ALBERT

All Library Books, journals and Electronic Records Telegrafenberg

X
feed icon rss

Your email was sent successfully. Check your inbox.

An error occurred while sending the email. Please try again.

Proceed reservation?

Export
Filter
  • Articles  (26)
  • L13  (26)
  • 1995-1999  (26)
  • 1985-1989
  • 1970-1974
  • 1950-1954
  • 1945-1949
  • Economics  (26)
  • Political Science
Collection
  • Articles  (26)
Source
Keywords
Publisher
Years
  • 1995-1999  (26)
  • 1985-1989
  • 1970-1974
  • 1950-1954
  • 1945-1949
    • +
Year
Topic
  • Economics  (26)
  • Political Science
  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Investment coordination and demand complementarities (1999)
    Springer
    Economic theory 13 (1999), S. 495-505 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: Keywords and Phrases: The Big Push ; Coordination failures. ; JEL Classification Numbers: O14 ; O33 ; L13 ; L16.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. This paper establishes necessary conditions for demand complementarity to imply investment coordination failure and explores the welfare implications of coordinated investment. Our main results caution against demand complementarities as a motive for investment coordination. We find that: 1) generally, a strict notion of complementarity (Hicks) is necessary for the existence of an investment coordination problem and 2) that when the problem does exist, coordination lowers social welfare without countervailing sectoral asymmetries.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050267
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A note on evolutionary stability of Bertrand equilibrium (1999)
    Springer
    Journal of evolutionary economics 9 (1999), S. 367-371 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1386
    Keywords: Key words: Bertrand ; Oligopoly ; Evolution ; Evolutionary stability ; JEL-classification: D43 ; L13 ; C72
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract. It is shown that the equilibrium notion of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) does have predictive power for standard models of Bertrand competition. This is in contrast to a recent claim by Qin and Stuart (1997). The claim is based on the observation that the solution concept ESS behaves discontinuously when finite (discrete) action games approach an infinite (continuous) action game in the limit. Furthermore, it is argued that from a model-theoretic point of view evolutionary stability in prices (i.e. in the Bertrand model) is quite different from evolutionary stability in quantities (i.e. in the Cournot model).
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001910050087
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Switching costs and implicit contracts (1999)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 69 (1999), S. 159-171 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Keywords: switching costs ; implicit contracts ; reputation ; D43 ; L13 ; L14
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract When firms can discriminate between old and new customers and when multiperiod binding commitments are too costly, the effects of switching costs may be mitigated thanks to implicit contracts offered (competitively) by firms in equilibrium and backed by reputation.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01232419
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Optimal punishments in linear duopoly supergames with product differentiation (1999)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 69 (1999), S. 173-188 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Keywords: penal codes ; security level ; product differentiation ; positivity constraints ; C72 ; D43 ; L13
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract We analyze optimal penal codes in both Bertrand and Cournot supergames with product differentiation. We prove that the relationship between optimal punishments and the security level (individually rational discounted profit stream) depends critically on the degree of supermodularity in the stage game, using a linear duopoly supergame with product differentiation. The security level in the punishment phase is reached only under extreme supermodularity, i.e., when products are perfect substitutes and firms are price setters. Finally, we show that Abreu's rule cannot be implemented under Cournot behavior and strong demand complementarity between products.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01232420
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Capital-accumulation games under environmental regulation and duopolistic competition (1999)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 69 (1999), S. 267-287 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Keywords: differential game ; investment ; pollution ; emission taxes ; tradeable emission permits ; open-loop Nash equilibria ; duopolistic competition ; C73 ; D92 ; L11 ; L13 ; Q25 ; Q28
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract In a differential game between two symmetric firms, provided with a clean and a dirty production activity, it is analyzed how investment and emissions are affected by environmental regulation. If both firms face the same environmental policy, a stricter policy reduces long-run investment in the dirty activity, while the impact on the clean activity is ambiguous. Both long-run emissions of each firm and total emissions decrease. This result does not necessarily hold if both firms face different policy instruments: Each firm's investment levels increase with a stricter environmental policy towards its rival, which causes more emissions by this firm.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01231162
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Explaining cross-supplies (1999)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 70 (1999), S. 37-60 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Keywords: cross-supplies ; subcontracting ; Stackelberg ; L13 ; L22
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Cross-supplies describe the phenomenon that two or more firms in the same industry supply each other with their final products. A prominent example is the cooperation in the European flat-glass industry, which was recently criticized by the European Commission. In a simple model we attempt to explain what incentives firms may have to use cross-supplies (instead of producing the goods themselves) and what welfare effects cross-supplies have if they are used. Contrary to the ruling of the European Commission we find that cross-supplies improve welfare whenever they are employed. Furthermore, for a large range of parameters, they even benefit consumers.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01226143
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    When imperfect collusion is profitable (1999)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 70 (1999), S. 235-259 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Keywords: imperfect collusion ; cartel stability ; L13 ; L41
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper studies cartel stability under the assumption that member firms can choose intermediate degrees of collusion as well as the joint-profit-maximizing solution in determining the quota to be produced by each firm. After showing that firms can increase the number of participants by decreasing the degree of collusion, I prove that individual members' profits are maximized when firms choose a (possibly low) degree of collusion such that all firms in the industry want to take part in the cartel. More precisely, if the number of firms in the industry is four or less, then all of them want to take part in the cartel even if the maximum degree of collusion is chosen (i.e., the monopoly output is produced); if the number of firms is greater than four, firms will still create an industry-wide cartel but they will produce a higher quantity than the monopoly output.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01224738
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Exchange rates and bertrand oligopoly (1999)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 70 (1999), S. 281-307 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Keywords: exchange rate ; incomplete pass-through ; Bertrand oligopoly ; F12 ; D43 ; L13
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract The impact of exchange-rate changes on industrial prices seems ambiguous. Incomplete and even “perverse” pass-through has been observed: the import prices in the depreciating country decrease while those in the appreciating country increase. To explain these “counterintuitive” price reactions we consider a situation of international Bertrand competition: two firms, based in different countries, are selling in both countries simultaneously. The profit-maximizing duopolists set the prices for their products in each of the two markets which are segmented on the demand side. We then study the qualitative effect of an exogenous exchange-rate change on the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. Under the strong assumption of linear demand and cost functions we have “normal” exchange-rate pass-through. However, allowing for more general cost structures in this simple static model enables us to show that the import prices in both countries might move in counterintuitive directions.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01224740
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Conjectural-variation models and supergames with price competition in a differentiated product oligopoly (1999)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 70 (1999), S. 309-326 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Keywords: Conjectural-variation models ; supergames ; product differentiation ; L11 ; L13 ; D43 ; C73
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Conjectural-variation models (CV models) are popular in empirical research as they infer the degree of market power from real data. Theorists of industrial organization, however, disapprove of them for lack of theoretical foundation arguing that dynamic reactions are forced into a static model with the strategy space and time horizon only loosely defined. The presented model follows an idea put forward by Cabral (1995) and demonstrates that the CV model can be interpreted as the joint-profit-maximizing steady-state reduced form of a price-setting supergame in a differentiated product market under optimal punishment strategies. For the symmetric two-firm case the CV parameter is shown to cover the full range of possible outcomes — from Bertrand competition to joint unconstrained monopoly — depending on the degree of product differentiation, market growth, bankruptcy risk, and the discount rate. For the asymmetric-cost case numerical calculations are provided.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01224741
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Markov-perfect Nash equilibria in a class of resource games (1998)
    Springer
    Economic theory 11 (1998), S. 79-100 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: C73 ; L13 ; Q20.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary. A general model of non-cooperating agents exploiting a renewable resource is considered. Assuming that the resource is sufficiently productive we prove that there exists a continuum of Markov-perfect Nash equilibria (MPNE). Although these equilibria lead to over-exploitation one can approximate the efficient solution by MPNE both in the state space and the payoff space. Furthermore, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for maximal exploitation of the resource to qualify as a MPNE. This condition is satisfied if there are sufficiently many players, or if the players are sufficiently impatient, or if the capacity of each player is sufficiently high.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050179
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 11
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Cooperation vs. competition in R&D: The role of stability of equilibrium (1998)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 67 (1998), S. 63-73 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Keywords: strategic R&D ; research joint venture ; unstable equilibrium ; C72 ; L13 ; O31
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract We consider a model in which firms first choose process R&D expenditures and then compete in an output market. We show the symmetric equilibrium under R&D competition is sometimes unstable, in which case two asymmetric equilibria must also exist. For the latter, we find, in contrast to the literature that total profits are sometimes higher with R&D competition than with research joint venture cartelization (due to the cost asymmetry of the resulting duopoly in the noncooperative case). Furthermore, these equilibria provide another instance of R&D-induced firm heterogeneity.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01227763
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 12
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Information sharing about a demand shock (1998)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 68 (1998), S. 137-152 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Keywords: information sharing ; demand uncertainty ; asymmetric oligopoly ; D82 ; L13 ; L41
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper examines two questions in asymmetric Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly with a demand shock. Under which conditions is information sharing a subgame-perfect equilibrium? What is the welfare effect when firms are better off? Given these questions, the normal assumptions in the earlier literature can be relaxed in three ways: demand functions can be asymmetric; a demand shock can affect firms differently; distributions of the demand shock and information signals can be arbitrary. Under these general assumptions, the answer to the first question is: every firm's response to the demand shock is stronger when all firms have perfect information than when one firm does so alone; the answer to the second question is: social welfare increases in Cournot competition, and consumer surplus decreases in Bertrand competition.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01237188
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 13
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    What collusion? Unilateral market power as a catalyst for countercyclical markups (1998)
    Springer
    Experimental economics 1 (1998), S. 133-145 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-6938
    Keywords: countercyclical markups ; market power ; oligopoly pricing ; L13 ; E32
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper presents and tests a simple model of competitive and unilateral market power regimes that yields countercyclical markups. Following a decrease in demand in the short run, capacity-constrained firms may have a strong incentivenot to lower their prices to the new competitive price. Demand shocks may introduce market power into a previously competitive market. Experimental posted offer markets support this conjecture with complete information on the market structure. With only private information, there appears to be a hysteresis effect concerning supracompetitive prices, i.e., markets with a history of supracompetitive pricing continue to generate supracompetitive prices following demand shocks. However, competitive markets also remain competitive following demand shocks when firms only have private information on costs and capacities.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01669299
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 14
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Markov-perfect Nash equilibria in a class of resource games (1997)
    Springer
    Economic theory 11 (1997), S. 79-100 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-0479
    Keywords: JEL Classification Numbers: C73 ; L13 ; Q20.
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Summary.  A general model of non-cooperating agents exploiting a renewable resource is considered. Assuming that the resource is sufficiently productive we prove that there exists a continuum of Markov-perfect Nash equilibria (MPNE). Although these equilibria lead to over-exploitation one can approximate the efficient solution by MPNE both in the state space and the payoff space. Furthermore, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for maximal exploitation of the resource to qualify as a MPNE. This condition is satisfied if there are sufficiently many players, or if the players are sufficiently impatient, or if the capacity of each player is sufficiently high.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001990050179
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 15
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Vertical product differentiation and entry deterrence (1997)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 65 (1997), S. 79-102 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Keywords: product differentiation ; quality ; oligopoly ; entry ; L12 ; L13 ; L15
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract I study how a potential entrant influences quality in a model of vertical product differentiation with quality-dependent production costs. With identical costs, the incumbent will always deter entry if possible, i.e., if fixed costs are high. Quality will be set at a level lower than or equal to the optimal quality under either duopoly or monopoly. Results are completely different when the entrant has substantially lower costs. They are explained by the relative location of the entrant's quality best response to the incumbent's optimal quality choice in monopoly. This sheds new light on the influence of industrial policy on market conduct.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01239060
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 16
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Exchange rates and perfect competition (1997)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 65 (1997), S. 151-161 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Keywords: exchange rates ; incomplete pass-through ; perfect competition ; D43 ; F12 ; F31 ; L13
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract The purpose of this note is to demonstrate that the commonly held belief that incomplete and perverse pass-through are incompatible with perfect competition is wrong! To this end, we consider two types of firms both operating in two countries. The demand sides of the markets of the two countries are separated and each type of firm produces its good in one of these countries. We study the effect of an exchange-rate change on the competitive equilibrium prices in each country. When producing for the foreign market causes the same costs as producing for the home market then the “law of one price” holds and an exchange-rate change is completely offset by price changes. Furthermore, when cost functions neither exhibit economies nor diseconomies of scope between producing for the home and producing for the foreign market then prices move in the “right” directions in response to an exchange-rate change. However, with general cost structures, even in this simple perfectly competitive model, “perverse” directions of price changes can result from an exchange-rate change.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01226932
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 17
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Schumpeterian competition in heterogeneous oligopolies (1996)
    Springer
    Journal of evolutionary economics 6 (1996), S. 411-423 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1386
    Keywords: L13 ; O31 ; Evolutionary economics ; Schumpeterian competition ; Innovation ; Oligopoly
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract The modeling of Schumpeterian competition as a process of innovation, imitation and selection was first presented by Nelson/Winter (1982) in a simulation study and further analyzed in a similar but general analytical formulation by Iwai (1984a, 1984b). Their results concerning the relations between the combination of the different forces of Schumpeterian competition and market structure respectively the distributions of profits are interesting, but restricted to competitive markets. Comparing rules of thumb and satisficing for the R&D decisions the present study analyzes the process of Schumpeterian competition in a heterogeneous oligopoly. Firstly, the authors find for the R&D-concentration relation results contrary to the traditional interpretation of Schumpeter. Secondly, Iwai's (1984a, 1984b) qualitative results hold in this less restrictive modeling.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01202278
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 18
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Coalition-proof information exchanges (1996)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 63 (1996), S. 259-278 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Keywords: information exchange ; coalition-proof Nash equilibrium ; D82 ; L13
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract In a three-firm oligopoly model we show that, in addition to being a simple Nash equilibrium, information sharing among all firms is sometimes coalition-proof, and, information exchange among a proper subset of the firms can constitute a coalition-proof equilibrium. Thus, information exchange among firms, even without collusion on prices or outputs, can be very stable and may occur more widely than previously expected.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01227436
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 19
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Bargained shares in joint ventures among asymmetric partners: Is the matthew effect catalyzing? (1996)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 64 (1996), S. 23-51 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Keywords: asymmetry ; research and development ; joint ventures ; sharing rules ; L13 ; O13
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract The impact of asymmetries between partners on the likelihood of establishing successful research and development and production joint ventures relative to the alternative of own development is assessed analytically. The often empirically observed 50/50 sharing rule in asymmetric alliances is compared to a bargained rule, where asymmetries in absorptive capacity, as well as R&D and production efficiency are explicitly taken into account. Industry settings in which successful asymmetric alliances are more likely to occur are pinpointed. The analysis focuses on the influence of the size and format of these asymmetries, the technological appropriability and complementarity between partners on the incentives for both partners to cooperate as well as to cheat on the venture agreement. The results are compared to a setting where the joint venture is only involved in R&D.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01237524
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 20
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Exchange-rate pass-through and market structure (1996)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 64 (1996), S. 129-154 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Keywords: exchange rates ; pass-through ; market structure ; D43 ; F12 ; F31 ; L13
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract We consider a situation in whichn firms located in market 1 andm firms located in market 2 each sell a commodity which is homogeneous within each market but may differ between markets. All firms sell on both markets. Each market has its own currency. The market demand functions differ. We give some basic results on the effects of exchange-rate changes and then show the following. When these markets are independent on the cost side (constant marginal costs) and demands are linear, a reduction in the number of firms (which might result from a merger) in market 1 increases the pass-through (of an appreciation of currency 2) in market 1 and decreases the pass-through in market 2. A similar occurrence in market 2 has the opposite effect. We give conditions under which, with identical economies of scope linking the markets, the sign of the price changes will be reversed when the number of foreign firms is small enough compared to the number of local firms. However, such sign reversals cannot occur in the two markets simultaneously.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01250111
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 21
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Capacity constraints may restore the existence of an equilibrium in the Hotelling model (1996)
    Springer
    Journal of economics 64 (1996), S. 315-324 
    Details
    ISSN: 1617-7134
    Keywords: minimum differentiation ; Hotelling ; capacity constraints ; L13
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract In this note, we consider the Hotelling model with linear transportation costs. We show that capacity constraints may restore the existence of an equilibrium for locations inside the first and third quartiles.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01250131
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 22
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Bandwagon mergers, international competitiveness, and government policy (1996)
    Springer
    Empirica 23 (1996), S. 255-278 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-6911
    Keywords: Theory of mergers ; competitiveness ; competition policy ; industrial policy ; D81 ; F23 ; L21 ; L13 ; L40 ; L50 ; O38
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper suggests that while the static welfare losses of merger predilections among Western firms may not be dramatic, they may lead to substantial dynamic losses when merger-prone firms need to compete with firms which instead focus on equipment investment and investments in R&D. It is suggested that such diverging investment priorities have been the real cause of the deteriorating competitiveness of many of the largest Western enterprises vis-à-vis their Japanese rivals. While mergers are generally taken to be determined by either efficiency or monopoly considerations, this paper argues that Western merger predilections are likely to be generated by a combination of imitative and defensive routines as well. That would make it difficult for firms to unilaterally break away from these competitiveness-threatening investments. If correct, this would imply that competition policies would need to be refocused. However, it is also suggested that the implications for international competitiveness should make merger questions a subject of industrial policies too. In that respect, the paper suggests some basic attitudinal changes.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00924973
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 23
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Mixed duopoly, inefficiency, and public ownership (1996)
    Springer
    Review of industrial organization 11 (1996), S. 853-860 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7160
    Keywords: Mixed oligopoly ; public ownership ; privatization ; L33 ; L13
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract If a publicly-owned firm has a higher marginal cost than a private firm, partial public ownership may be welfare-improving, if the public firm acts is Stackelberg leader. If the private firm's marginal cost is private information a simple transfer function is truth-eliciting. If the stock market is efficient, the cost of renationalization is “small”.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00174411
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 24
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Can market power really be estimated? (1996)
    Springer
    Review of industrial organization 11 (1996), S. 115-124 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7160
    Keywords: Market power measurement ; oligopoly pricing ; L11 ; L12 ; L13
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract In a previous paper in this Review, Hyde and Perloff ask the question, “Can Market Power be Estimated?” using the “structural model” or two proposed alternatives. They find that none of the three methods produce consistent, meaningful results in the food and beverage industries and that simulations suggest great sensitivity of results to model misspecification. This paper offers an explanation for these disappointing results. The difficulty is that the structural model (and its proposed alternatives) is based on an overly-ambitious estimating form that over-simplifies the diversity and true complexity of oligopoly pricing. By neglecting accounting data on costs and by arbitrarily relying on an assumption that outputs are set by subtracting a constant proportion of the difference between Price and Marginal Revenue, the “structural model” and proposed alternatives try to fit an elegant form to a messy world with predictably disappointing results.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00163602
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 25
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Damoclean tax and innovation (1995)
    Springer
    Journal of evolutionary economics 5 (1995), S. 71-89 
    Details
    ISSN: 1432-1386
    Keywords: Damoclean tax ; Innovation ; R&D ; Tax credit ; Cooperative R&D ; L13 ; L43 ; O32 ; O38 ; H21 ; H25
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract The paper presents a novel tax that is designed to improve the performance of research and development (R&D) investments. Ideally, the tax allows the technical efficiencies of monopoly while bringing about the desirable effects of the competitive pressure of R&D rivalry. Thus, with the tax, the state can sanction a monopoly of R&D investment in order to attain technical efficiencies and yet avoid the underinvestment in R&D that would result without competitive pressures. A critique of the tax emphasizes the problems of implementing it and offers a more practical alternative that would achieve the same desirable effects.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01199671
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 26
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Spatial aspects of retail market structure: BLS and ERS food prices revisited (1995)
    Springer
    Empirica 22 (1995), S. 71-76 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-6911
    Keywords: Market structure ; spatial ; retail prices ; grocers ; L13 ; L81 ; D43
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper draws on the spatial model in (Claycombe and Mahan, 1993) and the BLS data developed in (Lamm, 1981) to test for the significance of spatial and concentration variables as determinants of retail prices. Results strongly suggest that structure in narrow retail markets affects price. Different results are found using the ERS data in (Kaufman and Handy, 1989), further fueling controversy there.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01388381
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
Close ⊗
This website uses cookies and the analysis tool Matomo. More information can be found here...