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  • Articles  (7)
  • cognition  (7)
  • 2015-2019
  • 1990-1994  (7)
  • 1915-1919
  • Philosophy  (7)
  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Symbols, neurons, soap-bubbles and the neural computation underlying cognition (1994)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 4 (1994), S. 439-449 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Computation ; dynamics ; symbolic-dynamics ; cognition ; neural-networks
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract A wide range of systems appear to perform computation: what common features do they share? I consider three examples, a digital computer, a neural network and an analogue route finding system based on soap-bubbles. The common feature of these systems is that they have autonomous dynamics — their states will change over time without additional external influence. We can take advantage of these dynamics if we understand them well enough to map a problem we want to solve onto them. Programming consists of arranging the starting state of a system so that the effects of the system's dynamics on some of its variables corresponds to the effects of the equations which describe the problem to be solved on their variables. The measured dynamics of a system, and hence the computation it may be performing, depend on the variables of the system we choose to attend to. Although we cannot determine which are the appropriate variables to measure in a system whose computation basis is unknown to us I go on to discuss how grammatical classifications of computational tasks and symbolic machine reconstruction techniques may allow us to rule out some measurements of a system from contributing to computation of particular tasks. Finally I suggest that these arguments and techniques imply that symbolic descriptions of the computation underlying cognition should be stochastic and that symbols in these descriptions may not be atomic but may have contents in alternative descriptions.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974169
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    Paper (German National Licenses)
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Computation is just interpretable symbol manipulation; cognition isn't (1994)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 4 (1994), S. 379-390 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Causality ; cognition ; computation ; consciousness ; continuity ; implementation ; robotics ; sensorimotor transduction ; semantics ; symbol systems ; syntax ; Turing Machine ; Turing Test
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Computation is interpretable symbol manipulation. Symbols are objects that are manipulated on the basis of rules operating only on theirshapes, which are arbitrary in relation to what they can be interpreted as meaning. Even if one accepts the Church/Turing Thesis that computation is unique, universal and very near omnipotent, not everything is a computer, because not everything can be given a systematic interpretation; and certainly everything can't be givenevery systematic interpretation. But even after computers and computation have been successfully distinguished from other kinds of things, mental states will not just be the implementations of the right symbol systems, because of the symbol grounding problem: The interpretation of a symbol system is not intrinsic to the system; it is projected onto it by the interpreter. This is not true of our thoughts. We must accordingly be more than just computers. My guess is that the meanings of our symbols are grounded in the substrate of our robotic capacity to interact with that real world of objects, events and states of affairs that our symbols are systematically interpretable as being about.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974165
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    On implementing a computation (1994)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 4 (1994), S. 391-402 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Computation ; implementation ; artificial intelligence ; cognition ; Turing machines
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract To clarify the notion of computation and its role in cognitive science, we need an account of implementation, the nexus between abstract computations and physical systems. I provide such an account, based on the idea that a physical system implements a computation if the causal structure of the system mirrors the formal structure of the computation. The account is developed for the class of combinatorial-state automata, but is sufficiently general to cover all other discrete computational formalisms. The implementation relation is non-vacuous, so that criticisms by Searle and others fail. This account of computation can be extended to justify the foundational role of computation in artificial intelligence and cognitive science.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974166
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Beyond interpretation: Reply to Cummins' response (1992)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 2 (1992), S. 85-95 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Mental representation ; formal condition ; determinate content ; intentionality ; interpretation ; cognition
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract In his response to my ‘Why There Are No Mental Representations’, Robert Cummins accused me of having misinterpreted his views, and attempted to undermine a crucial premise of my argument, which claimed that one could only define a semantic type non-semantically by stipulating which tokens should receive a uniform interpretation. I respond to the charge and defend the premise.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00261291
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Form, interpretation, and the uniqueness of content: Response to Morris (1991)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 31-42 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Mental representation ; computation ; formal condition ; symbols ; intentionality ; computationalism ; cognition
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract In response to Michael Morris, I attempt to refute the crucial second premise of the argument, which states that the formality condition cannot be satisfied “non-stipulatively” in computational systems. I defend the view of representation urged in Meaning and Mental Representation against the charge that it makes content stipulative and therefore irrelevant to the explanation of cognition. Some other reservations are expressed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00360577
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Notationality and the information processing mind (1991)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 129-165 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Computation ; cognition ; representation ; information processing ; physical symbol systems ; language of thought
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Cognitive science uses the notion of computational information processing to explain cognitive information processing. Some philosophers have argued that anything can be described as doing computational information processing; if so, it is a vacuous notion for explanatory purposes. An attempt is made to explicate the notions of cognitive information processing and computational information processing and to specify the relationship between them. It is demonstrated that the resulting notion of computational information processing can only be realized in a restrictive class of dynamical systems called physical notational systems (after Goodman's theory of notationality), and that the systems generally appealed to by cognitive science-physical symbol systems-are indeed such systems. Furthermore, it turns out that other alternative conceptions of computational information processing, Fodor's (1975) Language of Thought and Cummins' (1989) Interpretational Semantics appeal to substantially the same restrictive class of systems. The necessary connection of computational information processing with notationality saves the enterprise from charges of vacuousness and has some interesting implications for connectionism. But, unfortunately, it distorts the subject matter and entails some troubling consequences for a cognitive science which tries to make notationality do the work of genuine mental representations.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00361034
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Other bodies, other minds: A machine incarnation of an old philosophical problem (1991)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 43-54 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Artificial intelligence ; causality ; cognition ; computation ; explanation ; mind/body problem ; other-minds problem ; robotics ; Searle ; symbol grounding ; Turing Test
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Any attempt to explain the mind by building machines with minds must confront the other-minds problem: How can we tell whether any body other than our own has a mind when the only way to know is by being the other body? In practice we all use some form of Turing Test: If it can do everything a body with a mind can do such that we can't tell them apart, we have no basis for doubting it has a mind. But what is “everything” a body with a mind can do? Turing's original “pen-pal” version of the Turing Test (the TT) only tested linguistic capacity, but Searle has shown that a mindless symbol-manipulator could pass the TT undetected. The Total Turing Test (TTT) calls instead for all of our linguistic and robotic capacities; immune to Searle's argument, it suggests how to ground a symbol manipulating system in the capacity to pick out the objects its symbols refer to. No Turing Test, however, can guarantee that a body has a mind. Worse, nothing in the explanation of its successful performance requires a model to have a mind at all. Minds are hence very different from the unobservables of physics (e.g., superstrings); and Turing Testing, though essential for machine-modeling the mind, can really only yield an explanation of the body.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00360578
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