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  • Articles  (10)
  • game theory  (10)
  • 2015-2019
  • 1990-1994  (8)
  • 1985-1989  (2)
  • 1940-1944
  • 1915-1919
  • Sociology  (9)
  • Philosophy  (1)
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  • Articles  (10)
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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The epistemic structure of a theory of a game (1994)
    Springer
    Theory and decision 37 (1994), S. 7-48 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: epistemic logic ; game theory ; formal theory of rational play ; logical omniscience ; impossible world ; default ; autoepistemic logic ; groundedness
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper is a contribution to the systematic study of alternative axiom-sets for theories of (normal-form, complete-information) games. It provides an introduction to epistemic logic, describes a formulation in epistemic logic of the structure of a theory of a game (the ‘broad theory’ of that game), and applies methods of epistemic logic to define strategies for dealing with two disturbing features of game theory, its hyperrationality assumptions and its indeterminacy. The analysis of these problems is conducted in terms of two principles which impregnate much game theory, Cleverness and Cloisteredness (the principles that players know respectively all, and only, the logical consequences of their assumed knowledge). Broad theories allow us to formulate and revise these principles despite their metatheoretical character. It is shown how Cleverness may be weakened by using logics which restrict the Rule of Epistemization, and Cloisteredness by using default logic or autoepistemic logic; the latter is used to characterize Nash equilibrium beliefs as parts of certain autoepistemic extensions of players' knowledge bases, but these particular extensions are rejected as ungrounded.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01079204
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Learning to cooperate with Pavlov an adaptive strategy for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with noise (1993)
    Springer
    Theory and decision 35 (1993), S. 107-150 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: game theory ; evolution of cooperation ; Prisoner's Dilemma ; Pavlov
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract Conflict of interest may be modeled, heuristically, by the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. Although several researchers have shown that the Tit-For-Tat strategy can encourage the evolution of cooperation, this strategy can never outscore any opponent and it does poorly against its clone in a noisy environment. Here we examine the family of Pavlovian strategies which adapts its play by positive and negative conditioning, much as many animals do. Mutual cooperation will evolve in a contest with Pavlov against a wide variety of opponents and in particular against its clone. And the strategy is quite stable in a noisy environment. Although this strategy cooperates and retaliates, as does Tit-For-Tat, it is not forgiving; Pavlov will exploit altruistic strategies until he is punished by mutual defection. Moreover, Pavlovian strategies are natural models for many real life conflict-of-interest encounters as well as human and computer simulations.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01074955
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Three pseudo-paradoxes in ‘quantum’ decision theory: Apparent effects of observation on probability and utility (1993)
    Springer
    Theory and decision 35 (1993), S. 55-73 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: Paradox ; pseudo-paradox ; decision theory ; game theory ; observation ; probability ; utility ; expected utility
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract In quantum domains, the measurement (or observation) of one of a pair of complementary variables introduces an unavoidable uncertainty in the value of that variable's complement. Such uncertainties are negligible in Newtonian worlds, where observations can be made without appreciably disturbing the observed system. Hence, one would not expect that an observation of a non-quantum probabilistic outcome could affect a probability distribution over subsequently possible states, in a way that would conflict with classical probability calculations. This paper examines three problems in which observations appear to affect the probabilities and expected utilities of subsequent outcomes, in ways which may appear paradoxical. Deeper analysis of these problems reveals that the anomalies arise, not from paradox, but rather from faulty inferences drawn from the observations themselves. Thus the notion of ‘quantum’ decision theory is disparaged.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01075235
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The evolution of altruism: Correlation, cost, and benefit (1992)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 7 (1992), S. 177-187 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Altruism ; evolution ; game theory ; group selection ; kin selection ; prisoner's dilemma
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract A simple and general criterion is derived for the evolution of altruism when individuals interact in pairs. It is argued that the treatment of this problem in kin selection theory and in game theory are special cases of this general criterion.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00129882
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    An axiomatic analysis of the Nash equilibrium concept (1992)
    Springer
    Theory and decision 33 (1992), S. 177-189 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: Axioms ; cooperation ; game theory ; Nash equilibrium ; rationality
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract The purpose of this paper is to analyze axiomatically the Nash equilibrium concept. The class of games under study is a (relatively large) subclass of n-person normal form games. Solutions are correspondences which associate to each game a non empty set of strategy vectors of this game. It is shown that if a solution satisfies the axioms Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and Individual rationality (IR), then all the strategy vectors in this solution are Nash equilibria. This result holds good also if IR is replaced by Strong individual monotonicity (SIM) or Weak principle of fair compromise (WPFC).
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00134095
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Healthy scepticism as an expected-utility explanation of the phenomena of Allais and Ellsberg (1992)
    Springer
    Theory and decision 32 (1992), S. 57-64 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: game theory ; prospective reference theory ; suspicion
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract Expected utility theory is a normative approach to the question of how people should rationally make choice under uncertainty. Its admirers (the present author among them) would use it in every such situation. Consequently alledged counter examples, in which it is arguably unreasonable to act as expected utility theory suggests, threaten to undermine the theory as a normative theory. The phenomena of Allais and Ellsberg were proposed as just such examples. They differ from the later work of Kahneman, Tversky and others in that the latter exposes ways in which people's behavior, descriptively, differs from the expected utility theory norm. Those examples do not threaten the normative status of expected utility theory. This paper reviews the Allais and Ellsberg examples, and proposes an explanation of them within expected utility theory. The key to the explanation is that the expectation in expected utility theory is to be taken with respect to the subjective beliefs of the decision maker. If I have positive probability of strategic behavior by the person making the offers, neither phenomenon is a paradox.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00133627
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Evaluating Cooperative Game Theory in water resources (1992)
    Springer
    Theory and decision 32 (1992), S. 1-20 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: game theory ; transferable utility ; water resources ; regional cooperation
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract Two empirical applications of Cooperative Game Theory concerned with regional cooperation in the use of irrigation water are presented. Both studies attempt to derive income maximizing solutions for the participants and the related income allocation schemes. Distinction is made between transferable and non-transferable utility situations. The reasonableness and the acceptability of the schemes derived are later critically evaluated. Main findings are: (1) use of utility functions leads to problems in gains allocations, (2) the Core concept may be useless in this application because since it is either difficult to calculate or is empty in many cases, (3) gains allocation and the derived core are heavily dependent on probabilities of coalitions formation in the Shapley value or the Generalized Shapley Value.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00133625
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Arbitrage, rationality, and equilibrium (1991)
    Springer
    Theory and decision 31 (1991), S. 199-240 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: Bayesian decision theory ; game theory ; arbitrage ; coherence ; incompleteness ; competitive equilibrium ; correlated equilibrium ; capital asset pricing model ; risk-neutral probabilities
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract No-arbitrage is the fundamental principle of economic rationality which unifies normative decision theory, game theory, and market theory. In economic environments where money is available as a medium of measurement and exchange, no-arbitrage is synonymous with subjective expected utility maximization in personal decisions, competitive equilibria in capital markets and exchange economies, and correlated equilibria in noncooperative games. The arbitrage principle directly characterizes rationality at the market level; the appearance of deliberate optimization by individual agents is a consequence of their adaptation to the market. Concepts of equilibrium behavior in games and markets can thus be reconciled with the ideas that individual rationality is bounded, that agents use evolutionarily-shaped decision rules rather than numerical optimization algorithms, and that personal probabilities and utilities are inseparable and to some extent indeterminate. Risk-neutral probability distributions, interpretable as products of probabilities and marginal utilities, play a central role as observable quantities in economic systems.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00132993
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Pavlov and the prisoner's dilemma (1989)
    Springer
    Theory and decision 26 (1989), S. 47-79 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: game theory ; prisoner's dilemma ; Markov chain ; evolution of cooperation
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract Our Pavlov learns by conditioned response, through rewards and punishments, to cooperate or defect. We analyze the behavior of an extended play Prisoner's Dilemma with Pavlov against various opponents and compute the time and cost to train Pavlov to cooperate. Among our results is that Pavlov and his clone would learn to cooperate more rapidly than if Pavlov played against the Tit for Tat strategy. This fact has implications for the evolution of cooperation.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00134056
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Utility theory and the Bayesian paradigm (1989)
    Springer
    Theory and decision 26 (1989), S. 263-293 
    Details
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: utility ; risk ; value ; game theory ; consequences ; Bayesian
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract In this paper, a problem for utility theory - that it would have an agent who was compelled to play “Russian Roulette’ with one revolver or another, to pay as much to have a six-shooter with four bullets relieved of one bullet before playing with it, as he would be willing to pay to have a six-shooter with two bullets emptied - is reviewed. A less demanding Bayesian theory is described, that would have an agent maximize expected values of possible total consequence of his actions. And utility theory is located within that theory as valid for agents who satisfy certain formal conditions, that is, for agents who are, in terms of that more general theory, indifferent to certain dimensions of ‘risk’. Raiffa- and Savage-style arguments for its more general validity are then resisted. Addenda are concerned with implications for game theory, and relations between ‘utilities’ and ‘values’.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00134109
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