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  • Articles  (64)
  • Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)  (64)
  • American Meteorological Society
  • Springer Nature
  • Springer Science + Business Media
  • 2020-2022
  • 2005-2009  (64)
  • 1960-1964
  • Law  (64)
  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    The Size of the Sanction Should Depend on the Weight of the Evidence (2005)
    Berkeley, Calif. : Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
    Review of law and economics 1.2005, 2, art4 
    Details
    ISSN: 1555-5879
    Source: Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
    Topics: Law , Economics
    Notes: The paper argues that society should vary the sanction applied to a criminal defendant with the weight of the evidence against him or her. This is optimal when it is costly for society to apply sanctions, since it can yield the same degree of deterrence while requiring fewer resources to be spent on sanctioning. Furthermore, when the unfairness of convicting an innocent defendant increases with the size of the sanction, this provides a further rationale for graduating sanctions with the probability of guilt. Some objections are briefly discussed, mainly that it is inherently unfair to apply different sanctions on people, who have committed the same offense, and that the legal system will lose legitimacy if it allows sanctions to vary in the way suggested.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol1/iss2/art4
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Completing Contracts Ex Post: How Car Manufacturers Manage Car Dealers (2005)
    Berkeley, Calif. : Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
    Review of law and economics 1.2005, 1, art8 
    Details
    ISSN: 1555-5879
    Source: Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
    Topics: Law , Economics
    Notes: This article illustrates how contracts are completed ex post in practice and, in so doing, indirectly suggests what the real function of contracts may be. Our evidence comes from the contracts between automobile manufacturers and their dealers in 23 dealership networks in Spain. Franchising dominates automobile distribution because of the need to decentralize pricing and control of service decisions. It motivates local managers to undertake these activities at minimum cost for the manufacturer. However, it creates incentive conflicts, both between manufacturers and dealers and among dealers themselves, concerning the level of sales and service provided. It also holds potential for expropriation of specific investments. Contracts deal with these conflicts by restricting dealers' decision rights and granting manufacturers extensive completion, monitoring and enforcement powers. The main mechanism that may prevent abuse of these powers is the manufacturers' reputational capital.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol1/iss1/art8
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Caution, Children Crossing: Heterogeneity of Victim's Cost of Care and the Negligence Rule (2006)
    Berkeley, Calif. : Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
    Review of law and economics 1.2006, 3, art3 
    Details
    ISSN: 1555-5879
    Source: Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
    Topics: Law , Economics
    Notes: The paper deals with a bilateral accident situation in which victims have heterogeneous costs of care. With perfect information, efficient care by the injurer raises with the victim's cost. When the injurer cannot observe at all the victim's type, and this fact can be verified by Courts, first-best cannot be implemented with the use of a negligence rule based on the first-best levels of care. Second-best leads the injurer to intermediate care, and the two types of victims to choose the best response to it. We explore in particular detail the more interesting case of imperfect observation of the victim's type, characterizing the optimal solution and examining the different legal alternatives when Courts cannot verify the injurers' statements. Counterintuitively, we show that there is no difference at all between the use by Courts of a rule of complete trust and a rule of complete distrust towards the injurers' statements. We then relate the findings of the model to existing rules and doctrines in Common Law and Civil Law legal systems.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol1/iss3/art3
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Legal Durability (2005)
    Berkeley, Calif. : Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
    Review of law and economics 1.2005, 1, art2 
    Details
    ISSN: 1555-5879
    Source: Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
    Topics: Law , Economics
    Notes: This paper develops a framework to study the effects of the durability of legal allocation decisions, such as trial outcomes, regulatory enactments and property entitlements. For a party favored by the legal allocation, a more durable decision is also more costly to secure, ex-ante. Thus, it is not the greater durability of the allocation that determines whether the "winner" is better-off, but other factors that are affected by the durability attribute, such as the cost of securing a favorable outcome and the ability of contesting parties to affect this cost. The paper develops conditions under which greater durability is irrelevant, or even undesirable to the winner. The analysis is applied to shed light on durability doctrines relating to trial outcomes (e.g., res judicata and double jeopardy), rules and regulations (e.g., transition relief when rules change), entitlements (e.g., adverse possession and statutes of limitations), and marriages.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol1/iss1/art2
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    On the Optimal Scope of Negligence (2006)
    Berkeley, Calif. : Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
    Review of law and economics 1.2006, 3, art2 
    Details
    ISSN: 1555-5879
    Source: Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
    Topics: Law , Economics
    Notes: This article studies the optimal scope of negligence, considering which of the parties' precautionary measures should be included in the determination of negligence and which instead should be omitted. The analysis shows that the optimal scope of negligence balances the gains derived from improved accident prevention with the administrative costs of the system. This approach also provides insights concerning not only the notions of care and activity level and their respective boundaries, but also the choice between strict liability and negligence.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol1/iss3/art2
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    "Unhappy Contracts": The Case of Divorce Settlements (2005)
    Berkeley, Calif. : Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
    Review of law and economics 1.2005, 2, art3 
    Details
    ISSN: 1555-5879
    Source: Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
    Topics: Law , Economics
    Notes: This paper examines a particular type of contracts that is, sadly, increasingly frequent: the agreements produced by divorcing couples. They are unhappy contracts, agreements produced as a necessary part of exit from what is now suboptimal marriage. They are virtually required by many states and are, in theory at least, closely monitored by courts since, when children are involved, they will be incorporated into court orders. What parties to unhappy contracts do is attempt to minimize losses, rather than maximize gain. How are contracts structured that will do this, and how does a difference in the size or power of the bargaining entities change the final settlement or contracting result? Because they are for more than one year, they also must be analyzed as relational contracts. This empirical study not only considers how the contractual terms come to be, but also what effect they have over a five year period, with an eye to seeing which contracts produce (or are at least consistent with) further litigation and which correspond with adjustment over time. The role of lawyers in the entire process is also a focus of the inquiry. Special attention is also paid to the role of fault, with surprising results in a no-fault system. All the divorce stipulations for parents of minor children that were filed in Johnson County, Iowa, during 1998 provide the beginning data, which is supplemented by other court records in each case.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol1/iss2/art3
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Featuring the Three Tenors in La Triviata (2005)
    Berkeley, Calif. : Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
    Review of law and economics 1.2005, 1, art3 
    Details
    ISSN: 1555-5879
    Source: Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
    Topics: Law , Economics
    Notes: In the "Three Tenors" case the FTC found an agreement to be an antitrust violation despite the fact that there was no way it could be anticompetitive. The Commission failed to heed the lessons of Coase's classic paper on the nature of the firm, making a sharp distinction between activities within a firm (legal) and across firm boundaries (not legal). Analytically, there should be no distinction. The decision to integrate activities by contract rather than ownership is a matter of relative transactions costs. Since the boundaries of the firm are, ultimately, an economic decision reflecting the costs and benefits of the alternative arrangements, there is no economic justification for making the legality of any act contingent upon whether it was on the proper side of that boundary. Nor is there any particular virtue in using antitrust rules to alter the relative costs so as to shift that boundary to favor bringing activities within the firm. The paper proposes a "quick look" approach. The first thing to look for is some indication of market power. If antitrust harm is not credible, as in this case, because there was no market power, stop looking.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol1/iss1/art3
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Brandeis and Holmes, Business and Economics, Then and Now (2005)
    Berkeley, Calif. : Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
    Review of law and economics 1.2005, 1, art1 
    Details
    ISSN: 1555-5879
    Source: Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
    Topics: Law , Economics
    Notes: This Article attempts to explain the views about business of Brandeis and Holmes. The Article analyses why their economic thinking differed as it did; to what extent it comports with a modern understanding of economics; and how Holmes and Brandeis could have been such close allies when their economic theories differed as fundamentally as they did. Finally, the Article addresses the consequences and current significance of, if any, the theories of Brandeis and Holmes, with particular though not exclusive reference on the one hand to antitrust law and on the other hand to the current crisis of corporate governance.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol1/iss1/art1
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A Simple Theory of Increasing Penalties for Repeat Offenders (2005)
    Berkeley, Calif. : Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
    Review of law and economics 1.2005, 1, art5 
    Details
    ISSN: 1555-5879
    Source: Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
    Topics: Law , Economics
    Notes: A feature of many penal codes is that punishments are more severe for repeat offenders, yet economic models have had a hard time providing a theoretical justification for this practice. This paper offers an explanation based on the wage penalty suffered by individuals convicted of crime. While this penalty probably deters some first-timers from committing crimes, it actually hampers deterrence of repeat offenders because of their diminished employment opportunities. We show that in this setting, an escalating penalty scheme is optimal and time consistent.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol1/iss1/art5
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    A Response to Professor Goldberg: An Anticompetitive Restraint by Any Other Name . . . (2005)
    Berkeley, Calif. : Berkeley Electronic Press (now: De Gruyter)
    Review of law and economics 1.2005, 1, art4 
    Details
    ISSN: 1555-5879
    Source: Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals
    Topics: Law , Economics
    Notes: In ignoring the facts of the Three Tenors case and the transactions costs of legal rulemaking, Professor Goldberg would unnecessarily complicate antitrust law to the detriment of consumers. Contrary to his assertions, the FTC's opinion does not favor ownership over contract. The parties could have chosen to coordinate Three Tenors products and promote a "brand," but they did not. Indeed, their contract explicitly provided otherwise. For a small class of cases - in which the parties restrain basic forms of competition such as price or advertising without a legitimate claim of consumer benefit - antitrust law avoids the costs of finding market power. In any event, the facts of the Three Tenors case provide a natural experiment revealing that the agreement the Commission proscribed in fact harmed consumers.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol1/iss1/art4
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