ALBERT

All Library Books, journals and Electronic Records Telegrafenberg

X
feed icon rss

Your email was sent successfully. Check your inbox.

An error occurred while sending the email. Please try again.

Proceed reservation?

Export
Filter
  • Articles  (12,090)
  • Springer  (10,991)
  • Blackwell Publishing Ltd.  (741)
  • De Gruyter  (358)
  • American Geophysical Union (AGU)
  • Annual Reviews
  • 2000-2004  (6,954)
  • 1980-1984  (4,555)
  • 1935-1939  (581)
  • Economics  (12,090)
Collection
  • Articles  (12,090)
Source
Keywords
Publisher
Years
Year
Journal
Topic
  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Effect of Organizational form on Information Flow and Decision Quality: Informational Cascades in Group Decision Making (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper identifies a disadvantage to decision making in a team. We show that in some cases available information is lost due to sequential communication that results in informational cascades. Although incentive contracts exist that prevent cascades, in some cases these contracts do not maximize shareholders' expected residual value and cascades are tolerated in equilibrium. Cascades never occur in hierarchies that exogenously prevent communication. However, when the firm is organized as a hierarchy (and the agents are given the optimal hierarchical contract), in some cases agents will collude and sequentially communicate, admitting the possibility of cascades. In these cases, the principals must monitor and enforce the hierarchical process. When monitoring costs exceed the cost of cascades, the team is the optimal organizational form.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00115.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A Practitioner's Guide to Estimation of Random-Coefficients Logit Models of Demand (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Estimation of demand is at the heart of many recent studies that examine questions of market power, mergers, innovation, and valuation of new brands in differentiated-products markets. This paper focuses on one of the main methods for estimating demand for differentiated products: random-coefficients logit models. The paper carefully discusses the latest innovations in these methods with the hope of increasing the understanding, and therefore the trust among researchers who have never used them, and reducing the difficulty of their use, thereby aiding in realizing their full potential.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00513.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Incumbency and R&D Incentives: Licensing the Gale of Creative Destruction (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper analyzes the relationship between incumbency and R&D incentives in the context of a model of technological competition in which technologically successful entrants are able to license their innovation to (or be acquired by) an incumbent. That such a sale should take place is natural, since postinnovation monopoly profits are greater than the sum of duopoly profits. We identify three key findings about how innovative activity is shaped by licensing. First, since an incumbent's threat to engage in imitative R&D during negotiations increases its bargaining power, there is a purely strategic incentive for incumbents to develop an R&D capability. Second, incumbents research more intensively than entrants as long as (and only if) their willingness to pay for the innovation exceeds that of the entrant, a condition that depends critically on the expected licensing fee. Third, when the expected licensing fee is sufficiently low, the incumbent considers entrant R&D a strategic substitute for in-house research. This prediction about the market for ideas stands in contrast to predictions of strategic complementarity in patent races where licensing is not allowed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00485.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Weak Property Rights and Holdup in R&D (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We study how the sequence of financing of R&D varies according to the ease with which property rights over knowledge can be defined. There are two financiers: a venture capitalist (VC) and a corporation. The knowledge acquired in costly research becomes embodied in the researcher's human capital, and she may hold up the financier and walk away with the project to develop it elsewhere. The main results are: (1) When property rights are strong, research is always funded by the VC, development is performed efficiently, and breakaways from the VC to the corporation are observed in equilibrium. (2) When property rights are weak, projects may be financed by the VC or the corporation, or may remain unfunded. (3) When property rights are weak, no breakaways occur in equilibrium; local spillovers and strong product market competition increase the likelihood that research projects will get funding. (4) The equilibrium sequence of R&D finance need not be first-best efficient. (5) In equilibrium, and controlling for the strength of property rights, VCs finance projects that are more profitable on average.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00615.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    External Liberalization and Foreign Presence: Cross-Industry Evidence From Poland and Hungary (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: External liberalization—the relaxation of restrictions on cross-border trade and inbound direct investment—has played an important role in the programs of economic transition in central Europe. While liberalization is widely heralded, there has been little empirical analysis of the links between liberalization and industry structure. This analysis examines changes in foreign presence following external liberalization in Poland and Hungary. I show that the presence of proprietary and intangible assets explains much of the cross-industry variation in patterns of foreign presence and, for a given level of foreign presence, whether this will occur via trade or inbound direct investment.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00211.x-i1
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Exercising Market Power in Proprietary Aftermarkets (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Over 20 recent antitrust cases have turned on whether competition in complex durable-equipment markets prevents manufacturers from exercising market power over proprietary aftermarket products and services. We show that the price in the aftermarket will exceed marginal cost despite competition in the equipment market. Absent perfectly contingent long-term contracts, firms will balance the advantages of marginal-cost pricing to future generations of consumers against the payoff from monopoly pricing for current, locked-in equipment owners. The result holds for undifferentiated Bertrand competition, differentiated duopoly, and monopoly equipment markets. We also examine the effects of market growth and equipment durability.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00157.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Vertical Foreclosure, Technological Choice, and Entry on the Intermediate Market (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper analyzes the profitability of vertical integration for an upstream monopoly facing a potential competitor. We show that it depends on the technology used by the firm when it integrates. We distinguish two types of technologies: standard technologies, used by nonintegrated firms, and nonstandard technologies, reserved for integrated firms and implying the complete foreclosure of nonintegrated firms. Vertical integration with the adoption of a nonstandard technology dominates vertical integration with the adoption of a standard technology and is profitable, as long as the degree of competition in the downstream industry is sufficiently low.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00211.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A Test of the Resource-Based Model Using Baseball Free Agents (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper examines a nearly untested premise of the resource-based view of the firm: managers can exploit uncertainty about a factor's true value to generate returns. Our results show that empirically validating this basic proposition is difficult and potentially impossible, despite our use of a rather simple empirical setting. While market imperfections appear to underlie the payment of baseball free agents, we cannot easily determine whether this imperfection constitutes a return or not. In addition, while we find convincing evidence of uncertainty underlying owner's expectations of a free agent's performance potential, it is not clear whether team owners can exploit this uncertainty by amassing superior informational strategies or investing in complementary assets. Our difficulty in testing resource-based propositions suggests limitations to the theory's practicality.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00585.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Exercising Market Power in Proprietary Aftermarkets (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Over 20 recent antitrust cases have turned on whether competition in complex durable-equipment markets prevents manufacturers from exercising market power over proprietary aftermarket products and services. We show that the price in the aftermarket will exceed marginal cost despite competition in the equipment market. Absent perfectly contingent long-term contracts, firms will balance the advantages of marginal-cost pricing to future generations of consumers against the payoff from monopoly pricing for current, locked-in equipment owners. The result holds for undifferentiated Bertrand competition, differentiated duopoly, and monopoly equipment markets. We also examine the effects of market growth and equipment durability.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1046/j.1365-2745.1998.00285.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Vertical Foreclosure, Technological Choice, and Entry on the Intermediate Market (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper analyzes the profitability of vertical integration for an upstream monopoly facing a potential competitor. We show that it depends on the technology used by the firm when it integrates. We distinguish two types of technologies: standard technologies, used by nonintegrated firms, and nonstandard technologies, reserved for integrated firms and implying the complete foreclosure of nonintegrated firms. Vertical integration with the adoption of a nonstandard technology dominates vertical integration with the adoption of a standard technology and is profitable, as long as the degree of competition in the downstream industry is sufficiently low.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00189.x-i1
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 11
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Graft, Bribes, and the Practice of Corruption (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We construct a dynamic model of corruption in organizations where officials privately know their propensity for corruption and clients optimally choose the bribe offered. We show that there is a continuum set of stationary bribe equilibria due exclusively to the dynamic nature of the model and the endogenous determination of bribes. This can explain why similar countries have stable but different “implicit prices” for the same illegal services. We also show that, by not considering the reaction of clients, traditional analysis have systematically overestimated the beneficial effect of increasing wages as an anticorruption measure.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00231.x-i1
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 12
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Divisionalization and Delegation in Oligopoly (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We consider a model where oligopolistic firms create independent divisions or franchises, which subsequently delegate output decisions to managers. We show that the number of firms required to make divisionalization privately profitable is greater in our model than in previous pure divisionalization models. However, in contrast with pure delegation models, we show that the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium approaches perfect competition as divisionalization costs tends to zero, even with a small fixed number of firms.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00321.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 13
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Pay to Switch or Pay to Stay: Preference-Based Price Discrimination in Markets with Switching Costs (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: In many markets, firms can price discriminate between their own customers and their rivals' customers, charging one price to consumers who prefer their own product and another price to consumers who prefer a rival's product. We find that when demand is symmetric, charging a lower price to a rival's customers is always optimal. When demand is asymmetric, however, it may be more profitable to charge a lower price to one's own customers. Surprisingly, price discrimination can lead to lower prices to all consumers, not only to the group that is more elastic, but also to the less elastic group.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00397.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 14
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Reputation, Honesty, and Efficiency with Insider Information: an Experiment (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We conduct an experimental study of sales of insider information about an asset's future value, where the insiders cannot purchase the underlying asset. We examine whether such information is purchased, the quality of the information provided, and the subsequent accuracy of purchase decisions in the underlying asset market. Our design explores whether reputation, in a repeated game of finite (but uncertain) duration, is an effective constraint on deliberate strategic misinformation. The insiders have an immediate incentive to state that the asset value is high when its true value is low. We suggest an application to insider trading in financial information markets. With fixed matching, cooperative outcomes featuring truthful revelation are frequently achieved and sustained, even though this suggests subjects have sophisticated beliefs about the beliefs and behavior of others. As a comparison, we also conduct a control treatment with random rematching. Here, information purchase is less frequent, the rate of truthful revelation decreases, and efficiency is diminished. Our results suggest that most people anticipate that others realize the potential value of a good reputation.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00425.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 15
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Takeover Waves (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Horizontal takeovers often occur in waves. A sequence of takeovers is obtained in a Cournot setting with cost asymmetries. They are motivated by two different reasons: (1) a low realization of demand increases the profitability of takeovers; (2) takeovers raise the profitability of future takeovers. A possible explanation of merger races is also obtained by showing that firms buying in the first place pay a lower price for their targets.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00189.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 16
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Selling to Socially Responsible Consumers: Competition and The Private Provision of Public Goods (2003)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We model firms as competing for socially responsible consumers by linking the provision of a public good (environmentally friendly or socially responsible activities) to sales of their private goods. In many cases, too little of the public good is provided, but under certain conditions, competition leads to excessive provision. Further, there is generally a trade-off between more efficient provision of the private and the public good. Our results indicate that the level of private provision of the public good varies inversely with the competitiveness of the private-good market and that the types of public goods provided are biased toward those for which consumers have high participation value.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00419.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 17
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Price and Nonprice Competition with Endogenous Market Structure (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper examines the effect of the intensity of short-run price competition and other exogenous variables that affect gross profit margins—such as the degree of product differentiation and the consumers' responsiveness to quality—on market structure and on advertising and R&D expenditure. A key result is that more intense short-run competition can lead to lower concentration in industries with high advertising or R&D intensity, unlike exogenous-sunk-cost industries. Also, price competition has a negative effect on advertising or R&D expenditure. A case study is also presented, which is consistent with the theoretical results of the paper.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00053.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 18
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Contract Mixing in Franchising as a Mechanism for Public-Good Provision (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper is concerned with the coexistence of company-owned units and franchised units in business format franchising and their different contractual arrangements. Drawing insights from case studies that indicate both the development and the maintenance of company-wide brand names and unit-specific sales activities are crucial to a franchise company, we construct a multitask model to account for such contract mixing in franchising. Intuitively, low-powered contracts are offered to some managers to induce effort for brand-name development and maintenance, while high-powered contracts are offered to the remaining managers to elicit sales activity and capture the beneficial effect of the company brand name. Franchising can thus be viewed as an organizational agreement for production involving brand-name products and services.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00085.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 19
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Board Efficiency and Internal Corporate Control Mechanisms (2003)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We analyze the interactions between internal and external control mechanisms in a framework in which the board selects the CEO and then decides whether to retain or dismiss him after observing a signal regarding his ability. The novel aspect of our paper is that we consider both the hiring and the firing of the CEO by the board. The type of board is defined by its ability to select a good CEO, so that the quality of the CEO depends on the type of board. Then, the dismissal-retention decision provides information not only on the quality of the CEO but also on the board's type. We show that the board's behavior depends on the pressure from the takeover market and on whether its type is publicly known. When the pressure from the takeover market is high and the type of board is private information, the board prefers not to dismiss the manager even if it has received a very low signal regarding his quality. Hence, our model endogenously derives a collusion between board and CEO in which the board does not fire a bad CEO. This behavior emerges as an attempt to hide the board's inability to accomplish the first task, CEO selection, by distorting the second task, the CEO retention-dismissal decision.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00495.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 20
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Role of Network Effects in the US VCR Market, 1978–1986 (2003)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper estimates the importance of indirect network effects in the US video cassette recorder (VCR) market between 1978 and 1986. Estimation reveals the significant role of networks in the format competition between VHS and Beta. The paper also finds that if Sony, the system sponsor of Beta, had aggressively introduced its VCRs at the early stage of competition, Beta would likely have dominated the market in 1985; instead, the format disappeared in 1989. Finally, the paper measures consumer welfare for the value of network effects in VCRs, and assesses the consumer welfare effect of standardization.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00447.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 21
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A Comparison of Exit and Voice Relationships Under Common Uncertainty (2003)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We consider a repeated interaction between a manufacturing firm and a subcontractor. The relationship between the two parties is characterized (1) by moral hazard, and (2) by the fact that they do not have perfect knowledge about the base cost level of the project, which is carried out by a subcontractor (the parties only have identical a priori beliefs). We consider a two-period model where the players can update their estimate of the base cost level according to incoming information. Exit relationships, where the firm signs one-period contracts with different subcontractors, are compared with voice relationships, where both partners commit to a two-period interaction and (due to information sharing and face-to-face communication between the partners) additional information about the base cost level is generated. It is shown that in such a dynamic framework with common uncertainty the quality of the additional information plays a crucial role in determining the characteristics of the optimal relationship: voice-based strategies governed by long-term contracts are preferable if the precision of the additional information about the base cost level is high. If the precision of the additional signal is low, exit strategies with frequent changes of the subcontractors are optimal for the manufacturer.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00531.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 22
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Minimum Differentiation in Commercial Media Markets (2003)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We examine a model of locational choice in commercial media markets. Commercial media (stations) compete for audiences with their choice of programming variety in order to attract advertising revenues from advertisers. These advertisers (producers) compete in a differentiated product market and rely on advertising to inform consumers about their product. We use the model to show that media have incentives to minimize the extent of differentiation between them. This incentive is an implication of the assumed role of advertising as information and as an ultimate nuisance to the audience. When stations minimally differentiate their programming offerings, producers choose lower levels of advertising. Consequently, lower levels of product information are available to consumers, permitting producers to gain higher margins on product sales. As a result, stations can negotiate higher payments for advertising space.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00291.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 23
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Hamburger Prices and Spatial Econometrics (2003)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper applies spatial econometrics to hamburger price data to assess the degree of substitutability of products and locations of spatially dispersed franchised chains. First, while intrachain price variation exists, I find that hamburger prices at neighboring outlets of different chains are spatially uncorrelated. I conclude that their products are not close substitutes, which provides an explanation for why price promotions have not raised market share. I do find spatial price correlation, however, among proximate outlets of separate franchisees within the same chain. This finding implies that customers view proximate locations of a chain as substitutes.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00591.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 24
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Randal Heeb Innovation and Vertical Integration in Complementary Markets (2003)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper studies vertical integration by an essential-good monopolist into complementary markets. Unlike previous studies of complementary products, consumers are allowed to purchase some components of a complementary basket, but not others. Two different pricing strategies by the integrated firm may emerge. In mass-market equilibria, the price of the complement under integration is zero and it is given away with the essential good. Niche-market equilibria have more conventional pricing. This dichotomy is consistent with consumer software pricing. Integration enhances consumer and total surplus, unless it leads to exit by the higher-quality rival, in which case welfare is reduced. Exit is most likely when it is least damaging to consumer welfare. Integration reduces innovation by the rival firm. The effect on innovation by the integrated firm is ambiguous, but numerical computation of an extended model indicates that integration increases the innovation of the integrated firm and enhances welfare.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00387.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 25
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Renegotiation and Collusion in Organizations (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: It has been argued that collusion among the members of an organization may lead to inefficiencies and hence should be prevented in equilibrium. This paper shows that whenever the parties to an organization can renegotiate their incentive scheme after collusion, these inefficiencies can be greatly reduced. Moreover, it might not be possible to prevent collusion and renegotiation in equilibrium. Indeed, if collusion is observable but not verifiable, then the organization's optimal incentive scheme will always be renegotiated. If, instead, collusion is not observable to the principal, both collusion and renegotiation will occur in equilibrium with positive probability. The occurrence of collusion and renegotiation should therefore not be taken as evidence of the inefficiency of an organization.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00453.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 26
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Managerial Compensation and Capital Structure (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We investigate the interaction between financial structure and managerial compensation and show that risky debt affects both the probability of managerial replacement and the manager's wage if he is retained by the firm. Our model yields a rich set of predictions, including the following: (i) The market values of equity and debt decrease if the manager is replaced; moreover, the expected cash flow affirms that retain their managers exceeds that affirms that replace their managers, (ii) Managers affirms with risky debt outstanding are promised lower severance payments (golden parachutes) than managers affirms that do not have risky debt. (Hi) Controlling for firm's size, the leverage, managerial compensation, and cash flow of firms that retain their managers are positively correlated, (iv) Controlling for the firm's size, the probability of managerial turnover and firm value are negatively correlated, (v) Managerial pay-performance sensitivity is positively correlated with leverage, expected compensation, and expected cash flows.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00549.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 27
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    External Liberalization and Foreign Presence: Cross-Industry Evidence from Poland and Hungary (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: External liberalization—the relaxation of restrictions on cross-border trade and inbound direct investment—has played an important role in the programs of economic transition in central Europe. While liberalization is widely heralded, there has been little empirical analysis of the links between liberalization and industry structure. This analysis examines changes in foreign presence following external liberalization in Poland and Hungary. I show that the presence of proprietary and intangible assets explains much of the cross-industry variation in patterns of foreign presence and, for a given level of foreign presence, whether this will occur via trade or inbound direct investment.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00231.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 28
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Intermediation Can Replace Certification (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We consider a market in which consumers do not have perfect information about product quality. Producers can perfectly reveal that a good is of high quality through certification, which entails socially wasteful costs. Firms can choose whether to sell through an intermediary or to sell independently (vertical integration). We show that multibrand retailing, which leads to a redistribution of profits but not to social costs, can fully or partially replace certification by signaling product quality. Renting the image of a competing high-quality brand is shown to be an outcome that can be sustained through intermediation.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00001.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 29
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Takeover Waves (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Horizontal takeovers often occur in waves. A sequence of takeovers is obtained in a Cournot setting with cost asymmetries. They are motivated by two different reasons: (1) a low realization of demand increases the profitability of takeovers; (2) takeovers raise the profitability of future takeovers. A possible explanation of merger races is also obtained by showing that firms buying in the first place pay a lower price for their targets.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00157.x-i1
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 30
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Multimarket Contact and Price Coordination in the Cellular Telephone Industry (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Empirical studies have confirmed the prediction of theoretical models that contact in multiple markets may enhance firms' abilities to tacitly collude and consequently achieve higher prices and profits. It has remained largely unexplored, however, how firms coordinate their actions. This paper identifies a method of pricing in the cellular telephone industry that seems to enable firms to coordinate their actions across markets. This pricing pattern is found to raise prices by approximately 7–10%, and cannot be attributed to a variety of noncooperative explanations.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00287.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 31
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Focused Firms and the Incentive to Innovate (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper explores the possibility that a firm may make a credible strategic commitment to high levels of innovation by limiting its horizontal or vertical scope. Specifically, I develop a model in which a firm decides whether to undertake an innovation that affects a system of products, which can also be interpreted as multiple stages of the production process. The products are technologically related, and innovation in the core product is assumed to impose costs on the producers of ancillary products, due to cannibalization of the old technology and redesign or retooling costs, for example. I demonstrate that a firm may optimally and credibly commit to innovate by choosing to be a focused firm and licensing the production of the ancillary product, even when licensees are inefficient. In stark contrast to the irrelevance results of the strategic delegation literature, this commitment may be credible even when licensing contracts are renegotiable, but only if licensees are sufficiently inefficient.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00339.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 32
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Regulatory Reform and Bureaucratic Responsiveness to Firms: the Impact of User Fees in the FDA (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper examines the impact of user fees on the speed of new-drug review and on the responsiveness of FDA reviewers to pharmaceutical firms. User fees are expected to alter FDA behavior and responsiveness to pharmaceutical firms because they give regulators a financial incentive to process more new-drug applications and because they convey information to regulators that may reduce type I error. The analysis examines the variation in FDA review times for new drugs approved between 1990 and 1995 as a function of differences that exist among firms and drugs. Specifically, it compares estimates of regulator responsiveness to several firm and drug characteristics before and after the introduction of user fees. The results show that user fees produced a significant change in FDA behavior. Regulators have become less responsive to the differences among firms since the introduction of user fees, which suggests that the reform has led to more equity in the new-drug review process. In addition, the FDA has expedited the review of new drugs, especially the most therapeutically novel drugs, which suggests that politicians have been fairly successful in designing a reform to realign regulatory incentives in the FDA.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00363.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 33
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Graft, Bribes, and the Practice of Corruption (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We construct a dynamic model of corruption in organizations where officials privately know their propensity for corruption and clients optimally choose the bribe offered. We show that there is a continuum set of stationary bribe equilibria due exclusively to the dynamic nature of the model and the endogenous determination of bribes. This can explain why similar countries have stable but different “implicit prices” for the same illegal services. We also show that, by not considering the reaction of clients, traditional analysis have systematically overestimated the beneficial effect of increasing wages as an anticorruption measure.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00257.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 34
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Systems Competition, Vertical Merger, and Foreclosure (2000)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 9 (2000), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We address the possibility of foreclosure in markets where the final good consists of a system composed of a hardware good and complementary software and the value of the system depends on the availability of software. Foreclosure occurs when a hardware firm merges with a software firm and the integrated firm makes its software incompatible with a rival technology or system. We find that foreclosure can be an equilibrium outcome where both the merger and compatibility decisions are part of a multistage game which permits the foreclosed hardware firm to play a number of counter-strategies. Further, foreclosure can be an effective strategy to monopolize the hardware market.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00025.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 35
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Bargaining When Exchange Affects the Value of Future Trade (2003)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We examine bargaining in a dynamic context where exchange between two parties affects the potential surplus from future trade. In this setting traders negotiate current contracts anticipating the impact of their agreement on future exchanges. We show that in growing environments these dynamic considerations will often ameliorate bargaining inefficiencies associated with private information and facilitate exchange as both parties cooperate to nurture the relationship. In contrast, we find that in declining environments dynamic considerations will often exacerbate bargaining inefficiencies and hinder trade, as both parties are hesitant to let the relationship mature. These findings have implications for preferences to form long-lived relationships.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00557.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 36
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Knowledge Spillovers and Growth in the Disagglomeration of the Us Advertising-Agency Industry (2003)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We investigate knowledge spillovers and externalities in the disagglomeration and growth of the advertising-agency industry. A simple model of high demand, low wages, and externalities associated with clusters of related industries can explain the dispersion of advertising agency employment across states. Other factors affected the industry growth rate within states. Consistent with Jacobs and Porter but contrary to Marshall, Arrow, and Romer, competition, but not specialization, enhanced growth. In accord with Porter (1990), growth increased with buyer cluster size. Diversity had no effect on growth. Despite improvements in telecommunications and transportation reducing effective distances, location still matters.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00327.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 37
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Dvd-vs.-Divx Standard War: Empirical Evidence of Network Effects and Preannouncement Effects (2003)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We test empirically for network effects and preannouncement effects in the DVD market. We do this by measuring the effect of potential (incompatible) competition on a network undergoing growth. We find that there are network effects. The data are generally consistent with the hypothesis that the preannouncement of DIVX temporarily slowed down the adoption of DVD technology.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00363.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 38
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Endogenous Technological Spillovers: Causes and Consequences (2003)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We develop a new approach to endogenizing technological spillovers. We analyze a game in which firms can first invest in cost-reducing R&D, then compete on the human-capital market for their knowledge-bearing employees, and finally enter the product market. If R&D employees change firms, spillovers arise. We show that technological spillovers are most likely when they increase total industry profits. We use this result to show that innovation incentives are usually stronger for endogenous than for exogenous spillovers and that endogenous spillovers may reverse the result that innovation incentives are stronger under quantity competition than under price competition. Finally, we explore the robustness of our results with respect to contractual incompleteness and the number of R&D workers.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00179.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 39
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Patents, Invalidity, and the Strategic Transmission of Enabling Information (2003)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The patent system encourages innovation and knowledge disclosure by providing exclusivity to inventors. Exclusivity is limited, however, because a substantial fraction of patents have some probability of being ruled invalid when challenged in court. The possibility of invalidity—and an ensuing market competition—suggests that when an innovator's capability (e.g., cost of production) is private information, there is potential value to an innovator from signaling strong capability via a disclosure that transfers technical knowledge to a competitor. We model a product-innovation setting in which a valid patent gives market exclusivity and find a unique signaling equilibrium. One might expect that as the probability that a patent will be invalid becomes low, greater disclosure will be induced. We do not find this expectation to be generally supported. Further, even where full disclosure arises in equilibrium, it is only the less capable who make full disclosures. The equilibrium analysis also highlights many of the novel and appealing features of enabling knowledge disclosure signals.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00151.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 40
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Downstream Competition, Foreclosure, and Vertical Integration (2003)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper analyzes the effect of competition among downstream firms on an upstream firm's payoff and on its incentive to integrate vertically when firms in both segments negotiate optimal contracts. We argue that as downstream competition becomes more intense, the upstream firm obtains a larger share of a smaller downstream industry profit. The upstream firm may encourage downstream competition (even excessively) in response to high downstream bargaining power. The option of vertical integration may be a barrier to entry downstream and may trigger strategic horizontal spinoffs or mergers. We extend the analysis to upstream competition.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00261.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 41
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Backward Integration by a Dominant Firm (2003)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper studies the welfare consequences of a vertical merger that raises rivals' costs when downstream competition is a la Cournot between firms with constant asymmetric marginal costs. The main result is that such a vertical merger can nevertheless improve welfare if it involves a downstream firm whose cost is low enough. This is because by raising the input price paid by the nonmerging firms the merger shifts production away from those relatively inefficient producers in favor of the more efficient firm. Yet, there is a trade-off between the gain in productive efficiency and the loss in consumers' surplus caused by the higher downstream price that follows a higher input price. It is also shown, through an example, that this result extends to price competition with differentiated products.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00231.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 42
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Efficient Intercarrier Compensation for Competing Networks When Customers Share the Value of A Call (2003)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: In competitive telecommunications markets each carrier relies on competing networks to terminate internetwork calls. Regulators typically require the calling party's network to pay a termination fee to the called party's network equal to the terminating network's “incremental cost” of completing the call, effectively imposing all of the costs on the calling party's network. These payments can affect retail prices and therefore consumption. I show that when both parties benefit from a call, they should bear its costs in proportion to the benefit they receive. Therefore, imposing all of the costs of an internetwork call on the calling party's network can be inefficient if these costs are reflected in the calling party's usage rates. A system in which two networks exchange traffic at specified points on a bill-and-keep basis imposes some of the cost on each network, which will then be imposed on the parties. This can generate more efficient network utilization, even with unbalanced traffic between networks. Thus, regulators may improve the efficiency of telecommunications markets by establishing bill-and-keep intercarrier compensation rules.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00207.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 43
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Private Politics (2003)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper introduces the subject of private politics, presents a research agenda, and provides an example involving activists and a firm. Private politics addresses situations of conflict and their resolution without reliance on the law or government. It encompasses the political competition over entitlements in the status quo, the direct competition for support from the public, bargaining over the resolution of the conflict, and the maintenance of the agreed-to private ordering. The term private means that the parties do not rely on public order, i.e., lawmaking or the courts. The term politics refers to individual and collective action in situations in which people attempt to further their interests by imposing their will on others. Four models of private politics are discussed: (1) informational competition between an activist and a firm for support from the public, (2) decisions by citizen consumers regarding a boycott, (3) bargaining to resolve the boycott, and (4) the choice of an equilibrium private ordering to govern the ongoing conflicting interests of the activist and the firm.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00031.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 44
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Power in the Firm and Managerial Career Concerns (2003)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: More powerful managers make more important decisions. Therefore, firm performance is more informative about the abilities of such managers, who, realizing that they are more visible, are more eager to improve performance. If this reputation effect exists, how should firms allocate power? I analyze the optimal allocation of power and derive implications for several issues that often arise in management practice: the choice of departmentation criteria, the importance given to seniority, and the width of job definitions. Finally, I show that the model is consistent with the empirical evidence on managerial succession.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00001.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 45
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Sunk Costs, Contestability, and the Latent Contract Market (2003)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The idea that an industry with sunk costs may be contestable even in the absence of long-term contracts has received little attention informal economic theory yet is sometimes popular among practitioners. This paper formally illustrates the argument. In an infinitely repeated game, there exists a class of contestable outcomes in which the monopolist sells only on the spot market and charges low prices along the equilibrium path to prevent customers from resorting to long-term contracts. The crucial test for contestability is the level of transaction costs in the latent contract market.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00119.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 46
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    R&D Competition when firms Choose Variance (2003)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: I consider an infinite-period race where players choose between low- and high-variance motion technologies. I provide sufficient conditions under which, in equilibrium, the leader chooses a safe technology and the laggard a risky one, thus formalizing the sports intuition that the laggard has nothing to lose. Various examples and empirical implications are presented.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00139.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 47
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Why aren't all Truck Drivers Owner-Operators? Asset Ownership and the Employment Relation in Interstate for-hire Trucking (2003)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Transaction-cost and agency theorists have frequently cited trucks as prototypical user-owned assets, and have consequently predicted a predominance of self-employed drivers who contract with motor carriers. In fact, owner-operators accounted for less than one-third of US trucking activity conducted by large interstate trucking firms in 1991, a proportion that has changed little since deregulation. Given the predictions of organizational economists, why is self-employment in the interstate trucking industry not the dominant organization form?We propose that transaction costs and agency costs are indeed important in the trucking industry. In the absence of externalities across hauls, contracting between carriers and owner-operators is preferred for traditional agency reasons. However, when the outcome of one haul imposes externalities on other hauls or on the carrier's reputation, an owner-operator will not internalize all costs associated with poor outcomes. Given problems of noncontractibility of maintenance effort, carrier ownership of the vehicle is the preferred organizational form in such a case. We also propose that vehicle idiosyncrasy can create thin market conditions that encourage carrier ownership of vehicles. A study of the organization and operations of 354 trucking firms for 1991 provides evidence consistent with these predictions.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00091.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 48
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Do Pharmaceutical Sales Respond to Scientific Evidence? (2002)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 11 (2002), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: I investigate how different sources of information influence the diffusion of pharmaceutical innovations. In prescription-drug markets, both advertising and scientific information stemming from clinical trials can affect physicians' prescription choices. Using novel indices of clinical-research output, I find that both marketing and scientific evidence directly influence the diffusion process in the antiulcer-drug market, with marketing having a more pronounced influence. I also find evidence that clinical outputs are important drivers of firms' marketing efforts, affecting sales indirectly. Taken together, the direct and indirect effects of science on demand imply strong private incentives for clinical research. I conclude that product-market competition in the pharmaceutical industry is shaped by both advertising rivalries and scientific rivalries. Moreover, drug advertising may perform an important informative function.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2002.00551.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 49
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Does Ownership Matter? Evidence from the Zaibatsu Dissolution Program (2003)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 12 (2003), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: In 1985, Demsetz and Lehn argued both that the optimal corporate ownership structure was firm-specific, and that market competition would drive firms toward that optimum. Because ownership was endogenous to expected performance, any regression of profitability on ownership patterns would yield insignificant results. To test this hypothesis, we use the zaibatsu dissolution program from late-1940s Japan as a natural experiment: an exogenous shock to the equilibrium ownership structure. Through that program, the US-run occupation removed the more prominent shareholders from many of the most successful Japanese companies. By focusing on the way firms and investors responded to the mandated selloff, we accomplish two goals: (a) we avoid the endogeneity problem that has plagued much of the other research on the subject, and (b) we clarify the equilibrating dynamics by which competitive markets move firms toward their optimal ownership structure. With a sample of 637 Japanese firms for 1953 and 710 for 1958, we confirm the equilibrating mechanism behind the Demsetz-Lehn hypothesis: between 1953 and 1958, the ex-zaibatsu firms did retructure their ownership patterns. As of 1953, the unlisted ex-zaibatsu and new firms still had not been able to negotiate the transactions necessary to approach their profit-maximizing ownership structures. Even the listed firms had not fully undone the effect of the occupation-induced changes on managerial practices. By 1958 the firms had done this, and the earlier correlation between profitability and ownership disappeared. By then, firm profitability showed no correlation with ownership, whether under linear, quadratic, or piecewise specifications. We further find no evidence that ex-zaibatsu firms sought to strengthen their ties to banks over 1953–1958.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00067.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 50
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Bundling and the Reduction of the Winner's Curse (2002)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 11 (2002), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The paper studies the effects of bundling on the bidding strategies and seller revenues in auctions when the bidders have common values for the objects. Bundling of objects before the auction reduces the problem of the winner's curse, and the bidders bid more aggressively. This does not mean that a bundled auction is always better for the seller's revenue. Indeed, there is another effect that makes the bundled auction preferable (from the seller's standpoint) if and only if the number of bidders is small. While this is the only effect present in an independent-private-values model, it does not vanish when bidders have pure common values for the objects. The paper concludes that a bundled auction is unambiguously better for the seller than separate auctions when the number of bidders is small.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2002.00663.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 51
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Determinants of Organizational Change and Structural Inertia: Technological and Organizational Factors (2002)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 11 (2002), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: There are a growing body of theoretical work, wide anecdotal evidence, and a few large-scale empirical studies supporting the view that business firms quite rarely change their organizational structure, a phenomenon usually referred to in the literature as structural inertia. The present paper aims to analyze empirically the determinants of structural inertia and organizational change. As far as we know, this work constitutes the first attempt to directly address such issues through econometric estimates based on a large, longitudinal dataset at plant level. For this purpose, we consider changes of the organizational structure within a sample composed of 438 Italian manufacturing plants observed from 1975 to 1996. More precisely, we specify and test a duration model of the likelihood of an individual plant changing the number of hierarchical tiers after a spell r, provided that no change has occurred up to T. We also analyze the direction of change, distinguishing increases from decreases of the number of managerial layers. We consider a set of plant- and industry-specific explanatory variables that are expected to induce or oppose organizational change. The findings show that the adoption of advanced manufacturing technologies and new human-resources management practices favors organizational change. On the contrary, the presence of sunk costs and the extent of influence activities figure prominently in explaining structural inertia of business organizations.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2002.00595.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 52
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Open Source Software: Private Provision of a Public Good (2002)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 11 (2002), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: A simple model of open source software (as typified by the GNU-Linux operating system) is presented. Individual user-programmers decide whether to invest their own effort to develop a software enhancement that will become a public good if so developed. The effect of changing the population size of user-programmers is considered; finite and asymptotic results are given. Welfare results are presented. It is shown that whether development will increase when applications have a modular structure depends on whether the developer base exceeds a critical size. Potential explanations of several stylized facts are given, including why certain useful programs don't get written.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2002.00637.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 53
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    An Economic Approach to the Psychology of Change: Amnesia, Inertia, and Impulsiveness (2002)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 11 (2002), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper examines the effect of memory loss on the continuity of behavior. We consider a player (individual or firm) who remembers previous actions but not underlying rationales. In a stable environment, relative to a full-recall scenario, memory loss increases the probability of following old policies (inertia). In a volatile environment, memory loss can decrease this probability (impulsiveness). The model provides a memory-loss explanation for some documented psychological biases, implies that inertia and organizational routines should be more important in stable environments than in volatile ones, and provides empirical implications relating memory and environmental variables to economic decisions.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2002.00379.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 54
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Venture-Capital Syndication: Improved Venture Selection vs. The Value-Added Hypothesis (2002)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 11 (2002), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Syndication arises when venture capitalists jointly invest in projects. We model and test two possible reasons for syndication: project selection, as an additional venture capitalist provides an informative second opinion; and complementary management skills of additional venture capitalists. The central question is whether venture capitalists are engaged primarily in selection or in managerial value added. These alternatives imply contrasting predictions about comparative returns to syndicated and standalone investments. Our empirical analysis, using Canadian data, finds that syndicated investments have higher returns, favoring the value-added interpretation. We also discuss risk sharing and project scale as possible reasons for syndication.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2002.00423.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 55
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Why Should the Boss Own the Assets? (2002)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 11 (2002), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: In the context of an employment relationship, I present an argument suggesting that it is more efficient for the boss to own the productive assets. The idea is that a conflict between productivity and depreciation is internalized if the player deciding what an asset is used for also has residual claims. An empirical test finds evidence consistent with this. By asking whether the boss should own the assets, the paper reverses the reasoning from the literature in which it is argued that the owner has power and thus is the boss.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2002.00473.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 56
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    In Support of Trigger Strategies: Experimental Evidence from Two-Person Noncooperative Games (2002)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 11 (2002), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Cooperative equilibria can be supported in a repeated game when players use trigger strategies. This paper tests how well trigger strategies explain behavior in two-person experimental games. Reducing payoffs for choices larger than the Cournot level induces smaller average outputs, behavior generally consistent with trigger strategy models. Reducing payoffs for choices well above the Cournot level will not affect behavior if actions are consistent with a trigger strategy involving longer-lived, less intense punishment phases (the grim-reaper strategy), but would matter for trigger strategies with short-lived but intense punishment phases. Results show that behavior is most consistent with the former.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2002.00685.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 57
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Revisiting Oligopolistic Reaction: Are Decisions on Foreign Direct Investment Strategic Complements? (2002)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 11 (2002), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Knickerbocker (1973) introduced the notion of oligopolistic reaction to explain why firms follow rivals into foreign markets. We develop a model that incorporates central features of Knickerbocker's story—oligopoly, uncertainty, and risk aversion—to establish the conditions required to generate follow-the-leader behavior. We find that rival foreign investment will make risk-neutral firms less inclined to move abroad once its rivals have done so. We show that Knickerbocker's prediction relies on risk aversion and derive an expression for the minimum amount of risk aversion needed to generate oligopolistic reaction.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2002.00453.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 58
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Mergers to Monopoly (2002)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 11 (2002), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Horizontal mergers between firms that have different costs are examined. Owners can transfer technology to an acquired firm and decide whether to consolidate or operate their firms as separate entities in the product market. Thus mergers can exhibit both efficiencies and a market-power effect. The prices of target firms are determined via a bargaining game. An equilibrium sequence of mergers entails the largest firm targeting the next largest rival firm. Initially, this sequence of mergers with technology transfers involves no consolidations and improves welfare. Ultimately, the acquisitions lead to consolidation and may decrease total welfare.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2002.00513.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 59
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Product Switching Cost and Strategic Flexibility: Correction (2002)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 11 (2002), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This note corrects Proposition 3 of Chang (1998).
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2002.00547.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 60
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    On the Use of Nonfinancial Performance Measures in Management Compensation (2002)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 11 (2002), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: It is often claimed that (i) managers work too hard on operational issues and do not spend enough effort on strategic activities, and (ii) something can be done about this by introducing nonfinancial performance measures, as for instance with a balanced scorecard. We give an explanation for both claims in a formal model. The distortion toward operational effort arises because with financial performance measures strategic effort can only be rewarded in the future. But renegotiation-proof long-term compensation plans entail too weak variable components in the future. This problem can be reduced by introducing performance measures that help to disentangle strategic and operational effects.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2002.00487.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 61
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Fable of the Keiretsu (2002)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 11 (2002), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Central to so many accounts of post-war Japan, the keiretsu corporate groups lacked economic substance from the start. Conceived by Marxists committed to locating “domination” by “monopoly capital,” they found an early audience among western scholars searching for evidence of culture-specific group behavior in Japan. By the 1990s, they had moved into mainstream economic studies, and keiretsu dummies appeared in virtually all econometric regressions of Japanese industrial or financial structure. Yet the keiretsu began as a figment of the academic imagination, and they remain that today. Regardless of the keiretsu definition used, cross-shareholdings within the “groups” were trivial, even during the years when keiretsu ties were supposedly strongest. Neither does membership proxy for “main bank” ties. Econometric studies basing “keiretsu dummies” on the available rosters produce predictably haphazard and unstable results. In the end, the only reliably robust results are the artifacts of the sample biases created by the definitions themselves.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2002.00169.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 62
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Symposium on Organizational Change (2002)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 11 (2002), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2002.00253.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 63
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Employee Involvement And Pay At Us And Canadian Auto Suppliers (2002)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 11 (2002), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We use survey data and field research to investigate the effects of employee involvement practices on outcomes for blue-collar workers in the auto-supply industry. We find these practices raise wages by 3–5%. The causal mechanism linking involvement and wages appears to be most consistent with efficiency-wage theories, and least consistent with compensating differences. We find no evidence that employee involvement affects plants' survival or employment growth.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2002.00329.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 64
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Patent Licensing Under Strategic Delegation (2002)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 11 (2002), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The modern corporation is characterized both by a separation of ownership from management and by managerial incentives that often include strategic elements in addition to the standard incentive elements. Despite the importance of these two features in the agency and corporate-governance literatures, they are absent in the treatment of the firm in the patent-licensing literature. The analysis in this paper shows how, by simply taking into account these two features of the modern corporation, it is possible to offer a new explanation for the use of royalties in licensing agreements.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2002.00225.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 65
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Network Incentives in Managed Health Care (2002)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 11 (2002), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper introduces a theory of network incentives in managed health care. Participation in the plan's network confers an economic benefit on providers; in exchange, the plan expects compliance with its protocols. The network sets a target for the number of outpatient visits in an episode of care. A provider failing to satisfy the target may be penalized by the plan's attempt to direct patients to other providers within its network. There is an equilibrium in which every provider in the network uses the target. We test the theory by observing behavior of providers before and after the introduction of managed mental health care in a large, employed population. Managed care consisted of price reductions, utilization review, and creation of a network. Quantity per episode of care fell sharply after initiation of managed care. We identify a network effect in our empirical work. The results indicate that in this case, network incentives account for most of the quantity reduction due to managed care.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2002.00001.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 66
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Impact of Activity-Based Costing on Managerial Decisions at Insteel Industries—A Field Study (2002)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 11 (2002), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: In this field-based study, we interview top- and middle-level managers at Insteel Industries and conduct statistical analysis of firm-level data in order to shed light on whether activity-based costing (ABC) provides new information to managers and whether activity-based management (ABM) significantly influences product and customer-related decisions. We find that after the ABC analysis, Insteel undertook a number of process improvements that resulted in significant cost savings. Additionally, Insteel displayed a higher propensity to discontinue or increase prices of products and discontinue customers that were found comparatively unprofitable in the ABC study. Thus we provide empirical evidence that ABC influences both strategic and operational managerial decisions.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2002.00257.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 67
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Managed Care Incentives and Inpatient Complications (2002)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 11 (2002), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Managed care organizations control costs through restrictions on patient access to specialized services, oversight of treatment protocols, and financial incentives for providers. We investigate possible effects of such practices on the care patients receive by studying frequencies of in-hospital complications. We find significant differences in complication rates between managed care and fee-for-service patients. We investigate the sources of this variation by comparing probabilities of complications among patients with different types of managed care coverage and patients treated in different hospitals. For several patient categories, the differences in outcomes we find appear to arise not from differential treatment of patients within hospitals or from heterogeneity in patients, but from variations in care across hospitals that tend to treat patients with different insurance types.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2002.00037.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 68
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Public and Private Provision of Health Care (2002)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 11 (2002), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: One of the mechanisms that are implemented in the cost containment movement in the health care sectors in western countries is the definition, by the third-party payer, of a set of preferred providers. The insured patients have different access rules to such providers when ill. The rules specify the copayments patients must pay when using an out-of-plan care provider. This paper studies the competitive process among providers in terms of both prices and qualities. Competition is influenced by the status of providers as in-plan or out-of-plan care providers. Also, there is a moral hazard of provider choice related to the trade-off between freedom to choose and the need to hold down costs. It is possible to achieve the first-best allocation by an appropriate definition of the reimbursement scheme when decisions on prices and qualities are taken simultaneously (as in primary health care sectors). In contrast, some type of regulation is needed to achieve the optimal solution when decisions are sequential (as in specialized health care sectors). We also derive normative conclusions on how price controls should be implemented in some European Union member states.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2002.00109.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 69
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Optimal Money Burning: Theory and Application to Corporate Dividends (2001)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 10 (2001), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We explore signaling behavior in settings with a discriminating activity and several costly nondiscriminating (“money-burning”) activities. Existing theory provides no basis for selecting one method of burning money over another. When senders have better information about activity costs than receivers, each sender's indifference is resolved, the taxation of a money-burning signal is potentially Pareto-improving, and the use of the taxed activity becomes more widespread as the tax rate rises. We apply this theory to dividend signaling. Its central testable implication—that an increase in the dividend tax increases the likelihood of dividend payout—is verified empirically.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00463.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 70
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Health Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Managed Care (2002)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 11 (2002), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: If an illness is not contractible, then even partially insured consumers demand treatment for it when the benefit is less than the cost, a condition known as moral hazard. Traditional health insurance, which controls moral hazard with copayments (demand management), can result in either a deficient or an excessive provision of treatment relative to ideal insurance. In particular, treatment for a low-probability illness is deficient if illness per se has little effect on the consumer's marginal utility of income and if the consumer's price elasticity of expected demand for treatment is large relative to the risk-spreading distortion when these are evaluated at a copayment that brings forth the ideal provision of treatment. Managed care, which controls moral hazard with physician incentives, can either increase or decrease treatment delivery relative to traditional insurance, depending on whether demand management results in deficient or excessive treatment.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2002.00081.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 71
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Horizontal Integration Between Brand and Generic Firms in the Pharmaceutical Industry (2002)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 11 (2002), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper asserts that brand pharmaceutical firms (those mostly involved in the invention and production of new drugs) engage in a set of complementary activities that are different from those of generic pharmaceutical firms (those that primarily make off-patent medicines). Complementarities of the Milgrom-Roberts variety within, but not across, these two kinds of firms make it more efficient for pharmaceutical firms to specialize in either brand or generic production. Using FDA data, I show that this is indeed the case. I then examine the firms that produce both types of drugs to see if there are market-level strategic synergies between brand and generic products. I find generic entrants that belong to a corporation that owns the brand in the market are (1) not more likely to enter, (2) not more likely to be approved faster, and (3) not more likely to deter other generics from entering. Thus the advantage, or synergy, from mixing brand and generic activities in one corporation must arise elsewhere in the operations of the firm. If not, the integrated pharmaceutical firm is not the most efficient organizational form for the production of ethical drugs.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2002.00135.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 72
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Strategic and Queue effects on Entry in Spanish Banking (2001)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 10 (2001), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper analyzes the factors that influence entry and geographic diversification decisions, a topic of special strategic interest in a context of growing globalization. The empirical model we propose is tested in a framework— the Spanish savings-bank market—where recent deregulation has eliminated the legal barriers to entry. Our results show two important conclusions for the evolution of the effects of branching deregulation in Europe and the US. First, it seems that entry in new geographical markets has been impeded by the strategic interactions between entrants and incumbents. Second, savings banks exhibit a preference for closer locations at the time of expanding, which may have undermined the effects of deregulation and its potential benefits for consumers.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00529.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 73
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Strategic Effects of Vertical Market Structure: Common Agency and Divisionalization in the US Motion Picture Industry (2001)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 10 (2001), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: I examine the release-date scheduling of all motion pictures that went into wide release in the US in 1995 and 1996 to investigate the effects of vertical market structure on competition. The evidence suggests that complex vertical structures involving multiple upstream or downstream firms generally do not achieve efficient outcomes in movie scheduling. In addition, analysis of the data suggests that the production divisions of the major studios act as integrated parts of the studio, rather than as independent competing firms.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00509.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 74
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Asymmetric Information, Bargaining, and International Mergers (2001)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 10 (2001), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The formation of international mergers is examined in the presence of two kinds of asymmetric information, one when a local firm has private information on market size and the other when a foreign firm has private information on its technology. In each situation, parametric configurations are identified under which a merger offer may or may not be made. It also examines the kind of offer and the probability of its acceptance. The likelihood of a merger beingformed is also related to the basic market size, demand uncertainty, and cost uncertainty. Welfare effects of tax/subsidy policies by the host country are also analyzed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00565.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 75
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Price Competition and Advertising Signals: Signaling by Competing Senders (2001)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 10 (2001), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Can price and advertising be used by vertically differentiated duopolists to signal qualities to consumers? We show that pure price separation is impossible if the vertical differentiation is small, while adding dissipative advertising ensures the existence of separating equilibria. Two simple, but nonstandard, equilibrium refinements are introduced to deal with the multisender nature of the game, and they are shown to produce a unique separating and a unique pooling profile. Pooling results in a zero-profit Bertrand outcome. Separation gives strictly positive duopoly profits, and dissipative advertising is used by the high-quality firm when products are sufficiently close substitutes. Finally, compared to the complete-information benchmark, the separating prices of both firms are distorted upwards when the degree of vertical differentiation is large, and downwards when it is small.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00621.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 76
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Financially Interlinked Business Groups* (2001)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 10 (2001), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Financial interlinkage, in the form of cross-holding of equity and debt between firms, characterizes business groups in many countries. We suggest that such financial interlinkage can be viewed as a way to solve credit rationing caused by asymmetric information. If firms possess better information about each other than a bank, then business groups can be a mechanism to induce firms to sort on the basis of this information. Banks can offer a menu of contracts that vary in the extent of financial interlinkage to induce firms to self-select on the basis of the equilibrium composition of the business groups they can form.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00591.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 77
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    On the Evolution of Overconfidence and Entrepreneurs (2001)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 10 (2001), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper explains why seemingly irrational overconfident behavior can persist. Information aggregation is poor in groups in which most individuals herd. By ignoring the herd, the actions of overconfident individuals (“entrepreneurs”) convey their private information. However, entrepreneurs make mistakes and thus die more frequently. The socially optimal proportion of entrepreneurs trades off the positive information externality against high attrition rates of entrepreneurs, and depends on the size of the group, on the degree of overconfidence, and on the accuracy of individuals' private information. The stationary distribution trades off the fitness of the group against the fitness of overconfident individuals.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00301.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 78
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Implicit Contracts, Managerial Incentives, and Financial Structure (2001)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 10 (2001), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper examines how managers may be given incentives to exert effort, and to implement efficient implicit contracts with workers. Under certain assumptions, this can be achieved by tying managerial compensation to shareholder value. However, if reputation effects are weak, it is more efficient to adopt an incentive scheme in which the manager is punished by outside investor intervention when performance falls below a critical level, and otherwise retains control, receiving a fixed reward. The required form of outside intervention can be implemented through a financial structure combining hard debt with a dispersed ownership structure.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00359.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 79
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Electricity Auctions (2001)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 10 (2001), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This article examines auctions in the electricity industry. We find that the laws of physics that rule power transmission networks defeat ex post productive efficiency: the cheapest combination of generating plants is not always selected, not even in the optimal auction. Furthermore, neither the pay-your-bid nor the uniform-price auction coincides in general with the optimal auction, nor do they yield productive efficiency. Our analysis also sheds light on behavior observed in existing power markets, and leads to policy recommendations. First, producers protected by transmission constraints must see their bids capped in the short run to curb their ability to extract large rents. Second, producers apparently hurt by the unavailability of transmission capacity may benefit from it. Hence, contrary to common wisdom, policy makers cannot rely on them to finance or advocate transmission expansion.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00331.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 80
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Trade Secrets and Information Sharing (2001)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 10 (2001), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: If trade secrets are weakly protected by law, firms risk losing their valuable information when employees are hired by competitors. It may therefore be optimal to limit the number of employees who share the trade secrets even if it reduces the firm's productive efficiency. The benefits of limited information sharing are greatest if the efficiency cost is low and the competition in the market is neither very tough nor very weak. It is shown that it is more profitable to reduce the information sharing by giving the employees different information than by giving some employees more information than others.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00391.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 81
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Second-Mover Advantages in Dynamic Quality Competition (2001)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 10 (2001), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper explores a dynamic model of product innovation, extending the work of Dutta, Lach, and Rustichini (1995). It is shown that if R&D costs for quality improvements are low, the dynamic competition is structured as a race for being the pioneer firm with payoff equalization in equilibrium, but switches to a waiting game with a second-mover advantage in equilibrium if R&D costs are high. Moreover, the second-mover advantage increases monotonically as R&D becomes more costly.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00419.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 82
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Endogenously Asynchronous Entries into an Uncertain Industry (2001)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 10 (2001), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We model and analyze a priori symmetric duopoly where supply quantity adjustment is slow and time-consuming. The state of demand is ex ante uncertain, and becomes observable a certain time period after at least one firm's entry. We characterize those conditions under which sequential entries can be endogenously chosen either as an asymmetric pure-strategy equilibrium or as a consequence of a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium. Also, in the limit where information revelation is infinitely fast (i.e., the time period it requires becomes infinitesimally short), the expected waiting time until the first entry does not necessarily become proportionately short, whilst the time interval between the leader's entry and the follower's entry does become infinitesimally short. This suggests that chronologically nearly simultaneous entry should not necessarily be interpreted as counterevidence against leader-follower relations. In addition to equilibrium comparative statics, we also analyze some of the welfare issues associated with strategic timing of entry.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00435.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 83
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Corners in Auctions (2001)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 10 (2001), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Different pricing rules in multiunit auctions provide different incentives for a bidder to corner the auction and thus require different levels of effort from the seller to deter cornering. We consider three different types of auctions: the pay-your-bid or “discriminatory” auction commonly used by the US Treasury, the lowest-winning-bid uniform-price auction used in the current Treasury experiment, and the highest-losing-bid uniform-price auction considered by Vickrey almost four decades ago. We show that the pay-your-bid auction provides the greatest incentive to corner the market, that the experimental Treasury auction provides less incentive, and that the highest-losing-bid uniform-price auction provides the least. Arguably, the less the incentive to corner the market, the easier it will be for sellers to deter cornering, and the greater their expected revenue (net of the cost to deter cornering) will be in otherwise expected-revenue-equivalent auctions.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00265.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 84
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Strategic Quality Decisions under Heterogeneous Resource Endowments (2001)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 10 (2001), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The literature on product competition advocates a differentiation strategy assuming firm homogeneity in resources. However, firm heterogeneity in resource endowments has long been recognized in economics. Merging these two perspectives, we show that the increase in consumer preference for quality leads to firms' aggressive price competition instead of quality differentiation. As consumers look for higher quality, the cost advantage arising from superior resources increases and makes head-to-head competition more profitable than accommodating a less efficient rival. When consumers are highly concerned about quality, even a small resource difference leads a more efficient firm to initiate cutthroat price competition for market dominance.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00235.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 85
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Vertical Integration and Proprietary Information Transfers (2001)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 10 (2001), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Suppose that rival downstream producers of a final good contract with the same upstream supplier of an input and, in the process, reveal private information. A vertical merger between the upstream supplier and one of the downstream firms may dissipate the information advantage of the remaining downstream firms. The welfare consequences of such a merger and related information sharing depend on the value of information, the benefits of integration apart from information sharing, and the nature of upstream competition. In this paper, conditions are found under which owners of a vertically integrated firm are better off breaking up into independent firms. This result may explain AT&T's recent spinoff of Lucent Technologies. Further results suggest that a prohibition on information transfers, such as that often proposed by the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice as a precursor to approving vertical mergers, may actually reduce expected consumer surplus and expected social welfare.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00277.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 86
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Product Differentiation and Upstream-Downstream Relations (2001)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 10 (2001), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper examines the relationship between a differentiated downstream market and a specialized upstream market. We analyze three different types of vertical relation between the upstream and downstream sectors when the upstream market supplies specialized and complementary inputs to a downstream product-differentiated market. The first is the benchmark case of decentralized markets, the second is a network of alliances among upstream suppliers, and the third is partial vertical integration. We identify the perfect equilibrium for a symmetric model in each case and show that there is no simple relationship between the degree of connection between upstream and downstream firms and profitability. The key factor affecting prices and the relative profitability of the different market organizations is the degree of product differentiation among the downstream firms, because it affects the intensity of competition among upstream suppliers. We show that vertical foreclosure is not an equilibrium strategy.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00201.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 87
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Social Cost of Cheap Pseudonyms (2001)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 10 (2001), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We consider the problems of societal norms for cooperation and reputation when it is possible to obtain cheap pseudonyms, something that is becoming quite common in a wide variety of interactions on the Internet. This introduces opportunities to misbehave without paying reputational consequences. A large degree of cooperation can still emerge, through a convention in which newcomers “pay their dues” by accepting poor treatment from players who have established positive reputations. One might hope for an open society where newcomers are treated well, but there is an inherent social cost in making the spread of reputations optional. We prove that no equilibrium can sustain significantly more cooperation than the dues-paying equilibrium in a repeated random matching game with a large number of players in which players have finite lives and the ability to change their identities, and there is a small but nonvanishing probability of mistakes. Although one could remove the inefficiency of mistreating newcomers by disallowing anonymity, this is not practical or desirable in a wide variety of transactions. We discuss the use of entry fees, which permits newcomers to be trusted but excludes some players with low payoffs, thus introducing a different inefficiency. We also discuss the use of free but unreplaceable pseudonyms, and describe a mechanism that implements them using standard encryption techniques, which could be practically implemented in electronic transactions.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00173.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 88
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Introduction to Volume 10 (2001)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 10 (2001), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00001.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 89
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Introduction (2001)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 10 (2001), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00003.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 90
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Theories of Strategic Nonmarket Participation: Majority-Rule and Executive Institutions (2001)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 10 (2001), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper presents theories of strategic nonmarket participation in majority-rule and executive institutions and develops from those theories a set of principles for nonmarket strategy. The theories are based on models of vote recruitment in client and interest-group politics and on models of common agency. The basic strategies developed are majority building, vote recruitment, agenda setting, rent-chain mobilization, majority protection, and competitive agenda setting and vote recruitment.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00047.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 91
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Institutional Environment for Telecommunications Investment (2001)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 10 (2001), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper demonstrates that a structurally derived, internationally comparable index of checks and balances on executive discretion created by variation in political structures and party systems affects relative rates of basic telecommunications infrastructure deployment in 147 countries during the period 1960–1994. Models of infrastructure investment that omit the political characteristics of a prospective host country confound countries whose economic and demographic characteristics point to rapid demand growth for infrastructure services with those that create a potential trap for investors due to a higher probability of arbitrary change in the policy environment. The econometric analysis exploits both cross-sectional and temporal variation in the panel. A robust covariance-matrix estimator based on that developed by Newey and West is used to compute valid standard errors in the presence of heteroskedasticity and within unit-serial correlation, two common characteristics in the error-term structure of panel datasets.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00123.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 92
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Integrated Strategy (2001)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 10 (2001), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper provides a theory of private politics in which an activist seeks to change the production practices of a firm for the purpose of redistribution to those whose interests it supports. The source of the activist's influence is the possibility of support for its cause by the public. The paper also addresses the issue of corporate social responsibility by distinguishing among corporate redistribution as motivated by profit maximization, altruism, and threats by the activist. Private politics and corporate social responsibility not only have a direct effect on the costs of the firm, but also have a strategic effect by altering the competitive positions affirms in an industry. From an integrated-strategy perspective the paper investigates the strategic implications of private politics and corporate social responsibility for the strategies of rival firms when one or both are targets of an activist campaign. Implications for empirical analysis are derived from the theory.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00007.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 93
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Structure and Conduct of Corporate Lobbying: How Firms Lobby the Federal Communications Commission (2001)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 10 (2001), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper examines the amount and organization (individual vs. collective) of lobbying by firms in administrative agencies. It explores the power and limitations of the collective-action theories and transaction-cost theories in explaining lobbying. It introduces a dataset of over 900 lobbying contacts covering 101 issues at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in early 1998. It finds that the structure and conduct of large-firm lobbying at the FCC is consistent with the predictions of theories of transaction costs and the main results of theories of collective action. Small firms show little sensitivity to collective-action issues or transaction-cost issues in the organization of their lobbying, but they do lobby less when having to reveal proprietary information. In sum, large firms behave in a manner largely consistent with theoretical predictions, while small firms do not.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00091.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 94
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Saints and Markets: Activists and the Supply of Credence Goods (2001)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 10 (2001), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper contains a theoretical exploration of the potential effects of an information-supplying activist on a market for credence goods. Using a non-cooperative game-theoretic model with incomplete information, we find that such an activist can alter the decisions of firms and consumers and enhance the social welfare of market exchange. We also find that an activist can support equilibria in which firms differentiate their products on some credence characteristic even though this characteristic remains unknown to the consumer both prior and subsequent to consumption. In general, our analysis has several implications for the study of private collective action in markets.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2001.00149.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 95
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    ON THE WEALTH DYNAMICS OF SWEDISH FAMILIES, 1984–98 (2004)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Review of income and wealth 50 (2004), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1475-4991
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper focuses on three issues. First, it analyzes the increasing inequality of wealth in Sweden in terms of percentile age and birth cohort differences, and finds very weak evidence of life-cycle savings. There are rather strong birth cohort differences in wealth accumulation. Second, it is shown that bequests and inter vivo gifts contribute to the age and cohort differences in wealth, but do not increase the inequality of wealth. The third theme is mobility of wealth as a function of bequests, age, period, length of the transition period, and the magnitude of quantile differences.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0034-6586.2004.00136.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 96
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    ASSET POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1984–99: EVIDENCE FROM THE PANEL STUDY OF INCOME DYNAMICS (2004)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Review of income and wealth 50 (2004), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1475-4991
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Using PSID data for the years 1984–99, we estimate the level and severity of asset poverty. We find that despite a sharp decline in the official poverty rate, the asset poverty rate barely budged over this period. Moreover, the severity of asset poverty increased during this period. The likelihood of being asset-poor decreased for those who are college graduates or married with children, whereas it increased for those who are white, for the unmarried elderly, and for those without a college degree. Lifetime events such as changes in job market, marital and homeownership status are correlated with transitions into and out of asset poverty.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0034-6586.2004.00137.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 97
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    RANK AND QUANTITY MOBILITY IN THE EMPIRICAL DYNAMICS OF INEQUALITY (2004)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Review of income and wealth 50 (2004), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1475-4991
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Horizontal and vertical measures of inequality are related through mobility. The paper draws attention to two types of mobility: quantity mobility, which refers to mobility in income itself, and rank mobility, which refers to mobility in the position in the distribution of income. Individually matched census data for earnings in Israel are used to illustrate these concepts empirically. Mobility is measured between 1983 and 1995. It is shown that earnings in Israel are highly mobile. The high degree of earnings mobility implies that horizontal measures of inequality considerably overstate the underlying level of inequality. The method of errors in variables is used to distinguish between current and permanent mobility and inequality. Permanent earnings are more equal than current earnings and less mobile. Finally, the methodology is applied to PSID. It is shown that earnings were more mobile in Israel than in the United States.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0034-6586.2004.00138.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 98
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    POVERTY, NON-WHITE POVERTY, AND THE SEN INDEX (2004)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Review of income and wealth 50 (2004), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1475-4991
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper investigates the impact of economic growth, and more specifically robust economic growth along with other macroeconomic determinants, on poverty levels using both the U.S. official measure of poverty and an estimated time series of Sen indices of poverty. The results reveal that the period of robust economic expansion that the U.S. economy experienced during the 1990s did not have a significant impact on poverty using either measure. In addition, we find that the impact of growth and other macro controls is dramatically different when a subset of the poverty population, namely non-white poverty, is investigated. The percentage of households headed by women is shown to be a significant factor in examining poverty for this subgroup.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0034-6586.2004.00139.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 99
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    MEASURES OF STOCK MARKET VALUE AND RETURNS FOR THE U.S. NONFINANCIAL CORPORATE SECTOR, 1900–2002 (2004)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Review of income and wealth 50 (2004), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1475-4991
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper describes a new dataset of annual time series relating to the U.S. nonfinancial corporate sector: its market value, returns, and the major underlying stocks and flows that are valued by financial markets. The data cover the entire twentieth century, and thus fill a significant gap in the documentation of financial and real economy linkages. Previously available data cover either shorter periods, or a more restricted sample of quoted companies. A range of series are constructed on a consistent basis: returns; dividend yields (including an alternative “cashflow” measure); earnings; and “q”, on a range of definitions; as well as corporate leverage measures. The main features are: the relative long-run stability of both q and the cashflow dividend yield; the systematic tendency for q to be less than unity; and the ambiguous picture presented by alternative measures of corporate leverage.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0034-6586.2004.00140.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 100
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR RESEARCH IN INCOME AND WEALTH (2004)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Review of income and wealth 50 (2004), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1475-4991
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0034-6586.2004.00142.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
Close ⊗
This website uses cookies and the analysis tool Matomo. More information can be found here...