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  • Articles  (15)
  • Other Sources
  • cognitive science  (8)
  • consciousness  (7)
  • taxonomy
  • Springer  (15)
  • Nature Publishing Group
  • 1995-1999  (15)
  • 1965-1969
  • Philosophy  (15)
  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Materialism and the “problem” of quantum measurement (1995)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 5 (1995), S. 207-217 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Artificial intelligence ; cognitive science ; consciousness ; cosmology ; decoherence ; materialism ; measurement theory ; objectivity ; physics ; pointer basis ; preferred basis ; quantum mechanics ; state vector reduction ; subjectivity ; superselection
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract For nearly six decades, the conscious observer has played a central and essential rôle in quantum measurement theory. I outline some difficulties which the traditional account of measurement presents for material theories of mind before introducing a new development which promises to exorcise the ghost of consciousness from physics and relieve the cognitive scientist of the burden of explaining why certain material structures reduce wavefunctions by virtue of being conscious while others do not. The interactive decoherence of complex quantum systems reveals that the oddities and complexities of linear superposition and state vector reduction are irrelevant to computational aspects of the philosophy of mind and that many conclusions in related fields are ill founded.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974744
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Hownot to demarcate cognitive science and folk psychology: A response to Pickering and Chater (1995)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 5 (1995), S. 339-355 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Artificial intelligence ; cognitive science ; folk psychology
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Pickering and Chater (P&C) maintain that folk psychology and cognitive science should neither compete nor cooperate. Each is an “independent enterprise,” with a distinct subject matter and characteristic modes of explanation. P&C's case depends upon their characterizations of cognitive science and folk psychology. We question the basis for their characterizations, challenge both the coherence and the individual adequacy of their contrasts between the two, and show that they waver in their views about the scope of each. We conclude that P&C do not so muchdiscover ascreate the gap they find between folk psychology and cognitive science. It is an artifact of their implausible and unmotivated attempt to demarcate the two areas, and of the excessively narrow accounts they give of each.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974749
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Searle's Chinese Box: Debunking the Chinese Room Argument (1997)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 7 (1997), S. 199-226 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Artificial intelligence ; cognitive science ; computation ; Functionalism ; Searle's Chinese room argument
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract John Searle's Chinese room argument is perhaps the most influential andwidely cited argument against artificial intelligence (AI). Understood astargeting AI proper – claims that computers can think or do think– Searle's argument, despite its rhetorical flash, is logically andscientifically a dud. Advertised as effective against AI proper, theargument, in its main outlines, is an ignoratio elenchi. It musterspersuasive force fallaciously by indirection fostered by equivocaldeployment of the phrase "strong AI" and reinforced by equivocation on thephrase "causal powers" (at least) equal to those of brains." On a morecarefully crafted understanding – understood just to targetmetaphysical identification of thought with computation ("Functionalism"or "Computationalism") and not AI proper the argument is still unsound,though more interestingly so. It's unsound in ways difficult for high church– "someday my prince of an AI program will come" – believersin AI to acknowledge without undermining their high church beliefs. The adhominem bite of Searle's argument against the high church persuasions of somany cognitive scientists, I suggest, largely explains the undeserved reputethis really quite disreputable argument enjoys among them.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008255830248
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Two Projects for Understanding the Mind: A Response to Morris and Richardson (1997)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 7 (1997), S. 553-569 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Folk psychology ; cognitive science ; justifications ; causes ; computation ; knowledge-free ; knowledge-rich ; problem solving ; scientific discovery ; reasoning
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract We respond to Morris and Richardson's (1995) claim that Pickering and Chater's (1995) arguments about the lack of a relation between cognitive science and folk psychology are flawed. We note that possible controversies about the appropriate uses for the two terms do not affect our arguments. We then address their claim that computational explanation of knowledge-rich processes has proved possible in the domains of problem solving, scientific discovery, and reasoning. We argue that, in all cases, computational explanation is only possible for aspects of those processes that do not make reference to general knowledge. We conclude that consideration of the issues raised by Morris and Richardson reinforces our original claim that there are two fundamentally distinct projects for understanding the mind, one based on justification, and the other on computational explanation, and that these apply to non-overlapping aspects of mental life.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008264330143
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    When Physical Systems Realize Functions... (1999)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 9 (1999), S. 161-196 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: computation ; implementation ; computationalism ; realization of a function ; digital system ; computer ; computational practice ; cognitive science ; artificial intelligence
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract After briefly discussing the relevance of the notions ‘computation’ and ‘implementation’ for cognitive science, I summarize some of the problems that have been found in their most common interpretations. In particular, I argue that standard notions of computation together with a ‘state-to-state correspondence view of implementation’ cannot overcome difficulties posed by Putnam's Realization Theorem and that, therefore, a different approach to implementation is required. The notion ‘realization of a function’, developed out of physical theories, is then introduced as a replacement for the notional pair ‘computation-implementation’. After gradual refinement, taking practical constraints into account, this notion gives rise to the notion ‘digital system’ which singles out physical systems that could be actually used, and possibly even built.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008364332419
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    New Philosophies of Science in North America — Twenty Years Later (1998)
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 29 (1998), S. 71-122 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: science ; philosophy of science ; methodology ; realism ; naturalism ; empiricism ; cognitive science ; feminism ; experiment ; scientific practice
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Abstract This survey of major developments in North American philosophy of science begins with the mid-1960s consolidation of the disciplinary synthesis of internalist history and philosophy of science (HPS) as a response to criticisms of logical empiricism. These developments are grouped for discussion under the following headings: historical metamethodologies, scientific realisms, philosophies of the special sciences, revivals of empiricism, cognitivist naturalisms, social epistemologies, feminist theories of science, studies of experiment and the disunity of science, and studies of science as practice and culture. A unifying theme of the survey is the relation between historical metamethodologists and scientific realists, which dominated philosophical work in the late 1970s. I argue that many of the alternative cognitive naturalisms, social epistemologies, and feminist theories that have been proposed can be understood as analogues to the differences between metamethodological theories of scientific rationality and realist accounts of successful reference to real causal processes. Recent work on experiment, scientific practice, and the culture of science may, however, challenge the underlying conception of the field according to which realism and historical rationalism (or their descendants) are the important alternatives available, and thus may take philosophy of science in new directions.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008259514953
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A critique of information processing theories of consciousness (1995)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 5 (1995), S. 89-107 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Computation ; computer metaphor ; consciousness ; information processing ; psychology ; schema theory
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Information processing theories in psychology give rise to “executive” theories of consciousness. Roughly speaking, these theories maintain that consciousness is a centralized processor that we use when processing novel or complex stimuli. The computational assumptions driving the executive theories are closely tied to the computer metaphor. However, those who take the metaphor serious — as I believe psychologists who advocate the executive theories do — end up accepting too particular a notion of a computing device. In this essay, I examine the arguments from theoretical computational considerations that cognitive psychologists use to support their general approach in order to show that they make unwarranted assumptions about the processing attributes of consciousness. I then go on to examine the assumptions behind executive theories which grow out of the computer metaphor of cognitive psychology and conclude that we may not be the sort of computational machine cognitive psychology assumes and that cognitive psychology's approach in itself does not buy us anything in developing theories of consciousness. Hence, the state space in which we may locate consciousness is vast, even within an information processing framework.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974191
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Some phenomenological implications of a quantum model of consciousness (1995)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 5 (1995), S. 609-620 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Quantum ; consciousness ; emergence ; agency ; time
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract We contrast person-centered categories with “objective” categories related to physics: consciousness vs. mechanism, observer vs. observed, agency vs. event causation. semantics vs. syntax, beliefs and desires vs. dispositions. How are these two sets of categories related? This talk will discuss just one such dichotomy: consciousness vs. mechanism. Two extreme views are dualism and reductionism. An intermediate view is emergence. Here, consciousness is part of the natural order (as against dualism), but consciousness is not definable only in terms of physical mass, length, and time (as against reductionism). There are several detailed theories of emergence. One is based on the Great Chain of Being and on organic evolutionary hierarchy. The theory here is based instead on the concept of “relational holism” in quantum mechanics. The resulting brain model has two interacting systems: a computational system and a quantum system (a Bose-Einstein condensate), perhaps interacting via EEG waves. Thus, we need both person-centered and matter-centered categories to describe human beings. Some possible experimental tests are discussed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974989
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Computationalism (1995)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 5 (1995), S. 517-524 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Artificial intelligence ; cognitive science ; Lucas's argument ; incompleteness ; Chinese room ; embodiedness
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Computationalism, the notion that cognition is computation, is a working hypothesis of many AI researchers and Cognitive Scientists. Although it has not been proved, neither has it been disproved. In this paper, I give some refutations to some well-known alleged refutations of computationalism. My arguments have two themes: people are more limited than is often recognized in these debates; computer systems are more complicated than is often recognized in these debates. To underline the latter point, I sketch the design and abilities of a possible embodied computer system.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974982
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A quantum mechanical model of consciousness and the emergence of ‘I’ (1995)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 5 (1995), S. 597-607 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Quantum ; consciousness ; emergence ; Bose-Einstein condensates ; Fröhlich
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract There have been suggestions that the unity of consciousness may be related to the kind of holism depicted only in quantum physics. This argument will be clarified and strengthened. It requires the brain to contain a quantum system with the right properties — a “Bose-Einstein condensate”. It probably does contain one such system, as both theory and experiment have indicated. In fact, we cannot pay full attention to a quantum whole and its parts simultaneously, though we may oscillate between the two. In a quantum theory of consciousness, emergent meanings arise as an inevitable consequence of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974988
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  • 11
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Thinking and Computing: Computers as Special Kinds of Signs (1997)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 7 (1997), S. 345-364 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: cognition ; cognitive science ; computers ; computing ; kinds of minds ; minds ; signs ; thinking ; types of signs
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Cognitive science has been dominated by the computational conception that cognition is computation across representations. To the extent to which cognition as computation across representations is supposed to be a purposive, meaningful, algorithmic, problem-solving activity, however, computers appear to be incapable of cognition. They are devices that can facilitate computations on the basis of semantic grounding relations as special kinds of signs. Even their algorithmic, problem-solving character arises from their interpretation by human users. Strictly speaking, computers as such — apart from human users — are not only incapable of cognition, but even incapable of computation, properly construed. If we want to understand the nature of thought, then we have to study thinking, not computing, because they are not the same thing.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008230900201
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  • 12
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Let's Dance! The Equivocation in Chalmers' Dancing Qualia Argument (1998)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 8 (1998), S. 237-249 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: consciousness ; functionalism ; qualia
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract David Chalmers' dancing qualia argument is intended to show that phenomenal experiences, or qualia, are organizational invariants. The dancing qualia argument is a reductio ad absurdum, attempting to demonstrate that holding an alternative position, such as the famous inverted spectrum argument, leads one to an implausible position about the relation between consciousness and cognition. In this paper, we argue that Chalmers' dancing qualia argument fails to establish the plausibility of qualia being organizational invariants. Even stronger, we will argue that the gap in the argument cannot be closed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008273402702
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  • 13
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The definitions of species and clade names: A reply to Ghiselin (1995)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 10 (1995), S. 223-228 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Clade ; class ; definition ; defining property ; individual ; intension ; name ; organism ; ostensive definition ; species ; taxon ; taxonomy
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00852247
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  • 14
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Some Nonhuman Animals Can Have Pains in a Morally Relevant Sense (1996)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 12 (1996), S. 51-71 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: philosophy of mind ; ethics ; animal pain ; Peter Carruthers ; consciousness ; evolution
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract In a series of works, Peter Carruthers has argued for the denial of the title proposition. Here, I defend that proposition by offering direct support drawn from relevant sciences and by undercutting Carruthers‘ argument. In doing the latter, I distinguish an intrinsic theory of consciousness from Carruthers‘ relational theory of consciousness. This relational theory has two readings, one of which makes essential appeal to evolutionary theory. I argue that neither reading offers a successful view.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1017933132500
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  • 15
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Animal Consciousness and Ethics in Asia and the Pacific (1997)
    Springer
    Journal of agricultural and environmental ethics 10 (1997), S. 249-267 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-322X
    Keywords: Animals ; Asia ; consciousness ; Australia ; Hong Kong ; India ; Israel ; Japan ; New Zealand ; The Philippines ; Russia ; Singapore ; Thailand
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering , Agriculture, Forestry, Horticulture, Fishery, Domestic Science, Nutrition , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract The interactions between humans, animals and the environment have shaped human values and ethics, not only the genes that we are made of. The animal rights movement challenges human beings to reconsider interactions between humans and other animals, and maybe connected to the environmental movement that begs us to recognize the fact that there are symbiotic relationships between humans and all other organisms. The first part of this paper looks at types of bioethics, the implications of autonomy and the value of being alive. Then the level of consciousness of these relationships are explored in survey results from Asia and the Pacific, especially in the 1993 International Bioethics Survey conducted in Australia, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, The Philippines, Russia, Singapore and Thailand. Very few mentioned animal consciousness in the survey, but there were more biocentric comments in Australia and Japan; and more comments with the idea of harmony including humans in Thailand. Comparisons between questions and surveys will also be made, in an attempt to describe what people imagine animal consciousness to be, and whether this relates to human ethics of the relationships.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1007774409131
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