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  • Articles  (8)
  • auctions  (8)
  • Springer  (8)
  • American Geophysical Union (AGU)
  • Annual Reviews
  • Blackwell Publishing Ltd
  • 2000-2004  (8)
  • 1980-1984
  • 1935-1939
  • Economics  (8)
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  • Articles  (8)
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  • Springer  (8)
  • American Geophysical Union (AGU)
  • Annual Reviews
  • Blackwell Publishing Ltd
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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Experts and Amateurs: The Role of Experience in Internet Auctions (2000)
    Springer
    Marketing letters 11 (2000), S. 363-374 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-059X
    Keywords: auctions ; electronic commerce ; consumer behavior
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract The use of auctions as a pricing mechanism has grown dramatically over the last few years. The introduction of electronic auctions has significantly widened the pool of consumers who participate in auctions and increased the number of companies attempting to sell their products in an auction format. Previous empirical research on auctions has focused almost exclusively on the behavior of professional bidders in high stakes common value auctions or the behavior of students in laboratory experiments. We collect data on a large number of electronic auctions, across four product categories, to explore the behavior of consumers bidding in a real marketplace. In particular, we focus on the role experience plays in their bidding behavior to uncover whether consumer learning drives the bidding process towards outcomes described in the theoretical literature on auctions. We find that experience does indeed lead to behavior which is more consistent with theory although the proportion of experienced bidders who behave in a manner inconsistent with theory remains quite large.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1008141313927
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Dominant Strategy Adoption and Bidders' Experience with Pricing Rules (2000)
    Springer
    Experimental economics 3 (2000), S. 261-280 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-6938
    Keywords: auctions ; experiments ; dominant strategy ; nonparametric coefficient ; restriction test
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Truthful revelation is a dominant strategy in both English (oral ascending bid) and second-price sealed-bid private-values auctions. Controlled observations of English auctions are largely consistent with the dominant strategy prediction, but laboratory second-price auctions exhibit substantial and persistent overbidding, even with prior experience. However, the experience of having bid in an English auction has a significant learning effect, moving bidding in subsequent second-price auctions closer to the dominant strategy. I explore two treatments isolating facets of the lessons learned from English auction participation, leading me to the following conclusions. Part of the lesson carried over appears to be considering prices one-by-one, but most of it appears to be a crude awareness that overbidding leads to losses. A claim that English auction experience teaches subjects to recognize the dominant strategy in second-price auctions seems overly optimistic. I introduce a nonparametric technique to test coefficient restrictions when the assumption of normally distributed errors is untenable.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1011476619484
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Dominant strategy adoption and bidders' experience with pricing rules (2000)
    Springer
    Experimental economics 3 (2000), S. 261-280 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-6938
    Keywords: auctions ; experiments ; dominant strategy ; nonparametric coefficient ; restriction test ; D44 ; C9
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Truthful revelation is a dominant strategy in both English (oral ascending bid) and second-price sealed-bid privatevalues auctions. Controlled observations of English auctions are largely consistent with the dominant strategy prediction, but laboratory second-price auctions exhibit substantial and persistent overbidding, even with prior experience. However, the experience of having bid in an English auction has a significant learning effect, moving bidding in subsequent second-price auctions closer to the dominant strategy. I explore two treatments isolating facets of the lessons learned from English auction participation, leading me to the following conclusions. Part of the lesson carried over appears to be considering prices one-by-one, but most of it appears to be a crude awareness that overbidding leads to losses. A claim that English auction experience teaches subjects to recognize the dominant strategy in second-price auctions seems overly optimistic. I introduce a nonparametric technique to test coefficient restrictions when the assumption of normally distributed errors is untenable.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01669775
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Robustness of the incentive compatible combinatorial auction (2000)
    Springer
    Experimental economics 3 (2000), S. 31-53 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-6938
    Keywords: combinatorial ; auctions ; Vickrey ; experiments ; D44 ; C90
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Goods are said to be combinatorial when the value of a bundle of goods is not equal to the sum of the values of the same goods unbundled. Investigations of combinatorial allocation problems should recognize that there are two separate aspects of such problems: anenvironmental distinction between multiple-unit allocation problems which involve combinatorial goods and those which do not do so, and aninstitutional distinction between auctions in which combinatorial values can be expressed as part of the bidding rules and those in which they cannot. Forsythe and Isaac (Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 2 (1982). Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, Inc.) reports the extension of the Vickrey auction into a demand-revealing, multiple unit, private goods auction that can incorporate combinatorial values. This current paper places that theoretically demand-revealing institution in a series of experimental environments in order to generate results (e.g. efficiencies) which may serve as a benchmark for other auctions (combinatorial or otherwise) whose implementation characteristics may be more favorable. To aid in interpretation of our Vickrey experimental results, we also provide results of alternatives to Vickrey allocations from both institutional and heuristic sources, as well as a discussion of the source of the Vickrey auctions high efficiencies even in the presence of misrevelation.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01669206
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A Market-Based Mechanism for Allocating Space Shuttle Secondary Payload Priority (2000)
    Springer
    Experimental economics 2 (2000), S. 173-195 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-6938
    Keywords: mechanism design ; auctions ; scheduling
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This is an investigation into the design of a market-based process to replace NASA's current committee process for allocating Shuttle secondary payload resources (lockers, Watts and crew). The market-based process allocates budgets of tokens to NASA internal organizations that in turn use the budget to bid for priority for their middeck payloads. The scheduling algorithm selects payloads by priority class and maximizes the number of tokens bid to determine a manifest. The results of a number of controlled experiments show that such a system tends to allocate resources more efficiently by guiding participants to make resource and payload tradeoffs. Most participants were able to improve their position over NASA's current ranking system. Furthermore, those that are better off make large improvements while the few that do worse have relatively small losses.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1009900310537
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A market-based mechanism for allocating space Shuttle secondary payload priority (2000)
    Springer
    Experimental economics 2 (2000), S. 173-195 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-6938
    Keywords: mechanism design ; auctions ; scheduling ; C92
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This is an investigation into the design of a market-based process to replace NASA's current committee process for allocating Shuttle secondary payload resources (lockers, Watts and crew). The market-based process allocates budgets of tokens to NASA internal organizations that in turn use the budget to bid for priority for their middeck payloads. The scheduling algorithm selects payloads by priority class and maximizes the number of tokens bid to determine a manifest. The results of a number of controlled experiments show that such a system tends to allocate resources more efficiently by guiding participants to make resource and payload tradeoffs. Most participants were able to improve their position over NASA's current ranking system. Furthermore, those that are better off make large improvements while the few that do worse have relatively small losses.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01669195
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Robustness of the Incentive Compatible Combinatorial Auction (2000)
    Springer
    Experimental economics 3 (2000), S. 31-53 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-6938
    Keywords: combinatorial ; auctions ; Vickrey ; experiments
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract Goods are said to be combinatorial when the value of a bundle of goods is not equal to the sum of the values of the same goods unbundled. Investigations of combinatorial allocation problems should recognize that there are two separate aspects of such problems: an environmental distinction between multiple-unit allocation problems which involve combinatorial goods and those which do not do so, and an institutional distinction between auctions in which combinatorial values can be expressed as part of the bidding rules and those in which they cannot. Forsythe and Isaac (Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 2 (1982). Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, Inc.) reports the extension of the Vickrey auction into a demand-revealing, multiple unit, private goods auction that can incorporate combinatorial values. This current paper places that theoretically demand-revealing institution in a series of experimental environments in order to generate results (e.g. efficiencies) which may serve as a benchmark for other auctions (combinatorial or otherwise) whose implementation characteristics may be more favorable. To aid in interpretation of our Vickrey experimental results, we also provide results of alternatives to Vickrey allocations from both institutional and heuristic sources, as well as a discussion of the source of the Vickrey auctions high efficiencies even in the presence of misrevelation.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1009942024096
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Design of ``Smart'' Water Market Institutions Using Laboratory Experiments (2000)
    Springer
    Environmental and resource economics 17 (2000), S. 375-394 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-1502
    Keywords: auctions ; laboratory experiments ; mechanism design ; water markets
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Energy, Environment Protection, Nuclear Power Engineering , Economics
    Notes: Abstract One of the problems with proposals for substantialinstitutional change in water systems is thatmodification and irreversibility make the processslow, cautious and costly to society. In this paper,we discuss the role that experimental economics canplay in evaluating proposed institutional changes tohelp facilitate a more rapid and smooth adoption ofchanges in the water system. Experimental economicsyields a formal and replicable system for analyzingalternative market structures before they are actuallyimplemented. For example, a water market can bedeveloped and tested in the laboratory under supplyand demand constraints that reflect drought conditionsthat might occur in California, or other arid regionsin the world. We present a prototype of a Californiawater transfer model and the results from a series ofwater market experiments. Results include realizedmarket efficiency and surplus distribution, as well asan analysis of market price volatility. Theimplications of this research extend well beyondCalifornia water markets, not only to water markets inother arid regions, but also to the design of marketsfor other environmental goods, including tradablepollution permits and fishery ITQs.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1026598014870
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