ALBERT

All Library Books, journals and Electronic Records Telegrafenberg

X
feed icon rss

Your email was sent successfully. Check your inbox.

An error occurred while sending the email. Please try again.

Proceed reservation?

Export
Filter
  • Articles  (78)
  • Blackwell Publishing Ltd.  (78)
  • 1995-1999  (78)
  • 1985-1989
  • 1970-1974
  • 1950-1954
  • 1945-1949
  • Economics  (78)
  • Political Science
Collection
  • Articles  (78)
Source
Publisher
Years
Year
Topic
  • Economics  (78)
  • Political Science
  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Product Differentiation, Strategic Divisionalization, and Persistence of Monopoly (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper analyzes the strategic incentive of oligopolists to create autonomous rival divisions when products are differentiated. We consider a two-stage game where firms choose the number of autonomous divisions in the first stage and all the divisions engage in Cournot competition in the second. It is shown that product differentiation ensures the existence of an interior subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), and the equilibrium number of divisions increases with the degree of substitution among products and the number of firms. Further, if divisions are allowed to divide further, they always will, which leads to total rent dissipation. Thus, parent firms have incentives to unilaterally restrict their divisions from further dividing. In the free-entry equilibrium, it is found that the possibility of setting up autonomous divisions is a natural barrier to entry. Incumbents may persistently earn abnormally high profits. In the cases where product differentiation is difficult, the only pure-strategy free-entry SPNE is the monopoly outcome even if the entry cost is relatively low.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00581.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Termination and Coordination in Partnerships (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: It is common practice for firms to pool their expertise by forming partnerships such as joint ventures and strategic alliances. A central organization problem in such partnerships is that managers may behave noncooperatively in order to advance the interests of their parent firms. We ask whether contracts can be designed so that managers will maximize total profits. We characterize first best contracts for a variety of environments and show that efficiency imposes some restrictions on the ownership shares. In addition, we evaluate the performance of two termination contracts that are widely used in practice: the shotgun rule and price competition. We find that although these contracts do not achieve full efficiency, they both perform well. We provide insight into when each rule is more efficient.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00191.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Foreign Direct Investment Strategies and Firms' Capabilities (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper presents a simple model to analyze the effect of geographically localized spillovers on the internationalization decision of firms. It is shown that, once spatially bounded externalities are taken into account, the standard predictions on the nature and direction of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows may be reversed. We highlight three effects. First, an FDI-en-hancing effect: the presence of spillovers increases the profitability of the FDI strategy when the competitive gap between firms is narrow. Second, a dissipation effect: firms may refrain from investing abroad for fear of diffusion of their firm-specific assets. Third, a sourcing effect: the presence of spillovers may induce a firm to invest abroad, even in the absence of exporting costs.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00251.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Mergers and Exclusionary Practices in Health Care Markets (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We evaluate the relationship between insurers (payers) and providers of health care (hospitals) when they each have a nonnegligible share of the market. We focus in particular on their incentives to merge and the existence of equilibria where payers offer preferential treatment to a subset of hospitals. We demonstrate that hospitals are more likely to merge without consolidating their capacities the less competitive they are vis-à-vis the payer's market. Payers are more likely to merge without consolidating their capacities the less competitive either the hospitals' or the payers' market is. A given payer follows an exclusionary strategy when its starting bargaining position vis-à-vis hospitals is weak. At such exclusionary equilibria, payers tend to distinguish themselves from neighboring payers by contracting with a different subset of hospitals.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00315.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Measuring Hospital Cost-Sharing Incentives Under Refined Prospective Payment (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper evaluates the usefulness of a model (McClellan, 1997) that was recently proposed for measuring reimbursement incentives under ongoing refinements to the hospital prospective payment system. The model is applied to a single major disease category (HIV infection) for which the hospital reimbursement system has undergone dramatic refinements in recent years. The paper highlights a problem in the original specification, namely, the use of endogenous costs as an explanatory variable. The paper illustrates how hospital response to both marginal price incentives (e.g., a change in the supply of payment-related services) and average price incentives (e.g., a change in the supply of non-payment-related services) can cause either over-or underestimation of payer cost sharing. In the present case study, overestimation of the marginal reimbursement incentives was evidenced. Obtaining cost-sharing estimates that can be used to evaluate alternative payment classification systems requires controlling for endogenous changes in hospital behavior.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00433.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A Strategic Approach to Software Protection (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper demonstrates that there is a strategic reason why software firms have followed consumers' desire to drop software protection. We analyze software protection policies in a price-setting duopoly software industry selling differentiated software packages, where consumers' preference for particular software is affected by the number of other consumers who (legally or illegally) use the same software. Increasing network effects make software more attractive to consumers, thereby enabling firms to raise prices. However, it also generates a competitive effect resulting from feircer competition for market shares. We show that when network effects are strong, unprotecting is an equilibrium for a noncooperative industry.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00163.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Effects of One-Way Spillovers on Market Shares, Industry Price, Welfare, and R & D Cooperation (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: With one-way spillovers, the standard symmetric two-period R&D model leads to an asymmetric equilibrium only, with endogeneous innovator and imitator roles. We show how R&D decisions and measures of firm heterogeneity—market shares, R&D shares, and profits—depend on spillovers and on R&D costs. While a joint lab always improves on consumer welfare, it yields higher profits, cost reductions, and social welfare only under extra assumptions, beyond those required with multidirectional spillovers. Finally, the novel issue of optimal R&D cartels is addressed. We show an optimal R&D cartel may seek to minimize R&D spillovers between its members.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00223.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Policy Shocks, Market Intermediaries, and Corporate Strategy: The Evolution of Business Groups in Chile and India (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Numerous countries have undergone rapid transitions in their economic environments. Yet, little is known about firms' responses to such transitions. We use field-collected data to study the evolution of eighteen large and diversified business groups in Chile (1987–1997) and India (1990–1997). The chosen periods correspond to significant deregulation in the primary markets in both countries. Conventional wisdom suggests that the intermediation roles played by business groups ought to decrease during these periods. However, we find an increase in group scope, an increase in the strength of the social and economic ties that bind together group firms, an increase in self-reported intermediation attempts by the groups, and some evidence that these actions are associated with improvements in accounting and stock-market performance of the group affiliates. We suggest that the slow development of market intermediaries, in a manner suggested by institutional economics, and the attendant lack of reduction in transaction costs in primary markets, can explain these findings.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00271.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A Reexamination of Yardstick Competition (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper shows that yardstick competition does not assist a regulator when lump-sum transfers are not costly and the regulator does not care about the distribution of income. Yardstick competition may discourage investment that would make efficient operation possible. The paper characterizes optimal regulatory schemes in a simple model and demonstrates that it may be optimal to limit the amount of information available to the regulator.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00033.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Price Dynamics and Consumer Learning (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper studies the price dynamics induced by strategic firm behavior in the presence of consumer learning about the uncertain quality differential of the products offered by a duopoly. It is found that consumers learn slowly and that prices converge also slowly to full-information levels. A consequence is that the incentives affirms to manipulate consumers' beliefs are persistent. Although pricing tends to be aggressive at the early stages, and average prices eventually increase over time, price wars may occur at intermediate stages of the product life cycle.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00095.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 11
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Process- Versus Function-Based Hierarchies (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: I consider a firm's choice between having people who carry out complementary tasks report to the same manager and having them report to separate, function-based managers. Even supposing that the former enhances coordination, the latter may be preferred because it improves the firm's control over employees. I show that, because switching from a function-based hierarchy to a process-based hierarchy reduces the firm's direct control, it raises the attractiveness of making the employee pay more sensitive to performance. Also, this switch tends to raise the profitability of fostering altruism between employees. I extend the analysis so that it deals with the relative benefits of IT- and M-form organizations. I show that the M form becomes more profitable as the firm gets large.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00453.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 12
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Coupon Advertising Under Imperfect Price Information (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper studies sales promotions through coupons in an oligopoly under imperfect price information. Sellers can distribute either ordinary coupons, or coupon (price) advertising, or both types of coupons, at distant locations to attract consumers from their rivals' markets. A unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium exists where rebates and couponing intensity are always positive. In the ordinary-coupon equilibrium, prices, promotional efforts, and sellers' profits are higher than in the coupon-advertising equilibrium. However, if sellers are allowed to distribute both types of coupons, only coupon advertising is sent out in equilibrium.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00523.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 13
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Quality Competition, Insurance, and Consumer Choice in Health Care Markets (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: In this model, insurance offering a choice of hospitals is valued because consumers are uncertain which hospital they will prefer ex post. A competitive insurance market facilitates tacit price collusion between hospitals; high margins induce hospitals to compete for customers through overinvestment in quality. Incentives may exist to lock in market share via managed-care plans with less choice and lower prices. As technology becomes more expensive, the market increasingly offers too little choice. A pure managed care market may emerge, with underinvestment in quality. Relative to a pure insurance regime, however, all consumers are better off under managed care.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00546.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 14
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Hassle Costs: The Achilles' Heel of Price-Matching Guarantees* (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We show that price-matching guarantees can facilitate monopoly pricing only if firms automatically match prices. If consumers must instead request refunds (thereby incurring hassle costs), we find that any increase in equilibrium prices due to firms' price-matching policies will be small; often, no price increase can be supported. In symmetric markets price-matching guarantees cannot support any rise in prices, even if hassle costs are arbitrarily small In asymmetric markets, higher prices can be supported, but the prices fall well short of maximizing joint profits. Our model can explain why some firms adopt price-matching guarantees while others do not.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00489.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 15
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Introduction (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00311.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 16
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Using Subjective Risk Adjusting to Prevent Patient Dumping in the Health Care Industry (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We examine how to procure health care services at minimum cost while preventing suppliers from refusing to care for high-cost patients. A single risk-adjusted prospective payment is optimal only when it is particularly costly for the supplier to discover likely treatment costs. Cost sharing is optimal when these screening costs are somewhat smaller. When screening costs are sufficiently small, screening is optimally accommodated and subjective risk adjusting is implemented. Under subjective risk adjusting, the supplier classifies patients according to his personal assessment of likely treatment costs, and payments are structured accordingly. Optimal procurement policies are contrasted with prevailing industry policies.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00351.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 17
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Separating the True Effect from Gaming in Incentive-Based Contracts in Health Care (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper studies the effect of incentive regulation on health care. In the context of incentive-based health contracts, which might also introduce an incentive for the providers simply to report better treatment outcomes, evaluation of treatment using the information supplied by the providers (reported output) could be problematic. The systematic error on the output report is called providers' gaming behavior. This paper develops a general method for decomposing the effect of incentive-based contracts on performance into the true effect, which is the result of clinicians' improved effort induced by the contract, and the gaming effect, which is due to the change in the providers' reporting practice. The method follows the essence of linear structural relation (LISREL) models, and the true treatment output is modeled using a latent variable. Various output measures can be included in the structural evaluation model, but objective measure(s) (output measures not affected by providers' potential gaming) must be constructed based on available information to identify gaming through its correlation with the reported measures. The strengths of this method are that information from more than one output measure can be used, no monitoring system is required, and the construction of a gold-standard measure is not necessary. This method is applied to evaluate the impact of Maine's performance-based contracting on its public providers' substance-abuse services. Evidence of gaming is found in Maine's system, which remains robust in most of the sensitivity analyses. The methodology developed here can be used to evaluate the impact of a broad range of incentive-based contracts.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00383.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 18
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Adverse Selection with Competitive Inspection (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We develop a model with heterogeneous buyers and sellers in which the sellers have private information about their goods' qualities. We show that efficient trading cannot occur without middlemen. Middlemen can provide two services: one is inspection, and the other is the sorting of buyers and sellers through the rationing of sellers and the provision of two different price schedules. The latter service permits the possibility of achieving the first best. When the first best is not attainable, there is a second best characterized by two intervals, one consisting of low-quality noninspected goods, and the other of high-quality inspected goods. We determine whether first and second best outcomes can be implemented in a market equilibrium with both zero and infinite buyer-seller search costs. First and second best outcomes are attainable under a larger set of parameter values when search costs are infinite; also, typically too much inspection occurs in a market equilibrium. Welfare may be either raised or lowered by the introduction of middlemen.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00001.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 19
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Empirical Evaluation of Regulatory Regimes in Local Telecommunications Markets (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper relies on an engineering optimization model of the local telecommunication exchange network to calibrate the functions entering various regulatory mechanisms, from both traditional and modern (incentive) regulation, and evaluate their relative performance. The engineering process model is used to generate data, which are econometrically synthesized in a translog economic cost function. Using this estimated cost function and some empirical and institutional information on market and regulatory conditions, we then calibrate demand, social-surplus, and disutility-of-(cost-reducing)-effort functions. These functions, together with probability distributions reflecting the regulator's beliefs about technology characteristics, allow us to quantitatively assess the social value of regulatory transfers and of good cost auditing procedures, the redistributive consequences of the various forms of regulation, and the sensitivity of their relative performance to the cost of public funds.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00061.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 20
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Erratum: “Time Schedule and Program Profile: TV News in Norway and Denmark” (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00161.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 21
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Licensing vs. Litigation: The Effect of the Legal System on Incentives to Innovate (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: With uncertain scope of patent protection and imperfect enforcement, the effective strength of patent protection is determined by the legal system. We analyze how the legal system affects the incentives of firms to innovate, taking into account possibilities of strategic licensing and litigation to deter imitation. The legal system that guarantees the patentee's monopoly power maximizes the R&D intensities. However, the legal system that induces licensing provides incentives to exert R&D effort while preserving ex post efficiency. We also compare R&D, patent licensing, and litigation behavior under American and English rules of legal cost allocation.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00133.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 22
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Profitability under an Open versus a Closed System (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper explores the conditions under which a monopolist selling a system consisting of a main component and differentiated secondary components can increase profits by allowing competition in the aftermarket for the secondary components. Opening the system in this fashion can increase profits by giving consumers an added incentive to incur the setup cost of purchasing the main component. This paper extends the second-sourcing literature by showing the explicit effects of various parameters of demand on the decision to open the system. The results show that an open system is likely to be more profitable than a closed one when demand for the system is more elastic, when secondary-component variety is more valued, and when the share of the main component in the total system budget of the consumer is high.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00307.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 23
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Task Shifts vs. Termination as Devices for Eliciting Optimal Effort Supply (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper contrasts assignments to punitive tasks and terminations as alternative incentive devices. The basic question we ask here is: does the threat of assigning employees to a punitive task allow one to attain higher effort levels than termination threats? The answer critically depends on whether employers are able or not to commit themselves not to fire. We show that in the no-commitment case the only relevant incentive device is termination threats. In contrast, when employers commit themselves not to fire, by threatening punitive task reassignments there obtain effort levels that are not implementable by termination. The implementation results are then applied to the study of incentive problems arising when investment infirm-specific human capital is unverifiable.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00033.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 24
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Corporate Control Through Board Dismissals and Takeovers (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper examines some policy issues related to the interaction between internal and external corporate control mechanisms—board dismissals and takeovers—by focusing on the information aggregation and other effects related to this interaction. We model the functioning of corporate control mechanisms as an example of a multilayered principal-agent relationship in which shareholders delegate the task of monitoring management quality to the board and rely on the external takeover market to provide additional disciplining of the manager as well as of the board. This gives rise to two effects: (1) a substitution effect, whereby the takeover market partially substitutes for board dismissal of the manager, leading to greater lenience toward the manager by a board acting in the shareholders' best interest, and (2) a kick-in-the-pants effect, whereby the board is stricter with the manager because it may be dismissed by a successful acquirer who views it as lax. The interaction of these two effects leads to various implications about the behavior of boards and potential acquirers. In particular, a well-functioning internal control mechanism (the board) does not obviate the need for external control (takeovers). Moreover, somewhat counterintuitively, there may be a greater incidence of takeovers when the internal control mechanism is working well than when it is not.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00489.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 25
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Entry Deterrence, Product Quality: Price and Advertising as Signals (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: I analyze the marketing strategy of an incumbent monopolist facing a threat of entry. Product quality is unknown to consumers, and the monopolist's cost is unknown to the potential entrant. The incumbent uses both price and advertising to signal cost and quality. The monopolist faces a dilemma because signaling a high quality attracts customers but requires a high price, whereas signaling low cost prevents entry but requires a low price. I characterize the unique (stable) separating equilibrium and show that dissipative advertising may be used, while it is never used if either quality or cost is known. Some equilibria may involve pooling on cost. A welfare analysis indicates that potential entry may improve welfare and that the effect of unknown quality is not always negative when it interferes with entry deterrence.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00615.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 26
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Minimum Advertised Price (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper examines minimum advertised price (MAP), a vertical restraint that is observed in manufacturer-retailer interactions. Under MAP, the manufacturer announces that it will reimburse retailers for a fraction of their advertising expenditures if retailers do not advertise the product at below a specified price. MAP can be considered a combination of resale price maintenance (RPM) and a cooperative advertising subsidy. Current antitrust law treats RPM as illegal per se, whereas MAP is judged according to a rule of reason. A framework is presented within with neither a minimum retail price nor a cooperative advertising subsidy is individually sufficient to enable maximization of profits in the complete manufacturer-retailer structure, but the two instruments together are. MAP is therefore a sufficient instrument for the maximization of joint profits. We argue that MAP can also be designed as a second-best instrument that replicates RPM.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00647.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 27
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Increases in Executive Pay Following Privatization (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The average chief executive at one of Britain's twelve regional electricity distribution companies experienced nearly a threefold salary increase in the two years following the industry privatization in 1990. It is hard to account for the tremendous pay raises with conventional explanations for executive compensation rates. They are not attributable to increases in managerial talent, because privatization brought virtually no changes in personnel at the top rank. In addition, the salary increases did not coincide with dramatic changes in firm scale, and cross-firm differences in the raises are uncorrelated with stock-market returns and other measures of firm performance. By contrast, salary increases are highly correlated with firms' potential profits (as measured by the administratively assigned price cap). The findings presented here thus provide new perspectives on the determinants of executive compensation.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00327.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 28
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Seller Financing of Consumer Durables (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Sellers of consumer durables often provide financing to customers. This paper shows that when customers desire consumption smoothing and when financial markets are imperfect, a seller can find it optimal to offer a menu of deferred-payment plans. A monopolist seller price discriminates among customers with different intertemporal income profiles by making such menu offers, and the interest rate on the seller credit can be significantly lower than the market borrowing rate. Seller financing can be an equilibrium outcome in a game where sellers and banks with market power choose payment plans and interest rates strategically.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00435.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 29
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Effectiveness and Targeting of Television Advertising (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Television networks spend about 16% of their revenues on tune-ins, which are previews or advertisements for their own shows. In this paper, we examine two questions. First, what is the informational content in advertising? Second, is this level of expenditures consistent with profit maximization? To answer these questions, we use a new and unique micro-level panel dataset on the television viewing decisions of a large sample of individuals, matched with data on show tune-in advertisements. The difference in effectiveness of advertisements between “regular” shows (about which viewers are assumed to have substantial information a priori) and “specials” (about which they have very little) reveals the value of information in advertisements and the different roles that information can play. The number of exposures for each individual is likely to be correlated with their preferences, since networks target their audiences. We address this endogeneity problem by controlling for observed, and integrating the unobserved, characteristics of individuals, and find that the estimated effects of tune-ins are still large. Finally, we find that actual expenditures on tune-ins closely match the predicted optimal levels of spending.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00363.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 30
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Vertical Organization of Industry: Systems Competition versus Component Competition (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We discuss two contrasting styles of vertical organization of complementary activities or components in an industry: systems competition versus component competition. When firms' competencies differ, systems competition is not a perfect substitute for component competition, even with Bertmnd behavior. Costs, prices, industry profits, and the distribution of those profits among firms all differ between the two styles of organization. Moreover, firms' profit incentives do not generally guide them towards the socially efficient form of vertical organization. In duopoly, there is a bias towards open organization (component competition), but with enough firms (three or more, in an exponential example) this bias is reversed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00143.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 31
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Statistical Causality and Strategic Behavior in Industrial Markets (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper proposes a simple test of the leader-follower model of strategic behavior. This test relates the temporal notions of leadership central to such models to the empirical methods of statistical causality. This test is performed using data from the US softwood plywood industry of the last three decades. Others have productively explored the spatial pricing practices of this industry by applying a leader-follower model. Similarly, we find that a leader-follower model explains well the temporal relations between key strategic variables (prices) in the industry. We conclude that the leader-follower model imposes meaningful restrictions on observable time-series data and that statistical causality is a useful method for testing these restrictions.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00183.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 32
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Influence Costs, Structural Inertia, and Organizational Change (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper builds an economic model of the relationship between influence activity and resistance to change in organizations. I show that influence activity can create harmful barriers to change and that the influence costs of change are positively related to the firm's prospects. The model rationalizes the widely held view that firms often must endure a survival-threatening crisis before meaningful change can be achieved. I show that employees' choices of whether to engage in influence activity can depend on their beliefs as to whether the firm will choose to change its organizational form. If employees expect change, their best response is to try to affect the form of the change in their favor.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00237.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 33
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Patent Breadth, Patent Life, and the Pace of Technological Progress (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: In active investment climates where firms sequentially improve each other's products, a patent can terminate either because it expires or because a non-infringing innovation displaces its product in the market. We define the length of time until one of these happens as the effective patent life, and show how it depends on patent breadth. We distinguish lagging breadth, which protects against imitation, from leading breadth, which protects against new improved products. We compare two types of patent policy with leading breadth: (1) patents are finite but very broad, so that the effective life of a patent coincides with its statutory life, and (2) patents are long but narrow, so that the effective life of a patent ends when a better product replaces it. The former policy improves the diffusion of new products, but the latter has lower R&D costs.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00001.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 34
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oligopoly, Financial Structure, and Resolution of Uncertainty (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We characterize equilibria of a multistage game in which competing duopolists may acquire and share information in advance of choosing their financial structure which, in turn, precedes production. Given sufficient uncertainty, equilibria exist in which the efficiency and, possibly, coordination gains to acquiring and sharing perfect information are sufficient to break Brander and Lewis's (1986) result wherein both firms issue debt to their mutual disadvantage. However, more interesting may be the robustness of that result when uncertainty is low or when information is imperfect. The key insight is that the consequences of issuing debt are invariant to the level of uncertainty, given that firms can recalibrate the terms of debt to achieve the Stackelberg solution.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00067.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 35
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Time Schedule and Program Profile: TV News in Norway and Denmark (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Two TV channels compete on programming with respect to both time schedule (continuous choice) and program profile (discrete choice), with a directional constraint concerning time schedule (viewers cannot watch TV before they get home). We show how the relative importance of program profile and time schedule, as perceived by the viewers, determines the equilibrium outcome. Furthermore, we find that there is a first-mover disadvantage in a sequential game where one channel sets its two choice variables before its rival does, and a first-mover advantage in a semise-quential game where the channels set time schedules sequentially and thereafter set program profiles simultaneously. The results are applied to the Norwegian and Danish markets for TV news, where number-two channels have challenged the incumbents.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00209.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 36
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Disciplinary Takeovers and Industry Effects (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper presents a disciplinary explanation for some seemingly paradoxical stylized facts from the takeover literature. Most notable among these are: (1) hostile takeovers are predicted better by industry-wide than by firm-specific performance failures; and (2) gains from a successful bid for a specific firm extend to other firms in the same industry. Our explanation is based on the idea that managerial incentives based on relative performance evaluation may induce an inefficient industry-wide equilibrium in which all firms underperform with respect to a value-maximizing firm, but no firm underperforms with respect to the industry average. A takeover can serve as a means to destroy such an inefficient industry-wide incentive equilibrium.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00265.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 37
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Strategic Invasion in Markets with Switching Costs (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We investigate the role of consumer switching costs in a three-stage model in which the entrant and the incumbent firm set prices sequentially and then the consumers decide from which firm to buy. We characterize the unique subgame perfect equilibrium and find that even an entrant with a higher marginal cost may profitably invade part of the market due to the existence of switching costs. Switching costs benefit both firms but harm consumers. This model is used to understand pricing behavior in the US telecommunications industry.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00521.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 38
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Yardstick Competition and Investment Incentives (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper analyzes how firms' investment incentives are affected by yardstick competition in a situation in which the regulator is unable to commit himself to the regulatory contract before firms invest. Despite its rent-extracting property, yardstick competition does not necessarily reduce efficiency-improving investment. Considering firm-specific investment, yardstick competition is shown to increase investment incentives over individual regulation affirms. In this case, therefore, yardstick competition both reduces the regulator's informational problem ex post and strengthens the firms' investment incentives ex ante. If instead investment is industry-specific, incentives to invest are lowered by yardstick competition.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00105.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 39
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Rational Nonprofit Entrepreneurship (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper derives the decision to found a nonprofit firm as the equilibrium outcome of a multistage game among individuals who would like a public good to be provided. The model predicts that if individuals will voluntarily contribute towards provision of the public good, then it is in the self-interest of the entrepreneur to impose a nondistribution constraint on herself by founding a nonprofit firm.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00551.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 40
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Agency-Theory and Internal-Labor-Market Explanations of Bonus Payments: Empirical Evidence from Spanish Firms (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper combines agency theory and internal-labor-market theories to explain the determinants of bonus payments among a large sample of top and middle managers from Spanish firms. A distinction is made between the decision whether to pay bonus or not and the size of the bonus. The empirical evidence confirms that the two decisions are determined by different factors. The results of the analysis show a trade-off between short-term and long-term incentives (bonuses and promotion opportunities) as well as differences in the pattern of compensation policies across economic sectors and functional areas inside the firm.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00573.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 41
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Hiring Risky Workers: Some Evidence (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Lazear recently suggested that firms that do not expect to live for a long time will hire only safe workers. Hence their worker turnover will be lower. In this paper we test this hypothesis using both the industry growth rate and industry-average age of establishments as measures of the horizon for a particular firm. We find mixed results, both at the industry level and at the establishment level. Establishments in growing industries do indeed exhibit higher churning flows, but a high average age of establishments reduces rather than increases churning.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00669.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 42
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Contract Renegotiation with Time-Varying Valuations (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The paper characterizes optimal renegotiation-proof rental contracts in a model with adverse selection and hidden information. It generalizes the work of Hart and Tirole (1988) to the case of time-varying valuations. The paper considers a durable-goods monopolist who serves a nonanonymous buyer with time-varying valuation for the seller's good. The buyer's valuation has a persistent and a transient component; both are private information. The paper shows that for some range of prior beliefs the seller strictly prefers leasing to selling.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00397.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 43
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Product Switching Cost and Strategic Flexibility (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper examines the equilibrium degree of flexibility adopted by firms competing in oligopolistic product markets in which the value of flexibility arises from the initial presence of uncertainty over consumer preferences and its eventual resolution. The equilibrium choice of flexible mode depends on the following factors: (1) the cost of switching product design in response to revealed consumer preferences, (2) the difference in the acquisition costs of the flexible and dedicated modes, and (3) the precision of the ex ante information held by the firms regarding consumer preferences. The relationship between these factors and the equilibrium choice of modes is fully characterized.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00461.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 44
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Competition for Managers and Product Market Efficiency (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We investigate whether competition between two firms to hire managers with different abilities might affect efficiency in the product market, when a manager's effort is his/her private information. We conclude that competition for managers might lead to an improvement in efficiency in the market of the firm that attracts the most efficient manager. Competition for managers might even eliminate the productive efficiency loss due to the asymmetry of information in the firm-manager relationship.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00089.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 45
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Health-Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives—Reply (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: I reconsider the implementation of efficient cost and quality efforts when health-care providers may refuse services to consumers, and introduce a mechanism that is a combination of prospective payment and cost reimbursement. Conditions are derived for the prospective payment level and the margin above cost reimbursement for the implementation of efficient efforts.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00139.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 46
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Health-Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives—Comment (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This note analyzes the incentives for cost reduction that different payment policies provide to profit-maximizing health-care providers. Ching-to Albert Ma (1994) proposes a reimbursement mechanism that seeks to induce first-best cost reduction by using a combination of cost reimbursement and prospective payment in a model where higher effort on the part of the health-care provider reduces treatment costs. This note shows that a mechanism of this type, generally, will not result in first-best cost reduction. However, such a mechanism is optimal when the payer has efficiency and distributional concerns.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00127.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 47
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Hospital Reimbursement Incentives: An Empirical Analysis (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Reimbursement systems for health-care providers are very complex, like the production systems that they regulate. This complexity has led to some important misperceptions about the incentive consequences of major reimbursement reforms. One example is the prospective payment system (PPS), developed to provide “high-powered” incentives through fixed prices for hospital admissions for the US elderly. In fact, various features of the DRG system allow reimbursement to vary with actual treatment decisions during an admission, and so are not prospective. This paper develops a general method for measuring actual reimbursement incentives in complex regulated price systems. The method uses regression techniques with variance decompositions to quantify the effects of particular features of the payment system on prospective and retrospective cost sharing, as well as overall generosity of payments. I apply this method to microdata on 20 percent of Medicare hospital admissions in 1987 and 1990 to summarize the incentives created by PPS in practice, and how the incentives are evolving over time. I show that PPS involves limited and decreasing cost sharing with hospitals, most of which is not prospective. The reimbursement incentives vary substantially across diagnoses, demographic groups, and types of intensive treatments, possibly with important implications for hospital behavior and medical expenditure growth. The techniques developed here can be used to analyze a broad range of provider reimbursement mechanisms.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00091.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 48
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Buyer Alliances and Managed Competition (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: In a health insurance market, a large employer or an organized “buyer alliance” is in a position to influence the design of plans offered to its members. We study how the sponsors of buyer alliances manage competition among insurance firms by focusing on their choices of the format of competition, the number of firms allowed to compete, and the quality of care offered by the firms. We find deviations from optimality in all three dimensions. Specifically, we find a tendency toward too many firms and too much quality, and a bias toward a format involving the prescreening of insurance plans by the sponsor.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00175.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 49
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Firm Characteristics and the Speed of FDA Approval (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper empirically examines the effect of firm-specific characteristics on the length of time required by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to review and approve new-drug applications between 1990 and 1992. The approach treats regulatory decisions as endogenous and explains the variation in regulatory behavior as a function of differences that exist between firms and drugs. Results show that, controlling for drug-specific characteristics, regulators respond to firm-specific characteristics when evaluating new drug applications. For instance, firms that are less diversified and more R&D-inten-sive receive shorter review times for their new-drug applications than more diversified and less R&D-intensive firms. The reason is that most firm characteristics signal information to reviewers about either firm reputation or application quality. This information reduces reviewers' uncertainty about approving a dangerous or ineffective drug and leads to faster review times. The results suggest that regulators respond to the heterogeneities among firms in the pharmaceutical market in systematic ways.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00377.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 50
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Entry and Predation: British Shipping Cartels 1879–1929 (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: I examine the outcomes of cases of entry by merchant shipping lines into established markets around the turn of the century. These established markets are completely dominated by an incumbent cartel composed of several member shipping lines. The cartel makes the decision whether or not to begin a price war against the entrant; some entrants are formally admitted to the cartel without any conflict. I use characteristics of the entrant to predict whether or not the entrant will encounter a price war conditional on entering. I find that weaker entrants are fought, where “weaker” means having fewer financial resources, less experience, smaller size, or poor trade conditions. The empirical results provide most support for the long-purse theory of predation. Due to the small number of observations available, 47, I discuss qualitative evidence (such as predatory intent expressed in correspondence between cartel members) that supports the empirical results. The results are also found to be robust to misclassification of the dependent variable, which is a particular concern when dealing with historical data.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00679.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 51
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Tender Offers, Proxy Contests, and Large-Shareholder Activism (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The paper analyzes tender offers and proxy contests as alternative means of resolving corporate governance conflicts between dissidents and incumbent management. We show that when a dissident shareholder is sufficiently confident about the potential benefits from changing corporate policy, he will seek majority control by making a tender offer rather than initiating a proxy contest. When the dissident is relatively uninformed, however, he may opt for a proxy contest, thereby utilizing the information of other shareholders to implement the better policy. Consistent with empirical evidence, the model predicts that announcements of tender offers will tend to be associated with larger positive stockprice reactions than announcements of proxy contests. The model is easily extended to allow for promanagement bias in proxy voting by institutional investors. Empirical observations that have been viewed as evidence of such promanagement bias are shown to be quite consistent with the absence of such bias. Policy issues are discussed as well. An interesting result is that even policies targeted at reducing the costs of conducting proxy contests may have ambiguous social consequences, given the possibility of substitution between tender offers and proxy contests.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00787.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 52
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Regulation of Predatory Firms (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This article investigates the issue ofpredation by a regulated firm. Since it has private information, a regulated firm obtains higher rents in case of successful predation: the fewer the competitors, the higher the marginal social value of the regulated firm's effort and the higher the informational rents. Both principals (the investor of a “target” firm and the regulator) have to provide some incentives to prevent predation: the investor has to reduce the sensitivity of refinancing to predation; the regulator has to lower the gain of successful predation. It is shown that there is a trade-off between the power of the regulatory incentive scheme and the regulated firm's incentives to prey. In addition, as deterring predation is costly, the investor and the regulator compete when offering contracts: each wants to free-ride on the other. Hence, predation may occur in equilibrium although it makes both principals worse off.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00849.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 53
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Limited Liability and Bonus Contracts (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper studies the nature of incentive contracts between a risk-neutral principal and a risk-neutral agent under the constraint that the agent's liability is limited. A necessary and sufficient condition is derived for the existence of a first-best contract under this constraint, and a bonus-based contract is shown to be the most efficient contractual form. Implications of bonus contracts are also discussed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00899.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 54
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Interaction between a Most-Favored-Customer Clause and Price Dispersion: An Empirical Examination of the Medicaid Rebate Rules of 1990 (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper examines the effect of the MFC rules adopted by Medicaid on both price dispersion and price levels in the wholesale pharmaceutical market. Theory suggests that the regulations should reduce price dispersion and increase the average price for those products with a high initial level of price dispersion. Using data which can only measure some dimensions of price discrimination, I find that discrimination falls for products sold to hospitals, but not drugstores. Branded drugs facing generic competition have the most dispersion ex ante. Prices of these brands rise with dispersion at the implementation of the new rules. The last two results are consistent with Scott Morton (1997), where I look only at price changes due to the law. The results of this paper confirm that part of the mechanism of action for the price increase is the high level of price dispersion for some products combined with the MFC.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00151.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 55
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Division of Labor in Teams (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper examines the incentive effects of division of labor on worker effort, in the absence of the scale effects studied by Adam Smith. The game-theoretic model gives two results. (1) Suppose workers are identical and risk-neutral, and there is stochastic observation of group output by the firm offering compensations subject to some worker-participation constraint. Then the firm can arrive at the same first-best outcome with or without division of labor. However, if workers are risk-averse, division of labor can give the firm strictly greater profit. (2) A deepening division of labor magnifies this positive incentive effect; but if workers are heterogeneous, or if there are certain informational imperfections in the production process, this incentive advantage of division of labor could be impaired or even reversed. The first result may help explain the emergence of division of labor in the early stages of industrialization without relying on the Smithian advantages, which are also present in some labor deployment schemes without division of labor. The second result throws light on some recent anecdotal evidence of a shallowing division of labor in some areas of modern manufacturing. These factors affecting the efficiency of division of labor are then further discussed in the light of recent empirical findings on division of labor and team work, such as those in Katzenbach and Smith (1993).
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00403.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 56
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Capacity Commitment versus Flexibility (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We show how technological flexibility choices and equilibrium configurations (both simultaneous and sequential duopoly) depend on six industry characteristics. Low market volatility combined with intermediate market size favors inflexible technologies; large values of either volatility or size favor flexible technologies; low or intermediate values of both favor the coexistence of flexible and inflexible technologies. The possibility of a flexibility trap exists in industries of low volatility and intermediate size. Entry prevention can sometimes be achieved by inflexible technologies or flexible technologies, depending on the industry characteristics.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00347.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 57
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Nonlinear Supply Contracts, Exclusive Dealing, and Equilibrium Market Foreclosure (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We examine how the feasibility of both nonlinear pricing and exclusive dealing arrangements affect incentives for market foreclosure when two manufacturers contract with a retail monopolist. Surprisingly, we find that although market foreclosure equilibria exist, they are Pareto-dominated (from each manufacturer's perspective) by all nonforeclosure equilibria. If one believes that Pareto-dominated equilibria are unlikely to arise, then the difference between our results and those of Mathewson and Winter (1987), who do not allow for nonlinear pricing, suggests an ironic twist on the notion that quantity discounts and other kinds of nonlinear pricing can provide an additional way for a manufacturer to foreclose a rival. By providing a manufacturer with increased flexibility (beyond linear pricing) to extract a retailer's surplus, nonlinear pricing may instead have the effect of reducing the incidence of observed market foreclosure.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00755.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 58
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Option Contracts and Vertical Foreclosure (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: A model of vertical integration is studied. Upstream firms sell differentiated inputs; downstream firms bundle them to make final products. Downstream products are sold as option contracts, which allow consumers to choose from a set of commodities at predetermined prices. The model is illustrated by examples in telecommunication and health markets. Equilibria of the integration game must result in upstream input foreclosure and downstream monopolization. Consumers may or may not benefit from integration.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00725.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 59
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Regulation of Duopoly: Managed Competition vs Regulated Monopolies (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper discusses the regulation of oligopolistic differentiated-product industries. The regulator can control prices and impose quantity restrictions, but cannot control the quality choices of the firms. We inquire about the optimal choice of regulatory regime—whether and under what conditions managed competition or segmentation of the market between regulated monopolies achieves better results. In the spatial duopoly model analyzed here, unhindered competition generally results in an inefficient allocation. When the regulator knows the technologies, optimal managed competition results in distortions of the quality choice, but an optimal regulated-monopolies regime achieves the first best outcome. When the regulator is uncertain about the technologies, neither of these methods yields the first-best outcome. The regulated-monopolies regime still tends to produce better quality choices, but managed competition tends to be more effective at extracting rents from the firms. The overall comparison depends on some finer details of the environment.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00821.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 60
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Paying Customers to Switch (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper studies the business practice of offering discounts to new customers in markets with switching costs. In a two-period homogeneous-good duopoly model, it is shown that the equilibrium amount of discounts increases continuously in the expected switching costs of a typical consumer. In equilibrium, firms offer the same prices and discounts in a mature market even if they have different market shares, and the demands faced by these firms in a new market become more elastic. Firms are worse off engaging in the discriminatory pricing, while consumers need not necessarily benefit from it. There is costly equilibrium switching of consumers, which creates a dead-weight loss to the society.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00877.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 61
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Introduction (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00425.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 62
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper analyzes six spectrum auctions conducted by the Federal Communications Commission from July 1994 to May 1996. These auctions were simultaneous multiple-round auctions in which collections of licenses were auctioned simultaneously. This auction form proved remarkably successful. Similar items sold for similar prices, and bidders successfully formed efficient aggregations of licenses. Bidding behavior differed substantially in the auctions. The extent of bidder competition and price uncertainty played an important role in determining behavior. Bidding credits and installment payments also played a major role in several of the auctions.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00431.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 63
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We examine bid data from the first two broadband PCS spectrum auctions for evidence of value synergies. First, we estimate a benchmark regression for the determinants of final auction prices. Then, we include variables reflecting the extent to which bidders ultimately won or already owned the adjacent wireless properties. Consistent with geographic synergies in an ascending-bid auction, prices were higher when the highest losing bidder had adjacent licenses. The footprints of winning bidders suggest that they were often successful in realizing these synergies.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00497.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 64
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Making More from Less: Strategic Demand Reduction in the FCC Spectrum Auctions (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: When multiple items are sold through the use of simultaneous ascending-bid auctions, bidders can find it in their mutual interests to reduce their aggregate demand for the items while prices are still low relative to the bidders' valuations. The FCC's first broadband PCS auction provides examples of how such mutual reductions might be arranged even when the bidders are not allowed to communicate with one another outside of the auction arena.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00529.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 65
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Up in the Air: GTE's Experience in the MTA Auction for Personal Communication Services Licenses (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: In late 1994, GTE, one of the largest telecommunications firms in the world, entered an auction for the rights to provide personal communications services (PCS) using the electromagnetic spectrum. The administering agency, the Federal Communications Commission, adopted a novel multiple-round format for the PCS auction. The format presented GTE with a complex bidding problem. This article describes how the GTE bidding team answered the following question: Given its budget and valuations and the information available about rival bidders, how should GTE bid to achieve the best attainable outcome?
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00549.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 66
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Laboratory Experimental Testbeds: Application to the PCS Auction (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The paper reviews the uses of laboratory experimental economics methods in the background research and implementation of the Personal Communication Systems auctions held by the Federal Communications Commission. The applications began during the rule making process with the testing of broad rules that might be implemented. Data from experiments were systematically used. The methods were used again in the software development process where several important contributions were made. Finally, experiences gained from the study of experimental auction processes were used in the actual management of the first auctions and in interpreting auction performance.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00605.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 67
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Second-Price Auctions with Asymmetric Payoffs: An Experimental Investigation (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: A series of two-player, second-price common-value auctions are reported. In symmetric auctions, bidders suffer from a winner's curse. In asymmetric auctions in which one bidder has a private value advantage, the effect on bids and prices is proportional rather than explosive (the prediction of Nash equilibrium bidding theory). Although advantaged bidders are close to making best responses to disadvantaged bidders, the latter bid much more aggressively than in equilibrium, thereby earning negative average profits. Experienced bidders consistently bid closer to the Nash equilibrium than inexperienced bidders, although these adjustments towards equilibrium are small and at times uneven.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00573.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 68
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Experiments Testing Multiobject Allocation Mechanisms (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper reports the results of over 130 auctions conducted under controlled conditions to examine the robustness of several auction mechanisms to allocate multiple objects. The simultaneous discrete auction process used by the Federal Communications Commission to allocate Personal Communications licenses was contrasted with a sequential auction and a combinatorial auction over a variety of demand conditions. In test environments created to check only the minimum competency of the procedures, the simultaneous discrete auction process produces highly efficient allocations, approaching levels similar to those found with a continuous form of the auction, and it outperforms a sequential auction. However, in environments created to stress test the procedures, a combinatorial auction outperforms the simultaneous discrete auction.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00639.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 69
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Firm as a Multicontract Organization (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The firm is often considered as a nexus of contracts linking the management and its different stakeholders: claim-holders, workers, unions, customers, suppliers, and the state, among others. This paper surveys recent work in contract theory, the multiprincipal incentive theory, and the theory of side contracts, which provides some insights into the structure of those contracts and therefore into the structure of the firm. First, we discuss the incomplete contracting assumptions underlying these variations of the usual grand contract approach. Second, we explain how the theoretical lessons learned from this work—the distribution of contracting rights, the power of incentive schemes within organizations, and the design of communication channels—apply to the theory of the firm.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00201.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 70
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Introduction (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00001.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 71
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Dynamic Equilibrium in the Hospital Industry (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We present a dynamic model of the hospital industry in which nonprofit and for-profit hospitals coexist and compete and are differentiated by their objective functions, investment technologies, and taxation rates. In our model, patients differ by income and type of insurance coverage, and choose admission to their preferred hospital, while hospitals choose investment, entry, exit, and pricing strategies. We estimate the parameters of the model with aggregate data and a GMM procedure. We then use the model to examine the effects of changes in the Medicare reimbursement system, universal health-care coverage, and taxation of nonprofits.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00045.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 72
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Exclusionary Equilibria in Health-Care Markets (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We have demonstrated that when providers of health insurance are perceived to be differentiated by consumers, circumstances may arise under which they find it advantageous to restrict the set of health-care providers that they approve to their customers. Even if all health-care providers are equally qualified and efficient, payers may choose to contract with a selected subset of them in order to secure more favorable contract terms. Moreover, in a concentrated health-care market that consists of two health insurance companies (payers) and two health-care providers (hospitals), both payers may choose to contract with only one of the hospitals while excluding the other completely from the market. When consumers' valuation of an extended choice of providers is small in comparison with the extent of differentiation that exists between the payers, such an exclusionary outcome is the unique equilibrium of the game.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00005.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 73
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Generic Entry and the Pricing of Pharmaceuticals (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: During the 1980s the share of prescriptions sold by retail pharmacies that was accounted for by generic products roughly doubled. The price response to generic entry of brand-name products has been a source of controversy. In this paper we estimate models of price responses to generic entry in the market for brand-name and generic drugs. We study a sample of 32 drugs that lost patent protection during the early to mid-1980s. Our results provide evidence that brand-name prices increase after generic entry and are accompanied by large decreases in the price of generic drugs.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00075.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 74
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Competition among Health Maintenance Organizations (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We develop a model of competition among health maintenance organizations (HMOs) to analyze the effects of market power, scale economies, and asymmetric knowledge of health risk on market outcomes. We find that competition among HMOs may, but need not, ensure socially preferred outcomes. Market power or scale economies can sometimes admit socially preferred outcomes when they would otherwise not arise. Asymmetric knowledge of health risk may or may not be constraining. When it is constraining, a variety of patterns of incomplete health insurance can arise, along with excessive or insufficient treatment and preventive care for either high-risk or low-risk individuals.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00129.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 75
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Multiprincipal Agency Relationships as Implied by Product Market Competition (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper surveys recent work in contract theory that relates to the allocation of tasks among agents within an organization as well as to the effect of product market competition upon optimal contracting and agency costs.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00235.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 76
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Contract Complexity, Incentives, and the Value of Delegation (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: In settings where the revelation principle applies, delegation arrangements are frequently inferior to centralized decision making, and at best achieve the same level of performance. This paper studies the value of delegation when organizations are constrained by a bound on the number of contingencies in any contract. For a principal-agent setting with asymmetric information, we compare centralized mechanisms where the principal retains sole responsibility for contracting and coordinating production, with delegation mechanisms where one agent (a manager) is delegated authority to contract with other agents and coordinate production. Relative to centralization, delegation entails a control loss, but allows decisions to be more sensitive to the manager's private information. We identify circumstances under which the flexibility gain outweighs the control loss, so that delegation emerges superior to centralized contracting.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00257.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 77
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Integrated Strategy and International Trade Disputes: The Kodak-Fujifilm Case (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper examines the integration of market and nonmarket strategies in a setting involving market competition and international trade policy where governments serve as bargaining agents for firms. In the case modeled, the Eastman Kodak Company (Kodak) filed a Section 301 petition under US trade law against practices of Fuji Photo Film Company (Fujifilm) in the Japanese distribution system that Kodak alleges constitute trade barriers. The model has four components. The market model characterizes the competition between Fujifilm and Kodak, incorporating characteristics descriptive of the demand and market structure in Japan. Enforcement of an international trade agreement focusing on practices in a distribution system are problematic, so the second model characterizes the sustainability of concessions obtained through a trade agreement using a repeated game extension of the market model. The third model characterizes the bargaining between the US and Japanese governments using the preferences induced by the market model and the limits on sustainable concessions characterized in the second model. Using a common-agency framework, the fourth model represents the nonmarket competition between the two firms as they work to influence the bargaining positions of the governments. The result is a model in which market and nonmarket strategies are integrated in a formal theory of the resolution of trade disputes and the subsequent effects on market competition. The equilibrium characterized allows a comparative statics analysis of the synergies between market and nonmarket strategies.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00291.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 78
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Regulation of Predatory Firms (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This article investigates the issue of predation by a regulated firm. Since it has private information, a regulated firm obtains higher rents in case of successful predation: the fewer the competitors, the higher the marginal social value of the regulated firm's effort and the higher the informational rents. Both principals (the investor of a “target” firm and the regulator) have to provide some incentives to prevent predation: the investor has to reduce the sensitivity of refinancing to predation; the regulator has to lower the gain of successful predation. It is shown that there is a trade-off between the power of the regulatory incentive scheme and the regulated firm's incentives to prey. In addition, as deterring predation is costly, the investor and the regulator compete when offering contracts: each wants to free-ride on the other. Hence, predation may occur in equilibrium although it makes both principals worse off.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.jems0697_425.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
Close ⊗
This website uses cookies and the analysis tool Matomo. More information can be found here...