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  • Articles  (10)
  • intentionality  (10)
  • 2020-2022
  • 2015-2019
  • 1990-1994  (10)
  • 1915-1919
  • Philosophy  (10)
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  • Articles  (10)
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Keywords
Publisher
Years
  • 2020-2022
  • 2015-2019
  • 1990-1994  (10)
  • 1915-1919
  • 1995-1999  (4)
Year
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  • 1
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Thought and qualia (1994)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 4 (1994), S. 283-302 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Consciousness ; qualia ; intentionality ; secondary properties ; functionalism ; physicalism ; propositional attitudes
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract I present a theory of the nature and basis of the conscious experience characteristic of occurent propositional attitudes: thinking this or that. As a preliminary I offer an extended criticism of Paul Schweizer's treatment of such consciousness as unexplained secondary qualities of neural events. I also attempt to rebut arguments against the possibility of functionalist accounts of conscious experience and qualia.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974195
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  • 2
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    “Words lie in our way” (1994)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 4 (1994), S. 421-437 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Computation ; computationalism ; calculus ; analog computation ; digital computation ; continuous representation ; Chinese Room argument ; symbol grounding ; continuous formal system ; simulacrum ; intentionality ; connectionism
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract The central claim of computationalism is generally taken to be that the brain is a computer, and that any computer implementing the appropriate program would ipso facto have a mind. In this paper I argue for the following propositions: (1) The central claim of computationalism is not about computers, a concept too imprecise for a scientific claim of this sort, but is about physical calculi (instantiated discrete formal systems). (2) In matters of formality, interpretability, and so forth, analog computation and digital computation are not essentially different, and so arguments such as Searle's hold or not as well for one as for the other. (3) Whether or not a biological system (such as the brain) is computational is a scientific matter of fact. (4) A substantive scientific question for cognitive science is whether cognition is better modeled by discrete representations or by continuous representations. (5) Cognitive science and AI need a theoretical construct that is the continuous analog of a calculus. The discussion of these propositions will illuminate several terminology traps, in which it's all too easy to become ensnared.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974168
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  • 3
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Comments on Bechtel, “Levels of description and explanation in cognitive science” (1994)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 4 (1994), S. 27-37 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Epistemic authority ; explanation ; hierarchy ; homuncular functionalism ; intentionality ; levels ; measurement ; mechanistic explanation ; models ; reduction ; theories
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract I begin by tracing some of the confusions regarding levels and “reduction” to a failure to distinguish two different principles according to which theories can be viewed as hierarchically arranged — epistemic authority and ontological constitution. I then argue that the notion of levels relevant to the debate between symbolic and connectionist paradigms of mental activity answers to neither of these models, but is rather correlative to the hierarchy of functional decompositions of cognitive tasks characteristic of “homuncular functionalism”. Finally, I suggest that the incommensurability of the intentional and extensional vocabularies constitutes a strongprima facie reason to conclude that there is little likelihood of filling in the story of Bechtel's “missing level” in such a way as to bridge the gap between such “homuncular functionalism” and his own model of mechanistic explanation.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00974202
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  • 4
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Intentionality, social play, and definition (1994)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 9 (1994), S. 63-74 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Ethology ; cognitive ethology ; play ; intentionality ; evolution ; definition
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Social play is naturally characterized in intentional terms. An evolutionary account of social play could help scientists to understand the evolution of cognition and intentionality. Alexander Rosenberg (1990) has argued that if play is characterized intentionally or functionally, it is not a behavioral phenotype suitable for evolutionary explanation. If he is right, his arguments would threaten many projects in cognitive ethology. We argue that Rosenberg's arguments are unsound and that intentionally and functionally characterized phenotypes are a proper domain for ethological investigation.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00849914
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  • 5
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Reaping the whirlwind: Reply to Harnad's “other bodies, other minds” (1993)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 3 (1993), S. 219-237 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Animal intelligence ; artificial intelligence ; causation ; consciousness ; Chinese Room Experiment ; Descartes ; intentionality ; other-minds problem ; Searle ; subjectivity ; symbol grounding ; Turing ; Turing's Test
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract Harnad's proposed “robotic upgrade” of Turing's Test (TT), from a test of linguistic capacity alone to a Total Turing Test (TTT) of linguisticand sensorimotor capacity, conflicts with his claim that no behavioral test provides even probable warrant for attributions of thought because there is “no evidence” of consciousness besides “private experience”. Intuitive, scientific, and philosophical considerations Harnad offers in favor of his proposed upgrade are unconvincing. I agree with Harnad that distinguishing real from “as if” thought on the basis of (presence or lack of) consciousness (thus rejecting Turing (behavioral) testing as sufficient warrant for mental attribution)has the skeptical consequence Harnad accepts — “there is in factno evidence for me that anyone else but me has a mind”. I disagree with hisacceptance of it! It would be better to give up the neo-Cartesian “faith” in private conscious experience underlying Harnad's allegiance to Searle's controversial Chinese Room “Experiment” than give up all claim to know others think. It would be better to allow that (passing) Turing's Test evidences — evenstrongly evidences — thought.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00975533
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  • 6
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Beyond interpretation: Reply to Cummins' response (1992)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 2 (1992), S. 85-95 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Mental representation ; formal condition ; determinate content ; intentionality ; interpretation ; cognition
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract In his response to my ‘Why There Are No Mental Representations’, Robert Cummins accused me of having misinterpreted his views, and attempted to undermine a crucial premise of my argument, which claimed that one could only define a semantic type non-semantically by stipulating which tokens should receive a uniform interpretation. I respond to the charge and defend the premise.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00261291
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  • 7
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Revisionary physicalism (1992)
    Springer
    Biology and philosophy 7 (1992), S. 411-430 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8404
    Keywords: Sentential model of cognition ; functional profile ; intentionality ; mutual evolutionary feedback ; synaptic modifiability
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Biology , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract The focus of much recent debate between realists and eliminativists about the propositional attitudes obscures the fact that a spectrum of positions lies between these celebrated extremes. Appealing to an influential theoretical development in cognitive neurobiology, I argue that there is reason to expect such an “intermediate” outcome. The ontology that emerges is a revisionary physicalism. The argument draws lessons about revisionistic reductions from an important historical example, the reduction of equilibrium thermodynamics to statistical mechanics, and applies them to the relationship developing between propositional attitude psychology and this potential neuroscientific successor. It predicts enough conceptual change to rule out a straightforward realism about the attitudes; but at the same time it also resists the eliminativist's comparison of the fate awaiting the propositional attitudes to that befalling caloric fluid, phlogiston, and the like.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00130060
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  • 8
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Form, interpretation, and the uniqueness of content: Response to Morris (1991)
    Springer
    Minds and machines 1 (1991), S. 31-42 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8641
    Keywords: Mental representation ; computation ; formal condition ; symbols ; intentionality ; computationalism ; cognition
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Computer Science , Philosophy
    Notes: Abstract In response to Michael Morris, I attempt to refute the crucial second premise of the argument, which states that the formality condition cannot be satisfied “non-stipulatively” in computational systems. I defend the view of representation urged in Meaning and Mental Representation against the charge that it makes content stipulative and therefore irrelevant to the explanation of cognition. Some other reservations are expressed.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00360577
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  • 9
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Searles Kritik am Funktionalismus — Eine Untersuchung des Chinesischzimmers (1991)
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 22 (1991), S. 321-336 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: functionalism ; intentionality ; simulation ; mental state
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Summary Searle claims that for a machine to have intentional states it is not sufficient that a formal programme be instantiated. Various types of objections to this claim have been brought up by Searle's critics. Searle's replies to some of these objections are analysed. It turns out that it is more to these objections than Searle wants to make us believe. What is crucial, however, is that Searle's „Gedankenexperiment“ results in a dilemma. At the outset of the dilemma there are two ways of not understanding. According to one of these ways a person (Searle's homunculus) does not understand something without knowing that s/he does not understand. While in the other mode the person knows that s/he doesn't understand. In the first case the inference from facts about the homunculus to facts about the computer is not valid whereas in the second case one would attribute mental states to the computer. Thereby Searle's claim turns out to be unfounded.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01801213
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  • 10
    Electronic Resource
    Electronic Resource
    Künstliche Intelligenz und Philosophie (1990)
    Springer
    Journal for general philosophy of science 21 (1990), S. 347-358 
    Details
    ISSN: 1572-8587
    Keywords: artificial intelligence ; understanding ; representation ; meaning ; intentionality ; teleology ; subjectivity ; semiotics ; philosophical anthropology
    Source: Springer Online Journal Archives 1860-2000
    Topics: Philosophy , Nature of Science, Research, Systems of Higher Education, Museum Science
    Notes: Summary Artificial Intelligence can be considered as the so far last attempt to decode the anthropological comparison between human beings and machines. Thereby it also represents in a prominent way what can be called “systemic thought”. Searle's conclusive argument against strong AI (that is the idea of computers having intention in a literal way) refers to his precise distinction between syntax and semantics. This difference obviously opposing some of Searle's other essential ideas will only convince if it also explains the genetic-pragmatic aspect. A theory explaining the “life of mind” and the possibility of understanding needs to combine representation and intention with the subjective causation of signs. At the same time they have to be contextualized within a model of teleologically interpreted life recognized with the help of self-experience and self-reflection. This suggests that AI is a simulation which wrongly believes to be a real duplication. Actually it is a semiotic reduction (syntax and semantic surface of signs only) and a psychological compensation (Turing test) connected with a genetic or abductive fallacy. The biological decontextualization, in fact the elimination of teleology and intention, the deconstruction of subjectivity, the loss of the genetic-pragmatic dimension and the abductive fallacy induce the strong AI to confuse its surface-illusion of simulated understanding with the real process itself.
    Type of Medium: Electronic Resource
    URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01801043
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