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  • Articles  (16)
  • Other Sources
  • cognitive science  (8)
  • morality  (7)
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  • Springer  (16)
  • Nature Publishing Group
  • 1995-1999  (16)
  • 1965-1969
  • Philosophy  (16)
  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Materialism and the “problem” of quantum measurement (1995)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 5 (1995), S. 207-217 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Artificial intelligence ; cognitive science ; consciousness ; cosmology ; decoherence ; materialism ; measurement theory ; objectivity ; physics ; pointer basis ; preferred basis ; quantum mechanics ; state vector reduction ; subjectivity ; superselection
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract For nearly six decades, the conscious observer has played a central and essential rôle in quantum measurement theory. I outline some difficulties which the traditional account of measurement presents for material theories of mind before introducing a new development which promises to exorcise the ghost of consciousness from physics and relieve the cognitive scientist of the burden of explaining why certain material structures reduce wavefunctions by virtue of being conscious while others do not. The interactive decoherence of complex quantum systems reveals that the oddities and complexities of linear superposition and state vector reduction are irrelevant to computational aspects of the philosophy of mind and that many conclusions in related fields are ill founded.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974744
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Hownot to demarcate cognitive science and folk psychology: A response to Pickering and Chater (1995)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 5 (1995), S. 339-355 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Artificial intelligence ; cognitive science ; folk psychology
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Pickering and Chater (P&C) maintain that folk psychology and cognitive science should neither compete nor cooperate. Each is an “independent enterprise,” with a distinct subject matter and characteristic modes of explanation. P&C's case depends upon their characterizations of cognitive science and folk psychology. We question the basis for their characterizations, challenge both the coherence and the individual adequacy of their contrasts between the two, and show that they waver in their views about the scope of each. We conclude that P&C do not so muchdiscover ascreate the gap they find between folk psychology and cognitive science. It is an artifact of their implausible and unmotivated attempt to demarcate the two areas, and of the excessively narrow accounts they give of each.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974749
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Searle's Chinese Box: Debunking the Chinese Room Argument (1997)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 7 (1997), S. 199-226 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Artificial intelligence ; cognitive science ; computation ; Functionalism ; Searle's Chinese room argument
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract John Searle's Chinese room argument is perhaps the most influential andwidely cited argument against artificial intelligence (AI). Understood astargeting AI proper – claims that computers can think or do think– Searle's argument, despite its rhetorical flash, is logically andscientifically a dud. Advertised as effective against AI proper, theargument, in its main outlines, is an ignoratio elenchi. It musterspersuasive force fallaciously by indirection fostered by equivocaldeployment of the phrase "strong AI" and reinforced by equivocation on thephrase "causal powers" (at least) equal to those of brains." On a morecarefully crafted understanding – understood just to targetmetaphysical identification of thought with computation ("Functionalism"or "Computationalism") and not AI proper the argument is still unsound,though more interestingly so. It's unsound in ways difficult for high church– "someday my prince of an AI program will come" – believersin AI to acknowledge without undermining their high church beliefs. The adhominem bite of Searle's argument against the high church persuasions of somany cognitive scientists, I suggest, largely explains the undeserved reputethis really quite disreputable argument enjoys among them.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008255830248
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Two Projects for Understanding the Mind: A Response to Morris and Richardson (1997)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 7 (1997), S. 553-569 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Folk psychology ; cognitive science ; justifications ; causes ; computation ; knowledge-free ; knowledge-rich ; problem solving ; scientific discovery ; reasoning
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract We respond to Morris and Richardson's (1995) claim that Pickering and Chater's (1995) arguments about the lack of a relation between cognitive science and folk psychology are flawed. We note that possible controversies about the appropriate uses for the two terms do not affect our arguments. We then address their claim that computational explanation of knowledge-rich processes has proved possible in the domains of problem solving, scientific discovery, and reasoning. We argue that, in all cases, computational explanation is only possible for aspects of those processes that do not make reference to general knowledge. We conclude that consideration of the issues raised by Morris and Richardson reinforces our original claim that there are two fundamentally distinct projects for understanding the mind, one based on justification, and the other on computational explanation, and that these apply to non-overlapping aspects of mental life.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008264330143
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    When Physical Systems Realize Functions... (1999)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 9 (1999), S. 161-196 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: computation ; implementation ; computationalism ; realization of a function ; digital system ; computer ; computational practice ; cognitive science ; artificial intelligence
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract After briefly discussing the relevance of the notions ‘computation’ and ‘implementation’ for cognitive science, I summarize some of the problems that have been found in their most common interpretations. In particular, I argue that standard notions of computation together with a ‘state-to-state correspondence view of implementation’ cannot overcome difficulties posed by Putnam's Realization Theorem and that, therefore, a different approach to implementation is required. The notion ‘realization of a function’, developed out of physical theories, is then introduced as a replacement for the notional pair ‘computation-implementation’. After gradual refinement, taking practical constraints into account, this notion gives rise to the notion ‘digital system’ which singles out physical systems that could be actually used, and possibly even built.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008364332419
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    New Philosophies of Science in North America — Twenty Years Later (1998)
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 29 (1998), S. 71-122 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: science ; philosophy of science ; methodology ; realism ; naturalism ; empiricism ; cognitive science ; feminism ; experiment ; scientific practice
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Abstract This survey of major developments in North American philosophy of science begins with the mid-1960s consolidation of the disciplinary synthesis of internalist history and philosophy of science (HPS) as a response to criticisms of logical empiricism. These developments are grouped for discussion under the following headings: historical metamethodologies, scientific realisms, philosophies of the special sciences, revivals of empiricism, cognitivist naturalisms, social epistemologies, feminist theories of science, studies of experiment and the disunity of science, and studies of science as practice and culture. A unifying theme of the survey is the relation between historical metamethodologists and scientific realists, which dominated philosophical work in the late 1970s. I argue that many of the alternative cognitive naturalisms, social epistemologies, and feminist theories that have been proposed can be understood as analogues to the differences between metamethodological theories of scientific rationality and realist accounts of successful reference to real causal processes. Recent work on experiment, scientific practice, and the culture of science may, however, challenge the underlying conception of the field according to which realism and historical rationalism (or their descendants) are the important alternatives available, and thus may take philosophy of science in new directions.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008259514953
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Computationalism (1995)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 5 (1995), S. 517-524 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Artificial intelligence ; cognitive science ; Lucas's argument ; incompleteness ; Chinese room ; embodiedness
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Computationalism, the notion that cognition is computation, is a working hypothesis of many AI researchers and Cognitive Scientists. Although it has not been proved, neither has it been disproved. In this paper, I give some refutations to some well-known alleged refutations of computationalism. My arguments have two themes: people are more limited than is often recognized in these debates; computer systems are more complicated than is often recognized in these debates. To underline the latter point, I sketch the design and abilities of a possible embodied computer system.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974982
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Thinking and Computing: Computers as Special Kinds of Signs (1997)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 7 (1997), S. 345-364 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: cognition ; cognitive science ; computers ; computing ; kinds of minds ; minds ; signs ; thinking ; types of signs
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Cognitive science has been dominated by the computational conception that cognition is computation across representations. To the extent to which cognition as computation across representations is supposed to be a purposive, meaningful, algorithmic, problem-solving activity, however, computers appear to be incapable of cognition. They are devices that can facilitate computations on the basis of semantic grounding relations as special kinds of signs. Even their algorithmic, problem-solving character arises from their interpretation by human users. Strictly speaking, computers as such — apart from human users — are not only incapable of cognition, but even incapable of computation, properly construed. If we want to understand the nature of thought, then we have to study thinking, not computing, because they are not the same thing.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008230900201
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Gibbard's evolutionary theory of rationality and its ethical implications (1995)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 10 (1995), S. 129-180 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Evolution ; explanation ; morality ; rationality ; normative communication ; fact/value distinction ; utilitarianism
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Gibbard's theory of rationality is “evolutionary” in terms of its result as well as its underpinning argument. The result is that judgments about what is “rational” are analyzed as being similar to judgments of morality — in view of what Darwin suggests concerning the latter. According to the Darwinian theory, moral judgments are based on sentiments which evolve to promote the survival and welfare of human societies. On Gibbard's theory, rationality judgments should be similarly regarded as expressing emotional attachments to behavioral norms which originate and function to coordinate social interaction. Consequently, Gibbard's theory of rationality might be used to illuminate Darwin's theory of morality, and vice versa. Additionally, as argued in the present essay, both can be further elaborated, and defended, by developing related themes in philosophical ethics: viz., connected with Hume and 20th-century emotivists. The main problem is that this general Darwinian approach faces widespread opposition nowadays, not only in ethics but in philosophy of science. The purpose of this essay is to analyze Gibbard's theory, critically and constructively, with emphasis on the pertinent commonalities in Darwin, Hume and the emotivists, while also critically addressing their common enemies. The pervasive methodological orientation is to relate this analysis to (philosophy of) science in general, and biological science in particular.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00852243
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The definitions of species and clade names: A reply to Ghiselin (1995)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 10 (1995), S. 223-228 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Clade ; class ; definition ; defining property ; individual ; intension ; name ; organism ; ostensive definition ; species ; taxon ; taxonomy
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00852247
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  • 11
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Six things Popper would like biologists not to ignore: In memoriam, Karl Raimund Popper, 1902–1994 (1996)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 11 (1996), S. 141-159 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Popper ; metaphysics ; problems ; falsifiability ; demarcation ; evolution theory ; rationality ; morality ; downward causation ; dogmatism
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract To honour the memory of Sir Karl Popper, I put forward six elements of his philosophy which might be of particular interest to biologists and to philosophers of biology and which I think Popper would like them not to ignore, even if they disagree with him. They are: the primacy of problems; the criticizability of metaphysics (and thus the dubiousness of materialism); how downward causation might be real; how norms should matter to scientists; why dogmatism should be avoided; how genuine science is recognizable. I preface these six things with a brief discussion of Popper's early (but later recanted) mistakes concerning biology.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00128917
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  • 12
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Taking the ‘Error’ Out of Ruse‘s Error Theory (1997)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 12 (1997), S. 385-397 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: morality ; evolution ; error theory
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Michael Ruse‘s Darwinian metaethics has come under just criticism from Peter Woolcock (1993). But with modification it remains defensible. Ruse (1986) holds that people ordinarily have a false belief that there are objective moral obligations. He argues that the evolutionary story should be taken as an error theory, i.e., as a theory which explains the belief that there are obligations as arising from non-rational causes, rather than from inference or evidential reasons. Woolcock quite rightly objects that this position entails moral nihilism. However, I argue here that people generally have justified true beliefs about which acts promote their most coherent set of moral values, and hence, by definition, about which acts are right. What the evolutionary story explains is the existence of these values, but it is not an error theory for moral beliefs. Ordinary beliefs correspond to real moral properties, though these are not objective or absolute properties independent of anyone‘s subjective states. On its best footing, therefore, a Darwinian metaethics of the type Ruse offers is not an error theory and does not entail moral nihilism.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006577007049
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  • 13
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    How a Kantian Can Accept Evolutionary Metaethics (1997)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 12 (1997), S. 303-326 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: altruism ; cognitivism ; ethics ; evolutionary ethics ; human sociobiology ; Kant ; Kantian ; metaethics ; morality ; non-cognitivism
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Contrary to widely held assumptions, an evolutionary metaethics need not be non-cognitivist. I define evolutionary metaethics as the claim that certain phenotypic traits expressing certain genes are both necessary and sufficient for explanation of all other phenotypic traits we consider morally significant. A review of the influential cognitivist Immanuel Kant‘s metaethics shows that much of his ethical theory is independent of the anti-naturalist metaphysics of transcendental idealism which itself is incompatible with evolutionary metaethics. By matching those independent aspects to an evolutionary metaethics a cognitivist Kantian evolutionary metaethical theory is a possibility for researchers to consider.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006521907071
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  • 14
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    On the Relationship Between Memes and Genes: A Critique of Dennett (1998)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 13 (1998), S. 187-204 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: evolution ; meme ; gene ; morality ; culture ; psychological predisposition
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Dennett (1995) argues that memes or cultural replicators are largely autonomous of genes, and that they are fairly efficacious in determining who we are and what we do. I argue that Dennett's arguments are wrong in several aspects, which we can see by analyzing processes at appropriate levels. Specifically, I argue that it is not true that we as persons are created largely by memes, that our memes are not largely independent of our genes, and that we can use the universality of memes to make inferences about genetic predispositions. Finally, by suggesting an innate psychological mechanism for morality, I argue that morality may be largely the effect of genetic predispositions rather than autonomous.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006529312488
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  • 15
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Teaching Business Ethics Through Literature (1997)
    Springer
    Teaching business ethics 1 (1997), S. 33-51 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-1944
    Keywords: business ethics ; business-related classic literature ; morality ; moral philosophy ; vocabulary of ethics
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Economics
    Notes: Abstract America's economic ideology lacks a vocabulary of ethics. If, as we assume, an economic system requires a moral component for long-term survival, students in business schools must be exposed to a vocabulary of ethics that is consistent with the ideology of capitalism. We present a vocabulary of ethics and describe an approach to teaching business ethics based on business-related classic literature and moral philosophy.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1009795830349
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  • 16
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    An Exercise in Moral Philosophy: Seeking to Understand “nobody” (1997)
    Springer
    Teaching business ethics 1 (1997), S. 63-91 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-1944
    Keywords: banality of evil ; cognition and institutions ; cognition and morality ; ethics ; evil ; information distortion ; morality ; moral philosophy ; self-knowledge ; systems theory
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Economics
    Notes: Abstract The late Hannah Arendt proposed that many, perhaps most monstrous deeds are not committed by moral monsters but by individuals who do not “think.” However, understanding the significance of “activity of thinking as such” requires a moral philosophy that transcends rational actor assumptions and instrumental reason centering, instead, on the conditions of self-knowledge. The ubiquitous and often lethal phenomenon of information distortions provides a vehicle for expanding our understandings of individual moral response-abilities in our modern times.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1009787710014
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