ALBERT

Description: The J-2 engine was unique in many respects. Technology was not nearly as well-developed in oxygen/hydrogen engines at the start of the J-2 project. As a result, it experienced a number of "teething" problems. It was used in two stages on the Saturn V vehicle in the Apollo Program, as well as on the later Skylab and Apollo/Soyuz programs. In the Apollo Program, it was used on the S-II stage, which was the second stage of the Saturn V vehicle. There were five J-2 engines at the back end of the S-II Stage. In the S-IV-B stage, it was a single engine, but that single engine had to restart. The Apollo mission called for the entire vehicle to reach orbital velocity in low Earth orbit after the first firing of the Saturn-IV-B stage and, subsequently, to fire a second time to go on to the moon. The engine had to be man-rated (worthy of transporting humans). It had to have a high thrust rate and performance associated with oxygen/hydrogen engines, although there were some compromises there. It had to gimbal for thrust vector control. It was an open-cycle gas generator engine delivering up to 230,000 pounds of thrust.

Description: The ascent engine was the last one from the moon, and I want to focus on the idea of redundancy and teams in regard to the engine. By teams, I mean teamwork - not just within Rocketdyne. It was teamwork within Rocketdyne; it was teamwork within Grumman; it was teamwork within NASA. These were all important elements leading to the successful development of the lunar excursion module (LEM) engine. Communication, rapid response, and cooperation were all important. Another aspect that went into the development of the ascent engine was the integration of technology and of lessons learned. We pushed all the above, plus technology and lessons learned, into a program, and that led to a successful result. One of the things that I like to think about - again in retrospect - is how it is very "in" now to have integrated product and process teams. These are buzzwords for teamwork in all program phases. That s where you combine a lot of groups into a single organization to get a job done. The ascent engine program epitomized that kind of integration and focus, and because this was the mid- to late-1960s; this was new ground for Rocketdyne, Grumman, and NASA. Redundancy was really a major hallmark of the Apollo Program. Everything was redundant. Once you got the rocket going, you could even lose one of the big F-1 engines, and it would still make it to orbit. And once the first stage separated from the rest of the vehicle, the second stage could do without an engine and still make a mission. This redundancy was demonstrated when an early Apollo launch shut down a J-2 second-stage engine. Actually, they shut down two J-2 engines on that flight. Even the third stage, with its single J-2 engine, was backed up because the first two stages could toss it into a recoverable orbit. If the third stage didn't work, you were circling the earth, and you had time to recover the command module and crew. Remember how on the Apollo 13 flight, there was sufficient system redundancy even when we lost the service module. That was a magnificent effort. TRW Inc. really ought to be proud of their engine for that. (See Slide 2, Appendix I) We had planned for redundancy; we had landed on the moon. However, weight restrictions in the architecture said, "You can t have redundancy for ascent from the moon. You've got one engine. It s got to work. There is no second chance. If that ascent engine doesn't work, you re stuck there." It would not have looked good for NASA. It wouldn't have looked good for the country. There was a letter written that President Richard Nixon would read if the astronauts got stuck on the moon, expressing how sorry we were and so forth. It was a scary letter, really. The ascent engine was an engine that had to work. (See Slide 3, Appendix I).

Description: As we went through the program, what we determined, and what we all agreed on, was that the thrust coefficient (Cf) of the nozzle, after you get past a certain point, is really an engineering parameter. It s not a fundamental parameter that is going to be highly variable. Once we knew what the contour of the nozzle was, and once we knew what its characteristic was out to 2:1, we could calculate what the 48:1 thrust coefficient was going to be. In every case that we made a test, the calculation was precise. We weren't looking for a problem out at 48:1. Once we crushed the nozzle and said, "Yeah, we can land on the boulder," and once we had the thermal profile of that columbium nozzle, we did not require a lot of effort there. The real characterization was done in throttling over the 10:1 with the injector and controlling the mixture ratio on that - the whole head-end assembly - out to 2:1. I think everybody at NASA and Grumman agreed that flying like you test is great, particularly if you are using an aircraft engine. But, in this case, the thrust coefficient of the nozzle was not an issue. We had the tandem configuration of the service module, the command module, and the LEM sitting out there, and we were to fire the LEM. On Apollo 5, we were firing the LEM to show how it would work. There was a problem. I can t remember where the problem was, but something caused a problem before that engine had finished its burn. It was not in the engine, but there was some other problem, and NASA made a controlled shutdown. Then, they came to us and asked, "Hey, we re up there. We want to finish this test program. Is it okay if we restart that engine again in space with this tandem configuration?" We said, "As long as it has been more than forty minutes since you shut down, our analysis says that you will be okay in terms of the thermal characteristics of the inside of that chamber." They restarted it and pushed that system around in orbit on Apollo 5. It turned out, that when it came to Apollo 13, we went back into the record, and said, "Hey, we have pushed this system around up there on Apollo 5, and we have also restarted this tandem configuration." The requirements on Apollo 13 were to put it back into play. The spacecraft was out of free return to the earth at the time of the accident. It would not have come back. NASA said, "Okay, we ll use the descent engine to put the spacecraft in a free trajectory; it will go around the moon and be on free trajectory back to Earth." Then, as it came around the far side of the moon, the guys found out that they had an oxygen problem. As you remember, things were getting pretty bad in there. They said, "We ve got to get it back as fast as we can. Is it okay if we re-fire the engine? Now, we re in a free trajectory, so we want to put as much delta-v (or change in velocity) in as we can. Can we re-fire right now?" We said, "Yes, the data says it has been this period of time." We could re-fire the engine, run the rest of the duty cycle up as far as we needed while preserving enough fluids to make the final correction as the spacecraft got near Earth, and restart the engine. It was pretty fortuitous that we could give them those answers.

Description: The general configuration of the SPS engine was 20,000 pounds of thrust, with a chamber pressure of 100 psi and specific impulse (Isp) of 314.5. The very large nozzle had an area ratio of 62.5:1 (exit area to throat area). The propellants were nitrogen tetroxide (also known as N2O4 and nitrous oxide) and A-50. A-50 was a hydrazine family fuel. Aerojet developed it for the Titan Missile Program when they went with Titan II, to store it in the launch silos. They wanted the highest performance they could get. N2H4 was just pure hydrazine, which doesn't take low temperature very well. In fact, it freezes about like water. We started adding unsymmetrical-dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) to the hydrazine until such time as it would meet the environmental specifications the Air Force needed for Titan II. It turned out it s roughly a fifty-fifty mix. We still had to be careful with that fuel because the two fluids didn't mix very well chemically. We had to spray the two fluids through some special nozzles to get them to emulsify with each other into a single fluid. If we ever got it too cold or froze it, the hydrazine separated back out. Then, if we tried to run the engine, things could go boom in the night. The inlet pressure was only 165 pounds per square inch absolute (psia), but we needed at least forty psi pressure drop across the injector just to get some kind of stable flow. It was a whole new game for some of us. We didn't have much supply pressure to work with. It had the aluminum injector to keep the weight down. That was a couple feet in diameter, and we didn't have a lot of propellant to cool it. In fact, we had to use both propellants to keep the injector cool. There were twenty-two ring channels in the injector. Specification required 750 seconds duration, or fifty engine restarts during a flight. There were several first flight things we accomplished with the engine. It was the first ablative thrust chamber of any size to fly. (See Slide 6, Appendix G) There were no liners in it. It was just straight ablative material. It took us a while to figure that out. It was a throat-gimbaled engine, and it was the first engine to fly with columbium (also known as niobium, used as an alloying element in steels and superalloys) in the nozzle.

Description: Before I go into the history of F-1, I want to discuss the F-1 engine s role in putting man on the moon. The F-1 engine was used in a cluster of five on the first stage, and that was the only power during the first stage. It took the Apollo launch vehicle, which was 363 feet tall and weighed six million pounds, and threw it downrange fifty miles, threw it up to forty miles of altitude, at Mach 7. It took two and one-half minutes to do that and, in the process, burned four and one-half million pounds of propellant, a pretty sizable task. (See Slide 2, Appendix C) My history goes back to the same year I started working at Rocketdyne. That s where the F-1 had its beginning, back early in 1957. In 1957, there was no space program. Rocketdyne was busy working overtime and extra days designing, developing, and producing rocket engines for weapons of mass destruction, not for scientific reasons. The Air Force contracted Rocketdyne to study how to make a rocket engine that had a million pounds of thrust. The highest thing going at the time had 150,000 pounds of thrust. Rocketdyne s thought was the new engine might be needed for a ballistic missile, not that it was going to go on a moon shot.

Description: The 70-pound SE-7 engine is very similar with its two valves, ablative material, a silicon carbide liner, a silicon carbide throat, and overall configuration. There were different wraps. One had a ninety-degree ablative material orientation. That is important because it caused problems with the SE-8, but not for this application. It was not overly stressed. It was a validation of the off-the-shelf application approach. There were two SE-7 engines located on the stage near the bottom. They had their own propellant tanks. That was the application. All it did was give a little bit of gravity by firing to push the propellants to the bottom of the tanks for start or restart. It was not a particularly complicated setup. (See Slides 6 and 7, Appendix F) What had we learned? This was a proven engine in a space environment. There weren't any development issues. Off-the-shelf seemed to work. There were no operational issues, which made the SE-7 very cost-effective. Besides NASA, the customer for this application was the Douglas Aircraft Company. Douglas decided the off-the-shelf idea was cost-effective. With the Gemini Program, the company was McDonnell Aircraft Corporation, which was part of the reason the off-the-shelf idea was applied to the Apollo. (See Slide 8, Appendix F) However, here are some differences between Apollo and Gemini vehicles. For one thing, the Apollo vehicle was really moving at high speed when it re-entered the atmosphere. Instead of a mere 17,000 miles per hour, it was going 24,000 miles per hour. That meant the heat load was four times as high on the Apollo vehicle as on the Gemini craft. Things were vibrating a little more. We had two redundant systems. Apollo was redundant where it could be as much as possible. That was really a keystone or maybe an anchor point for Apollo. We decided to pursue the off-the-shelf approach. However, the prime contractor was a different entity - the North American Space Division. They thought they ought to tune up this off-the-shelf setup. It was a similar off-the-shelf application, but at a higher speed. They wanted to improve it. What they wanted to improve was the material performance of silicon carbide. They were uncomfortable with the cracks they were seeing. They were uncomfortable with the cracks in the throat, and feeling that the environment was a little tougher, that maybe it was going to rattle, perhaps something would fall out, and they would have a problem. They wanted to eliminate the ceramic liner, and they wanted a different throat material. (See Slides 9 and 10, Appendix F) The Rocketdyne solutions were to replace silicon carbide material with a more forgiving ceramic material. Also, due to the multiple locations within the vehicle, the shape of the nozzles varied. Some nozzles were long, and some nozzles were short. We came up with a single engine design with variable nozzle extensions and configurations to fit particular vehicle locations. (See Slides 10 and 11, Appendix F)

Description: All the engines were both qualification and acceptance tested at Marquardt s facilities. After we won the Apollo Program contract, we went off and built two vacuum test facilities, which simulated altitude continuous firing for as long as we wanted to run an engine. They would run days and days with the same capability we had on steam ejection. We did all of the testing in both for the qualification and the acceptance test. One of them was a large ball, which was an eighteen-foot diameter sphere, evacuated again with a big steam ejector system that could be used for system testing; that s where we did the Lunar Excursion Module testing. We put the whole cluster in there and tested the entire cluster at the simulated altitude conditions. The lowest altitude we tested at - typically an acceptance test - was 105,000 feet simulated altitude. The big ball - because people were interested in what they called goop formation, which is an unburned hydrazine product migrating to cold surfaces on different parts of spacecraft - was built to address those kinds of issues. We ran long-life tests in a simulated space environment with the entire inside of the test cell around the test article, liquid nitrogen cooled, so it could act as getter for any of the exhaust products. That particular facility could pull down to about 350,000 feet (atmosphere) equivalent altitude, which was pushing pretty close to the thermodynamic triple point of the MMH. It was a good test facility. Those facilities are no longer there. When the guys at Marquardt sold the company to what eventually became part of Aerojet, all those test facilities were cut off at the roots. I think they have a movie studio there at this point. That part of it is truly not recoverable, but it did some excellent high-altitude, space-equivalent testing at the time. Surprisingly, we had very few problems while testing in the San Fernando Valley. In the early 1960s, nobody had ever seen dinitrogen tetroxide (N2O4), so that wasn't too big a deal. We really did only make small, red clouds. In all the hundreds of thousands of tests and probably well over one million firings that I was around that place for, in all that thirty-something years, we had a total of one serious injury associated with rocket engine testing and propellants. Because we were trying to figure out what propellants would really be good, we tried all of the fun stuff like the carbon tetrafluoride, chlorine pentafluoride, and pure fluorine. The materials knowledge wasn't all that great at the time. On one test, the fluorine we had didn't react well with the copper they were using for tubing, and it managed to cause another unscheduled disassembly of the facility. It was very serious. It's like one of those Korean War stories. The technician happened to be walking past the test facility when it decided to blow itself up. A piece of copper tubing pierced one cheek and came out the other. That was the only serious accident in all of the engines handled in all those years. Now, we did have a problem with the EPA later because they figured out what the brown clouds were about. We built a whole bunch of exhaust mitigation scrubbers to take care of engine testing in the daytime. In general, we operated the big shuttle (RCS) engine, the 870- pounder at nominal conditions; they scrubbed the effluents pretty well. If you operated that same 870-pound force engine at a level where you get a lot of excess oxidizer, yeah, there s a brown cloud. But, you know, it doesn't show up well in the dark. They did do some of that. But, that s gone; it was addressed one way or another. RELEASED -

Description: We develop a case breach model for the on-board fault diagnostics and prognostics system for subscale solid-rocket boosters (SRBs). The model development was motivated by recent ground firing tests, in which a deviation of measured time-traces from the predicted time-series was observed. A modified model takes into account the nozzle ablation, including the effect of roughness of the nozzle surface, the geometry of the fault, and erosion and burning of the walls of the hole in the metal case. The derived low-dimensional performance model (LDPM) of the fault can reproduce the observed time-series data very well. To verify the performance of the LDPM we build a FLUENT model of the case breach fault and demonstrate a good agreement between theoretical predictions based on the analytical solution of the model equations and the results of the FLUENT simulations. We then incorporate the derived LDPM into an inferential Bayesian framework and verify performance of the Bayesian algorithm for the diagnostics and prognostics of the case breach fault. It is shown that the obtained LDPM allows one to track parameters of the SRB during the flight in real time, to diagnose case breach fault, and to predict its values in the future. The application of the method to fault diagnostics and prognostics (FD&P) of other SRB faults modes is discussed.

Description: NASA's new Ares Launch Vehicle will require twelve thrusters to provide roll control of the vehicle during the first stage firing. All twelve roll control thrusters will be located at the inter-stage segment that separates the solid rocket booster first stage from the second stage. NASA selected a mono propellant hydrazine solution and as a result awarded Aerojet-General a contract in 2007 for an advanced development program for an MR-80- series 625 Ibf vacuum thrust monopropellant hydrazine thruster. This thruster has heritage dating back to the 1976 Viking Landers and most recently for the 2011 Mars Science Laboratory. Prior to the Ares application, the MR-80-series thrusters had been equipped with throttle valves and not typically operated in pulse mode. The primary objective of the advanced development program was to increase the technology readiness level and retire major technical risks for the future flight qualification test program. Aerojet built on their heritage MR-80 rocket engine designs to achieve the design and performance requirements. Significant improvements to cost and lead-time were achieved by applying Design for Manufacturing and Assembly (DFMA) principles. AerojetGeneral has completed Preliminary and Critical Design Reviews, followed by two successful rocket engine development test programs. The test programs included qualification random vibration and firing lite that significantly exceed the flight qualification requirements. This paper discusses the advanced development program and the demonstrated capability of the MR-80C engine. Y;

Description: The primary mission at NASA Stennis Space Center (SSC) is rocket propulsion testing. Such testing is generally performed within two arenas: (1) Production testing for certification and acceptance, and (2) Developmental testing for prototype or experimental purposes. The customer base consists of NASA programs, DOD programs, and commercial programs. Resources in place to perform on-site testing include both civil servants and contractor personnel, hardware and software including data acquisition and control, and 6 test stands with a total of 14 test positions/cells. For several business reasons there is the need to augment understanding of the test costs for all the various types of test campaigns. Historical propulsion test data was evaluated and analyzed in many different ways with the intent to find any correlation or statistics that could help produce more reliable and accurate cost estimates and projections. The analytical efforts included timeline trends, statistical curve fitting, average cost per test, cost per test second, test cost timeline, and test cost envelopes. Further, the analytical effort includes examining the test cost from the perspective of thrust level and test article characteristics. Some of the analytical approaches did not produce evidence strong enough for further analysis. Some other analytical approaches yield promising results and are candidates for further development and focused study. Information was organized for into its elements: a Project Profile, Test Cost Timeline, and Cost Envelope. The Project Profile is a snap shot of the project life cycle on a timeline fashion, which includes various statistical analyses. The Test Cost Timeline shows the cumulative average test cost, for each project, at each month where there was test activity. The Test Cost Envelope shows a range of cost for a given number of test(s). The supporting information upon which this study was performed came from diverse sources and thus it was necessary to build several intermediate databases in order to understand, validate, and manipulate data. These intermediate databases (validated historical account of schedule, test activity, and cost) by themselves are of great value and utility. For example, for the Project Profile, we were able to merged schedule, cost, and test activity. This kind of historical account conveys important information about sequence of events, lead time, and opportunities for improvement in future propulsion test projects. The Product Requirement Document (PRD) file is a collection of data extracted from each project PRD (technical characteristics, test requirements, and projection of cost, schedule, and test activity). This information could help expedite the development of future PRD (or equivalent document) on similar projects, and could also, when compared to the actual results, help improve projections around cost and schedule. Also, this file can be sorted by the parameter of interest to perform a visual review of potential common themes or trends. The process of searching, collecting, and validating propulsion test data encountered a lot of difficulties which then led to a set of recommendations for improvement in order to facilitate future data gathering and analysis.