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  • Articles  (9)
  • Other Sources
  • epistemology  (8)
  • taxonomy
  • Springer  (9)
  • Nature Publishing Group
  • 1995-1999  (9)
  • 1965-1969
  • Philosophy  (9)
  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Prima facie and seeming duties (1996)
    Springer
    Studia logica 57 (1996), S. 47-71 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8730
    Keywords: prima facie duties ; defeasible reasoning ; practical reasoning ; epistemology
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Sir David Ross introduced prima facie duties, or acts with a tendency to be duties proper. He also spoke of general prima facie principles, wwhich attribute to acts having some feature the tendency to be a duty proper. Like Utilitarians from Mill to Hare, he saw a role for such principles in the epistemology of duty: in the process by means of which, in any given situation, a moral code can help us to find out what we ought to do. After formalizing general prima facie principles as universally quantified conditionals I will show how seeming duties can be detached from them. There will be examples involving lies, burnt offerings and the question of whether to have a napkin on your lap while eating asparagus. They will illustrate the defeasibility of this detachment, how it can lead into dilemmas, and how general prima facie principles are overridden by more specific ones.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00370669
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Pseudoscience as structurally flawed practice: A reply to A.A. Derksen (1995)
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 26 (1995), S. 323-326 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: pseudoscience ; A. A. Derksen ; epistemology
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Summary I respond to two criticisms levelled by A. A. Derksen in a recent issue of this journal against characterizing pseudoscience as structurally flawed practice: I argue that he surreptitiously invokes this conception, his official view that we should concentrate on pseudoscientists' pretensions rather than their practices notwithstanding; and I critically examine his contention that judgements of scientificity (and pseudoscientificity) cannot properly be made independently of a consideration of whether the relevant theories and practices are empirically well-confirmed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00766732
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Towards a Philosophy of Chemistry. A short extract of this paper was first read at the 10th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Florence, August 19–25, 1995. (1997)
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 28 (1997), S. 307-336 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: philosophy of chemistry ; epistemology ; experiment ; classification ; reference ; prediction ; technology ; matter ; material properties
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Abstract The paper shows epistemological, methodological and ontological peculiarities of chemistry taken as a classificatory science of materials using experimental methods. Without succumbing to standard interpretations of physical science, chemical methods of experimental investigation, classification, reference, theorizing, prediction and production of new entities are developed one by one as first steps towards a philosophy of chemistry. Chemistry challenges traditional concepts of empirical object, empirical predicate, reference frame and theory, but also the distinction commonly drawn between natural science and technology. Due to its many peculiarities, I propose to treat chemistry philosophically as a special type of science, apart from other sciences.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008206719087
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Why we Believe (1999)
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 30 (1999), S. 317-339 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: knowledge ; full belief ; epistemology ; radicalprobabilism ; instrumentalism ; pragmatism ; bayesianism
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Abstract The radical probabilist counsels the prudent never to put away uncertainty, and hence always to balance judgment with probabilities of various sizes. Against this counsel I shall advise in favor of the practice of full belief — at least for some occasions. This advice rests on the fact that it is sometimes in a person's interests to accept certain propositions as a means of bringing it about that others recognize oneself as having accepted those propositions. With the pragmatists, therefore, I shall reject the view that belief formation must in every instance be a truth-directed affair. Unlike the pragmatists, however, I shall conclude that the enterprise of belief formation is not directed exclusively, or even primarily, at attaining knowledge. In other words, pursuit of that which it profits to believe, on the one hand, and pursuit of knowledge on the other, are distinct enterprises, which overlap (when they do) only accidentally.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008394130995
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Why are there no objective values? (1995)
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 26 (1995), S. 35-62 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: ethics ; intuitionism ; epistemology ; objectivism ; moral knowledge ; moral values
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Summary Using the mathematical frameworks of economic preference ranking, subjective probability, and rational learning through empirical evidence, the epistemological implications of teleological ethical intuitionism are pointed out to the extent to which the latter is based on cognitivist and objectivist concepts of value. The notions of objective value and objective norm are critically analysed with reference to epistemological criteria of intersubjectively shared valuative experience. It is concluded that one cannot meaningfully postulate general material theories of morality that could be tested, confirmed or refuted by intersubjective empirical evidence of preferences and values, however loosely the empirical evidence of values may be interpreted. This situation is explained with reference to the ways in which preceived values become systematically influenced by the concomitants of individual valuative experience, but which have nothing to do with contingent subjective interests.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01130925
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Heuristics, justification, and defeasible reasoning (1995)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 5 (1995), S. 467-487 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Heuristics ; epistemology ; problem-solving ; justification ; defeasible reasoning
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Heuristics can be regarded as justifying the actions and beliefs of problem-solving agents. I use an analysis of heuristics to argue that a symbiotic relationship exists between traditional epistemology and contemporary artificial intelligence. On one hand, the study of models of problem-solving agents usingquantitative heuristics, for example computer programs, can reveal insight into the understanding of human patterns of epistemic justification by evaluating these models' performance against human problem-solving. On the other hand,qualitative heuristics embody the justifying ability of defeasible rules, the understanding of which is provided by traditional epistemology.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974978
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Ontological aspects of information modeling (1996)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 6 (1996), S. 287-394 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Information modeling ; information vs. data ; knowledge vs. information ; information systems development ; semantic data modeling ; the relational data model ; the object-oriented paradigm ; data vs. reality ; analytic philosophy ; ontology ; epistemology ; views ; statements ; entities ; events ; attributes ; actions ; relationships ; categories and kinds
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Information modeling (also known as conceptual modeling or semantic data modeling) may be characterized as the formulation of a model in which information aspects of objective and subjective reality are presented (“the application”), independent of datasets and processes by which they may be realized (“the system”). A methodology for information modeling should incorporate a number of concepts which have appeared in the literature, but should also be formulated in terms of constructs which are understandable to and expressible by the system user as well as the system developer. This is particularly desirable in connection with certain “intimate” relationships, such as being the same as or being a part of. The conceptual basis for such a methodology, as conventionally approached, seems flavored with notions arising in the systems arena to an inappropriate degree. To counter this tendency it is useful to turn to a discipline not hitherto much involved in technology, namely analytic philosophy.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00729802
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The definitions of species and clade names: A reply to Ghiselin (1995)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 10 (1995), S. 223-228 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Clade ; class ; definition ; defining property ; individual ; intension ; name ; organism ; ostensive definition ; species ; taxon ; taxonomy
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00852247
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    “Just-so” stories about “inner cognitive Africa”: some doubts about Sorensen's evolutionary epistemology of thought experiments (1997)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 12 (1997), S. 207-224 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: evolution ; epistemology ; evolutionary epistemology ; naturalized epistemology ; thought experiments ; modality ; utility ; fitness ; adaptation ; reliability ; possible worlds
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Roy Sorensen advances an evolutionary explanation of our capacity for thought experiments which doubles as a naturalized epistemological justification. I argue Sorensen”s explanation fails to satisfy key elements of environmental-selectionist explanations and so fails to carry epistemic force. I then argue that even if Sorensen succeeds in showing the adaptive utility of our capacity, he still fails to establish its reliability and hence epistemic utility. I conclude Sorensen”s account comes to little more than a “just-so story”.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1017986908266
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