ALBERT

Notes: Debates about the form and nature of changes in the management of public systems have for some time now been articulated under the theme of governance. All definitions of governance are related to the problems of securing convergence among a diversity of actors and organizations, of redistributing power in an organizational or social field characterized by a high level of heterogeneity and of gaining sufficient legitimacy to act in the name of the collectivity. This paper concentrates on the dynamics involved in the emergence of new governing capabilities in public systems. More precisely we study the implementation of regionalization policies in the health care field (in this case of Canada) conceived as one major attempt to renew the governance structures in a large public system.Our study draws on the comparative analysis of empirical regulation in three health regions as contrasted with three ideal type models of governance in regionalized systems. The first model is inspired by an economic approach to organizational behaviour and focuses on mandate-giving, execution and control. The second model is based on a political interpretation of behaviours and focuses on negotiation processes between actors. Finally, the third model is based on the theory of deliberation as well as the institutional school of policy analysis and focuses on direct public participation in public affairs. Evidence for this article is primarily derived from interviews with key informants and documentary analysis.Our analysis shows that none of the three models is sufficient in itself to grant regional structures the authority and legitimacy they need to create added value in terms of regulation that could ensure their survival. Regional Boards are thus forced by environmental constraints to conceive and implement original mixes of these models. The two predominant logics in regional action are inspired by the first two models although the last one also has an influence. Overall, our study also suggests that the implementation of new sources of governing authorities in a public system is rather fragile because of dependence on existing institutions. Clearly, the attempt to modify the dynamics of governance in a given system must be conceived as a political exercise and not just as a technical problem consisting of the rational adjustment of policy instruments.

Notes: This paper uses an interpretative approach to analyse the relationship between ministers and officials. It argues that generally, the relationship between ministers and civil servants is harmonious. This can be explained by the fact that both sets of actors tend to draw from the same tradition, the Westminster model. The Westminster model can be understood as the building block from which both ministers and civil servants develop narratives that shape and condition their actions. In the case of ministers, the dominant narrative drawn from the Westminster model is what we refer to as that of ‘historical impact’. In the case of civil servants, their dominant narrative, again drawn from the Westminster model is conditioned by the need to provide an account that continually emphasizes how they have acted with ‘constitutional propriety’. Generally, these two contrasting narratives do not lead to conflict between ministers and civil servants. However, a serious breakdown in the relationship between ministers and civil servants can occur when either one or both sets of actors draw on a tradition other than the Westminster model, or when they appeal to a different narrative within the Westminster model which shapes their subsequent behaviour and actions.

Notes: The study of administrations and ministers and their relationships with UK Parliaments has tended to focus on the issues of accountability and responsibility, levels of legislative dissent or broad performance indicators supported by anecdotal examples. This paper addresses the lack of systematic analysis of executive/legislative relations in the policy-making process by examining the dominance of different administrations and ministers in the Scottish Parliament. Two questions are addressed. First, is there any variance in the legislative dominance of different administrations in the parliamentary arena? Second, do individual ministers make a difference to the degree of policy dominance? Controlling for both initial authorship and quality of amendments to Executive policy, we analyse the nature and extent of Executive dominance during the legislative process of the First Session of the Scottish Parliament. We find some evidence to suggest that Executive dominance varies both by administration and by individual minister.

Notes: The structure of the British state is growing increasingly complex. This trend raises a number of questions that focus on the forces stimulating this complexity and its implications both for society-state relationships and the design and implementation of public policy. This article focuses on one specific element or strand of these debates: the growth in the number and role of quasi-autonomous public bodies within Britain. It seeks to analyse and reflect upon the distinctive approach taken by the Labour government, since winning office in May 1997, in relation to the sphere of ‘distributed public governance’ in Britain. Moreover, the article seeks to locate this analysis within broader debates surrounding the future of the British state and the Labour government's approach to statecraft through a thematic framework based around: growth, co-ordination, accountability, depoliticization and power. The central argument of this article is that the Labour government has increased considerably the sphere of distributed public governance in Britain. This process has been largely devoid of an underpinning rationale and this may have significant implications for successful policy delivery, the public's trust in government and the future trajectory of the British state.

Notes: One of the most important claims advanced by comparative public management reform studies is that these reforms have been more successfully implemented in majoritarian than in consensus democracies. The claim is built on the premise that the institutional structure of a majoritarian democracy enables a parliamentary majority to implement policies unilaterally and in a desired way whereas the institutional structure of a consensus democracy forces parliamentary majorities to negotiate compromises. This claim, we argue, lacks sufficient empirical backing, is biased by studies focusing on the initiation of reforms, and needs serious rethinking in the light of recent empirical studies that downplay the salience of institutions as an explanatory factor for variations in policy reform. With The Netherlands and New Zealand as cases, this article first shows that far-reaching reforms can be implemented in consensus systems too; secondly, it develops a model that centres on the interplay between institutions and politicians’ reform styles and applies this to these countries.

Notes: This article seeks to highlight the conditions in which organizations with different levels of ‘publicness’ interact in the framework of policy-making. In France, decision making and implementation is shared among public, semi-public and private organizations. The specific responsibility and influence of public organizations within institutional collective action however is a source of ambiguity. It becomes therefore a matter of political authority for public organizations to invest in the structuring of public problems and policies. The case analysed here shows that the publicness of implemented policies is a construction which stakeholders may try to influence. Responses by public organizations show that publicness does not only relate to the plurality of organizational forms but also to the existence of a form of hierarchy within systems of governance themselves.

Notes: This article gives a broad overview of Norwegian research on public administration over the past 40 years. The main picture that emerges is that a Norwegian public administration built primarily on Webernian principles has lost some but not all these original properties. It describes a research tradition based on organizational theory and democratic theory. It also paints a picture of public administration as integrated into a complex network of domestic political institutions, public agencies, organized interests and clients, as well as extensive European and international networks. It shows how a strong theoretical tradition, based on bounded rationality, is supplemented by different types of institutional theories and increased theoretical pluralism. Finally, the paper underlines the importance of considering public administration not simply from an internal technical viewpoint, but of placing the discipline in a wider political and democratic context.

Notes: The aim of this article is to gain some understanding of the way the European Court of Auditors (ECA) assesses European Union (EU) member states’ performances in managing EU finances. To this end the ECA's annual reports for 1996–2001 have been analysed.We find that the information provided in the ECA annual reports is somewhat unsystematic, which is the result of the ECA's approach to auditing and its working methods. A review of the literature, as well as our own empirical analysis, allows us to conclude that the ECA does not in fact live up to its own mission of providing relevant, objective reports. Our analysis suggests, for instance, that there is some ambiguity within the ECA due to differences in audit traditions within the EU. Improvements could be made by reducing the number of ECA members to three or five, by (further) integrating the traditional ECA audit and the audit within the framework of the statement of assurance, and by further integrating internal and external budgetary control within the EU.

Notes: John Stewart, Modernising British Local Government: an Assessment of Labour's Reform ProgrammeChristopher Pollitt and Colin Talbot (eds), Unbundled Government: a Critical Analysis of the Global Trend to Agencies, Quangos and ContractualisationPaul Maltby, In the Public Interest? Assessing the Potential for Public Interest CompaniesChristopher Hood and B. Guy Peters with Grace O.M. Lee (eds), Reward for High Public Office. Asian and Pacific-Rim StatesStephen B. Johnson, The Secret of Apollo: Systems Management in American and European Space ProgrammesMichael Hill and Peter Hupe, Implementing Public Policy: Governance in Theory and PracticePeter John, Local Governance in Western EuropeRobert Agranoff and Michael McGuire, Collaborative Public Management: New Strategies for Local GovernmentsMartin Lodge, On Different Tracks: Designing Railway Regulation in Britain and GermanyAnthony B.L. Cheung and Ian Scott (eds), Governance and Public Sector Reform in Asia: Paradigm Shifts or Business as Usual?

Notes: This paper presents a review of three decades of implementation studies and is constructed in the form of a personal reflection. The paper begins with a reflection upon the context within which the book Policy and Action was written, a time when both governments and policy analysts were endeavouring to systematize and improve the public decision-making process and to place such decision-making within a more strategic framework. The review ends with a discussion about how public policy planning has changed in the light of public services reform strategies. It is suggested that as a result of such reforms, interest in the processes of implementation have perhaps been superseded by a focus upon change management and performance targets. It is further argued that this has resulted in the reassertion of normative, top-down processes of policy implementation. The paper raises points that are important ones and indeed are reflected throughout all four papers in the symposium issue. These are: (1) the very real analytical difficulties of understanding the role of bureaucratic discretion and motivation; (2) the problem of evaluating policy outcomes; and (3) the need to also focus upon micro political processes that occur in public services organizations. In conclusion, the paper emphasizes the continued importance of implementation studies and the need for policy analysts to understand what actually happens at policy recipient level.

Notes: This paper argues for the need to re-assess models of policy implementation in the ‘congested state’. This re-appraisal focuses on two main directions. The first involves locating implementation in the context of wider models of the policy process. We fuse three models, those of Kingdon, Wolman, and Challis et al., to form a new ‘policy streams’ approach. The second examines implementation in multi-level governance. In the UK and elsewhere, much of the focus of traditional implementation studies has been on the link between one central government department and a local agency. However, this vertical (central-local) dimension fails to give sufficient stress to the other horizontal dimensions of ‘central-central’ and ‘local-local’. Paraphrasing Kingdon's terms, implementation models also need to incorporate the ‘little windows’ at local level as well as the ‘big’ windows at national level. Using evidence relating to the implementation of UK policy towards health inequalities, this paper argues successful implementation is more likely when the three policy streams are linked across the three dimensions. The model is thought to be applicable to other areas of the public sectors and complex issues facing all governments.

Notes: Applying implementation theory to practice has been rare. Reasons include the difficulty of the theoretical challenge, the varied needs of practitioners and the complicating normative issues at stake. Nonetheless, several approaches can contribute to the efficacy of implementation action. Building on points of theoretical consensus is one strategy. A second is the systematic probing of points in theoretical dispute, to sketch out practical implications. A third is the development of a contingency perspective to determine which theoretical strands may be appropriate in a given case. Finally, tapping the emerging ideas built on a synthesis of partial perspectives is ultimately likely to be the most useful approach. New methodological tools can help select out valid high-performing instances for systematic inspection and possible emulation. And some of the synthetic perspectives now available are amenable to heuristic application; these include approaches based upon reversible logic, game-theoretic notions and contextual interaction theory.

Notes: Arguably, the government's aim of using the reward of ‘earned autonomy’ and Foundation Trust status as an incentive to improve performance in the NHS will only be effective if Trust managers view greater autonomy as both desirable and realistic. This article examines this issue by investigating the extent to which members of an NHS Trust's senior management team perceive themselves as autonomous, the factors most likely to hinder their ability to operate autonomously, and the extent to which managers want greater autonomy. In the event, autonomy was largely restricted by extensive centrally dictated targets. Entrenched professional interests and a lack of managerial skills on the part of clinician managers suggested limitations on the extent to which autonomy can be realistically devolved. Additionally, there was little belief among managers that greater autonomy would enable healthcare services to be delivered more effectively.

Notes: The contemporary literature on governance notes the difficulties that core executives, central points for steering and co-ordinating public activity, have in undertaking this strategic function. The UK core executive, particularly the Treasury, has developed a regime of Public Service Agreements (PSAs) as a novel and ambitious tool of governance, particularly for public services. The tool incorporates improved priority setting, information about performance, and incentive effects for ministers and officials through a system of performance targets. However, systems for setting priorities are fragmented and include those focused on the Prime Minister's Office and Cabinet Office. Monitoring has been improved, although measures often provide a limited, or sometimes even potentially misleading, impression of progress towards valued goals. The direct incentive effects of PSAs appear to be weak. While the link between the system and the allocation of expenditure has engaged the interest of departments in discussing priorities, ministerial and other officials’ responsibility for performance has been limited. Targets have increasingly been seen as by ministers as minimum pledges of performance rather than tools for stretching and improving performance. Various forms of blame avoidance and blame shifting have occurred and the credibility of the PSA system is in danger of being undermined by frequent changes to targets and misrepresentation of performance in some areas.

Notes: This paper explores the dynamics for changes to the machinery of government and public administration in the Bailiwicks of Jersey and Guernsey. Although constitutionally Crown possessions and under the jurisdiction of the UK, both territories are self-governing and are neither part of the UK nor the EU. Their importance as major offshore tax havens means that questions should be asked about their ability to effectively police the money that is invested through them, an issue that has acquired increased significance in the wake of recent terrorist events. Questions of financial probity inevitably lead to questions about governance and governmental efficiency and effectiveness. This paper explores the Bailiwicks’ reactions to this within the theoretical context of the differentiated polity and the modernizing government and new public management agenda. The paper suggests the unique and entrenched political culture of the Bailiwicks is resistant to change but will embrace it if that change ensures the continuance of their autonomy, within the context of being Crown possessions.

Notes: The resignations in 2002 of Stephen Byers and Estelle Morris (UK Secretaries of State for Transport and Education respectively) suggest the need to review the constitutional and political aspects of resignation. In both cases, ministers recognized that they had failed in the oversight or supervision of their departments and thus in the fulfilment of their ministerial role. Their resignations therefore provide evidence of a move away from ‘causal responsibility’, with its complication of the policy/operations and accountability/responsibility distinctions, towards ‘role responsibility’. In so doing, they raise the possibility that what are commonly understood as ‘departmental fault’ resignations may be more appropriately subsumed within an expanded category of personal fault. The resignations also challenge Finer's thesis on the conditions that need to be meet for a resignation to be forthcoming. In neither instance was the political party out for blood or the prime minister unbending. In both cases the press was relentless, suggesting that the media has become a prime actor in determining resignation, and the minister yielding, a recognition, perhaps, of constitutional principle over political pragmatism.

Notes: Rational choice is intimately associated with positivism and naturalism, its appeal to scholars of public administration lying in its ability to offer a predictive science of politics that is parsimonious in its analytical assumptions, rigorous in its deductive reasoning and overarching in its apparent applicability. In this paper I re-examine the ontology and epistemology which underpins this distinctive approach to public administration, challenging the necessity of the generally unquestioned association between rational choice and both positivism and naturalism. Rational choice, I contend, can only defend its claim to offer a predictive science of politics on the basis of an ingenious, paradoxical, and seldom acknowledged structuralism and a series of analytical assumptions incapable of capturing the complexity and contingency of political systems. I argue that analytical parsimony, though itself a condition of naturalism, is in fact incompatible with the deduction of genuinely explanatory/causal inferences. This suggests that the status of rational choice as an explanatory/predictive theory needs to be reassessed. Yet this is no reason to reject rational choice out of hand. For, deployed not as a theory in its own right, but as a heuristic analytical strategy for exploring hypothetical scenarios, it is a potent and powerful resource in post-positivist public administration.

Notes: Although there is a growing body of evidence demonstrating positive effects of ‘high commitment’ HRM practices on organizational performance, there is less evidence evaluating their effects on individual workers, especially within the public sector. Therefore the implications of applying ‘high commitment’ practices in the public sector needs to be considered. This paper seeks to address this gap by reporting the results of a staff survey and follow-up interviews conducted on a cross-section of  local government employees. The results showed that eight of the ten ‘high commitment’ practices had significant effects on worker attitudes. The results are discussed in light of HRM theory together with the implications for public sector managers.

Notes: The need for inter-agency collaboration between managers of mental health services has long been recognized, as has the difficulty of achieving and maintaining such relationships. Hudson et al. (1999) have developed a model for collaboration in the public sector and the current research has tested the model against attempts to achieve and maintain inter-agency collaboration between mental health managers in Wales. We find Hudson's model a useful analytical framework but our evidence suggests that it needs to be amended by giving greater emphasis to the importance of ‘uninterrupted . . . opportunities for interaction’ between key managers. Forthcoming changes to NHS structures in Wales (for example, the abolition of Health Authorities and the conversion of Local Health Groups into Local Health Boards) will not necessarily facilitate collaboration if the Local Health Boards are given the role of planning and commissioning mental health services without having the necessary ‘critical mass’ of knowledge, expertise and dedicated staff capacity for planning and commissioning mental health services.

Notes: The history of Danish political science is young, and public administration has from the beginning been part of the training of political scientists. This background reflects a double strategy: first, in order to ensure political scientists a position in the labour market, they were launched as a new kind of generalist, competing with lawyers and economists. Second, public administration has from the very beginning been seen as a subfield of political science. Even if the institutions engaging in PA research and training have varying profiles, the integration of the discipline in political science is still dominant. So far it has been a success, whether measured at the level of political science graduates in the civil service or the level of PA research. However, the paper argues that in a tougher labour market, generalists with a broad political science background face severe competition from lawyers and economists, and that this must have implications for the direction of research and training in public administration.

Notes: Political and administrative analysis is today said to be taking a narrative turn: to learning by telling and listening to the different stories that constitute political life. However, this new approach to studying the decentring of politics and policy as multiple discursive practices carries a new grand narrative too. A new connection between political authority and political community is taking shape outside the spheres of modern government and representative democracy. Political authority is becoming increasingly both communicative and interactive in order for it to be able to meet complexity with complexity. It is employed for reforming institutions by opening them towards the culture and by tying them to the political attributes and capacities of self-reflexive individuals and to the transformation and self-transformation of their conduct. I call this development culture governance. Culture governance is about how political authority must increasingly operate through capacities for self-and co-governance and therefore needs to act upon, reform, and utilize individual and collective conduct so that it might be amenable to its rule (Bang 2003; Dean 2003). Culture governance represents a new kind of top-down steering; it is neither hierarchical nor bureaucratic but empowering and self-disciplining. It manifests itself as various forms of joined-up government and network governance and proclaims itself to be genuinely democratic and dialogical. This I shall show by a study of local Danish politics and policy in Copenhagen. Culture governance, I shall argue, constitutes a formidable challenge and threat to democracy, in attempting to colonize the whole field of public reason, everyday political engagement, democratic deliberation, and so on, by its own systems logic of success, effectiveness or influence. It seeks to take charge of the working of the more spontaneous, less programmed and more lowly organized politics of the ordinary in political communities, thus undermining the very idea of a non-strategic public reasoning as founding the practices of freedoms.

Notes: Greater use of qualitative research methods – including observing boards in real time and interviewing directors – needs to occur to advance the field. Quantitative researchers are, it would seem, measuring variables in respect of “structural independence,” rather than board and individual director effectiveness, per se. Once “board effectiveness” and “director effectiveness” variables are able to be measured, together with their interaction, a greater likelihood of distilling a more definitive relationship between corporate governance and corporate financial performance may occur.

Notes: Using evidence from a survey of women directors in FTSE 100 companies, this paper considers possible explanations for the persistent homogeneity of top UK boards. Only 61 per cent of the top 100 companies had female directors in 2002, down from 64 per cent in 1999. Women held only 3 per cent of executive (= US inside) directorships, and there were only 15 women executive directors in total. Explanations usually include women's lack of ambition, lack of experience and lack of commitment. These have been disproved by research, but underlying theories of social exclusion may provide insight into this persistent phenomenon.

Notes: This paper is an attempt to identify what constitutes a good board of directors, and this is based on a comparison between academic literature, corporate governance rating systems and our field research into board practices. We observed that “traditional” academic research focused on a limited number of quantifiable board characteristics, while practitioners attach greater importance to “soft” elements, which are nearly absent in the literature and in the governance ratings. These findings highlight the need for a better understanding of all elements that determine board effectiveness. Furthermore, our results identify three areas of improvement for boards of directors.

Notes: Pressure on boards to improve corporate performance and management oversight has led to a series of inquiries and reports advocating governance reform. These reports largely reflect an agency perspective of governance and seek to ensure greater board independence from and control of management.While board independence is important to good governance, we contend that frameworks, models and advice centred on one element of governance ignore the complexity of how boards work. We develop a holistic board framework based upon the concept of board intellectual capital to address this concern.Our framework proposes a series of inputs (e.g. company history, company constitution, legal environment) that lead to a particular mix of board intellectual capital. We contend that the balance of the different elements of board intellectual capital will lead to a series of board behaviours. Further, the board needs to mobilise its intellectual capital to carry out a series of roles. The exact nature of these roles will depend on the company's requirements. Thus, the governance outputs of organisational performance, board effectiveness and director effectiveness will depend on the match between the board's intellectual capital and the roles required of it.We conclude by demonstrating the benefits of this framework as a diagnostic tool. We outline how boards wishing to improve their governance systems can diagnose common governance problems by evaluating their own board's capabilities in relation to the different components of the framework.

Notes: The establishment of board sub-committees has been strongly recommended as a suitable mechanism for improving corporate governance, by delegating specific tasks from the main board to a smaller group and harnessing the contribution of non-executive directors. In the UK, the Cadbury committee proposals focused on audit committees and the Greenbury study group advocated remuneration committees. Over the last decade, most large public com-panies have set up such committees, but their impact on governance standards has not been widely explored. This paper identifies significant differences in the orientation and operation of these committees. It also draws on interview data collected from participants in audit and remuneration committees to argue that these differences may lead to unacknowledged pressures on non-executive directors who form the membership of both committees. Given the current focus on the role of non-executive directors, the impact of such pressure is of particu-lar importance.

Notes: The role of the board of directors in firm strategy has long been the subject of debate. However, research efforts have suffered from several deficiencies: the lack of an overarching theoretical perspective, reliance on proxies for the strategy role rather than a direct measure of it and the lack of quantitative data linking this role to firm financial performance. We propose a new theoretical perspective to explain the board's role in strategy, integrating organisational control and agency theories. We categorise a board's approach to strategy according to two constructs: strategic control and financial control. The extent to which either construct is favoured depends on contextual factors such as board power, environmental uncertainty and information asymmetry.

Notes: This paper sets out the results of interview-based research to determine why companies use performance-related pay. The findings indicate that many companies adopt this structure despite a belief that the money does not motivate executives. Reasons related in part to best practice in human resource management: pay structures were designed to attract and retain executives with the potential of large earnings; to focus their efforts in the direction agreed by the board; and to demonstrate fairness. Importantly, the variable pay was seen as a symbol of the director's success, both internally and to his or her peers in other companies. Finally, and significantly, an institutional theory explanation was given: companies used performance-related pay because their peers did, and because that legitimised them in the eyes of the establishment.

Notes: The paper outlines the problems of conflicts of interest for fiduciary shareholders with respect to the stock of publicly owned companies in their portfolios and considers various approaches proposed to address these problems. The questions of whether fiduciary problems are the result of a vacuum of ownership and an imbalance of power, and the extent to which regulatory reform and shareholder activism can resolve these problems, are examined. From this analysis a framework is developed that describes the sources, outcomes and factors contributing to the effectiveness of conflict management in the context of the current investment environment. A series of recommendations for mediating conflicts of interest by changing board architectures are presented. These recommendations apply principles of participative corporate democracy to the overall governance system.

Notes: Books reviewed:Don Young and Pat Scott, HAVING THEIR CAKE . . . How the City and Big Bosses are Consuming UK Business, London: Kogan Page, 2004, ISBN 0-7494-3861-4Luis Corriea Da Silva, Marc Goergen and Luc Renneboog, Dividend Policy and Corporate Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, ISBN 0-19-925930-5Colin Coulson-Thomas, The Knowledge Entrepreneur, London: Kogan Page, 2003, ISBN 0-7494-3946-7Surendra Munshi and Biju Paul Abraham, eds, Good Governance, Democratic Societies and Globalisation, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2004, ISBN 0-7619-9848-9

Notes: In this paper we review the growth of socially responsible investment (SRI) in the UK and in Japan. We consider the various factors which have given rise to the growth of SRI in both countries. As SRI is currently more mature in the UK than in Japan, we consider ways in which the UK experience may provide some lessons for the growth of SRI in Japan. Significantly, we consider that the use of corporate governance mechanisms such as engagement and dialogue by large shareholders, to solve social, ethical and environmental (SEE) problems in companies, is a realistic route for the development of SRI in Japan. However, these mechanisms need to be designed so that they may operate more efficiently. Pension funds and other investment institutions need to appreciate the value of engagement over screening as an SRI stra-tegy. Further, the disclosure of SRI strategies by pension funds in Japan may contribute to enhancing consciousness about the responsibility of shareholders for the SEE outcomes of corporate activities that they invest in indirectly. We acknowledge, however, that this suggestion may be difficult to implement in the near future.

Notes: The current debate and theorising on corporate governance has been polarised between a shareholder perspective and a stakeholder perspective. While advocates and supporters of each camp attempt to justify the superiority, rationality and universality of each model in theory, they rarely pay attention to the age-old conceptions, assumptions and presuppositions underpinning their perspectives which are less credible and valid in matching the continually changing practice of corporate governance. This paper serves as a survey and critical review of major current theories on corporate governance. In so doing, it reveals the inadequacy of conventional approaches employed in corporate governance theorising. It calls for a new mode of thinking in analysing corporate governance and concludes by outlining a new direction of research in this field.

Notes: Board composition data and evaluations about how listed-company boards actually performed in 1997 were related to the performance of their companies over the ensuing three years. Statistical analyses were conducted on the relationships between Board Composition, Practice and Potential in 1997 and subsequent Company Performance, based on measures of Cash Flow Return on Total Assets (CFROTA) and Sales Turnover. Hypotheses were formulated in relation to three theories of the board and to various principles of the Combined Code and recommendations of the Higgs Review. Most were not supported and the results generally provide scant support for the main theories of the board. Board practice on the tasks was generally not linked to company performance, whereas board potential was significantly related on six of the 16 tasks of the board. Possible explanations for these findings are discussed.

Notes: This study suggests that firms in highly competitive industries should have fewer outside board members, whereas companies operating in less competitive industries should have more outside directors. Specifically, we argue that board independence is less relevant or even redundant in highly competitive industries, where the firm is already “monitored” by a competitive product market. Using publicly traded Swedish firms for empirical testing, this study finds that board independence reduces firm performance in industries with highly competitive product markets. On the other hand, board independence enhances firm performance among companies facing less competitive product markets.

Notes: Several supervisory authorities and governmental working groups issued corporate governance best practice codes for listed companies during the nineties. In this paper, we used a unique database that allowed us to analyse the relationship between the level of compliance of the code of best practice issued by the Portuguese Securities Market Commission and the returns of the concerned companies. By using a multifactor model, one can conclude that there is a positive relationship between the compliance of some of these recommendations and the returns that were determined. The recommendations on the structure and functioning of the executive board deserve a special attention. However, globally, CMVM's code of best practice doesn't have a systematic effect on firm returns.

Notes: Developing an effective corporate governance system is key to Russia's future. Russia is now at a crossroads as it decides to either continue pursuing the Anglo-American form of governance with its emphasis on external market controls, or turn to a more Western European model with its emphasis on internal controls, or some combination of the two. To make these challenges more tangible and bring them into sharper focus, we discuss some of the governance challenges facing four bellwether Russian firms – Gazprom, Sberbank, Wimm-Bill-Dann and Mobile TeleSystems. We conclude with a discussion of the key institutional forces that will heavily influence the path taken by Russia in the future, along with predictions for the future.

Notes: The paper adds to our knowledge of what non-executive directors do, knowledge which is still in its infancy. More specifically, it reports the findings of a survey among more than 250 Dutch non-executive directors regarding their roles and limitations. Although the majority agreed that monitoring is their main duty, they also expressed doubts whether they are really able to carry out this “watchdog role” effectively. The primary limitation is sought in the asymmetry of information which gives rise to the so-called “independence paradox”: in obtaining adequate information non-executives are dependent on the executives they are expected to supervise and to be independent from.

Notes: This paper examines the issue of independence of boards of directors and non-executive directors of companies listed on the Irish Stock Exchange. Based on information published in annual reports, the study found that most Irish listed companies were complying with the Combined Code's recommendations for a balanced board structure, albeit with only 60 per cent having majority-independent boards. The study found a lack of consistency in interpreting the definition of “independence”, a lack of disclosure of information and, by applying criteria generally regarded as prerequisite to independence of non-executive directors, certain situations which imposed upon their independence.

Notes: This study examines the qualifications of women and men corporate inside directors of Fortune 1000 firms. Our results indicate that women insiders differ significantly from a random set of men insiders on several characteristics relevant to their dual positions as directors and officers of the corporation. While they do not differ on the experience-based qualifications of board tenure or corporate tenure, women insiders hold fewer directorships of other corporations, hold less powerful corporate titles, occupy disproportionately more staff functions, are less likely to be top earners of the corporation, and earn considerably less than men inside directors. Implications are drawn for women executives’ under utilisation in the executive suite and corporate governance.

Notes: The Annual General Meeting (AGM) is a mechanism of governance used in both public and private sectors of the economy, but the AGM has rarely been the focus of research studies. This paper reports an investigation of attendance and procedures at the AGMs of National Health Service (NHS) Trusts. Analysis of the results is informed through the concept of regulatory space. Attendance at trust AGMs is low with, on average, more employees than external stakeholders at the meeting. The absence of any decision-making authority at trust AGMs is explained by the existence of other mechanisms of governance and control in trusts’ regulatory space. The creation of Foundation Trusts, which are intended to have increased local autonomy, will provide new opportunities to examine the role of the AGM as a mechanism of governance in the publicly funded health sector.

Notes: Corporate governance as a coherent notion and independent topic of academic and practitioner interest has developed rapidly in the last ten years. In particular, most countries have seen the publication of vast numbers of regulatory reports outlining best practice in handling the issues that arise from the increased prominence of the governance concept. Although a vast literature exists on the implications of an Initial Public Offering (IPO) for financial performance and ownership structure, few investigations have communicated directly with issuing firms and analysed the practical difficulties encountered on a day-to-day basis when a company decides to float. In particular, very few studies have sought to examine what corporate governance changes, if any, are made in the process. This note reports the findings of a questionnaire survey and a series of interviews with practitioners about the changes that are made before and after a sample of IPOs in the UK.

Notes: Interest in the causes of the conversion of building societies from a mutual to a proprietary form of ownership has grown in recent years. In this study, one of a number of possible explanations underlying the conversion of building societies is examined; namely, the potential for directors to enhance their remuneration once plc status has been achieved. Empirical tests indicate that the large increases in remuneration for converted building society boards and chief executives are not justified in terms of company performance and may, indeed, have been a factor driving the conversion of building societies.

Notes: This paper discusses the corporate governance of banking institutions in developing economies. This is an important issue given the essential role that banks play in the financial systems of developing economies and the widespread banking reforms that these economies have implemented. Based on a theoretical discussion of the corporate governance of banks, we suggest that banking reforms can only be fully implemented once a prudential regulatory system is in place. An integral part of banking reforms in developing economies is the privatisation of banks. We suggest that corporate governance reforms may be a prerequisite for the successful divestiture of government ownership. Furthermore, we also suggest that the increased competition resulting from the entrance of foreign banks may improve the corporate governance of developing-economy banks.

Notes: Books reviewed in this article:Andrew Chambers, Tolley's Corporate Governance Handbook, 2nd editionJohn Kidd and Frank-Jurgen Richter (eds.), Trust and Antitrust in Asian Business AlliancesRobert A. G. Monks and Nell Minow, Corporate Governance, 3rd editionJohn Smithson, The Role of the Non-Executive Director in the Small to Medium-Sized Business

Notes: Prior empirical evidence supports the wealth expropriation hypothesis that weak corporate governance induced by certain types of ownership structures and board composition tends to result in minority interest expropriation. This in turn reduces corporate value. However, it is still unclear whether corporate financial distress is related to these corporate governance characteristics. To answer this question, we adopt three variables to proxy for corporate governance risk, namely, the percentage of directors occupied by the controlling shareholder, the percentage the controlling shareholders shareholding pledged for bank loans (pledge ratio), and the deviation in control away from the cash flow rights. Binary logistic regressions are then fitted to generate dichotomous prediction models. Taiwanese listed firms, characterised by a high degree of ownership concentration, similar to that in most countries, are used as our empirical samples. The evidence suggests that the three variables mentioned above are positively related to the risk for financial distress in the following year. Generally speaking, firms with weak corporate governance are vulnerable to economic downturns and the probability of falling into financial distress increases.

Notes: This paper indicates that there is an inverse relationship between collateralised shares and firm performance. We further show that this inverse relationship exists only in conglomerate firms. These findings imply that agency problems resulting from shares used as collateral by boards of directors are more serious in conglomerate firms than in non-conglomerate firms. Moreover, we provide evidence that monitoring by institutional investors, creditors and dividend policy can effectively reduce the agency problems of shares used as collateral and thus can improve firm performance.

Notes: This paper argues that the Enron affair has been misunderstood as a failure of monitoring, with adverse consequences for the drafting of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Higgs report. Where Enron's board failed was in misunderstanding the risks which were inherent in the company's business plan and failing to implement an effective system of internal control. Enron demonstrates the limits of the monitoring board and points the way to a stewardship model in which the board takes responsibility for ensuring the sustainability of the company's assets over time.

Notes: Governance has become a topic of unprecedented emotional significance and fundamental importance in the boardrooms of companies, partly as a result of a confluence of early 21st century corporate scandals, stock market falls and public rage about senior executive remuneration. A simple adherence to formal systems of corporate governance, in terms of structures, rules, procedures and codes of practice, whilst a starting point, will not alone win back confidence in markets and corporations. Consideration needs to be given to how to release entrepreneurial self interest within a moral context. This focuses attention on the role of other major social institutions which may more naturally be able to nurture a moral framework as well as the role of individual citizens and the responsibility of all of us to enact a moral framework for business activities. There is no escape from individual moral responsibility, and our part in creating and sustaining social institutions beyond corporations.

Notes: The governance of companies, other than very small ones, operates through a double agency relationship. The first agency relationship is that between owners or stakeholders, on the one hand, and corporate management, on the other. The second agency relationship is that between corporate management and the employees of a firm, including middle managers, who execute its plans and policies. This second relationship has been largely ignored in discussions of corporate governance, yet its effectiveness is essential for achieving a firm's objectives. If employees have limited trust in their companies, the ability of corporate managers to have their intentions executed will be impaired. There is considerable evidence that such trust is today at a low ebb. This paper suggests policies that may help to repair employee trust and in so doing strengthen corporate governance. Its underlying theme is that greater attention to the trust that employees have in managers would help to achieve a long overdue realignment of corporate governance theory and policy.

Notes: Issues in corporate governance develop according to an identifiable process. Using the influence model of Jones and Pollitt (2002, Understanding How Issues in Business Ethics Develop. Basingstoke: Palgrave), we compare the conduct of and influences on the investigations leading to the Higgs Review (2003) and the Cadbury Report (1992). We suggest that, while there are similarities in the investigations, there are important differences arising from the review process adopted, the role of the government, the background of the leaders of the investigations and the influence of academics. These differences have important implications for the effectiveness of the implementation of the conclusions of the Higgs Review.

Notes: This paper reflects on the duties of the board of directors, in the light of transatlantic differences in practice, the instructive case history of Marconi, the interventions of Sarbanes-Oxley, and the proposals of the Higgs Review of non-executive directors. It is argued that ensuring a balance between good corporate governance and effective strategy is essential for sustained business results.

Notes: Corporate governance crisis and reform is essentially cyclical. Waves of corporate governance reform and increased regulation occur during periods of recession, corporate collapse and re-examination of the viability of regulatory systems. During long periods of expansion, active interest in the conformance aspects of governance diminishes, as companies and shareholders become again more concerned with the generation of wealth, rather than in ensuring governance mechanisms are working appropriately for the retention of wealth, and its use for agreed purposes. This cyclical historical saga revolves around the enduring agency and stewardship dilemmas of governance. Complacency concerning corporate governance during confident times compounds ensuing crises. Such dilemmas are universal in market systems, though internationally with different systems of corporate governance the unwinding of this saga has occurred at different times, for different reasons, and with different consequences. Corporate governance is about wealth generation and risk management, and these duties require continuous and simultaneous performance. Avoiding mandatory restrictive over-regulation requires active market regulation, particularly at times of expansion. The drive to make corporate governance both improve corporate performance and enhance corporate accountability will continue.

Notes: The authors draw on wide professional experience to address the recent failures in corporate conduct in the United States, the emerging corrective measures and the increasing public outcry for ethical accountability in organisations and governments. They conclude that it is essential that ethics are integral to the culture of an organization; a superficial grafting on of an ethical code will not effect organizational change or encourage public trust.

Notes: This paper examines how and why corporate governance has come to be of particular interest to investors, locating the discussion in an international context, yet focusing also on the issues raised for the UK, particularly in the light of the Higgs report. It argues that observation and monitoring of corporate governance, with a concern to see well-governed companies, could prove a wise strategy for investors.

Notes: Emerging markets present strong corporate governance challenges for the branded multinational which, in view of the greater public trust and scrutiny it receives, has a responsibility to provide its international managers with the necessary tools to maintain its governance standards, even in regions where such standards might be lacking.

Notes: In this age of transnational capitalism most victims of corporate malpractice have no means to hold the wrongdoers to account – especially those whose lives are blighted day-in, day-out by the “normal” operations of companies within the letter of the law. This paper argues that corporate social and environmental abuses are rooted in a lack of accountability of corporations to their stakeholders. It explores how governance mechanisms such as corporate engagement by “socially responsible” investors could enhance stakeholder accountability. It identifies and contrasts two paradigms in socially responsible investment engagement, and relates them to voluntary and regulatory responses to corporate abuses. It concludes that the development of standards for stakeholder-oriented engagement and governance could help stimulate effective regulatory measures to protect stakeholder interests.

Notes: Over the past few years multinational corporations have been coming increasingly under attack from a number of forces, including non governmental organisations, “political shoppers” and grass root activists. While these civil or market based forms of regulation have had some effect in moderating corporate behaviour, this paper argues that the effect is necessarily limited. What is proving to be more effective is instead the threat of litigation. Yet despite the evidence, the trend amongst government policy makers has been to encourage corporations to voluntarily self regulate. This paper warns that policy makers pursue this end at the peril not only of external stakeholders, but also of multinational corporations, and lays out steps that governments could take both to improve civil and market regulation, and also to strengthen the law. This paper will argue that such a course of action is in our collective interest.

Notes: We discuss the nature and role of (corporate) governance and (shareholder) value and their implications for (sustainable) economic performance. We critique and build on extant theory to develop a model of the determinants of value-wealth creation at the firm, national and global levels and explore current economic debates on governance and sustainable economic performance in its context. We conclude that (the need for) stakeholder value is derivative from (not opposed to) the concept of sustainable value, that national governance and the nationwide “governance-mix” impact on corporate governance and that national and global economic governance are essential for sustainable global value-wealth creation, and economic performance.

Notes: Books reviewed:Paul W. MacAvoy and Ira M. Millstein, The Recurrent Crisis in Corporate Governance, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave 2003 Macmillan, ISBN 1-4039-1666-7Christine A. Mallin, Corporate Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, ISBN 0-19-926131-8Ian Fraser and William Henry, The Future of Corporate Governance: insights from the UK, Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland, 2003

Notes: Recent empirical research confirms that companies with demanding governance standards achieve higher market valuations. Due to the complexity of specific corporate governance matters, there is a rising need for a systematic and quantitative evaluation approach for corporate governance. In Germany, a Corporate Governance Scorecard has been developed that fulfils the key goals defined by analysts and investors. It has a standardised format, can be applied efficiently, is available at no cost and enables self-assessments by companies as well as sector-specific comparisons. The German Scorecard has not only found good reception at the national financial community, but has also been adapted around the world, especially in emerging countries.

Notes: The paper presents an attempt to quantify the compliance of Greek companies with international best practices. Based on 37 indicators (composed out of 54 questions) it was found that Greek companies demonstrate a fairly satisfactory degree of compliance with OECD guidelines. Their weak points lie in: the role of stakeholders and corporate social responsibility; the organisation of CG; the effective role of the independent members of the board (which may be attributed to the small size of the pool of potential independent board members); disclosure of remuneration; and risk management. Methodologically, the merit of the exercise lies in its approach towards the creation of “collectively subjective” weightings, an effort to discuss the benefits of separating the rating of the market from the rating of companies and the discussion on typologies of work that can be effectively performed through rating exercises.

Notes: This paper analyses the market reaction to announcements made by Spanish firms of compliance with the code of best practice. It also attempts to determine how the characteristics of different firms may account for the excess returns observed. The results suggest that the market reacts positively to announcements of compliance with the code of best practice that imply a major restructuring of the board of directors, whereas no wealth effects are observed for announcements that relate to isolated recommendations in the code. These wealth effects are greater for lower levered firms, and also greater the higher the percentage of executive directors.

Notes: This paper examines the links between accounting quality, proxied by earnings timeliness and conservatism, and the composition of the board of directors. Results indicate that firms with a higher proportion of outside board members are more likely to recognise bad news in earnings on a timely basis. However, firms whose boards comprise a relatively high proportion of outsiders do not display greater reporting conservatism with regard to the recognition of good news. These findings suggest that board composition is an important factor in determining the quality of UK firms’ reported earnings with respect to incorporating bad news on a timely basis.

Notes: This paper discusses the role of the board of statutory auditors as a monitoring device within the prevailing Italian corporate governance system, characterised by the presence of a strong blockholder. We describe the structure and functioning of the board of statutory auditors in the listed companies in terms of size, composition, method of appointment, powers, and duties after the changes due to the Draghi reform and the Preda Code of conduct.

Notes: This empirical paper investigates the relationship between the corporate governance structure of the firm and the probability of voluntary accounting changes in the Netherlands during the period 1990–1998. The paper reports the results of a sample of 194 voluntary accounting changes. The empirical results show that the presence of large outside shareholders significantly decreases the probability of voluntary accounting changes that have a positive effect on reported net income. This result supports the monitoring hypothesis, which indicates that large outside shareholders will monitor voluntary accounting changes more effectively than small shareholders, and will restrict the opportunistic behaviour of managers bent on increasing reported net income. We find that management shareholdings decrease the probability of voluntary accounting changes. These findings are consistent with the alignment hypothesis, which suggests that managers who hold a stake in the firm will be more aligned with outside shareholders. Agency problems may be reduced through management shareholdings. We find no support for the monitoring role of outside members of the supervisory board. Finally, our results show that firm size affects the probability of negative accounting changes, which may support the political cost hypothesis.

Notes: This paper examines the development of the regulation of corporate governance in the UK. It seeks to identify why the boundaries of law and self-regulation exist and whether the regulation of corporate governance should now be viewed as a process of collibration rather than a “homeostatic” process of setting unattainable standards. This paper suggests that regulatory developments in the area of corporate governance have taken a substantial new direction; that the boundaries of regulation are no longer determined by the choice between market-based or state-based regulation, but determined by a process of collibration.

Notes: Given current debates on the future direction of bank regulatory design, the objective of this paper is to raise awareness of a new and potentially significant tool in the corporate governance of banks. Public policy proposals to improve the nature of bank regulation through private-sector solutions and, in particular, mandatory subordinated debt market discipline provide such an opportunity. This paper argues that apart from creating an additional class of bank stakeholder whose interests align with the risk-reduction objectives of the regulatory authorities, a suitable mandatory subordinated debt policy (MSDP) could also provide a new and meaningful voice in the corporate governance of banks.

Notes: Book Reviews Mark J Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance. Political Context, Corporate Impact, Oxford University Press, 2002. Ian Jones and Michael Pollitt eds, Understanding How Issues in Business Ethics Develop, Macmillan, 2002.

Notes: This paper explores current debates and trends in regulation and examines their relevance to the evolution of UK corporate governance codes of practice. In particular, the paper explores frameworks drawn from the regulation of financial services, accounting and audit, and discusses whether there are lessons to be learnt from them for the regulation of UK corporate governance. Because of trends in regulation, and in the light of empirical evidence and recent events, especially post-Enron, an appropriate structure for the regulation of UK corporate governance might be based on that of financial services.

Notes: This paper considers the impact of contemporary trends towards participative risk regulation on policy processes and outcomes. Using the example of reform of the UK food safety regime, the paper examines whether participative reforms are able to deliver their promised benefits and if not, why not. Empirically, the paper examines how in 2002 the UK's Food Standards Agency used a stakeholder decision-making process to manage the potential risks from BSE in sheep. The paper finds that the potential benefits of the stakeholder process were mitigated by a number of institutional factors, including: interpretative flexibility in representing consumer interests and the concept of precaution; restricted openness and exclusion of key stakeholders; and the supra-national regulatory context. The paper concludes that broadening participation per se does not necessarily produce more democratic or robust policy outcomes than closed processes, although it may have some limited value in improving public confidence in the regulatory regime.

Notes: This paper uses the BSE (‘mad cow disease’) crisis as a case study of the workings of the British core executive during a crisis event. Using the evidence from the Philips Inquiry, which reported on the BSE/vCJD crisis in 2000, the study analyses the patterns of decision making and the structures of institutional and resource dependence. It concludes that the lack of co-ordination between and within institutions and what was acknowledged to be the mismanagement of expert advice raise serious questions about the executive's ability to manage serious crises. The findings concur with scholarship indicating executive fragmentation and lack of accountability. Consecutive British governments have sought to diminish the centre's responsibility for managing public policy without putting an effective alternative mechanism in place.

Notes: This case study of Latvian local governments focuses on the qualitative aspects of reform legislation passed and implemented between 1990 and 2003 as the best available measures of changes made. Special attention is given to historical influences and inherited Soviet practices, the uncertain and conflicting value systems of reformers, and a gradual shift to concerns about the services provided. Power relationships are examined, together with the funding of local governments and minority relations. It is anticipated that in 2005 Latvia will adopt new elected regional development boards to work with the EU and other external institutions, leading to more democratic and cooperative modes of government. There is evidence that values of achievement and trust held by the younger generation are increasingly compatible with new needs and reform processes.

Notes: Responsive evaluation offers an emerging vision and rationale for evaluation. In the version of responsive evaluation presented here, evaluation is reframed from the assessment of policy interventions on the basis of policy-makers’ questions to a dialogue among diverse stakeholder interests that moves towards reciprocal understanding and acceptance. This approach to evaluation is especially appropriate for the field of public administration, given the existing problems of complexity and the potential synergy with interactive and participatory policy approaches. Responsive evaluation and interactive approaches to public policy issues share the same democratic goals of participation and influence, and the alignment between these concepts make both sets of ideas and activities more effective and meaningful. The value and meaning of responsive evaluation and the synergy of this evaluation approach with the concept of public dialogue about important public issues is illustrated by a case study. This concerns a responsive evaluation of an organized policy dialogue about the future of the Dutch aviation infrastructure, known publicly as the Schiphol discussion.

Notes: Lester Salamon, The Resilient Sector: The State of Nonprofit AmericaR.A.W. Rhodes, P. Carmichael, J. McMillan and A. Massey, Decentralising the Civil Service: from Unitary State to Differentiated Polity in the United KingdomBen Pimlott and Nirmola Rao, Governing LondonRoger W. Cobb and David M. Primo, Plane Truth: Airline Crashes, the Media and Transportation PolicyHoward Glennerster, Understanding the Financing of Welfare: What Welfare Costs and How to Pay for itMartin Powell (ed.), Evaluating New Labour's Welfare ReformsLiesbet Hooghe, The European Commission and the Integration of Europe: Images of GovernanceColin J. Bennett and Charles D. Raab, The Governance of Privacy: Policy Instruments in Global PerspectiveRudy B. Andeweg and Galen A. Irwin, Governance and Politics of the NetherlandsJustin Greenwood (ed.), The Challenge of Change in EU Business Associations

Notes: This paper explores the literature theorizing institutional crises by examining the policy problems faced by the UK's Child Support Agency and Prison Service Agency in the mid 1990s. In both these cases the ‘hardware’ (delivery through agencies), and the ‘software’ (policy saliency) were linked to their difficulties. However, these policy areas can be contrasted with the Benefits Agency, another highly salient policy area where no crisis occurred. This paper argues that it was neither the ‘hardware’ nor the ‘software’ but the way in which the bureaucratic networks surrounding these agencies operated that explains why the policy process was difficult. In concluding, the relevance of the network concept to the crisis literature is examined, illuminating the role that networks play in promoting or preventing institutional crisis as well as the research questions that arise if network relations are considered alongside a broader understanding of the dynamics of institutional crisis.

Notes: In 1996 Tony Blair declared in a speech in Singapore that stakeholding would define New Labour's programme in office. This speech provoked much interest in the UK among a centre-left keen to forge a ‘third way’ alternative to state-centred social democracy and free markets. Conservative politicians, however, subjected New Labour to a barrage of criticisms. Startled by the scale of the negative reaction, Blair stopped referring to stakeholding. A common judgement is that stakeholding got no further than the starting block. This paper challenges this, contending that the progress of stakeholding has not in fact been halted under New Labour. Policies such as Network Rail, foundation hospitals and the Child Trust Fund indicate that stakeholding remains a part of New Labour's approach. Recognizing the stakeholder dimension to policy is important because it opens up a new front in the reform of public services in Britain.

Notes: This paper revisits Harrison and Wood's (1999) account of health service organizational design in the UK to bring that account up to date. It also attempts to broaden it through an increased use of the political economy perspective it incorporated. As a consequence, the paper presents a number of alternative findings to Harrison and Wood, reconsidering their analysis of organization from ‘blueprint’ to ‘design’, and finding that Jessop's framework, utilizing the movement from the Keynesian Welfare National State toward the Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime (Jessop 1999), is more appropriate in explaining the reasons underpinning change in health services in the UK, and also in demonstrating their likely future direction.

Notes: Public administration studies have had a prominent role in Norwegian political science. Here, I argue for a revitalization of its role based on what gave it prominence – the merger of the rather opposite traditions of organization theory and democratic theory. A new merger between the two, i.e. by bringing discussions of democracy back in, is necessary to understand and discuss principally prominent changes in Norwegian politics and administration where the role of democratic decision making has been reduced. Also, a merger will contribute to the development of new theoretical insights in the current debate over ‘governance’. As it is a goal for public administration to study the whole pattern of the political system it is further argued for a revitalization of the study of the role of interests outside the state, and for a fusion of the separte tables of studies of different levels in politics and administration.

Notes: This paper systematically examines intra-organizational consensus of perceptions of managerial reform in local government in the UK. The paper questions the role of ‘elite surveys’ in public sector evaluation research by exploring the extent to which multiple informants agree on the expected impacts of Best Value. Results from a survey of 978 local government officers in 80 local authorities indicate modest levels of consensus. These findings suggest that single respondent surveys are likely to produce unreliable data and misrepresent the impact of public sector policy reforms. Rather than rely on the perceptions of one respondent it is argued that multiple respondent surveys should be employed if rigorous and reliable data are to be used in providing evidence-based policy recommendations for reform in public sector organizations.