ALBERT

All Library Books, journals and Electronic Records Telegrafenberg

X
feed icon rss

Your email was sent successfully. Check your inbox.

An error occurred while sending the email. Please try again.

Proceed reservation?

Export
Filter
  • Articles  (60,053)
  • Data
  • 2020-2022  (16,418)
  • 1995-1999  (43,635)
  • Economics  (60,053)
Collection
  • Books  (8)
  • Articles  (60,053)
  • Data
Source
Keywords
Publisher
Years
Year
Journal
Topic
  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Closing the Treasury Amendment Loophole (1996)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 5 (1996), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00449.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Termination Clauses in Long-Term Contracts (1996)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 5 (1996), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Many long-term contracts incorporate a termination clause. This paper argues that when agents have hidden information, such a clause has a beneficial incentive effect—it enables a principal to screen agents' private information at a lower cost. In a two-period model, this paper characterizes the optimal long-term contract with a termination clause, which specifies that the principal will switch agents in the second period when the first-period cost is high. The analysis delineates how the optimality of this clause depends on the intertemporal cost correlation structure, on the limits to agents' liability, and on the principal's degree of commitment.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00473.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Bankruptcy, Takeovers, and Wage Contracts (1996)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 5 (1996), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Takeovers give raiders the opportunity of breaking implicit contracts inside the firm. If implicit contracts are adopted by workers and management to reach more efficient outcomes, then the possibility of takeovers may cause a welfare loss. We show that, under some conditions, this argument can go through even if the firm and the workers can write explicit and complete contracts. The crucial assumption is that the profitability of the firm is linked to its financial situation, in the sense that a firm which has a high probability of bankruptcy will face fewer opportunities than a financially solid firm. In this framework, the possibility of takeovers imposes constraints on the set of feasible employment contracts, leading to inefficient outcomes.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00515.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Long-Term or Short-Term Managerial Incentive Contracts (1996)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 5 (1996), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper deals with the strategic role of the temporal dimension of contracts in a duopoly market. Is it better for a firm to sign long-term incentive contracts with managers or short-term contracts? For the linear case, with strategic substitutes (complements) in the product market, the incentive variables are also strategic substitutes (complements). It is shown that a long-term contract makes a firm a leader in incentives, while a short-term contract makes it a follower. We find that, under Bertrand competition, in equilibrium one firm signs a long-term contract and the other firm short-term incentive contracts; however, under Cournot competition, the dominant strategy is to sign long-term incentive contracts.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00343.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Price and Money-Back Guarantees as Signals of Product Quality (1996)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 5 (1996), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Why is it so common for the seller to provide guarantees that say “Satisfaction guaranteed or your money back” along with the sale of a product? Newly introduced goods and mail-ordered products are usually sold with such guarantees. In honoring money-back guarantees, why is it a common business practice to pay back exactly the purchase price rather than a portion of it? In this paper we study the informational role and optimality of the common business practice of money-back guarantees in a signaling model with quality uncertainty and risk-neutral buyers. We find that money-back guarantees and price together completely reveal a monopoly firm's private information about product quality, Moreover, the private information is revealed at no signaling cost. Furthermore, we show that in terms of the level of monetary compensation specified by a guarantee, price is the profit-maximizing level of monetary payback in case of product failure.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00361.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Damaged Goods (1996)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 5 (1996), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Manufacturers may intentionally damage a portion of their goods in order to price discriminate. Many instances of this phenomenon are observed. It may result in a Pareto improvement.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00149.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Interactive Effect of Product Differentiation and Cost Variability on Profit (1996)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 5 (1996), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: It is generally believed that industries with greater product differentiation have higher rates of return. This paper shows that this effect breaks down in the presence of firm-specific cost shocks. Greater substitutability in products generates two opposing effects: (1) it allows a larger increase in demand when a firm has a favorable cost shock, which more than compensates for the reduction in demand when it has an unfavorable cost shock, and (2) it results in more intense price competition. These two countervailing forces result in industry profit being highest in markets with a moderate degree of product differentiation.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00175.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    R&D, Investment, and Industry Dynamics (1996)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 5 (1996), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We present a model of industry evolution where the dynamics are driven by a process of endogenous innovations followed by subsequent embodiments in physical capital. Traditionally, the only distinction between R&D and physical investment was one of labeling: the first process accumulates an intangible stock, knowledge, while the second accumulates physical capital. Both stocks affect output in a symmetric fashion. We argue that the story is not that simple, and that there is more to it than differences in the object of accumulation. Our model stresses the causal relationship between past R&D expenditures and current investments in machinery and equipment. This causality pattern, which is supported by the data, also explains the observed higher volatility of physical investment relative to that of R&D expenditures.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00217.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Investment in a New Technology as a Signal of Firm Value Under Regulatory Opportunism (1996)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 5 (1996), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We examine the question of whether a regulated firm that makes a long-term investment in infrastructure can credibly signal its private information regarding the future demand for its output to the capital market. We show that necessary conditions for a separating equilibrium in which the magnitude of investment signals high future demand may include a low degree of managerial myopia, large variability of future demand, a lenient regulatory climate, and low sunk cost. Our model suggests that in estimating valuation models of regulated firms it is important to separate firms into two groups: firms for which a separating equilibrium is likely to obtain and firms for which the equilibrium is likely to be pooling. The market value of a firm in the first group is positively correlated with its level of investment, but uncorrelated with the level of actual demand, whereas for the second group the opposite holds.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00251.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Brand Capital and Entry Order (1996)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 5 (1996), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper develops the hypothesis that firms possess a stock of well-established brands, a stock termed brand capital. The firm with the greatest capital is able to introduce new products in response to new information about consumer tastes before rivals. The results using data from the ready-to-eat cereal industry not only support this hypothesis, but also distinguish brand capital from other sources of firm heterogeneity.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00107.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 11
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Strategies for Technological Innovation with Learning and Adaptation Costs (1996)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 5 (1996), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper attacks the problem of developing strategies for a firm to deal with technological change. We show that the product market strategies of the firm—including pricing, product positioning, and rent preemption strategies—can play a role in the efficient search for technology-related information when information search is costly and there are adaptation costs due to the presence of agency. We utilize a dynamic model of spatial competition with uncertain technological innovations in which firms can learn from each other about technological developments. Private information and agency conflicts are shown to increase the effective information search costs of incumbents, who then use interfirm learning to their advantage in equilibrium. This viewpoint also allows us to see the role of mergers and acquisitions, subsidiary formation, and internal R&D labs in a new light. The more general point is that organizational structures and, in particular, the differential distribution of information within the organization impose constraints on the information-search and adaptation strategies of the firm, and the formulation of product-market and R&D strategies serves to relax these constraints.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00025.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 12
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Nonlinear Pricing and Oligopoly (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We consider the general problem of price discrimination with nonlinear pricing in an oligopoly setting where firms are spatially differentiated. We characterize the nature of optimal pricing schedules, which in turn depends importantly upon the type of private information the customer possesses–either horizontal uncertainty regarding brand preference or vertical uncertainty regarding quality preference. We show that as competition increases, the resulting quality distortions decrease, as well as price and quality dispersions. Additionally, we indicate conditions under which price discrimination may raise social welfare by increasing consumer surplus through encouraging greater entry.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00529.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 13
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Shareholder Activism, “Voluntary” Restructuring, and Internal Labor Markets (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We model an internal labor market in which employee behavior and compensation are affected by the firm's financial position and the threat of hostile takeover or other exercise of shareholder “voice.” We show how good past performance can result in excessively generous promotion and pay decisions. While the threat of shareholder activism will remove this “slack,” activists optimally face a positive cost barrier, which in turn varies across firms. The cost barrier is higher when cooperation or “helping” between employees is more important, and is lower when employees receive efficiency wages due to an inability to “pay” for their jobs. Since the importance of helping is associated with pay compression and “flat” pay ladders, such firms should also exhibit a greater degree of management entrenchment.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00591.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 14
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Stable R&D Cooperation with Spillovers (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The literature on the incentives for R & D cooperation with spillovers typically deals only with the factors affecting cooperative profits. This paper focuses on the incentives to cheat and the stability of such cooperative agreements in a repeated game framework. It is shown that the stability of cooperation is influenced by the nature and magnitude of spillovers, relative to the nature and degree of product market competition. While cooperative profits are higher with large positive (exogenous, unintended) know-how spillovers, such as in fundamental research, our anslysis shows that it may be easier to sustain cooperation in areas with lower spillovers, such as applied research, because of the smaller incenfives to cheat on the initial agreement, at least when firms produce substitutes. Alternatively, the possibility of technology sharing (i.e., intended or endogenous spillovers), besides R&D coordination, not only increases cooperative profits but also reduces the incentives to defect from a cooperative equilibrium.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00651.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 15
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Managerial Incentives Based on Acquisition of Information (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: In a moral hazard setting, we model the fact that the agent may get private signals about the final outcome of his effort before the public realization of this outcome. Actions affect both the distribution of the outcome and the quality of the agent's private information. We compare simple contracts, based on output only, with revelation contracts, based on output and messages about signals. Revelation contracts give the agent some discretionary power during the course of the relationship; they are optimal if and only if lowering effort does not increase the quality of private information in the sense of Blackwell (1953). In the context of managerial compensation schemes, the revelation contracts we analyze can be viewed as allowing the agent to exercise an option on the final profits before the realization of these profits. The theory thus provides an alternative justification of the widespread use of stock options in managerial compensation schemes, as opposed to compensation schemes that rely only on salary, bonus, and (restricted) stock plans.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00427.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 16
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Product Differentiation, Strategic Divisionalization, and Persistence of Monopoly (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper analyzes the strategic incentive of oligopolists to create autonomous rival divisions when products are differentiated. We consider a two-stage game where firms choose the number of autonomous divisions in the first stage and all the divisions engage in Cournot competition in the second. It is shown that product differentiation ensures the existence of an interior subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), and the equilibrium number of divisions increases with the degree of substitution among products and the number of firms. Further, if divisions are allowed to divide further, they always will, which leads to total rent dissipation. Thus, parent firms have incentives to unilaterally restrict their divisions from further dividing. In the free-entry equilibrium, it is found that the possibility of setting up autonomous divisions is a natural barrier to entry. Incumbents may persistently earn abnormally high profits. In the cases where product differentiation is difficult, the only pure-strategy free-entry SPNE is the monopoly outcome even if the entry cost is relatively low.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00581.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 17
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Termination and Coordination in Partnerships (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: It is common practice for firms to pool their expertise by forming partnerships such as joint ventures and strategic alliances. A central organization problem in such partnerships is that managers may behave noncooperatively in order to advance the interests of their parent firms. We ask whether contracts can be designed so that managers will maximize total profits. We characterize first best contracts for a variety of environments and show that efficiency imposes some restrictions on the ownership shares. In addition, we evaluate the performance of two termination contracts that are widely used in practice: the shotgun rule and price competition. We find that although these contracts do not achieve full efficiency, they both perform well. We provide insight into when each rule is more efficient.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00191.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 18
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Foreign Direct Investment Strategies and Firms' Capabilities (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper presents a simple model to analyze the effect of geographically localized spillovers on the internationalization decision of firms. It is shown that, once spatially bounded externalities are taken into account, the standard predictions on the nature and direction of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows may be reversed. We highlight three effects. First, an FDI-en-hancing effect: the presence of spillovers increases the profitability of the FDI strategy when the competitive gap between firms is narrow. Second, a dissipation effect: firms may refrain from investing abroad for fear of diffusion of their firm-specific assets. Third, a sourcing effect: the presence of spillovers may induce a firm to invest abroad, even in the absence of exporting costs.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00251.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 19
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Hospital Reimbursement Incentives: An Empirical Analysis (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Reimbursement systems for health-care providers are very complex, like the production systems that they regulate. This complexity has led to some important misperceptions about the incentive consequences of major reimbursement reforms. One example is the prospective payment system (PPS), developed to provide “high-powered” incentives through fixed prices for hospital admissions for the US elderly. In fact, various features of the DRG system allow reimbursement to vary with actual treatment decisions during an admission, and so are not prospective. This paper develops a general method for measuring actual reimbursement incentives in complex regulated price systems. The method uses regression techniques with variance decompositions to quantify the effects of particular features of the payment system on prospective and retrospective cost sharing, as well as overall generosity of payments. I apply this method to microdata on 20 percent of Medicare hospital admissions in 1987 and 1990 to summarize the incentives created by PPS in practice, and how the incentives are evolving over time. I show that PPS involves limited and decreasing cost sharing with hospitals, most of which is not prospective. The reimbursement incentives vary substantially across diagnoses, demographic groups, and types of intensive treatments, possibly with important implications for hospital behavior and medical expenditure growth. The techniques developed here can be used to analyze a broad range of provider reimbursement mechanisms.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00091.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 20
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Buyer Alliances and Managed Competition (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: In a health insurance market, a large employer or an organized “buyer alliance” is in a position to influence the design of plans offered to its members. We study how the sponsors of buyer alliances manage competition among insurance firms by focusing on their choices of the format of competition, the number of firms allowed to compete, and the quality of care offered by the firms. We find deviations from optimality in all three dimensions. Specifically, we find a tendency toward too many firms and too much quality, and a bias toward a format involving the prescreening of insurance plans by the sponsor.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00175.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 21
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Profitability under an Open versus a Closed System (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper explores the conditions under which a monopolist selling a system consisting of a main component and differentiated secondary components can increase profits by allowing competition in the aftermarket for the secondary components. Opening the system in this fashion can increase profits by giving consumers an added incentive to incur the setup cost of purchasing the main component. This paper extends the second-sourcing literature by showing the explicit effects of various parameters of demand on the decision to open the system. The results show that an open system is likely to be more profitable than a closed one when demand for the system is more elastic, when secondary-component variety is more valued, and when the share of the main component in the total system budget of the consumer is high.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00307.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 22
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Task Shifts vs. Termination as Devices for Eliciting Optimal Effort Supply (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper contrasts assignments to punitive tasks and terminations as alternative incentive devices. The basic question we ask here is: does the threat of assigning employees to a punitive task allow one to attain higher effort levels than termination threats? The answer critically depends on whether employers are able or not to commit themselves not to fire. We show that in the no-commitment case the only relevant incentive device is termination threats. In contrast, when employers commit themselves not to fire, by threatening punitive task reassignments there obtain effort levels that are not implementable by termination. The implementation results are then applied to the study of incentive problems arising when investment infirm-specific human capital is unverifiable.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00033.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 23
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Firm Characteristics and the Speed of FDA Approval (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper empirically examines the effect of firm-specific characteristics on the length of time required by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to review and approve new-drug applications between 1990 and 1992. The approach treats regulatory decisions as endogenous and explains the variation in regulatory behavior as a function of differences that exist between firms and drugs. Results show that, controlling for drug-specific characteristics, regulators respond to firm-specific characteristics when evaluating new drug applications. For instance, firms that are less diversified and more R&D-inten-sive receive shorter review times for their new-drug applications than more diversified and less R&D-intensive firms. The reason is that most firm characteristics signal information to reviewers about either firm reputation or application quality. This information reduces reviewers' uncertainty about approving a dangerous or ineffective drug and leads to faster review times. The results suggest that regulators respond to the heterogeneities among firms in the pharmaceutical market in systematic ways.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00377.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 24
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Introduction (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00133.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 25
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Executive Forum Restructuring the Wireless Industry and the Information Skyway (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00139.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 26
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Tacit Collusion Under regulation in the Pricing of Interstate Long-Distance Telephone Services (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Analysis of seven wholesale and retail markets for long-distance telephone services since the AT & T divestiture indicates that service provider concentration declined in the later 1980s and then stabilized in the 2990–1993 period. In addition to this stability in market shares, a number of other conditions established since 1990 have been conducive to the development of market sharing rather than significant price competition. The most important of these conditions has been the tarifing process of the Federal Communications Commission by which MCI and Sprint replicate ATGT's price announcements. As market shares stabilized and became more equal, and as regulation formalized the price-setting process, the price-cost margins of the three large carriers increased and became more nearly identical. These results are consistent not with price competition but rather with emerging tacit collusion among AT&T, MCI, and Sprint.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00147.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 27
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Money Out of Thin Air: The nationwide Narrowband pcs Auction (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The Federal Communications Commission held its first auction of radio spectrum at the Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction in July 1994. The simultaneous multiple-round auction, which lasted five days, was an ascending bid auction in which all licenses were offered simultaneously. This paper describes the auction rules and how bidders prepared for the auction. The full history of bidding is presented. Several questions for auction theory are discussed. In the end, the government collected $617 million for ten licenses. The auction was viewed by all as a huge success an excellent example of bringing economic theory to bear on practical problems of allocating scarce resources.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00267.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 28
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Effect of Incentive regulation on Infrastructure Modernization: Local Exchange Companies' Deployment of Digital Technology (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This study examines the investment patterns of all large local exchange telephone companies in the United States over time. It identifies how different regulatoy environments have influenced the recent historical pattern of investment in modern infrastructure equipment. It focuses exclusively on the postdivestiture experience of local telephone exchange companies (LECs). It examines the growth of fiber-optic deployment and of complementary equipment associated with the modernization of today's information infrastructure. The study estimates the influence of different regulatory structures on infrastructure deployment by LECs. The study is unique in that if relates individual LEC investment patterns to LEC-specific regulatory, demographic, and economic characteristics. Thus, it isolates the contribution of state regulatory policies from that of other demographic and economic factors in the determination of infrastructure deployment at the state LEC rather than at the corporate level. Its main findings are as follows: First, price regulation (and, in particular, price caps) is a more potent regulatory mechanism than the standard earnings sharing scheme. Second, when associated with an earnings sharing scheme, price regulation is less effective in triggering infrastructure deployment than when it is implemented by itself. These results raise questions about the effectiveness of a popular regulatory instrument-earnings sharing schemes-and highlight the effectiveness of generic price-cap regulation. These results have implications for the design of regulatory policy at both the state and federal levels. In particular, given the importance currently being placed on the development of the information superhighway, regulatory emphasis should be focused more on price regulation than on regulating profits.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00187.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 29
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Auctioning the Airwaves: The Contest for Broadband pcs Spectrum (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The House and Senate of the United States Congress recently passed legislation that directs the FCC to establish a system for using auctions to allocate the use of radio spectrum for personal communications services. There is a unique and unprecedented set of issues that arise in this context, which are of interest to economists, industry analysts, regulators, and policymakers. We discuss these issues and evaluate their likely impact on the outcome of the spectrum auctions. In addition, we argue that there may be pitfalls in the auction procedure adopted by the FCC, and we discuss possible alternative procedures.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00345.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 30
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Why Are Royalty Rates Higher in Service-type Franchises? (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Royalty payments from a franchisee to a franchisor serve as incentive for the franchisor to provide appropriate levels of quality and brand, name investment. However, since they also distort the service provided by the franchisee, we should expect relatively lower royalty rates in franchises that are primarily service-oriented. Casual examination of royalty rates across product-oriented and service-oriented franchises shows that the opposite is true, with service-type franchises enjoying higher royalty rates. We resolve this apparent puzzle. The basic argument we put forth is that in product-type franchises, a franchisor can charge a wholesale price on goods transferred to the franchisee, thus using an alternative instrument that also serves as an incentive for the franchisor. Moreover, in general, a franchisor will use both wholesale price and royalty to minimize distortions in retail price and service at the retail level. We then test the predictions of our model on different industries and find confirmation for the same.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00007.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 31
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Mergers and Exclusionary Practices in Health Care Markets (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We evaluate the relationship between insurers (payers) and providers of health care (hospitals) when they each have a nonnegligible share of the market. We focus in particular on their incentives to merge and the existence of equilibria where payers offer preferential treatment to a subset of hospitals. We demonstrate that hospitals are more likely to merge without consolidating their capacities the less competitive they are vis-à-vis the payer's market. Payers are more likely to merge without consolidating their capacities the less competitive either the hospitals' or the payers' market is. A given payer follows an exclusionary strategy when its starting bargaining position vis-à-vis hospitals is weak. At such exclusionary equilibria, payers tend to distinguish themselves from neighboring payers by contracting with a different subset of hospitals.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00315.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 32
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Measuring Hospital Cost-Sharing Incentives Under Refined Prospective Payment (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper evaluates the usefulness of a model (McClellan, 1997) that was recently proposed for measuring reimbursement incentives under ongoing refinements to the hospital prospective payment system. The model is applied to a single major disease category (HIV infection) for which the hospital reimbursement system has undergone dramatic refinements in recent years. The paper highlights a problem in the original specification, namely, the use of endogenous costs as an explanatory variable. The paper illustrates how hospital response to both marginal price incentives (e.g., a change in the supply of payment-related services) and average price incentives (e.g., a change in the supply of non-payment-related services) can cause either over-or underestimation of payer cost sharing. In the present case study, overestimation of the marginal reimbursement incentives was evidenced. Obtaining cost-sharing estimates that can be used to evaluate alternative payment classification systems requires controlling for endogenous changes in hospital behavior.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00433.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 33
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A Strategic Approach to Software Protection (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper demonstrates that there is a strategic reason why software firms have followed consumers' desire to drop software protection. We analyze software protection policies in a price-setting duopoly software industry selling differentiated software packages, where consumers' preference for particular software is affected by the number of other consumers who (legally or illegally) use the same software. Increasing network effects make software more attractive to consumers, thereby enabling firms to raise prices. However, it also generates a competitive effect resulting from feircer competition for market shares. We show that when network effects are strong, unprotecting is an equilibrium for a noncooperative industry.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00163.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 34
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Effects of One-Way Spillovers on Market Shares, Industry Price, Welfare, and R & D Cooperation (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: With one-way spillovers, the standard symmetric two-period R&D model leads to an asymmetric equilibrium only, with endogeneous innovator and imitator roles. We show how R&D decisions and measures of firm heterogeneity—market shares, R&D shares, and profits—depend on spillovers and on R&D costs. While a joint lab always improves on consumer welfare, it yields higher profits, cost reductions, and social welfare only under extra assumptions, beyond those required with multidirectional spillovers. Finally, the novel issue of optimal R&D cartels is addressed. We show an optimal R&D cartel may seek to minimize R&D spillovers between its members.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00223.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 35
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Corporate Control Through Board Dismissals and Takeovers (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper examines some policy issues related to the interaction between internal and external corporate control mechanisms—board dismissals and takeovers—by focusing on the information aggregation and other effects related to this interaction. We model the functioning of corporate control mechanisms as an example of a multilayered principal-agent relationship in which shareholders delegate the task of monitoring management quality to the board and rely on the external takeover market to provide additional disciplining of the manager as well as of the board. This gives rise to two effects: (1) a substitution effect, whereby the takeover market partially substitutes for board dismissal of the manager, leading to greater lenience toward the manager by a board acting in the shareholders' best interest, and (2) a kick-in-the-pants effect, whereby the board is stricter with the manager because it may be dismissed by a successful acquirer who views it as lax. The interaction of these two effects leads to various implications about the behavior of boards and potential acquirers. In particular, a well-functioning internal control mechanism (the board) does not obviate the need for external control (takeovers). Moreover, somewhat counterintuitively, there may be a greater incidence of takeovers when the internal control mechanism is working well than when it is not.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00489.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 36
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Entry Deterrence, Product Quality: Price and Advertising as Signals (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: I analyze the marketing strategy of an incumbent monopolist facing a threat of entry. Product quality is unknown to consumers, and the monopolist's cost is unknown to the potential entrant. The incumbent uses both price and advertising to signal cost and quality. The monopolist faces a dilemma because signaling a high quality attracts customers but requires a high price, whereas signaling low cost prevents entry but requires a low price. I characterize the unique (stable) separating equilibrium and show that dissipative advertising may be used, while it is never used if either quality or cost is known. Some equilibria may involve pooling on cost. A welfare analysis indicates that potential entry may improve welfare and that the effect of unknown quality is not always negative when it interferes with entry deterrence.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00615.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 37
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Minimum Advertised Price (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper examines minimum advertised price (MAP), a vertical restraint that is observed in manufacturer-retailer interactions. Under MAP, the manufacturer announces that it will reimburse retailers for a fraction of their advertising expenditures if retailers do not advertise the product at below a specified price. MAP can be considered a combination of resale price maintenance (RPM) and a cooperative advertising subsidy. Current antitrust law treats RPM as illegal per se, whereas MAP is judged according to a rule of reason. A framework is presented within with neither a minimum retail price nor a cooperative advertising subsidy is individually sufficient to enable maximization of profits in the complete manufacturer-retailer structure, but the two instruments together are. MAP is therefore a sufficient instrument for the maximization of joint profits. We argue that MAP can also be designed as a second-best instrument that replicates RPM.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00647.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 38
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Increases in Executive Pay Following Privatization (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The average chief executive at one of Britain's twelve regional electricity distribution companies experienced nearly a threefold salary increase in the two years following the industry privatization in 1990. It is hard to account for the tremendous pay raises with conventional explanations for executive compensation rates. They are not attributable to increases in managerial talent, because privatization brought virtually no changes in personnel at the top rank. In addition, the salary increases did not coincide with dramatic changes in firm scale, and cross-firm differences in the raises are uncorrelated with stock-market returns and other measures of firm performance. By contrast, salary increases are highly correlated with firms' potential profits (as measured by the administratively assigned price cap). The findings presented here thus provide new perspectives on the determinants of executive compensation.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00327.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 39
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Seller Financing of Consumer Durables (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Sellers of consumer durables often provide financing to customers. This paper shows that when customers desire consumption smoothing and when financial markets are imperfect, a seller can find it optimal to offer a menu of deferred-payment plans. A monopolist seller price discriminates among customers with different intertemporal income profiles by making such menu offers, and the interest rate on the seller credit can be significantly lower than the market borrowing rate. Seller financing can be an equilibrium outcome in a game where sellers and banks with market power choose payment plans and interest rates strategically.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00435.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 40
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Effectiveness and Targeting of Television Advertising (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Television networks spend about 16% of their revenues on tune-ins, which are previews or advertisements for their own shows. In this paper, we examine two questions. First, what is the informational content in advertising? Second, is this level of expenditures consistent with profit maximization? To answer these questions, we use a new and unique micro-level panel dataset on the television viewing decisions of a large sample of individuals, matched with data on show tune-in advertisements. The difference in effectiveness of advertisements between “regular” shows (about which viewers are assumed to have substantial information a priori) and “specials” (about which they have very little) reveals the value of information in advertisements and the different roles that information can play. The number of exposures for each individual is likely to be correlated with their preferences, since networks target their audiences. We address this endogeneity problem by controlling for observed, and integrating the unobserved, characteristics of individuals, and find that the estimated effects of tune-ins are still large. Finally, we find that actual expenditures on tune-ins closely match the predicted optimal levels of spending.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00363.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 41
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Vertical Organization of Industry: Systems Competition versus Component Competition (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We discuss two contrasting styles of vertical organization of complementary activities or components in an industry: systems competition versus component competition. When firms' competencies differ, systems competition is not a perfect substitute for component competition, even with Bertmnd behavior. Costs, prices, industry profits, and the distribution of those profits among firms all differ between the two styles of organization. Moreover, firms' profit incentives do not generally guide them towards the socially efficient form of vertical organization. In duopoly, there is a bias towards open organization (component competition), but with enough firms (three or more, in an exponential example) this bias is reversed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00143.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 42
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Statistical Causality and Strategic Behavior in Industrial Markets (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper proposes a simple test of the leader-follower model of strategic behavior. This test relates the temporal notions of leadership central to such models to the empirical methods of statistical causality. This test is performed using data from the US softwood plywood industry of the last three decades. Others have productively explored the spatial pricing practices of this industry by applying a leader-follower model. Similarly, we find that a leader-follower model explains well the temporal relations between key strategic variables (prices) in the industry. We conclude that the leader-follower model imposes meaningful restrictions on observable time-series data and that statistical causality is a useful method for testing these restrictions.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00183.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 43
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Influence Costs, Structural Inertia, and Organizational Change (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper builds an economic model of the relationship between influence activity and resistance to change in organizations. I show that influence activity can create harmful barriers to change and that the influence costs of change are positively related to the firm's prospects. The model rationalizes the widely held view that firms often must endure a survival-threatening crisis before meaningful change can be achieved. I show that employees' choices of whether to engage in influence activity can depend on their beliefs as to whether the firm will choose to change its organizational form. If employees expect change, their best response is to try to affect the form of the change in their favor.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00237.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 44
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Patent Breadth, Patent Life, and the Pace of Technological Progress (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: In active investment climates where firms sequentially improve each other's products, a patent can terminate either because it expires or because a non-infringing innovation displaces its product in the market. We define the length of time until one of these happens as the effective patent life, and show how it depends on patent breadth. We distinguish lagging breadth, which protects against imitation, from leading breadth, which protects against new improved products. We compare two types of patent policy with leading breadth: (1) patents are finite but very broad, so that the effective life of a patent coincides with its statutory life, and (2) patents are long but narrow, so that the effective life of a patent ends when a better product replaces it. The former policy improves the diffusion of new products, but the latter has lower R&D costs.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00001.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 45
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Oligopoly, Financial Structure, and Resolution of Uncertainty (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We characterize equilibria of a multistage game in which competing duopolists may acquire and share information in advance of choosing their financial structure which, in turn, precedes production. Given sufficient uncertainty, equilibria exist in which the efficiency and, possibly, coordination gains to acquiring and sharing perfect information are sufficient to break Brander and Lewis's (1986) result wherein both firms issue debt to their mutual disadvantage. However, more interesting may be the robustness of that result when uncertainty is low or when information is imperfect. The key insight is that the consequences of issuing debt are invariant to the level of uncertainty, given that firms can recalibrate the terms of debt to achieve the Stackelberg solution.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00067.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 46
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Entry and Predation: British Shipping Cartels 1879–1929 (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: I examine the outcomes of cases of entry by merchant shipping lines into established markets around the turn of the century. These established markets are completely dominated by an incumbent cartel composed of several member shipping lines. The cartel makes the decision whether or not to begin a price war against the entrant; some entrants are formally admitted to the cartel without any conflict. I use characteristics of the entrant to predict whether or not the entrant will encounter a price war conditional on entering. I find that weaker entrants are fought, where “weaker” means having fewer financial resources, less experience, smaller size, or poor trade conditions. The empirical results provide most support for the long-purse theory of predation. Due to the small number of observations available, 47, I discuss qualitative evidence (such as predatory intent expressed in correspondence between cartel members) that supports the empirical results. The results are also found to be robust to misclassification of the dependent variable, which is a particular concern when dealing with historical data.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00679.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 47
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Incentive Contracting Under Limited Liability (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We examine the nature of incentive schemes between the principal and the risk-neutral agent in the presence of the agent's limited liability and ex ante action choice. We consider alternative schemes when a simple rental contract is infeasible due to the limited liability of the agent and study the effectiveness of a performance bonus scheme in achieving the first-best outcome. We also discuss some implications of such schemes in real practices.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00477.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 48
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Input Market Competition and the Make-or-Buy Decision (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Recent theories of vertical integration based on incomplete contracts assume perfect competition on at least one side of the market. As a result, the make-or-buy choice has no redistributive effect and will reflect efficiency considerations only. This paper introduces imperfect competition into an otherwise standard model of a vertical relationship with noncontractable specific investments. We assume that there are a finite number of potential input suppliers with private information about their costs. We first show that a monopoly buyer of such inputs will often prefer to own the seller's assets even though it would be more efficient for the seller's assets not to be so owned. We then show that an increase in the number of potential partners on either side of the market reduces this inclination towards vertical integration. With perfect competition on either side of the market, the make-buy decision will reflect only efficiency considerations.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00491.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 49
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Managerial Incentives for Takeovers (1996)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 5 (1996), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The paper studies managerial incentives in a model where managers choose product market strategies and make takeover decisions. The equilibrium contract includes an incentive to increase the firm's sales, under either quantity or price Competition. This result contrasts with previous findings in the literature, and hinges on the fact that when managers are more aggressive, rival firms earn lower profits and thus are willing to sell out at a lower price. However, as a side effect of such a contract, the manager might undertake unprofitable takeovers.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00497.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 50
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    U.S. Futures Exchanges Face“Mission Impossible” (1996)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 5 (1996), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: For U.S. futures exchanges, controlling costs while maintaining market performance is an ongoing, difficult challenge. New market realities have made that challenge even more daunting in recent years as costs have escalated, competition has expanded, and the role of information technology has expanded. It is always difficult for regulatory statutes to keep pace with ever-changing markets. Futures markets are no exception. The basic statutory framework represented by the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) was enacted in 1922, over seventy years ago. In order to maintain appropriate regulatory balance, periodic review and reform has been essential over the years. Our current federal regulatory systems were built for different markets with different competitive realities than we face today. Reforming the CEA to take into account those new market realities is vital to the survival of U.S. futures exchanges.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00459.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 51
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Wage Bargaining in Industries with Market Power (1996)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 5 (1996), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We develop a game-theoretic version of the right-to-manage model of firm-level bargaining where strategic interactions among firms are explicitly recognized. Our main aim is to investigate how equilibrium wages and employment react to changes in various labor and product market variables. We show that our comparative statics results hinge crucially on the strategic nature of the game, which in turn is determined by the relative bargaining power of unions and managers.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00535.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 52
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    In Defense of Downsizing: Competitiveness and Corporate Ownership (1996)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 5 (1996), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00307.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 53
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Product Range and Interfirm Competition (1996)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 5 (1996), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We develop a simple model in which there is both interfirm (or intraproduct) and intrafirm (or interproduct) competition. The purpose is to develop a classificatoy framework in order to understand product-range or diversification decisions alongside conventional competition. The equilibrium outcomes commonly involve a limited range of the available goods being produced. Deterrence equilibria and other strategic actions are also examined.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00317.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 54
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Most-Favored-Customer Clauses and Multilateral Contracting: When Nondiscrimination Implies Uniformity (1996)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 5 (1996), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: DeGraba and Postlewaite (1992) show that the seller of a durable input can solve the time inconsistency problem by offering most-favored-customer (MFC) protection to buyers. McAfee and Schwartz (1994) show that if a supplier sells inputs to competing firms using two-part tariffs, MFC protection that allows a firm to replace its contract with a contract executed by any other firm will not solve the commitment problem, and argue this implies managers cannot use MFCs as a strategic commitment device in complex contracting situations. This paper shows that if the profits of the seller and the buyers are monotonic in each term of the contract, then applying MFC protection to each term of a contract allows a manager to solve his commitment problem in complex contacting situations. We show that “standard” contract arrangements (two-part tariffs, declining block tariffs, and royalties as a percentage of sales) meet this condition.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00565.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 55
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Policy Shocks, Market Intermediaries, and Corporate Strategy: The Evolution of Business Groups in Chile and India (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Numerous countries have undergone rapid transitions in their economic environments. Yet, little is known about firms' responses to such transitions. We use field-collected data to study the evolution of eighteen large and diversified business groups in Chile (1987–1997) and India (1990–1997). The chosen periods correspond to significant deregulation in the primary markets in both countries. Conventional wisdom suggests that the intermediation roles played by business groups ought to decrease during these periods. However, we find an increase in group scope, an increase in the strength of the social and economic ties that bind together group firms, an increase in self-reported intermediation attempts by the groups, and some evidence that these actions are associated with improvements in accounting and stock-market performance of the group affiliates. We suggest that the slow development of market intermediaries, in a manner suggested by institutional economics, and the attendant lack of reduction in transaction costs in primary markets, can explain these findings.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00271.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 56
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A Reexamination of Yardstick Competition (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper shows that yardstick competition does not assist a regulator when lump-sum transfers are not costly and the regulator does not care about the distribution of income. Yardstick competition may discourage investment that would make efficient operation possible. The paper characterizes optimal regulatory schemes in a simple model and demonstrates that it may be optimal to limit the amount of information available to the regulator.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00033.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 57
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Price Dynamics and Consumer Learning (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper studies the price dynamics induced by strategic firm behavior in the presence of consumer learning about the uncertain quality differential of the products offered by a duopoly. It is found that consumers learn slowly and that prices converge also slowly to full-information levels. A consequence is that the incentives affirms to manipulate consumers' beliefs are persistent. Although pricing tends to be aggressive at the early stages, and average prices eventually increase over time, price wars may occur at intermediate stages of the product life cycle.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00095.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 58
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Tender Offers, Proxy Contests, and Large-Shareholder Activism (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The paper analyzes tender offers and proxy contests as alternative means of resolving corporate governance conflicts between dissidents and incumbent management. We show that when a dissident shareholder is sufficiently confident about the potential benefits from changing corporate policy, he will seek majority control by making a tender offer rather than initiating a proxy contest. When the dissident is relatively uninformed, however, he may opt for a proxy contest, thereby utilizing the information of other shareholders to implement the better policy. Consistent with empirical evidence, the model predicts that announcements of tender offers will tend to be associated with larger positive stockprice reactions than announcements of proxy contests. The model is easily extended to allow for promanagement bias in proxy voting by institutional investors. Empirical observations that have been viewed as evidence of such promanagement bias are shown to be quite consistent with the absence of such bias. Policy issues are discussed as well. An interesting result is that even policies targeted at reducing the costs of conducting proxy contests may have ambiguous social consequences, given the possibility of substitution between tender offers and proxy contests.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00787.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 59
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Regulation of Predatory Firms (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This article investigates the issue ofpredation by a regulated firm. Since it has private information, a regulated firm obtains higher rents in case of successful predation: the fewer the competitors, the higher the marginal social value of the regulated firm's effort and the higher the informational rents. Both principals (the investor of a “target” firm and the regulator) have to provide some incentives to prevent predation: the investor has to reduce the sensitivity of refinancing to predation; the regulator has to lower the gain of successful predation. It is shown that there is a trade-off between the power of the regulatory incentive scheme and the regulated firm's incentives to prey. In addition, as deterring predation is costly, the investor and the regulator compete when offering contracts: each wants to free-ride on the other. Hence, predation may occur in equilibrium although it makes both principals worse off.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00849.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 60
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Limited Liability and Bonus Contracts (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper studies the nature of incentive contracts between a risk-neutral principal and a risk-neutral agent under the constraint that the agent's liability is limited. A necessary and sufficient condition is derived for the existence of a first-best contract under this constraint, and a bonus-based contract is shown to be the most efficient contractual form. Implications of bonus contracts are also discussed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00899.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 61
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Why Retailers Sell Private Labels (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper interprets private label marketing as a retailer instrument for overcoming the double-marginalization problem inherent in the distribution of well-known manufacturer brands. Retailers with some degree of market power carry private label substitutes for popular national brands in order to capture more profit from the vertical structures they share with brand manufacturers. The net effect of private label marketing is to improve the performance of distribution channels. After presenting a formal model and deriving analytical results, the paper gathers some empirical evidence that supports these results.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00509.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 62
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Introduction (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00001.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 63
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Horizontal integration for bargaining Power: Evidence from the Cable Television Industry (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper studies the hypothesis that large firms have more bargaining power with suppliers than do small firms, using data from the cable television industry. Employing techniques from the “new empirical lo,” the effect of owner size on marginal costs is inferred from the effect of owner size on observable product market choices. In the cable industry, the downstream firms decide how many subscriptions of cable to sell and how many channels to offer in the cable package. lf large firms have lower costs than small firms, then large firms should be willing to supply more than small firms, at all prices. The effects of bargaining power are identified separately from the effects of scale economies by exploiting the structure of the cable industry. Scale economies, in the cable industry, are likely to stem from regional size, while bargaining power is likely to stem from national size. By controlling for regional size, estimates of the effect of owner national size on the willingness to supply cable subscriptions and to offer channels indicate that large downstream firms offer significantly more subscriptions and channels at all prices than do small downstream firms. These results provide some of the first systematic, industry-specific, evidence consistent with the bargaining-power hypothesis.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00375.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 64
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Usage Heterogeneity and Extended Warranties (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The role of product warranty in segmentation of consumer durable product markets is highlighted. I demonstrate that consumer moral hazard and heterogeneity in product usage create variation in the valuation of product warranties by the different segments in the market. In this context, the firm, by offering a self-selecting menu of base warranty and extended warranties, satisfies the warranty demands of the various segments of the population. The consumer choice behavior prediction of the theory with regard to extended warranty is empirically validated with data from a survey of new car buyers.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00033.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 65
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Marketing Channels and the Durable Goods Monopolist: Renting versus Selling Reconsidered (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Research on durable goods has shown that because of a time inconsistency problem, a monopolist manufacturer prefers to rent rather than sell its product. We reexamine the relative profitability of renting versus selling from a marketing perspective. In particular, using a simple linear demand formulation, we assume a durable goods monopolist has to use downstream intermediaries to market its product. In contrast to the case of an integrated monopolist, we find that when the monopolist has to rely on intermediaries, then it prefers to go through an intermediary that sells rather than one that rents its product. Similarly, the intermediary that sells the product is more profitable than the intermediary that rents the product. However, if the monopolist can commit to a set of prices, then the intermediary that rents is more profitable than the intermediary that sells.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00069.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 66
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Empirical Analysis of a Dynamic Duopoly Model of Competition (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Empirically validating and testing the specification of game theoretic models has received limited attention in the marketing literature. The authors provide an econometric framework for estimating the parameters of response functions when the observed data in the market place are the Nash equilibrium outcomes of an underlying dynamic duopoly game specification. Specifically, the estimation procedure accounts for the joint endogeneity of market shares and marketing efforts of market rivals using a system of simultaneous equations that included the market response function and the Nash equilibrium conditions. A formal statistical test is used to detect model misspecification. The empirical analysis is carried out using data from four product markets: pharmaceutical, soft drink, beer, and detergent. Comparisons are provided with conventional estimation of the response function parameters in which the equilibrium conditions are ignored in the estimation. Managerial implications of the empirical results are discussed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00109.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 67
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Process- Versus Function-Based Hierarchies (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: I consider a firm's choice between having people who carry out complementary tasks report to the same manager and having them report to separate, function-based managers. Even supposing that the former enhances coordination, the latter may be preferred because it improves the firm's control over employees. I show that, because switching from a function-based hierarchy to a process-based hierarchy reduces the firm's direct control, it raises the attractiveness of making the employee pay more sensitive to performance. Also, this switch tends to raise the profitability of fostering altruism between employees. I extend the analysis so that it deals with the relative benefits of IT- and M-form organizations. I show that the M form becomes more profitable as the firm gets large.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00453.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 68
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Role of Debt in Procurement Contracts (1996)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 5 (1996), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper develops a theory of capital structure based on the attempts of a firm to alleviate a holdup problem that arises in its bilateral relationship with a buyer. It is shown that by issuing debt to outsiders, the firm can improve its ex post bargaining position vis-a-vis the buyer and capture a larger share of the ex post gains from trade. Debt, however, is costly because the buyer may find the required price too high and refuse to trade. Since debt raises the payoff of claimholders, it strengthens the firm's incentive to make relationship-specific investments, and therefore alleviates the well-known underinvestment problem. A comparative static analysis yields a number of testable hypotheses regarding the firm's financial strategy.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00379.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 69
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, and profits in the Presence of Double Marginalization (1996)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 5 (1996), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Whether vertical integration between a downstream oligopolist and an upstream oligopolist is profitable for an integrated pair of firms is shown to depend on whether one means by this that profits increase no matter what other firms do, that all integrated firms are better off when all firms are integrated than when none are, or simply that no downstream-upstream pair of firms has an incentive to deviate from a situation where all firms are integrated. It is also shown to depend on the number of firms in each oligopoly and on the type of interaction that is assumed between firms that are integrated and firms that are not. In particular, it is shown that if no restriction is put on trade between integrated and nonintegrated firms, integrated firms may continue to purchase inputs from the nonintegrated upstream firms, with the goal of raising their downstream rivals' costs. Furthermore, even though firms are identical, asymmetric equilibria, where integrated and nonintegrated firms coexist, may actually arise as an outcome of the integration game.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00409.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 70
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Why Lever into a Zero-Profit Industry: Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion (1996)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 5 (1996), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper considers the incentives of a firm with power in a market for one good to tie in the sale of a complementary good even though the complementary good is produced in a zero profit market. If the zero-profit price of the tied good is greater than the marginal cost (which occurs for example when the technology is characterized by a fixed cost and a constant marginal cost), a firm will fie in order to increase the sales of the complementary good, which at the margin is profitable. We show that such tying will lower the effective prices paid by customers and increase welfare. This incentive exists if the firm with market power is a monopolist or one of several competing oligopolists.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00433.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 71
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Search and Trading in Intermediated Markets (1996)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 5 (1996), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper examines the effect of a middleman on the search and trading behavior of the traders. It is shown that the buyer and seller types with middle valuations choose to search for each other, while the buyer and seller types with high or low valuations drop out of the search market and choose to trade directly with the middleman. The ask and bid prices of the middleman act as an outside option for the buyer and seller, and influence the outcome of the bargaining between the two. The model generalizes Gehrig (1993) by endogenizing the traders' search intensities, by allowing the traders to go to an intermediary even if thy have engaged in search, and by enabling the intermediary to provide the service of immediacy.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00195.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 72
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Specialization, Option Demand, and the Pricing of Medical Specialists (1996)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 5 (1996), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper discusses the supplier power of medical specialists. We argue that a combination of factors, including the structure of health care delivery, reimbursement systems, the presence of option demand, and high consumer switching costs, create circumstances in which medical specialists may be able to exercise significant seller power. We explore the implications of this for the pricing and organization of medical care.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00277.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 73
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Introduction (1996)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 5 (1996), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00001.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 74
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Value-based Business Strategy (1996)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 5 (1996), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper offers an exact definition of the value created by firms together with their suppliers and buyers. The “added value” of a firm is similarly defined, and shown under certain conditions to impose an upper bound on how much value the firm can capture. The key to a firm's achieving a positive added value is the existence of asymmetries between the firm and other firms. The paper identifies four routes (“value-based” strategies) that lead to the creation of such asymmetries. Our analysis reveals the equal importance of a firm's supplier and buyer relations. Cooperative game theory provides the underpinnings of the analysis.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00005.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 75
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Who Adopts Total Quality Management (TQM): Theory and An Empirical Test (1996)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 5 (1996), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The recent emergence of total quality management (TQM) in the U.S. has spawned a great deal of interest in management circles as well as in the mass media. However, despite the growing number of firms that have adopted this management technique, few formal tests exist concerning the pattern of adoption as well as the changes that accompany the adoption of TQM. This paper contrasts models of production for TQM and non-TQM firms in order to explore reasons why some firms but not others have adopted the TQM approach to quality improvement. Predictions arising from such a comparison are tested using a unique data set that combines data on firms from three different sources. Our findings tend to support the proposed theory of systematic differences between firms that find it advantageous to adopt TQM and firms that do not. We also find evidence that firms adopting TQM experience greater growth in sales, employment, and capital stock.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00069.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 76
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Time Schedule and Program Profile: TV News in Norway and Denmark (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Two TV channels compete on programming with respect to both time schedule (continuous choice) and program profile (discrete choice), with a directional constraint concerning time schedule (viewers cannot watch TV before they get home). We show how the relative importance of program profile and time schedule, as perceived by the viewers, determines the equilibrium outcome. Furthermore, we find that there is a first-mover disadvantage in a sequential game where one channel sets its two choice variables before its rival does, and a first-mover advantage in a semise-quential game where the channels set time schedules sequentially and thereafter set program profiles simultaneously. The results are applied to the Norwegian and Danish markets for TV news, where number-two channels have challenged the incumbents.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00209.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 77
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Disciplinary Takeovers and Industry Effects (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper presents a disciplinary explanation for some seemingly paradoxical stylized facts from the takeover literature. Most notable among these are: (1) hostile takeovers are predicted better by industry-wide than by firm-specific performance failures; and (2) gains from a successful bid for a specific firm extend to other firms in the same industry. Our explanation is based on the idea that managerial incentives based on relative performance evaluation may induce an inefficient industry-wide equilibrium in which all firms underperform with respect to a value-maximizing firm, but no firm underperforms with respect to the industry average. A takeover can serve as a means to destroy such an inefficient industry-wide incentive equilibrium.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00265.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 78
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Interaction between a Most-Favored-Customer Clause and Price Dispersion: An Empirical Examination of the Medicaid Rebate Rules of 1990 (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper examines the effect of the MFC rules adopted by Medicaid on both price dispersion and price levels in the wholesale pharmaceutical market. Theory suggests that the regulations should reduce price dispersion and increase the average price for those products with a high initial level of price dispersion. Using data which can only measure some dimensions of price discrimination, I find that discrimination falls for products sold to hospitals, but not drugstores. Branded drugs facing generic competition have the most dispersion ex ante. Prices of these brands rise with dispersion at the implementation of the new rules. The last two results are consistent with Scott Morton (1997), where I look only at price changes due to the law. The results of this paper confirm that part of the mechanism of action for the price increase is the high level of price dispersion for some products combined with the MFC.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00151.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 79
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Organizational Diseconomies of scale (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Private information creates a cost of operating a hierarchy, which becomes larger as the hierarchical distance between the information source and the decision maker increases. When information about a firm's capabilities is dispersed among the individuals in the firm, production is inefficient even though everyone behaves rationally. Because hierarchies need rents in order to function, a firm with a long hierarchy may not be viable in a competitive industry.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00399.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 80
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Product Rivalry with multiple Strategic weapons: an Analysis of price and advertising Competition (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: A dynamic model of product rivalry is developed for a market in which firms choose price and advertising intensity. The model, a state-space game, is implemented using data that consist of weekly price, sales, and promotional activity for four brands of saltine crackers sold by four chains of grocery stores in a small town. A number of questions can be asked of this data. First, is advertising predatory (merely changing market shares) or cooperative (shifting out market demand)? Second, are price and advertising own and cross-strategic complements or substitutes? And finally, do investments in stocks of goodwill and in price reductions make firms tough and aggressive or soft and accommodating?
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00445.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 81
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Division of Labor in Teams (1997)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 6 (1997), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper examines the incentive effects of division of labor on worker effort, in the absence of the scale effects studied by Adam Smith. The game-theoretic model gives two results. (1) Suppose workers are identical and risk-neutral, and there is stochastic observation of group output by the firm offering compensations subject to some worker-participation constraint. Then the firm can arrive at the same first-best outcome with or without division of labor. However, if workers are risk-averse, division of labor can give the firm strictly greater profit. (2) A deepening division of labor magnifies this positive incentive effect; but if workers are heterogeneous, or if there are certain informational imperfections in the production process, this incentive advantage of division of labor could be impaired or even reversed. The first result may help explain the emergence of division of labor in the early stages of industrialization without relying on the Smithian advantages, which are also present in some labor deployment schemes without division of labor. The second result throws light on some recent anecdotal evidence of a shallowing division of labor in some areas of modern manufacturing. These factors affecting the efficiency of division of labor are then further discussed in the light of recent empirical findings on division of labor and team work, such as those in Katzenbach and Smith (1993).
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00403.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 82
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Must Sell (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Why are moving sales a successful and widespread phenomenon? How can it be optimal for a seller to disclose her low valuation for the item to be sold? We propose an explanation based on the “lemons problem” in bargaining with asymmetric information about quality. Disclosing a low valuation signals that there are significant gains from trade, so that trade takes place when it wouldn't otherwise, and all agents are made better off.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00055.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 83
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Models of Competitive Price Promotions: Some Empirical Evidence from the Coffee and Saltine Crackers Markets (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: I present tests of a competitive rationale for price promotions. In a model with a population of informed and uninformed customers, price competition yields a static equilibrium in which each seller draws a price from a specified density function. Price data on coffee and saltine crackers products are used to test whether the sample of prices on each product could have possibly come from the theoretically specified density function. The results suggest that some markets are indeed consistent with the marginal distributions of prices predicted by the model. Furthermore, in the process of testing this rationale for price promotions, estimates are obtained for the marginal cost of each product, the number of competing goods, and the percentage of informed consumers. The resulting excess variability of these estimates across competing brands can also raise questions with respect to the empirical validity of the model.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00085.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 84
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Coupon Advertising Under Imperfect Price Information (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper studies sales promotions through coupons in an oligopoly under imperfect price information. Sellers can distribute either ordinary coupons, or coupon (price) advertising, or both types of coupons, at distant locations to attract consumers from their rivals' markets. A unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium exists where rebates and couponing intensity are always positive. In the ordinary-coupon equilibrium, prices, promotional efforts, and sellers' profits are higher than in the coupon-advertising equilibrium. However, if sellers are allowed to distribute both types of coupons, only coupon advertising is sent out in equilibrium.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00523.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 85
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Quality Competition, Insurance, and Consumer Choice in Health Care Markets (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: In this model, insurance offering a choice of hospitals is valued because consumers are uncertain which hospital they will prefer ex post. A competitive insurance market facilitates tacit price collusion between hospitals; high margins induce hospitals to compete for customers through overinvestment in quality. Incentives may exist to lock in market share via managed-care plans with less choice and lower prices. As technology becomes more expensive, the market increasingly offers too little choice. A pure managed care market may emerge, with underinvestment in quality. Relative to a pure insurance regime, however, all consumers are better off under managed care.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00546.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 86
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Strategic Invasion in Markets with Switching Costs (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We investigate the role of consumer switching costs in a three-stage model in which the entrant and the incumbent firm set prices sequentially and then the consumers decide from which firm to buy. We characterize the unique subgame perfect equilibrium and find that even an entrant with a higher marginal cost may profitably invade part of the market due to the existence of switching costs. Switching costs benefit both firms but harm consumers. This model is used to understand pricing behavior in the US telecommunications industry.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00521.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 87
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Yardstick Competition and Investment Incentives (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper analyzes how firms' investment incentives are affected by yardstick competition in a situation in which the regulator is unable to commit himself to the regulatory contract before firms invest. Despite its rent-extracting property, yardstick competition does not necessarily reduce efficiency-improving investment. Considering firm-specific investment, yardstick competition is shown to increase investment incentives over individual regulation affirms. In this case, therefore, yardstick competition both reduces the regulator's informational problem ex post and strengthens the firms' investment incentives ex ante. If instead investment is industry-specific, incentives to invest are lowered by yardstick competition.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00105.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 88
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Explaining the Choice Among Regulatory Plans in the U.S. Telecommunications Industry (1995)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd
    Journal of economics & management strategy 4 (1995), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We investigate why different states in the United States choose different regulatory plans in their telecommunications industry. We present a simple theoretical model and an empirical analysis of the issue. We find that a state is more likely to replace rate-of-return regulation with incentive regulation when: (1) residential basic local service rates have historically been relatively high; (2) allowed earnings under rate-of-return regulation in the state have been either particularly high or particularly low; (3) the state's leaders tend to come from both major political parties, rather than from a single party; (4) the state's urban population is growing relatively rapidly; and (5) the bypass activity of competitors in the state is less pronounced.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1995.00237.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 89
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Hassle Costs: The Achilles' Heel of Price-Matching Guarantees* (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We show that price-matching guarantees can facilitate monopoly pricing only if firms automatically match prices. If consumers must instead request refunds (thereby incurring hassle costs), we find that any increase in equilibrium prices due to firms' price-matching policies will be small; often, no price increase can be supported. In symmetric markets price-matching guarantees cannot support any rise in prices, even if hassle costs are arbitrarily small In asymmetric markets, higher prices can be supported, but the prices fall well short of maximizing joint profits. Our model can explain why some firms adopt price-matching guarantees while others do not.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00489.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 90
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Introduction (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00311.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 91
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Using Subjective Risk Adjusting to Prevent Patient Dumping in the Health Care Industry (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We examine how to procure health care services at minimum cost while preventing suppliers from refusing to care for high-cost patients. A single risk-adjusted prospective payment is optimal only when it is particularly costly for the supplier to discover likely treatment costs. Cost sharing is optimal when these screening costs are somewhat smaller. When screening costs are sufficiently small, screening is optimally accommodated and subjective risk adjusting is implemented. Under subjective risk adjusting, the supplier classifies patients according to his personal assessment of likely treatment costs, and payments are structured accordingly. Optimal procurement policies are contrasted with prevailing industry policies.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00351.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 92
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Separating the True Effect from Gaming in Incentive-Based Contracts in Health Care (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper studies the effect of incentive regulation on health care. In the context of incentive-based health contracts, which might also introduce an incentive for the providers simply to report better treatment outcomes, evaluation of treatment using the information supplied by the providers (reported output) could be problematic. The systematic error on the output report is called providers' gaming behavior. This paper develops a general method for decomposing the effect of incentive-based contracts on performance into the true effect, which is the result of clinicians' improved effort induced by the contract, and the gaming effect, which is due to the change in the providers' reporting practice. The method follows the essence of linear structural relation (LISREL) models, and the true treatment output is modeled using a latent variable. Various output measures can be included in the structural evaluation model, but objective measure(s) (output measures not affected by providers' potential gaming) must be constructed based on available information to identify gaming through its correlation with the reported measures. The strengths of this method are that information from more than one output measure can be used, no monitoring system is required, and the construction of a gold-standard measure is not necessary. This method is applied to evaluate the impact of Maine's performance-based contracting on its public providers' substance-abuse services. Evidence of gaming is found in Maine's system, which remains robust in most of the sensitivity analyses. The methodology developed here can be used to evaluate the impact of a broad range of incentive-based contracts.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00383.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 93
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Adverse Selection with Competitive Inspection (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: We develop a model with heterogeneous buyers and sellers in which the sellers have private information about their goods' qualities. We show that efficient trading cannot occur without middlemen. Middlemen can provide two services: one is inspection, and the other is the sorting of buyers and sellers through the rationing of sellers and the provision of two different price schedules. The latter service permits the possibility of achieving the first best. When the first best is not attainable, there is a second best characterized by two intervals, one consisting of low-quality noninspected goods, and the other of high-quality inspected goods. We determine whether first and second best outcomes can be implemented in a market equilibrium with both zero and infinite buyer-seller search costs. First and second best outcomes are attainable under a larger set of parameter values when search costs are infinite; also, typically too much inspection occurs in a market equilibrium. Welfare may be either raised or lowered by the introduction of middlemen.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00001.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 94
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Empirical Evaluation of Regulatory Regimes in Local Telecommunications Markets (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper relies on an engineering optimization model of the local telecommunication exchange network to calibrate the functions entering various regulatory mechanisms, from both traditional and modern (incentive) regulation, and evaluate their relative performance. The engineering process model is used to generate data, which are econometrically synthesized in a translog economic cost function. Using this estimated cost function and some empirical and institutional information on market and regulatory conditions, we then calibrate demand, social-surplus, and disutility-of-(cost-reducing)-effort functions. These functions, together with probability distributions reflecting the regulator's beliefs about technology characteristics, allow us to quantitatively assess the social value of regulatory transfers and of good cost auditing procedures, the redistributive consequences of the various forms of regulation, and the sensitivity of their relative performance to the cost of public funds.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00061.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 95
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Erratum: “Time Schedule and Program Profile: TV News in Norway and Denmark” (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00161.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 96
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Licensing vs. Litigation: The Effect of the Legal System on Incentives to Innovate (1999)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 8 (1999), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: With uncertain scope of patent protection and imperfect enforcement, the effective strength of patent protection is determined by the legal system. We analyze how the legal system affects the incentives of firms to innovate, taking into account possibilities of strategic licensing and litigation to deter imitation. The legal system that guarantees the patentee's monopoly power maximizes the R&D intensities. However, the legal system that induces licensing provides incentives to exert R&D effort while preserving ex post efficiency. We also compare R&D, patent licensing, and litigation behavior under American and English rules of legal cost allocation.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1999.00133.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 97
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Rational Nonprofit Entrepreneurship (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper derives the decision to found a nonprofit firm as the equilibrium outcome of a multistage game among individuals who would like a public good to be provided. The model predicts that if individuals will voluntarily contribute towards provision of the public good, then it is in the self-interest of the entrepreneur to impose a nondistribution constraint on herself by founding a nonprofit firm.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00551.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 98
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Agency-Theory and Internal-Labor-Market Explanations of Bonus Payments: Empirical Evidence from Spanish Firms (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: This paper combines agency theory and internal-labor-market theories to explain the determinants of bonus payments among a large sample of top and middle managers from Spanish firms. A distinction is made between the decision whether to pay bonus or not and the size of the bonus. The empirical evidence confirms that the two decisions are determined by different factors. The results of the analysis show a trade-off between short-term and long-term incentives (bonuses and promotion opportunities) as well as differences in the pattern of compensation policies across economic sectors and functional areas inside the firm.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00573.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 99
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Hiring Risky Workers: Some Evidence (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: Lazear recently suggested that firms that do not expect to live for a long time will hire only safe workers. Hence their worker turnover will be lower. In this paper we test this hypothesis using both the industry growth rate and industry-average age of establishments as measures of the horizon for a particular firm. We find mixed results, both at the industry level and at the establishment level. Establishments in growing industries do indeed exhibit higher churning flows, but a high average age of establishments reduces rather than increases churning.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00669.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
  • 100
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Contract Renegotiation with Time-Varying Valuations (1998)
    Oxford, UK : Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
    Journal of economics & management strategy 7 (1998), S. 0 
    Details
    ISSN: 1530-9134
    Source: Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005
    Topics: Economics
    Notes: The paper characterizes optimal renegotiation-proof rental contracts in a model with adverse selection and hidden information. It generalizes the work of Hart and Tirole (1988) to the case of time-varying valuations. The paper considers a durable-goods monopolist who serves a nonanonymous buyer with time-varying valuation for the seller's good. The buyer's valuation has a persistent and a transient component; both are private information. The paper shows that for some range of prior beliefs the seller strictly prefers leasing to selling.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00397.x
    Location Call Number Expected Availability
    BibTip Others were also interested in ...
    Paper (German National Licenses)
    Fulltext
Close ⊗
This website uses cookies and the analysis tool Matomo. More information can be found here...