ALBERT

All Library Books, journals and Electronic Records Telegrafenberg

X
feed icon rss

Your email was sent successfully. Check your inbox.

An error occurred while sending the email. Please try again.

Proceed reservation?

Export
Filter
  • Articles  (9)
  • Evolution
  • Springer  (9)
  • American Chemical Society
  • 1995-1999  (9)
  • 1980-1984
  • Economics  (9)
  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Risk and evolution (1999)
    Springer
    Economic theory 13 (1999), S. 329-343 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: Risk ; Evolution ; Entrepreneur. ; JEL Classification Numbers: C72 ; D81.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. I examine a Knightian (1921) model of risk using a general equilibrium model of investment and trade. A population of agents with various preference types can choose between a safe production technology and a risky production technology. In addition, the distribution of types of agents changes through a standard evolutionary dynamic. For a given population distribution, the equilibrium is in general inefficient, however, by allowing the population distribution to change in response to market generated rewards, the population will converge to one where the equilibrium is efficient and where the population as a whole behaves as if all agents were risk neutral.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050257
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Multi-level evolution in population games (1998)
    Springer
    International journal of game theory 27 (1998), S. 21-35 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Keywords: Evolution ; games ; multilevel ; group selection
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract In this paper, we analyze a generalization of the evolutionary model of Kandori, Mailath, & Rob (1993) where the population is partitioned into groups and evolution takes place “in parallel” at the following two levels: (i) within groups, at the lower level; among groups, at the higher one. Unlike in their context, efficiency considerations always overcome those of risk-dominance in the process of selecting the long-run equilibrium. This provides an explicitly dynamic basis for a conclusion reminiscent of those put forward in the biological literature by the so-called theories group selection. From a normative viewpoint, it suggests the potential importance of “decentralization”, here understood as local and independent interaction.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01243192
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The economy as an evolving network (1997)
    Springer
    Journal of evolutionary economics 7 (1997), S. 339-353 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1386
    Keywords: Key words: Market organisation ; Network ; Communication ; Evolution ; Learning ; JEL-classification: C70; D23; D40; L11
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to suggest a view of the economy as a network of links between the individuals involved. One approach is to consider the structure of links as fixed as is the case with spatial models in which agents are situated on a lattice, another is to regard all links as possible but stochastic. If the probability of any of the links existing is uniform we have the situation familiar from the “population games” of evolutionary game theory. The basic idea here is to allow the network to evolve and to make the probability of each of the links dependent on the experience of the agents involved. Such analysis can give rise to interesting behaviour on the aggregate level which is very different from that which might have been predicted by looking at the individuals in isolation.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001910050047
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Detecting self-organisational change in economic processes exhibiting logistic growth (1999)
    Springer
    Journal of evolutionary economics 9 (1999), S. 109-133 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1386
    Keywords: Key words: Discontinuity ; Evolution ; Logistic diffusion ; Non-linearity ; Non-stationarity ; Self-organisation ; Spectral methods ; JEL-classification: C4; C5; N1; N2
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. This paper offers an econometric methodology for the detection of self-organisational change (defined in terms of the presence of time irreversibility, structural change and fundamental uncertainty) in economic processes that follow logistic diffusion growth paths in historical time. The approach we adopted is built upon recent developments in `moving window' spectral methods which are applied to the scaled residuals generated by estimated logistic diffusion models. We illustrate the use of such methods by examining the case of a financial instrument, namely, the Australian Building Society Deposit, which experienced logistic growth in its market share until bank deregulation was enacted in the 1980s. We show that there is clear evidence that self-organisational change is present over the historical period considered.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001910050077
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Nonlinear stochastic effects of substitution — an evolutionary approach (1996)
    Springer
    Journal of evolutionary economics 6 (1996), S. 1-30 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1386
    Keywords: Innovation ; Technology ; Master equation ; Survival probability ; Evolution ; O3
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Technological innovations have been investigated by means of substitution and diffusion as well as evolution models, each of them dealing with different aspects of the innovation problem. In this paper we follow the well known research traditions on self-organisation models of complex systems. For the first time in the literature we show the existence of a specific niche effect, which may occur in the first stage of establishment of a new technology. Using a stochastic Master equation approach, we obtain analytical expressions for the survival probabilities of a new technology in smaller or larger ensembles. As a main result we demonstrate how a hyperselection situation might be removed in a stochastic picture and thresholds against the prevailing of a new technology in a step-by-step process can be overcome.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01202370
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Economic evolution and the science of synergetics (1996)
    Springer
    Journal of evolutionary economics 6 (1996), S. 239-260 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1386
    Keywords: Synergetics ; Self-organisation ; Time-irreversibility ; Evolution ; Structural change ; O30 ; O31 ; C60 ; C63
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper deals with synergetic methods, which have developed as a sub-field of the self-organisation approach in the natural sciences. Such methods have been used successfully to model structural transitions in physio-chemical contexts. The synergetic approach is explained in a non-technical way and the main elements of the synergetic methodology are introduced. The extent to which such methods can be applied in the presence of historical time series data, which are subject to underlying processes of evolutionary economic change, is assessed. Proposals, concerning more appropriate synergetic methods for evolutionary economic application, are considered.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01193632
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A spectrum of equilibration processes in game theory (1998)
    Springer
    Journal of evolutionary economics 8 (1998), S. 67-87 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1386
    Keywords: Key words: Bounded rationality ; Cognitive rationality ; Game equilibrium ; Evolution ; Learning ; JEL-classification: B 41; C 73; D 83; D 84
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. In game theory, four dynamic processes converging towards an equilibrium are distinguished and ordered by way of agents' decreasing cognitive capacities. In the eductive process, each player has enough information to simulate perfectly the others' behavior and gets immediately to the equilibrium. In epistemic learning, each player updates his beliefs about others' future strategies, with regard to their sequentially observed actions. In behavioral learning, each player modifies his own strategies according to the observed payoffs obtained from his past actions. In the evolutionary process, each agent has a fixed strategy and reproduces in proportion to the utilities obtained through stochastic interactions. All along the spectrum, longer term dynamics makes up for weaker rationality, and physical relations substitute for mental interactions. Convergence, if any, is towards an always stronger equilibrium notion and selection of an equilibrium state becomes more sensitive to context and history. The processes can be mixed if associated to different periods, agents or mechanisms and deepened if obtained by formal reasoning principles.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001910050056
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A note on evolutionary stability of Bertrand equilibrium (1999)
    Springer
    Journal of evolutionary economics 9 (1999), S. 367-371 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1386
    Keywords: Key words: Bertrand ; Oligopoly ; Evolution ; Evolutionary stability ; JEL-classification: D43 ; L13 ; C72
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. It is shown that the equilibrium notion of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) does have predictive power for standard models of Bertrand competition. This is in contrast to a recent claim by Qin and Stuart (1997). The claim is based on the observation that the solution concept ESS behaves discontinuously when finite (discrete) action games approach an infinite (continuous) action game in the limit. Furthermore, it is argued that from a model-theoretic point of view evolutionary stability in prices (i.e. in the Bertrand model) is quite different from evolutionary stability in quantities (i.e. in the Cournot model).
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001910050087
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    EVOLUTION AND ULTIMATUM BARGAINING (1997)
    Springer
    Theory and decision 42 (1997), S. 147-175 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: Evolution ; fairness ; dominance ; bargaining ; mutation
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract Empirical research has discovered that experimental subjects in ultimatum bargaining situations generally fail to play the decision-theoretic optimum strategy, and instead play something between that strategy and a fair split. In evolutionary dynamics, fair division and nearly fair division strategies often go to fixation and weakly dominated strategies can do quite well. Computer simulations were done using three different ultimatum bargaining games as determinates of fitness. (1) No tendency toward the elimination of weakly dominated strategies was observed, with or without mutation. (2) Strategies making fair demands had sizable basins of attraction. (3) In a system where five different demands can be made, demands closest to (approximately) 91% had the largest basins of attraction. (4) If the strategies have thresholds for acceptable demands, rather than individuated responses to each demand, the apparent optimum demand may be quite low: 64% for one set of trials.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1004919326873
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
Close ⊗
This website uses cookies and the analysis tool Matomo. More information can be found here...