ltd
  • 1995-1999  (26)
  • 1945-1949
  • Economics  (26)
Collection
  • Articles  (26)
Source
Keywords
Publisher
  • Springer  (26)
  • American Physical Society (APS)
  • Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Years
Year
Topic
  • Economics  (26)
  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Markov-perfect Nash equilibria in a class of resource games (1998)
    Springer
    Economic theory 11 (1998), S. 79-100 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: C73 ; L13 ; Q20.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. A general model of non-cooperating agents exploiting a renewable resource is considered. Assuming that the resource is sufficiently productive we prove that there exists a continuum of Markov-perfect Nash equilibria (MPNE). Although these equilibria lead to over-exploitation one can approximate the efficient solution by MPNE both in the state space and the payoff space. Furthermore, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for maximal exploitation of the resource to qualify as a MPNE. This condition is satisfied if there are sufficiently many players, or if the players are sufficiently impatient, or if the capacity of each player is sufficiently high.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050179
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Investment coordination and demand complementarities (1999)
    Springer
    Economic theory 13 (1999), S. 495-505 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: The Big Push ; Coordination failures. ; JEL Classification Numbers: O14 ; O33 ; L13 ; L16.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. This paper establishes necessary conditions for demand complementarity to imply investment coordination failure and explores the welfare implications of coordinated investment. Our main results caution against demand complementarities as a motive for investment coordination. We find that: 1) generally, a strict notion of complementarity (Hicks) is necessary for the existence of an investment coordination problem and 2) that when the problem does exist, coordination lowers social welfare without countervailing sectoral asymmetries.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050267
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Markov-perfect Nash equilibria in a class of resource games (1997)
    Springer
    Economic theory 11 (1997), S. 79-100 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: C73 ; L13 ; Q20.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary.  A general model of non-cooperating agents exploiting a renewable resource is considered. Assuming that the resource is sufficiently productive we prove that there exists a continuum of Markov-perfect Nash equilibria (MPNE). Although these equilibria lead to over-exploitation one can approximate the efficient solution by MPNE both in the state space and the payoff space. Furthermore, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for maximal exploitation of the resource to qualify as a MPNE. This condition is satisfied if there are sufficiently many players, or if the players are sufficiently impatient, or if the capacity of each player is sufficiently high.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050179
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Damoclean tax and innovation (1995)
    Springer
    Journal of evolutionary economics 5 (1995), S. 71-89 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1386
    Keywords: Damoclean tax ; Innovation ; R&D ; Tax credit ; Cooperative R&D ; L13 ; L43 ; O32 ; O38 ; H21 ; H25
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract The paper presents a novel tax that is designed to improve the performance of research and development (R&D) investments. Ideally, the tax allows the technical efficiencies of monopoly while bringing about the desirable effects of the competitive pressure of R&D rivalry. Thus, with the tax, the state can sanction a monopoly of R&D investment in order to attain technical efficiencies and yet avoid the underinvestment in R&D that would result without competitive pressures. A critique of the tax emphasizes the problems of implementing it and offers a more practical alternative that would achieve the same desirable effects.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01199671
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Schumpeterian competition in heterogeneous oligopolies (1996)
    Springer
    Journal of evolutionary economics 6 (1996), S. 411-423 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1386
    Keywords: L13 ; O31 ; Evolutionary economics ; Schumpeterian competition ; Innovation ; Oligopoly
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract The modeling of Schumpeterian competition as a process of innovation, imitation and selection was first presented by Nelson/Winter (1982) in a simulation study and further analyzed in a similar but general analytical formulation by Iwai (1984a, 1984b). Their results concerning the relations between the combination of the different forces of Schumpeterian competition and market structure respectively the distributions of profits are interesting, but restricted to competitive markets. Comparing rules of thumb and satisficing for the R&D decisions the present study analyzes the process of Schumpeterian competition in a heterogeneous oligopoly. Firstly, the authors find for the R&D-concentration relation results contrary to the traditional interpretation of Schumpeter. Secondly, Iwai's (1984a, 1984b) qualitative results hold in this less restrictive modeling.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01202278
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A note on evolutionary stability of Bertrand equilibrium (1999)
    Springer
    Journal of evolutionary economics 9 (1999), S. 367-371 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1386
    Keywords: Key words: Bertrand ; Oligopoly ; Evolution ; Evolutionary stability ; JEL-classification: D43 ; L13 ; C72
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. It is shown that the equilibrium notion of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) does have predictive power for standard models of Bertrand competition. This is in contrast to a recent claim by Qin and Stuart (1997). The claim is based on the observation that the solution concept ESS behaves discontinuously when finite (discrete) action games approach an infinite (continuous) action game in the limit. Furthermore, it is argued that from a model-theoretic point of view evolutionary stability in prices (i.e. in the Bertrand model) is quite different from evolutionary stability in quantities (i.e. in the Cournot model).
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001910050087
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Coalition-proof information exchanges (1996)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 63 (1996), S. 259-278 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Keywords: information exchange ; coalition-proof Nash equilibrium ; D82 ; L13
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract In a three-firm oligopoly model we show that, in addition to being a simple Nash equilibrium, information sharing among all firms is sometimes coalition-proof, and, information exchange among a proper subset of the firms can constitute a coalition-proof equilibrium. Thus, information exchange among firms, even without collusion on prices or outputs, can be very stable and may occur more widely than previously expected.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01227436
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Bargained shares in joint ventures among asymmetric partners: Is the matthew effect catalyzing? (1996)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 64 (1996), S. 23-51 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Keywords: asymmetry ; research and development ; joint ventures ; sharing rules ; L13 ; O13
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract The impact of asymmetries between partners on the likelihood of establishing successful research and development and production joint ventures relative to the alternative of own development is assessed analytically. The often empirically observed 50/50 sharing rule in asymmetric alliances is compared to a bargained rule, where asymmetries in absorptive capacity, as well as R&D and production efficiency are explicitly taken into account. Industry settings in which successful asymmetric alliances are more likely to occur are pinpointed. The analysis focuses on the influence of the size and format of these asymmetries, the technological appropriability and complementarity between partners on the incentives for both partners to cooperate as well as to cheat on the venture agreement. The results are compared to a setting where the joint venture is only involved in R&D.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01237524
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Exchange-rate pass-through and market structure (1996)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 64 (1996), S. 129-154 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Keywords: exchange rates ; pass-through ; market structure ; D43 ; F12 ; F31 ; L13
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract We consider a situation in whichn firms located in market 1 andm firms located in market 2 each sell a commodity which is homogeneous within each market but may differ between markets. All firms sell on both markets. Each market has its own currency. The market demand functions differ. We give some basic results on the effects of exchange-rate changes and then show the following. When these markets are independent on the cost side (constant marginal costs) and demands are linear, a reduction in the number of firms (which might result from a merger) in market 1 increases the pass-through (of an appreciation of currency 2) in market 1 and decreases the pass-through in market 2. A similar occurrence in market 2 has the opposite effect. We give conditions under which, with identical economies of scope linking the markets, the sign of the price changes will be reversed when the number of foreign firms is small enough compared to the number of local firms. However, such sign reversals cannot occur in the two markets simultaneously.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01250111
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Capacity constraints may restore the existence of an equilibrium in the Hotelling model (1996)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 64 (1996), S. 315-324 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Keywords: minimum differentiation ; Hotelling ; capacity constraints ; L13
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract In this note, we consider the Hotelling model with linear transportation costs. We show that capacity constraints may restore the existence of an equilibrium for locations inside the first and third quartiles.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01250131
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
Close ⊗
This website uses cookies and the analysis tool Matomo. More information can be found here...