Publication Date:
2018-06-12
Description:
As we went through the program, what we determined, and what we all agreed on, was that the thrust coefficient (Cf) of the nozzle, after you get past a certain point, is really an engineering parameter. It s not a fundamental parameter that is going to be highly variable. Once we knew what the contour of the nozzle was, and once we knew what its characteristic was out to 2:1, we could calculate what the 48:1 thrust coefficient was going to be. In every case that we made a test, the calculation was precise. We weren't looking for a problem out at 48:1. Once we crushed the nozzle and said, "Yeah, we can land on the boulder," and once we had the thermal profile of that columbium nozzle, we did not require a lot of effort there. The real characterization was done in throttling over the 10:1 with the injector and controlling the mixture ratio on that - the whole head-end assembly - out to 2:1. I think everybody at NASA and Grumman agreed that flying like you test is great, particularly if you are using an aircraft engine. But, in this case, the thrust coefficient of the nozzle was not an issue. We had the tandem configuration of the service module, the command module, and the LEM sitting out there, and we were to fire the LEM. On Apollo 5, we were firing the LEM to show how it would work. There was a problem. I can t remember where the problem was, but something caused a problem before that engine had finished its burn. It was not in the engine, but there was some other problem, and NASA made a controlled shutdown. Then, they came to us and asked, "Hey, we re up there. We want to finish this test program. Is it okay if we restart that engine again in space with this tandem configuration?" We said, "As long as it has been more than forty minutes since you shut down, our analysis says that you will be okay in terms of the thermal characteristics of the inside of that chamber." They restarted it and pushed that system around in orbit on Apollo 5. It turned out, that when it came to Apollo 13, we went back into the record, and said, "Hey, we have pushed this system around up there on Apollo 5, and we have also restarted this tandem configuration." The requirements on Apollo 13 were to put it back into play. The spacecraft was out of free return to the earth at the time of the accident. It would not have come back. NASA said, "Okay, we ll use the descent engine to put the spacecraft in a free trajectory; it will go around the moon and be on free trajectory back to Earth." Then, as it came around the far side of the moon, the guys found out that they had an oxygen problem. As you remember, things were getting pretty bad in there. They said, "We ve got to get it back as fast as we can. Is it okay if we re-fire the engine? Now, we re in a free trajectory, so we want to put as much delta-v (or change in velocity) in as we can. Can we re-fire right now?" We said, "Yes, the data says it has been this period of time." We could re-fire the engine, run the rest of the duty cycle up as far as we needed while preserving enough fluids to make the final correction as the spacecraft got near Earth, and restart the engine. It was pretty fortuitous that we could give them those answers.
Keywords:
Spacecraft Propulsion and Power
Type:
Remembering the Giants: Apollo Rocket Propulsion Development; 75-88, 153-172; NASA/SP-2009-4545
Format:
application/pdf
Permalink
