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  • Articles  (18)
  • expected utility  (9)
  • risk aversion  (6)
  • core  (4)
  • 2020-2022
  • 1985-1989  (18)
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  • Economics  (18)
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  • Articles  (18)
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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Springer
    Journal of risk and uncertainty 2 (1989), S. 5-35 
    ISSN: 1573-0476
    Keywords: Ambiguity ; expected utility ; insurance ; risk ; subjective probability
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract In a series of experiments, economically sophisticated subjects, including professional actuaries, priced insurance both as consumers and as firms under conditions of ambiguity. Findings support implications of the Einhorn-Hogarth ambiguity model: (1) For low probability-of-loss events, prices of both consumers and firms indicated aversion to ambiguity; (2) As probabilities of losses increased, aversion to ambiguity decreased, with consumers exhibiting ambiguity preference for high probability-of-loss events; and (3) Firms showed greater aversion to ambiguity than consumers. The results are shown to be incompatible with traditional economic analysis of insurance markets and are discussed with respect to the effects of ambiguity on the supply and demand for insurance.
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  • 2
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    Journal of risk and uncertainty 2 (1989), S. 235-263 
    ISSN: 1573-0476
    Keywords: risk ; expected utility ; irrationality ; prospect theory
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This article develops a variant of the expected utility model termed prospective reference theory. Although the standard model occurs as a limiting case, the general approach is that individuals treat stated experimental probabilities as imperfect information. This model is applied to a wide variety of aberrant phenomena, including the Allais paradox, the overweighting of low-probability events, the existence of premiums for certain elimination of risks, and the representativeness heuristic. The prospective reference theory model predicts most of the observed behavioral patterns rather than being potentially reconcilable with such phenomena.
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  • 3
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    Springer
    Journal of risk and uncertainty 2 (1989), S. 385-403 
    ISSN: 1573-0476
    Keywords: social preferences ; expected utility ; optimum insurance ; inclusive welfare ; state-consistent preferences
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This article extends Bergsonian welfare analysis to an environment of uncertainty where preferences are not expected utility and may even be state-inconsistent. Given state-inconsistent preferences, the familiar notion of ex ante efficiency is also state-inconsistent. Other efficiency and welfare concepts achieve state consistency by ignoring entirely the prospective preferences of consumers. The framework developed in this article allows welfare judgments to be state-consistent while respecting prospective and conditional preferences. The theory is called inclusive welfare. An application to optimum insurance subsidies illustrates the practical use of the concept.
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  • 4
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    Springer
    Journal of risk and uncertainty 2 (1989), S. 353-365 
    ISSN: 1573-0476
    Keywords: bargaining ; axiomatic models ; strategic models ; risk aversion
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This article presents some new, intuitive derivations of several results in the bargaining literature. These new derivations clarify the relationships among these results and allow them to be understood in a unified way. These results concern the way in which the risk posture of the bargainers affects the outcome of bargaining as predicted by Nash's (axiomatic) solution of a static bargaining model (Nash, 1950) and by the subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinite horizon sequential bargaining game analyzed by Rubinstein (1982). The analogous, experimentally testable predictions for finite horizon sequential bargaining games are also presented.
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  • 5
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    Springer
    Journal of risk and uncertainty 2 (1989), S. 61-104 
    ISSN: 1573-0476
    Keywords: expected utility ; generalized utility ; nonexpected utility ; risky choice ; Allais paradox
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract There is much evidence that people willingly violate expected utility theory when making choices. Several axiomatic theories have been proposed to explain some of this evidence, but there are few data that discriminate between the theories. To gather such data, an experiment was conducted using pairs of gambles with three levels of outcomes and many combinations of probabilities. Most typical findings were replicated, including the common consequence effect and different risk attitudes for gains and losses. There is evidence of both fanning out and fanning in of indifference curves, and both quasiconcavity and quasiconvexity of preferences. No theory can explain all the data, but prospect theory and the hypothesis that indifference curves fan out can explain most of them.
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  • 6
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    Journal of risk and uncertainty 2 (1989), S. 219-234 
    ISSN: 1573-0476
    Keywords: risk aversion ; group decision ; syndicate ; risk sharing ; utility ; lotteries
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract A group of risk-averse members must choose among monetary risks and payoff-sharing rules. Departure from the status quo requires unanimous consent. Such groups drill for oil, bail out nations, and make hostile takeover bids. Assume agreement on probabilities. As is well known, if all members have identically shaped HARA utility functions, efficient group act-choices follow another such function independently of payoff sharing. We show that all other groups inevitably have complex efficient behavior, accepting gambles among individually unacceptable lotteries in almost every status quo position. We also develop proper risk aversion for groups, and treat disagreement on probabilities.
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  • 7
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    Theory and decision 27 (1989), S. 93-106 
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: cognition ; decision ; graphs ; artificial intelligence ; risk ; uncertainty ; expert systems ; expected utility
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract In the first part, we try to give a representation of the process by which man endeavours to grasp uncertainty. We propose a backward exploration which we will modelize through an influence diagram and then we can draw a few conclusions from that representation for the axiomatics of Decision. In the second part, we deal with the processing of the information formatted in such a way, regarding both its temporal complexity and its elective complexity. The first part as the second one dealing with representation and the consequences for information processing of uncertainty cognition lead to a severe criticism of the expected utility hypothesis. To conclude, we suggest a few remarks on expert systems of decision aid under uncertainty.
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  • 8
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    Springer
    Theory and decision 26 (1989), S. 235-251 
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: proxy contests ; corporate control ; cooperative games ; voting games ; Shapley values ; quarrellers ; core ; φ-stable pairs
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract Proxy fights have received comparatively little attention relative to the more popular methods for corporate control transfer: merger and tender offers. This paper presents an analytic model of the proxy contest as a cooperative game with four players: management, passive shareholders, insurgent shareholders and a trust fund. The power of the players and the effectiveness of certain managerial actions is discussed.
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  • 9
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    Springer
    Theory and decision 26 (1989), S. 37-46 
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: endogenous risk ; risk aversion ; risk premium
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract This note tries to correct a deficiency of the microeconomic literature on decision making under uncertainty. Indeed, when considering meaningful comparative statics results in situations where risks are at least partially controllable (endogenous), this literature has mostly relied upon the traditional Arrow-Pratt risk aversion functions and has paid very little attention to the definition of the risk premium. However when they defined the risk premium and the risk aversion functions, Arrow and Pratt considered only roulette gambles, i.e. risks totally exogenous to the individual. This note highlights the fact that several definitions of the risk premium may be proposed for endogenous risks. Two of them, already used in the literature, do not preserve the intuitively-appealing properties of the Arrow-Pratt risk premium. An alternative definition is then proposed. It is shown that this new definition of the risk premium applied to endogenous risks exhibits the properties generally admitted for roulette gambles.
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  • 10
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    Mathematical methods of operations research 33 (1989), S. 405-422 
    ISSN: 1432-5217
    Keywords: games ; restricted cooperation ; core ; convex functions
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Description / Table of Contents: Zusammenfassung Spiele mit beschränkter Kooperation sind kooperativeN-Personenspiele mit Nebenzahlungen, wobei nicht jede Teilmenge von Spielern zulässig zu sein braucht. In diesem Sinn sind die Kooperationsmöglichkeiten beschränkt. Balancierte und vollständig balancierte Spiele werden in diesem Zusammenhang untersucht. Die entsprechenden Sätze über die Existenz von Kernen werden von einem Sandwichsatz über Mengenfunktionen im Rahmen der linearen Programmierung abgeleitet. Insbesondere werden allgemeine konvexe Spiele diskutiert, deren Bedeutung auch für die kombinatorische Optimierung Edmonds and Giles (1977) aufgezeigt haben.
    Notes: Abstract Games with restricted cooperation are cooperativeN-person games with sidepayments, where the collection of feasible coalitions need not comprise all subsets of players and thus is restricted. We study balanced and completely balanced games in this context and derive the corresponding core theorems from a sandwich theorem for set functions within the setting of linear programming. In particular, we discuss general convex games, which Edmonds and Giles (1977) have shown to be of particular importance also in combinatorial optimization.
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  • 11
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    Journal of risk and uncertainty 1 (1988), S. 267-283 
    ISSN: 1573-0476
    Keywords: Risk ; uncertainty ; expected utility ; nonlinear preference
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract During the past generation, expected utility theory has been widely accepted as the normative standard for decision making under risk and under uncertainty. However, it is now known that reasonable people often violate its assumptions, and a number of generalizations of the theory have been developed to accommodate some of the more common violations. This essay recalls the origins of expected utility in the early 1700s, notes its axiomatizations on the basis of preference comparisons in the mid-1900s, describes violations of those axioms uncovered since then, outlines new theories stimulated by the violations, and suggests where the field might be headed in the next few decades.
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  • 12
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    Journal of risk and uncertainty 1 (1988), S. 389-393 
    ISSN: 1573-0476
    Keywords: expected utility ; internal consistecy ; book against self
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract If I am “coherent”, in the sense that I can always replace any subset of outcomes by their certainty equivalent (occurring with the sum of their probabilities), then I must act according to the dogma of maximizing an Exp {U}, ruling out Machina [1982], Allais [1952], and Ysidro [1950] functionals.
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  • 13
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    Journal of risk and uncertainty 1 (1988), S. 101-124 
    ISSN: 1573-0476
    Keywords: risk aversion ; bargaining ; experiments
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract This paper reports the results of three experiments designed to test the predictions of the principal game-theoretic models of bargaining concerning the influence of risk aversion on bargaining outcomes. These models predict that risk aversion will be disadvantageous in bargaining except in situations in which potential agreements are lotteries with a positive probability of being worse than disagreement. The experimental results support the models' predictions. However, in the range of payoffs studied here, the effects due to risk aversion may be smaller than some of the focal point effects observed in previous experiments. Implications for further theoretical and experimental work are considered.
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  • 14
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    Journal of risk and uncertainty 1 (1988), S. 395-413 
    ISSN: 1573-0476
    Keywords: risk aversion ; certainty equivalent ; multivariate utilities ; independent risks ; comparative concavity ; multiple risks
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Abstract The more risk-averse of two individuals need not have the smaller certainty equivalent for a risk \~x if another risk or combination of risks w is present. It is shown that he must, however, if either individual's conditional certainty equivalent for x is increasing in w. For independent risks, this condition follows immediately if either individual is decreasingly risk-averse, giving a natural proof of a known result. Another short proof of this result and necessary and sufficient conditions in the independent case are give. For multivariate utilities, the corresponding results do not hold, but it is proved simply that any mixture of decreasingly risk-averse utilities is decreasingly risk-averse. Also touched upon are risk aversion's relation to generalized means, concave composition, risk sharing, and interest rates, the application of the results to discounting under uncertainty and selection of investment level, and their connection to singly crossing distributions, noise, and dominance.
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  • 15
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    Theory and decision 24 (1988), S. 169-200 
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: decision theory ; risk ; expected utility ; security level ; risk aversion
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract The particular attention paid by decision makers to the security level ensured by each decision under risk, which is responsible for the certainty effect, can be taken into account by weakening the independence and continuity axioms of expected utility theory. In the resulting model, preferences depend on: (i) the security level, (ii) the expected utility, offered by each decision. Choices are partially determined by security level comparison and completed by the maximization of a function, which express the existing tradeoffs between expected utility and security level, and is, at a given security level, an affine function of the expected utility. In the model, risk neutrality at a given security level implies risk aversion.
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  • 16
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    Theory and decision 25 (1988), S. 219-223 
    ISSN: 1573-7187
    Keywords: St. Petersburg Paradox ; expected utility ; bounded utility ; cardinal utility ; Becker's theory of time
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Sociology , Economics
    Notes: Abstract The assumption of bounded utility function resolves the St. Petersburg paradox. The justification for such a bound is provided by Brito, who argues that limited time will bound the utility function. However, a reformulated St. Petersburg game, which is played for both money and time, effectively circumvents Brito's justification for a bound. Hence, no convincing justification for bounding the utility function yet exists.
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  • 17
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    International journal of game theory 16 (1987), S. 43-68 
    ISSN: 1432-1270
    Keywords: Fuzzy game ; fuzzy measure ; value ; core ; extension ; cooperative market
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Notes: Abstract The problem of the existence ofvalues (FA-valued, linear, positive, symmetric and efficient operators) on symmetric spaces of “fuzzy games” (that is, ideal set functions of bounded variation) arises naturally from [8], [18], [23] and [2], [3], [4] where it is implicitely approached for technical purposes. In our present work, this problem is approached in itself for the main reason that it is essentially related with the problem of the existence of significant countable additive measures lying in the cores of the “market games”. In fact, it is shown here that there exists a continuous value on the closed subspacebv′ICA ofIBV spanned by thebv′ functions of “fuzzy probability measures” ([9]), this values is “diagonal” onpICA, the closed subspace ofbv′ICA spanned by the natural powers of the fuzzy measures and this is used to prove the main result stating that the cooperative markets contained inpICA have unique fuzzy measures in their cores which are exactly the corresponding diagonal values. This result is of interest because it is providing a tool of determiningCA measures lying in the cores of large classes of games which are not necessarily “non-atomic” and, specially, because it is opening a way toward a new approach of the “Value Equivalence Principle” for differentiable markets with a continuum of traders which are not “perfectly competitive”.
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  • 18
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    Mathematical methods of operations research 30 (1986), S. A239 
    ISSN: 1432-5217
    Keywords: cooperative game ; core
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Mathematics , Economics
    Description / Table of Contents: Zusammenfassung In Driessen (1986) wurde für Spiele, die eine gewisse Bedingung erfüllen, gezeigt, da\ der Kern des Spieles in der konvexen Hülle von gewissen Vektoren der Marginalwerte liegt. Es wurde vermutet, da\ diese Inklusion ohne weitere Bedingung an das Spiel gilt. In dieser Note wird nun gezeigt, da\ die Inklusion für alle Spiele gilt.
    Notes: Abstract In Driessen (1986) it is shown that for games satisfying a certain condition the core of the game is included in the convex hull of the set of certain marginal worth vectors of the game, while it is conjectured that the inclusion holds without any condition on the game. In this note it is proved that the inclusion holds for all games.
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