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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    “X” meansX: Fodor/Warfield semantics (1994)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 4 (1994), S. 215-231 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Meaning ; representation ; disjunction problem ; Twin-Earth ; Fodor ; asymmetric causal dependency ; actual ; naturalized semantics ; information
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract In an earlier paper, we argued that Fodorian Semantics has serious difficulties. However, we suggested possible ways that one might attempt to fix this. Ted Warfield suggests that our arguments can be deflected and he does this by making the very moves that we suggested. In our current paper, we respond to Warfield's attempts to revise and defend Fodorian Semantics against our arguments that such a semantic theory is both too strong and too weak. To get around our objections, Warfield proposes a modified reading of one of Fodor's conditions and proposes adding a new condition to the theory. We show that neither the modified reading nor the additional condition saves the asymmetric causal dependency approach to naturalized semantics.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974146
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  • 2
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    Thought and qualia (1994)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 4 (1994), S. 283-302 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Consciousness ; qualia ; intentionality ; secondary properties ; functionalism ; physicalism ; propositional attitudes
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract I present a theory of the nature and basis of the conscious experience characteristic of occurent propositional attitudes: thinking this or that. As a preliminary I offer an extended criticism of Paul Schweizer's treatment of such consciousness as unexplained secondary qualities of neural events. I also attempt to rebut arguments against the possibility of functionalist accounts of conscious experience and qualia.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974195
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  • 3
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    The secret operations of the mind (1994)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 4 (1994), S. 303-315 
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    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Hume ; cognitive science ; history of ; knowledge representation ; functionalism
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract David Hume is widely believed to be one of the founders of functionalism. His principles of association are seen as an early attempt to articulate a mechanics of the mind akin to Newtonian mechanics. It is argued that this view is based on a failure to appreciate that Hume's skepticism about reason extends to our ability to understand the representation of everyday knowledge. For Hume there are “secret operations” of the mind, operations for which functional explanations are not forthcoming. Hume's place in the history of cognitive science is reevaluated in light of his views on common sense knowledge and belief formation.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974196
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
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    Can computers carry content ‘inexplicitly’? (1994)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 4 (1994), S. 333-344 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Emergence ; content ; information ; representation ; computers
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract I examine whether it is possible for content relevant to a computer's behavior to be carried without an explicit internal representation. I consider three approaches. First, an example of a chess playing computer carrying ‘emergent’ content is offered from Dennett. Next I examine Cummins’ response to this example. Cummins says Dennett's computer executes a rule which is inexplicitly represented. Cummins describes a process wherein a computer interprets explicit rules in its program, implements them to form a chess-playing device, then this device executes the rules in a way that exhibits them inexplicitly. Though this approach is intriguing, I argue that the chess-playing device cannot exist as imagined. The processes of interpretation and implementation produce explicit representations of the content claimed to be inexplicit. Finally, the Chinese Room argument is examined and shown not to save the notion of inexplicit information. This means the strategy of attributing inexplicit content to a computer which is executing a rule, fails.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974198
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  • 5
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    Intentionality, qualia, and mind/brain identity (1994)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 4 (1994), S. 259-282 
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    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Intentionality ; qualia ; consciousness ; functionalism ; mental content ; secondary qualities ; physicalism
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract The paper examines the status of conscious presentation with regard to mental content and intentional states. I argue that conscious presentation of mental content should be viewed on the model of a secondary quality, as a subjectiveeffect of the microstructure of an underlying brain state. The brain state is in turn viewed as the instantiation of an abstract computational state, with the result that introspectively accessible content is interpreted as a presentation of the associated computational state realized by the brain. However, if the relation between consciousness and representational content is construed in this manner, then conscious presentation does not provide an adequate foundation for the claim that human mental states areintrinsically intentional. On this model, I argue that functionalism is able to account for (non-intrinsic) intentionality, but not for consciousness, which has implications for the computational paradigm, as well as for Searle's Chinese room thought experiment.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974194
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  • 6
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    Connectionism, explicit rules, and symbolic manipulation (1993)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 3 (1993), S. 183-200 
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    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Connectionism ; representation ; explicit rules
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract At present, the prevailing Connectionist methodology forrepresenting rules is toimplicitly embody rules in “neurally-wired” networks. That is, the methodology adopts the stance that rules must either be hard-wired or “trained into” neural structures, rather than represented via explicit symbolic structures. Even recent attempts to implementproduction systems within connectionist networks have assumed that condition-action rules (or rule schema) are to be embodied in thestructure of individual networks. Such networks must be grown or trained over a significant span of time. However, arguments are presented herein that humanssometimes follow rules which arevery rapidly assignedexplicit internal representations, and that humans possessgeneral mechanisms capable of interpreting and following such rules. In particular, arguments are presented that thespeed with which humans are able to follow rules ofnovel structure demonstrates the existence of general-purpose rule following mechanisms. It is further argued that the existence of general-purpose rule following mechanisms strongly indicates that explicit rule following is not anisolated phenomenon, but may well be a common and important aspect of cognition. The relationship of the foregoing conclusions to Smolensky's view of explicit rule following is also explored. The arguments presented here are pragmatic in nature, and are contrasted with thekind of arguments developed by Fodor and Pylyshyn in their recent, influential paper.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00975531
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  • 7
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    Life and teleology (1992)
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 23 (1992), S. 85-103 
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    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: life ; teleology ; evolution ; reality ; representation ; experience
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Summary A comprehensive definition of the phenomenon called “life” led to the addition of many dimensions to the natural sciences, and especially the conscious mental dimension. Historical attention is paid not only to those employing the natural philosophical paradigms, but also to evolutionary theories and to the Kantian teleological philosophy. The belief that science can solve the riddle of life is a category of purposal thinking. A revised version of critical teleology is essential for comprehension of life.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01801797
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  • 8
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    Infons as mathematical objects (1992)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 2 (1992), S. 185-201 
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    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Constraint ; individuation scheme ; infon ; information ; representation ; type
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract I argue that the role played by infons in the kind of mathematical theory of information being developed by several workers affiliated to CSLI is analogous to that of the various number systems in mathematics. In particular, I present a mathematical construction of infons in terms of representations and informational equivalences between them. The main theme of the paper arose from an electronic mail exchange with Pat Hayes of Xeroxparc. The exposition derives from a talk I gave at theTheories of Partial Information conference held at the University of Texas at Austin, January 1990.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00704457
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  • 9
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    “X” means X: Semantics Fodor-style (1992)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 2 (1992), S. 175-183 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Meaning ; representation ; disjunction problem ; information semantics ; Fodor ; asymmetric causal dependency
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract InPsychosemantics Jerry Fodor offered a list of sufficient conditions for a symbol “X” to mean something X. The conditions are designed to reduce meaning to purely non-intentional natural relations. They are also designed to solve what Fodor has dubbed the “disjunction problem”. More recently, inA Theory of Content and Other Essays, Fodor has modified his list of sufficient conditions for naturalized meaning in light of objections to his earlier list. We look at his new set of conditions and give his motivation for them-tracing them to problems in the literature. Then we argue that Fodor's conditions still do not work. They are open to objections of two different varieties: they are too strong and too weak. We develop these objections and indicate why Fodor's new, improved list of conditions still do not work to naturalize meaning.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00704456
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  • 10
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    Virtual Symposium on Virtual Mind (1992)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 2 (1992), S. 217-238 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Chinese Room Argument ; Searle ; Turing Test ; computationalism ; functionalism ; hermeneutics ; implementation ; mind ; other-minds problem ; robotics ; semantics ; symbol grounding ; virtual reality
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract When certain formal symbol systems (e.g., computer programs) are implemented as dynamic physical symbol systems (e.g., when they are run on a computer) their activity can be interpreted at higher levels (e.g., binary code can be interpreted as LISP, LISP code can be interpreted as English, and English can be interpreted as a meaninguful conversation). These higher levels of interpretability are called ‘virtual’ systems. If such a virtual system is interpretable as if it had a mind, is such a ‘virtual mind’ real? This is the question addressed in this ‘virtual’ symposium, originally conducted electronically among four cognitive scientists. Donald Perlis, a computer scientist, argues that according to the computationalist thesis, virtual minds are real and hence Searle's Chinese Room Argument fails, because if Searle memorized and executed a program that could pass the Turing Test in Chinese he would have a second, virtual, Chinese-understanding mind of which he was unaware (as in multiple personality). Stevan Harnad, a psychologist, argues that Searle's Argument is valid, virtual minds are just hermeneutic overinterpretations, and symbols must be grounded in the real world of objects, not just the virtual world of interpretations. Computer scientist Patrick Hayes argues that Searle's Argument fails, but because Searle does not really implement the program: a real implementation must not be homuncular but mindless and mechanical, like a computer. Only then can it give rise to a mind at the virtual level. Philosopher Ned Block suggests that there is no reason a mindful implementation would not be a real one.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02454221
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  • 11
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    Notationality and the information processing mind (1991)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 129-165 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Computation ; cognition ; representation ; information processing ; physical symbol systems ; language of thought
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Cognitive science uses the notion of computational information processing to explain cognitive information processing. Some philosophers have argued that anything can be described as doing computational information processing; if so, it is a vacuous notion for explanatory purposes. An attempt is made to explicate the notions of cognitive information processing and computational information processing and to specify the relationship between them. It is demonstrated that the resulting notion of computational information processing can only be realized in a restrictive class of dynamical systems called physical notational systems (after Goodman's theory of notationality), and that the systems generally appealed to by cognitive science-physical symbol systems-are indeed such systems. Furthermore, it turns out that other alternative conceptions of computational information processing, Fodor's (1975) Language of Thought and Cummins' (1989) Interpretational Semantics appeal to substantially the same restrictive class of systems. The necessary connection of computational information processing with notationality saves the enterprise from charges of vacuousness and has some interesting implications for connectionism. But, unfortunately, it distorts the subject matter and entails some troubling consequences for a cognitive science which tries to make notationality do the work of genuine mental representations.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00361034
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  • 12
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    Connectionism isn't magic (1991)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 167-184 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Connectionism ; eliminativism ; propositional attitudes ; representation ; symbols
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Ramsey, Stich and Garon's recent paper ‘Connectionism, Eliminativism, and the Future of Folk Psychology’ claims a certain style of connectionism to be the final nail in the coffin of folk psychology. I argue that their paper fails to show this, and that the style of connectionism they illustrate can in fact supplement, rather than compete with, the claims of a theory of cognition based in folk psychology's ontology. Ramsey, Stich and Garon's argument relies on the lack of easily identifiable symbols inside the connectionist network they discuss, and they suggest that the existence of a system which behaves in a cognitively interesting way, but which cannot be explained by appeal to internal symbol processing, falsifies central assumptions of folk psychology. My claim is that this argument is flawed, and that the theorist need not discard folk psychology in order to accept that the network illustrated exhibits cognitively interesting behaviour, even if it is conceded that symbols cannot be readily identified within the network.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00361035
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  • 13
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    Searles Kritik am Funktionalismus — Eine Untersuchung des Chinesischzimmers (1991)
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 22 (1991), S. 321-336 
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    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: functionalism ; intentionality ; simulation ; mental state
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Summary Searle claims that for a machine to have intentional states it is not sufficient that a formal programme be instantiated. Various types of objections to this claim have been brought up by Searle's critics. Searle's replies to some of these objections are analysed. It turns out that it is more to these objections than Searle wants to make us believe. What is crucial, however, is that Searle's „Gedankenexperiment“ results in a dilemma. At the outset of the dilemma there are two ways of not understanding. According to one of these ways a person (Searle's homunculus) does not understand something without knowing that s/he does not understand. While in the other mode the person knows that s/he doesn't understand. In the first case the inference from facts about the homunculus to facts about the computer is not valid whereas in the second case one would attribute mental states to the computer. Thereby Searle's claim turns out to be unfounded.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01801213
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  • 14
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    Why there are no mental representations (1991)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 1-30 
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    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Artificial intelligence ; content ; cognitive science ; mind-body problem ; representation ; semantic ; syntax
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract I argue that there are no mental representations, in the sense of “representation” used in standard computational theories of the mind. I take Cummins' Meaning and Mental Representation as my stalking-horse, and argue that his view, once properly developed, is self-defeating. The argument implicitly undermines Fodor's view of the mind; I draw that conclusion out explicitly. The idea of mental representations can then only be saved by appeal to a Dennett-like instrumentalism; so I argue against that too. Finally, I argue that there is no good metaphysical reason in favour of believing in mental representations and that cognitive science can manage perfectly well without them.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00360576
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  • 15
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    Science in the age of mechanical reproduction: moral and epistemic relations between diagrams and photographs (1991)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 6 (1991), S. 205-226 
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    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Diagrams ; ethnomethodology ; knowledge ; photography ; representation ; science ; sociology
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Sociologists, philosophers and historians of science are gradually recognizing the importance of visual representation. This is part of a more general movement away from a theory-centric view of science and towards an interest in practical aspects of observation and experimentation. Rather than treating science as a matter of demonstrating the logical connection between theoretical and empirical statements, an increasing number of investigations are examining how scientists compose and use diagrams, graphs, photographs, micrographs, maps, charts, and related visual displays. This paper focuses on diagrams in biology, and tries to demonstrate how diagrams are an integral part of the production of scientific knowledge. In order to disclose some of the distinctive practical and analytical uses of diagrams, the paper contrasts the way diagrams and photographs are used in biological texts. Both diagrams and photographs are shown to be “constructions” that separately and together mediate the investigation of scientific phenoman.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02426838
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  • 16
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    Representations of the Natural System in the Nineteenth century (1991)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 6 (1991), S. 255-274 
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    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Classification ; diagrams ; evolution ; history ; natural history ; natural system ; ornithology ; phylogeny ; representation ; systematics ; taxonomy
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract ‘The Natural System’ is the abstract notion of the order in living diversity. The richness and complexity of this notion is revealed by the diversity of representations of the Natural System drawn by ornithologists in the Nineteenth Century. These representations varied in overall form from stars, to circles, to maps, to evolutionary trees and cross-sections through trees. They differed in their depiction of affinity, analogy, continuity, directionality, symmetry, reticulation and branching, evolution, and morphological convergence and divergence. Some representations were two-dimensional, and some were three-dimensional; n-dimensional representations were discussed but never illustrated. The study of diagrammatic representations of the Natural System is made difficult by the frequent failure of authors to discuss them in their texts, and by the consequent problem of distinguishing features which carried meaning from arbitrary features and printing conventions which did not. Many of the systematics controversies of the last thirty years have their roots in the conceptual problems which surrounded the Natural System in the late 1800s, problems which were left unresolved when interest in higher-level systematics declined at the turn of this century.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02426840
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  • 17
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    Künstliche Intelligenz und Philosophie (1990)
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 21 (1990), S. 347-358 
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    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: artificial intelligence ; understanding ; representation ; meaning ; intentionality ; teleology ; subjectivity ; semiotics ; philosophical anthropology
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Summary Artificial Intelligence can be considered as the so far last attempt to decode the anthropological comparison between human beings and machines. Thereby it also represents in a prominent way what can be called “systemic thought”. Searle's conclusive argument against strong AI (that is the idea of computers having intention in a literal way) refers to his precise distinction between syntax and semantics. This difference obviously opposing some of Searle's other essential ideas will only convince if it also explains the genetic-pragmatic aspect. A theory explaining the “life of mind” and the possibility of understanding needs to combine representation and intention with the subjective causation of signs. At the same time they have to be contextualized within a model of teleologically interpreted life recognized with the help of self-experience and self-reflection. This suggests that AI is a simulation which wrongly believes to be a real duplication. Actually it is a semiotic reduction (syntax and semantic surface of signs only) and a psychological compensation (Turing test) connected with a genetic or abductive fallacy. The biological decontextualization, in fact the elimination of teleology and intention, the deconstruction of subjectivity, the loss of the genetic-pragmatic dimension and the abductive fallacy induce the strong AI to confuse its surface-illusion of simulated understanding with the real process itself.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01801043
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  • 18
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    Causes, proximate and ultimate (1990)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 5 (1990), S. 401-415 
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    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Proximate cause ; ultimate cause ; function ; functionalism ; structuralism ; adaptation ; sociobiology ; behavioral ecology
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Within evolutionary biology a distinction is frequently made between proximate and ultimate causes. One apparently plausible interpretation of this dichotomy is that proximate causes concern processes occurring during the life of an organism while ultimate causes refer to those processes (particularly natural selection) that shaped its genome. But “ultimate causes” are not sought through historical investigations of an organisms lineage. Rather, explanations referring to ultimate causes typically emerge from functional analyses. But these functional analyses do not identify causes of any kind, much less ultimate ones. So-called “ultimate explanations” are not about causes in any sense resembling those of proximate explanations. The attitude, implicit in the term “ultimate cause”, that these functional analyses are somehow superordinate to those involving “proximate causes” is unfounded. “Ultimate causes” are neither ultimate nor causes.
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    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02207379
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